Mahlangu v Another v Minister of Labour and Others (CCT306119) (2020).

Case Name: Mahlangu v Another v minister of labour and others (CCT306119) (2020).

Citation: mahlangu v Another v Minister of labour and others (2020) ZACC 24.

Court: Constitutional court.

Coram:  Mogoeng CJ, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Majiedt J, Mathopo AJ, Mhlantla J, Theron J, Tshiqi J and Victor A

Decided on: 19 november 2020.

Introduction.

This case concerns the validity of the statutory exclusion of domestic workers from receiving compensation for injuries sustained in employment under compensation for occupational injuries and diseases Act. The matter arises from the tragic death of ms slyivia  Bongi mahlangu’s mother, a domestic worker who died in a work –related accident, leaving ms mahlangu without financial support.[1] After her claim for compensation was rejected due to the exclusion of domestic workers and their dependants from coida’s provision, ms mahlangu and the South African domestic service and allied workers union institute challenged the exclusion’s validity in the Gauteng high court.[2] The court ultimately declared the provision invalid, leading to this case[3]. This case requires consideration of the constitutionality of section 1 (xix) (v) of compensation for occupational injuries and diseases act, which excludes domestic workers from the definition of employees thereby denying them social security benefits. The case hinges of the social security system enshrined in section 27 (1) and (2) of the constitution, and its application to domestic workers currently unprotected in the event of injury or death[4]. The right to equality and dignity are also central in this matter.  The mahlangu v minister of labour case is a landmark judgement in south Africa , declaring the exclusion of domestic workers from the compensation for occupational injuries and diseases act unconstitutional[5]. This case is significant as it addresses the historical discrimination and inequality faced by domestic workers. The judgement acknowledges the important role domestic workers play in society and seeks to rectify the injustices they’ve faced[6]. 

Facts.

Ms mahlangu was a long – serving domestic workers, employed by the same family for 22 years in faerie Glen, Pretoria. Tragically on march 31 2012, she drowned in her employers pool while performing her duties. Her body was discovered floating in the pool by her employer, who was present at the time but reported hearing no struggle. Its alleged that ms mahlangu’s partial blindness and inability to swim contributed to her drowning[7]. Following ms mahlangu’s death her financially dependent daughter approached the department of labour seeking compensation, only to be told she was from COIDA benefits and unemployment insurance[8]. With the help of the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union (SADSAWU), she challenged the constitutionality if section 1 (xix) (v) of COIDA in the Pretoria high court, seeking to have domestic workers in private households included in the definition of employee[9]. The commission for gender equality and women’s legal trust intervened as amici curiae[10]. The high court declared section 1 (xix) (v) of COIDA invalid on May 23 , 2019, to the extent that it excluded domestic workers in private household from compensation for work-related injuries or death[11]. However, the court didn’t provide reasons for this declaration and postponed the issue of retrospectively for further submissions. After considering these submissions, the high court rules on October 17, 2019, that declaration of invalidity would apply retrospectively, providing relief to affected domestic workers[12].

Legal issues.

This court must consider whether section 1 (xix) (v) of compensation for occupational injuries and diseases act is constitutional, given that it excludes domestic workers from the definition of employee and thus denies them from COIDA social security benefits.[13]

Does the exclusion of domestic workers from compensation for occupational injuries and diseases Act of 130 of 1993 benefits, as per section 1 (xix) (v), infringe on their constitutional right to social security 999(section 27 (1) (c), equality and dignity, particular in cases of workplace injury, disablement or death[14]. Should the order of constitutional invalidity have immediate and retrospective effect? 

Argument presented

Appellants argument.

The applicants and amici submit that the exclusion of domestic workers amounts to unfair discrimination and impairs the fundamental dignity of domestic workers. They argue that, because domestic workers are predominantly black women, this constitute indirect discrimination on the basis of race and gender. The intersectional impact of this discrimination affects their right to equality and dignity, stemming from social status, gender,race and class. Additionally they argue that patriarchy and lack of access to education have contributed to this situation.[15]  The applicants and amici emphasize that domestic workers are a highly vulnerable group, facing ongoing disadvantages due to their work being undervalued. The exclusion from COIDA benefits is an example of this, denying them social insurance protection. Unlike employees covered by COIDA, who receive fault independent compensation, domestic workers are limited to fault-based common claims, hindering equal access to social security.[16]

The applicants argue that the exclusion of domestic workers from COIDA can’t be justified under section 36 of the constitution. They see no legitimate government purpose behind this exclusion, asserting its not rationally connected to COIDA’s goal of providing social insurance for employees injured or killed at work. Essentially, the exclusion impairs domestic workers rights without a valid reason.[17]

Respondents arguments

Initially , the respondents argued that challenging COIDA’S constitutionality in court was unnecessary, citing that the minister was already working on amendments to include domestic workers, making the applicants  ‘ relief potentially academic. However, during oral argument, they shifted stance, conceding the provision excluding domestic workers should be struck from COIDA.[18] They acknowledge this exclusion limits domestic workers right under section 9, 10 and 27 (1) of the constitution. With no justifiable purpose for this limitation under section 36, the respondent aren’t opposing the confirmation of the order declaring the exclusion invalid.[19]

Court’s reasoning and analysis.

The definition of social security in the bill of right include support for people themselves, like dependants of workers who’ve died or can’t work due to injury. COIDA benefits serve a similar purpose to social grants, aiming to prevent abject poverty. Seeing COIDA as just statutory mechanism ignore its social security role, which is about achieving substantive equality under section 27. COIDA fits within this framework, providing essential support.[20]

When interpreting the right to social security section 37 (1) (a) of the constitution requires considering values like dignity, equality, and freedom that underpin an open and democratic society.[21]

In jooste the court labelled COIDA important social legislation, highlighting its objective comprehensive regulation of compensation for occupational injuries or diseases. Section 35 9(1) is logically connected to this purpose, aiming to support employees injured in the course of employment.[22] in khosa the court emphasized equality as a foundational value shaping the interpretation of the bill of right, including social security rights. The constitution underscores this by using everyone to show socio- economic one, are interpreted purposively and generously, giving effect to values like substantive equality[23]. Determining these rights means recalling the constitution transformative aim healing past injustices and tackling apartheid and colonialism’s ongoing impacts[24]. Excluding domestic workers from COIDA doesn’t serve a legitimate objective, it stigmatize and entrenches disadvantage based on race, sex, and gender[25]. The amici highlighted black women domestic workers lived experiences and structural barriers[26]. The court should consider compounded vulnerabilities due to intersecting oppression. Allowing this inequity goes against values like dignity, equality, and Ubuntu[27]. Excluding them from COIDA’s social security scheme is problematic[28]. Court the court should consider those compounded vulnerabilities due to intersecting oppression. Section 27 (2) obliges extending COIDA to domestic workers given available resources, failure to do so infringes section 27 (1) (c)[29] 

The decision.

The high court‘s declaration that section 1 (xix) (v) of COIDA is unconstitutional is confirmed. This decision take effect immediately and applies retroactively from 27 April 1994. The government (first respondent) must pay the applicants cost in this court.[30] Om 17 october 2019, the high court ruled the declaration of invalidity applies retrospectively and immediately, benefiting domestic workers injured or who died at work before the order.[31] Which show us that the appeal was allowed and relief was granted.

Ratio decidendi

The exclusion of domestic workers employed in private households from the explanation of employee in section 1 (xix) (v) of COIDA violates the constitutional rights to equality, human dignity and social security, as it constitute unfair and intersectional discrimination against them who are black women.[32]  

Critical analysis.

The mahlangu v minister of labour judgment was a game- changer for domestic workers, the court declared excluding them from COIDA unconstitutional, recognizing domestic work as legitimate work[33]. This landmark case judgement grants black women, retrospective social security benefits for work-related injuries or death, tackling historical intersectional discrimination [34]. The mahlangu case marked a significant shift in the legal status of domestic workers in south Africa, effectively removing the exclusion that previously denied them protection against workplace accidents and prompting a re-evaluation of their rights within the country’s transformative constitutional framework.[35] 

conclusion

The exclusion of domestic workers employed in private households from the definition of employees in compensation for occupational injuries and diseases act COIDA is unconstitutional[36]. The most important thing to understand from this case is that the constitutional court ruled that excluding domestic workers mostly black women from COIDA definition of employee is unconstitutional. [37]What will be remembered by this case is that this ruling acknowledge the historical marginalization of domestic workers mostly black women and domestic work is officially recognized as real work and enabling domestic workers or their dependant to claim compensation for injuries or death occurring in the workplace. [38]

Reference(S):

Cases

Mahlangu and Another v minister of labour and other 9(2020) ZACC 24; 2021(1) BCLR 1 9(CC) 2021 (2) SA 54 (c)

Act

Compensation for occupational injuries and diseases act , no 61of 1997

[1] Mahlangu and another v minister of Labour and others (2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 132

[2] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 133

[3] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 134

[4] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 10

[5] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 131

Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph [6] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 188

Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 53.

[7] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 7

[8] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 8

[9] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others ( 2020) ZACC 24 paragraph 9

[10] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and another (2020) paragraph 9

[11] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 10

[12] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 11

[13] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 6

[14] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 6

[15] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 18

[16] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 19

[17]Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 20

[18] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 25

[19] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour ( 2020) para 26

[20] Mahlangu and others v minister of labour and others (2020) para 52

[21] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 53

[22] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 53

[23] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 54

[24] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 55

[25] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 64

[26] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 64

[27] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 65

[28] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 65

[29] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 66

[30]Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 1-3

[31] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 13

[32] Mahlangu and other v minister of labour and others (2020) para 10 and 18

[33] I wish to be transparent and punctual that I have made use of a grammarly to construct my sentence and correct my grammer, however what I have written below is my own ideas and knowledge I gained from  mahlangu and another v minster of labour

[34] [34] I wish to be transparent and punctual that I have made use of a grammarly to construct my sentence and correct my grammer, however what I have written below is my own ideas and knowledge I gained from  mahlangu and another v minster of labour

[35] [35] I wish to be transparent and punctual that I have made use of a grammarly to construct my sentence and correct my grammer, however what I have written below is my own ideas and knowledge I gained from  mahlangu and another v minster of labour

[36] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others (2020) para 13

[37] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others (2020) para 13

[38] Mahlangu and another v minister of labour and others (2020) para 155