Home » Blog » BHE AND OTHERS V MAGISTRATE KHAYELITSHA AND OTHERS

BHE AND OTHERS V MAGISTRATE KHAYELITSHA AND OTHERS

Authored By: Lanzar Williams

University of the Witwatersrand

I. Introduction

The decision in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others represents a watershed moment in South African jurisprudence, specifically regarding the intersection of customary law, the law of succession, and the constitutional right to equality.1 By striking down the principle of male primogeniture and the discriminatory provisions of the Black Administration Act,2 the court dismantled a legal structure that had historically institutionalised the subordination of Black women. In light of the above, the facts, issues, and principles of the judgment are discussed below, while situating its significance within the broader context of women’s rights as further illustrated by landmark cases such as King v De Jager and Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust.

II. Examination of the Judgment

(a) The Facts of the Case

The litigation arose from a dispute over the estate of the deceased, Vuyu Elius Mgolombane, who died intestate in October 2002.3 The Third Applicant and the deceased had lived together as husband and wife for twelve years, during which time they had two minor daughters: the First and Second Applicants.4 During their time together, the couple acquired an immovable property in Khayelitsha, which served as the family home.5 Upon the death of the deceased, the Second Respondent — the deceased’s father and the grandfather of the minor children — claimed to be the sole intestate heir.6 His claim was rooted in African customary law, specifically the principle of male primogeniture, which dictated that only a male related to the deceased through the male line could inherit.7 The grandfather indicated his intention to sell the property to defray funeral expenses, an action that would have left the minor children and their mother homeless.8

The Applicants challenged this system, arguing it was unconstitutional, discriminatory, and irrational.9 Although the Second Respondent contended the children were illegitimate, the court resolved this in favour of the Applicants, noting that legitimacy was ultimately irrelevant — the rule of primogeniture would have excluded the girls regardless of their status, simply because they were female.10

(b) The Legal Issues

The central issue before the court was whether the principle of male primogeniture and the legislative framework supporting it could withstand constitutional scrutiny.11 Three questions were considered. First, whether Section 23 of the Black Administration Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder were unconstitutional insofar as they discriminated based on race and gender.12 Second, whether the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 was unconstitutional in its exclusion of estates subject to the Black Administration Act.13 Third, whether the customary law of succession should be developed to comply with the Bill of Rights, or declared invalid.14

(c) Legal Principles

The court’s reasoning was anchored in the supremacy of the Constitution.15 Each of the relevant principles is discussed in turn.

First, regarding the right to equality,16 the court emphasised that Section 9(3) prohibits the State from discriminating unfairly on grounds including race, gender, and sex.17 In the context of Bhe, the court found that the law created a dual system of succession: one for “Europeans” and another for “Blacks,” with the latter being fundamentally underpinned by male domination.18

Second, while the Constitution recognises customary law, it is applicable only to the extent that it is consistent with the Bill of Rights.19 The court noted that, historically, customary law had been marginalised and “vitrified,” allowed to degenerate into a set of norms alienated from the community’s actual needs.20

Third, the principle of male primogeniture in customary law of succession is based on status and the male line.21 Only the eldest son, or the next male descendant, succeeds the family head.22 The court identified that this system treats ownership not as individualistic but as collective, with the family head acting as a trustee.23 However, this mode of ownership often leads to disinheritance and prejudice for female descendants in a modern, urban environment.24

(d) Application to the Facts

The court applied these principles by evaluating the impact of the Black Administration Act, which it described as an “egregious apartheid law” that systematised a colonial relationship between a dominant white minority and a subordinate Black majority.25

On the issue of discrimination based on race and gender, the court found that the only reason the First and Second Applicants could not inherit was that they were Black and female.26 This was determined to be per se discrimination.27 Under the Intestate Succession Act,28 which applied to other races, the children would have inherited equally.29 The statutory exclusion of Black female children from the same benefits afforded to other races was therefore prima facie unfair.30

Regarding the failure of primogeniture in a constitutional era, the court held that a situation where a male is preferred to a female for purposes of inheritance can no longer be tolerated.31 While differentiation for rituals might be justified in some contexts, it cannot be used to justify the disinheritance or prejudice of female descendants.32 The court further noted that the Second Respondent’s attempt to sell the family home and displace the children lacked basic humanity (ubuntu).33

(e) Conclusion of the Court

The court issued a comprehensive order to rectify the systemic inequality.34

i. Declaratory Orders

Sections 23(10)(a), (c), and (e) of the Black Administration Act were declared unconstitutional and invalid.35 Regulation 2(e) was likewise declared invalid.36

ii. Statutory Integration

Section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act was declared invalid insofar as it excluded Black estates.37 The court ordered that, until the legislature corrects the defects, the distribution of all intestate Black estates must be governed by the Intestate Succession Act.38

iii. Remedy Justification

The court declined to incrementally develop customary law and instead opted for statutory substitution to ensure immediate and uniform protection of vulnerable heirs.

iv. Relief for the Applicants

The First and Second Applicants were declared the sole heirs of the deceased’s estate, entitled to inherit in equal shares.39

v. Protection of Residence

The court declared the Applicants exclusively entitled to reside in the family home until the estate was transferred.40

III. Landmark Status

The significance of Bhe as a landmark for women’s rights is reinforced by subsequent case law. Two decisions in particular demonstrate how far the judgment’s influence has reached.

In King v De Jager,41 the Constitutional Court explicitly cited Bhe to acknowledge that the law of succession — both Roman-Dutch and customary — had historically suffered from a gender bias with “enormous” effects on South African society.42 King furthered the Bhe legacy by applying constitutional scrutiny to private wills, asserting that private interactions cannot be “enclaves of power immune from constitutional obligations.”43

Similarly, in Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust, the court drew on the transition described in Bhe — moving from a past that “institutionalised and legitimised racism” and “unfair discrimination against women” — to justify striking down discriminatory bursary conditions.44 Syfrets confirmed that public policy is now rooted in the Constitution, and just as Bhe struck down discriminatory statutory succession, Syfrets struck down discriminatory testamentary trusts that excluded women and other groups.45

IV. Conclusion

The Bhe judgment was not merely a ruling on a single estate; it was a reclamation of dignity for millions of South African women. By declaring that “African females, irrespective of age or social status, are entitled to inherit,” the court ensured that the “dead hand” of patriarchal tradition and apartheid-era legislation could no longer strip women of their economic security and right to equality.46 As echoed in King v De Jager, Bhe set the stage for a law of succession that is “socially engaged” and tempered by the principles of equity and ubuntu.47

Reference(S):

Primary Sources

Constitution

1. S. Afr. Const., 1996 §§ 2, 9, 172(1)(a).

Case Law

2. Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others, 2004 (2) SA 554 (C).

3. King v. De Jager, 2021 (4) SA 1 (CC).

4. Minister of Education and Another v. Syfrets Trust Ltd and Another, 2006 (4) SA 205 (C).

Legislation

5. Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (S. Afr.).

6. Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (S. Afr.).

Footnote(S):

1 S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 9.

2 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (S. Afr.).

3 Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others, 2004 (2) SA 554 (C) at 547.

4 Id. at 547–548.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 548.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 551.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 551–552.

12 Id. at 552–553.

13 Id. at 553–554.

14 Id.

15 S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 2.

16 S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 9.

17 Bhe, supra note 3, at 553.

18 Id. at 550.

19 S. Afr. Const. § 172(1)(a).

20 Bhe, supra note 3, at 550.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. at 553–554.

26 Id. at 554.

27 Id.

28 Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (S. Afr.).

29 Bhe, supra note 3, at 554.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 555.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 554.

34 Id. at 555.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id.

41 King v. De Jager, 2021 (4) SA 1 (CC).

42 Id. at 54.

43 Id. at 176.

44 Minister of Education and Another v. Syfrets Trust Ltd and Another, 2006 (4) SA 205 (C) at 25.

45 Id. at 47.

46 Bhe, supra note 3, at 555.

47 King, supra note 41, at 242.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top