Authored By: Michaele Kemp
University of the Free State (Graduate)
1 Introduction
Despite the near universality of the right to religious freedom, implementing such constitutional guarantees of protection in pluralist societies is complex.1 Religious freedom disputes sit at the intersection of public order, belief, and agency, situating issues like unlawful conversion within fragile regulatory nets. The most acute constitutional harm may manifest where religion intersects with the coercive mechanisms of criminal law; in these contexts, investigation, arrest, detainment and prosecution may become a punitive process in itself, even without a guilty verdict. This risk is heightened by legislative frameworks that are under amendment, contestation or are challenged in their constitutional validity; yet they remain operable through enforcement.2
Against this backdrop, the case of Rajendra Bihari Lal v State of Uttar Pradesh (hereafter “Rajendra”) warrants closer attention.3 While the court does not contemplate constitutionality, it clearly demonstrates an exercise of judicial action in concern with how criminal process operates within belief-related disputes. This article argues that in an act of constitutional guardianship, the judgment responds to the risk that procedure itself may become an instrument that undermines religious freedom.4
2 Instrumental Vulnerabilities in the Legislative Framework
The freedom of religion and belief is integrally woven into India’s legal order. As a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,5 it has constitutionally enshrined the right in Article 25 of the Constitution of India (“the Constitution”).6 The socialist form of secularism that it has adopted governs the nation’s cultural and religious plurality to foster unity appreciative of individual dignity.7
Its federalist governing structure, however, permits states to exercise some legislative autonomy, resulting in varied regulations on religious practice.8 The Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act 2021 (“UP Conversion Act” or “the 2021 Act”), amended in 2024, is one such act.9 Practically, its prohibitive provisions meld with national criminal law frameworks, creating vulnerable sites of procedural overlap. Contraventions of the Act may be formally reported by aggrieved parties affected by coercive efforts to cause religious conversion.10 The first information relating to such an incident or offence is captured in a First Information Report (FIR),11 triggering an investigative process that may lead to arrest, detainment and eventually prosecution.12 Thereafter, information is filed as supporting statements,13 so as not to expose the accused to multiple investigations for a single submission.14
Although these operations are procedurally standard, in matters of religious belief, which often coincide with political tensions,15 the circumstances in which they unfold must be examined with added circumspection.16 The judiciary is thus placed in a critical position to maintain the rule of law and foster the constitutional spirit in a dynamic legal order, subject to the institutional discretion of the legislature and executive enforcement.17
As the final guarantor of fundamental rights, the judiciary is called upon to balance the demands of justice with the rights of the accused, while ensuring that the functional arm of the law remains fair and non-prejudicial.18 While the rule of law maintains separation of powers to ensure accountability, it does not require judicial abdication where legislative intent or constitutional validity is not directly in challenge.19 In Rajendra, the Supreme Court illustrates that the judiciary must responsibly utilise its jurisdiction and power of review to indicate how legal processes can be institutionally weaponised.20
3 Rajendra: Procedural Calamities
The matter in Rajendra concerned the registration of six FIRs in respect of alleged incidents of unlawful conversion of Hindus to Christianity (conversion by allurement and a mass conversion event)21 under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act 2021,22 as it then was. Nine special leave petitions were filed,23 seeking an extraordinary right to appeal the High Court’s judgments.24 Three writ petitions were also filed under Article 32 of the Constitution,25 seeking the quashing of the FIRs,26 inter alia, for the violation of fundamental rights in the Supreme Court as the court of first instance.27
Questions were raised regarding the exercise of jurisdiction — the inherent or extraordinary powers of the High Court,28 as well as the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,29 and the appropriateness of quashing criminal proceedings as an available remedy under these judicial mechanisms.30 The court delineated the ambit of both mechanisms, holding that both courts may and, in fact, must exercise this remedy with cautious discretion.31 It must also consider holistically the attending circumstances and the evidentiary materials collected during the investigation.32
As the guarantor of fundamental constitutional rights like religious freedom, the Supreme Court is obliged to ensure justice is met where the facts reveal a patent and exceptional violation.33 Even though it ought not ordinarily be the court of first instance, its powers necessarily create scope for such remedies.34 When intervening is judged prudent, the court may quash proceedings at any stage;35 if a chargesheet has already been filed, as in this case, intervention is imperative to guard the sanctity of court process and mitigate the harm caused by initiating proceedings based on a legally defective or ill-intentioned FIR.36
The earliest dated FIR was lodged at the behest of a local Hindu organisation leader “observer,”37 who, the court held, did not qualify in this capacity as a competent complainant under the narrow pre-amendment categories.38 The court concluded that three subsequent FIRs were lodged after a considerable delay,39 which was argued to be due to a fear of retribution,40 to remedy the defective FIR once its validity came into dispute.41 These reports were virtually identical, related to the same incident and were lodged at the same police station within 24 hours.42 Further, two of the subsequent claimants, who had alleged themselves victims of the alleged mass conversion incident,43 were established to have made contradictory statements in the investigation of the original defective FIR — in which they claimed to have accompanied the complainant as witnesses, not “victim-converts.”44 Another FIR, relating to a separate alleged incident,45 was similarly supported by two witness statements that proved to be replications of those same individuals’ statements made in the original defective FIR’s investigation.46
Expressing explicit disapproval of the mala fides displayed in the conduct of these individuals,47 as well as the complicitous behaviour of the police,48 the court quashed all but one FIR (in part) to truncate the injustice the accused had experienced through repetitive investigations initiated on dubious evidentiary materials.49
4 Procedural Restraint and Constitutional Fidelity
Sketching the contextual setting, the Supreme Court acknowledged the pending verdict on a challenge to constitutional validity against the UP Conversion Act,50 inter alia, and deliberately set the parameters of its enquiry on the procedural aspect of the matter before it. Yet, in noting the provisions of the 2021 Act applicable at the time of the alleged incident(s), as well as their 2024 amended counterparts, the court draws attention to the expansive nature of the amendments, noting more burdensome pre- and post-conversion procedures,51 mandatory publication of personal details and investigation into personal choices to convert,52 the right to complain extended to any person,53 enhanced punishment for contraventions,54 and a mandatory requirement to allow any bail applications to be opposed.55 In a criminal justice system characterised by systemic procedural challenges,56 like poorly examined evidence, repetitive investigations punctuated by lengthy reporting delays, and unduly protracted detention,57 accused parties are already disproportionately burdened.
The court avoided deliberating on the legislation itself but reviewed its application in light of the Act’s argued religious freedom–protective intentionality.58 While illegal religious conversions warrant serious concern,59 the manner in which they are regulated, investigated and prosecuted must also reflect India’s constitutional values.60 Here, the court firmly reasserted that moral gravity in itself is not decisive — procedurally, legal criteria must be lawfully satisfied.61 It was rightly emphasised that enforcement agencies (the police) have the right and responsibility to investigate any cognizable offences;62 however, this right does not trump constitutional resolutions to promote personal dignity and national unity through the free exercise of conscience and belief.63 When exercised lackadaisically, or as the present matter suggests, maliciously, the “truth-finding” process turns punitive.64 The judiciary, and the Supreme Court in casu, does not overstep institutional boundaries or undercut democratic order by critiquing and intervening in an abusive procedural process that neither supports yet-to-be-proven-guilty accused parties nor upholds constitutional integrity.65
5 Concluding Remarks
While the judiciary is admonished to practice restraint, real threats of institutional overreach go unsung. The real risk does not lie in the court’s early interference but rather in institutional enforcement of onerous and invasive legislation aimed at bringing about prosecution in bad faith.66 Rajendra demonstrates precisely this: where procedural mechanisms are deployed without evidentiary integrity and against the constitutional grain, the court has not only the authority but the obligation to intervene. Weaponizable legal instruments further undermine the rule of law by facilitating potentially biased or partisan policies that invite larger-scale harassment and discrimination.67 Not only are promises of access to justice compromised, but equality before the law is negated, weakening the prospect of just and fair enforcement of any fundamental right.68 Judicial restraint under these circumstances would be irresponsible: while “faith unaccompanied by action is dead,”69 actions of bad faith are deadening.
Footnote(S):
1 Meher Shah, ‘The Impact of Extreme Hindutva Ideology on Freedom of Speech in India’ (2023) 27(1) Human Rights Brief 24, 24.
2 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Systematic Religious Persecution in India: November 2025 Issue Update (November 2025) https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/2025%20Issue%20Systematic%20Religious%20Persecution%20in%20India%20%28002%29.pdf
3 Rajendra Bihari Lal and Another v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 2025 INSC 1249 (SC) (Rajendra 2025).
4 Shah (n1) 29.
5 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OHCHR, accessed 31 January 2026) https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CCPR&Lang=en; Shah (n1) 29.
6 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [57]; The Constitution of India 1950 (The Constitution).
7 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [56]–[57]. Shah (n1) 27.
8 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [40]; USCIRF, Systematic Religious Persecution in India (n2).
9 Shah (n1) 25.
10 Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act 2021, s4. Note the amended provision radically broadens the scope of competent complainants, as opposed to the 2021 Act which only allowed the aggrieved party themselves or a close family member or friend to do so.
11 Vinay Kumar and Yogendra Singh, ‘Investigation and Trial: Analyzing Procedural Challenges in the Indian Criminal Justice System’ (2024) 4(2) International Journal of Criminal, Common and Statutory Law 196, 198.
12 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [95]–[96]; Kumar and Singh (n11) 198.
13 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [98]; Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (CrPC), s161.
14 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [98]; Kumar and Singh (n11) 197. The latter refers to the concept of ‘double jeopardy’ in the orthodox sense and in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the rationale behind this principle aptly transposes to matters concerning investigative processes leading towards prosecution, especially given similar facts to Rajendra’s, where multiple chargesheets had already been filed based on the impugned FIRs.
15 Kumar and Singh (n11) 196.
16 USCIRF, Systematic Religious Persecution in India (n2).
17 Maria Cahill and Seán Ó Conaill, ‘Judicial Restraint Can Also Undermine Constitutional Principles: An Irish Caution’ (2017) 36(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 259, 265, 268. The executive enjoys the power to influence and steer legislative output with specific policy agendas, so uncritical judicial deference to the legislature (or the executive) does not serve a free, pluralist democracy, particularly when the outcomes may be discriminatory or abusive.
18 Shah (n1); Kumar and Singh (n11) 198. This includes cases of police misconduct, false confessions, and political interference.
19 SP Sathe, ‘Judicial Review in India: Limits and Policy’ (1974) 35 Ohio State Law Journal 870, 871–72. The author Sathe’s quote stands to reason: “… a written constitution with a bill of rights can hardly ever become so definite and certain as to let the courts function as mere slot machines.”
20 Shah (n1) 29; Cahill and Ó Conaill (n17) 260–64. The court must then consciously decide whether to exercise restraint, cleanly deferring to the executive and legislature’s rationalities, or whether to assume its role within the democratic governance order more assertively.
21 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [9]–[14]. Note that other allegations were made relating to threats of violence or death, or force. The majority of the FIRs concerned the same allegations of mass conversion and allurement and were made largely in respect of the same incidents.
22 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [2].
23 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [2].
24 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [2], [3].
25 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [2]; Constitution of India.
26 Harsh Pathak, ‘The Prerogative Writs – Indian Perspective’ (2021) Revista de Drept Constituțional 44, 46–47, 51–52. Multiple [prerogative] writs of mandamus were prayed for, inter alia.
27 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [2], [4].
28 Pathak (n26) 45; the Constitution, art 226.
29 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [89].
30 Pathak (n26) 47.
31 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [83], [87]; Pathak (n26) 46–47.
32 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [83], [87].
33 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [90]–[91], [94].
34 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [90]. Part III of the Constitution encapsulates its powers to provide constitutional remedies and creates the right to pursue such remedies. Cahill and Ó Conaill (n17) 260, 263. While mindful of the nature of the Rajendra matter’s specific scope, Cahill and Ó Conaill offer insight: “The nature of fundamental rights discourse in a common law jurisdiction with a written constitution naturally lends itself to an inherent degree of judicial flexibility and innovation in order to determine the scope of rights which are superior to positive law enactments.”
35 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [85], [88].
36 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [83], [85], [87].
37 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [7]–[8]; FIR 224 of 2022.
38 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [133], [103]–[117] for rationale.
39 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [139]. FIRs 54, 55, and 60 of 2023.
40 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [149], [151]. This was contradicted by the fact that the complainants had made witness statements the day immediately following the alleged incident, when the original defective FIR was registered. Also see footnotes 15 and 16.
41 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [139], [153].
42 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [142], [145]–[146].
43 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [143]–[146], [51]. It was argued that since the complainants were 3 separate victims, the FIRs were not “subsequent” but were separate incidents warranting investigation. The court did not uphold this argument and quashed all 3 FIRs by virtue of the fact that they related to the same event, which was alleged to be a “mass conversion” incident.
44 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [143]. These contradictory statements were witness statements in terms of section 161 of the CrPC 1973, which has been replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023.
45 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [136]–[137]. The alleged incident was not proven. The video evidence submitted proved that outside of a standard speech given in a theological setting which relied on scriptural passages, no unusual activities occurred that would constitute an attempt at inducement or allurement for conversion.
46 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [136]–[138]. These sets of statements were made within a day of each other in respect of two separate FIR investigations.
47 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [154], [161].
48 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [155], [161].
49 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [97], [155]–[156], [161].
50 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [55].
51 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [52], [55].
52 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [51]; Shah (n1), 25.
53 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [48].
54 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [49], [52].
55 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [49].
56 Kumar and Singh (n11) 196.
57 Kumar and Singh (n11) 196.
58 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [38], [42], [55].
59 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [38]. It was submitted by the Attorney General appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh that these crimes bear considerable gravitas and seriously “conflict with the fundamental tenets of constitutional morality.”
60 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [38]; Cahill and Ó Conaill (n17) 270. Illegalities or bad faith actions breach standards relating to constitutional values, so in unwarranted judicial restraint, the judiciary shirks its own moral obligations while the government (executive/legislature) escapes accountability.
61 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [38]. The court deftly redirects the examination towards the facts, turning away from the merits and demerits of the case while acknowledging the underlying constitutional schema.
62 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [98], quoting T.T. Antony v State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181, [27]; Kumar and Singh (n11) 197; CrPC, s156.
63 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [56], [58], [61].
64 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [155]–[156]; Shah (n1) 26. As an example, the latter source cites occasions of extremist vigilante collaboration with law enforcement against inter-faith marriages.
65 Rajendra 2025 (n3), [56]; Sathe (n19) 878–79; Cahill and Ó Conaill (n17) 259, 263–265, 268.
66 Cahill and Ó Conaill (n17) 259, 263–265, 268.
67 Shah (n1) 24–25, 29; USCIRF, Systematic Religious Persecution in India (n2) 2–3; Cahill and Ó Conaill (n17) 259, 263–265, 268.
68 Shah (n1) 26–27.
69 Bible, James 2:14–17 (English Standard Version).
Bibliography
Cahill M and Ó Conaill S, ‘Judicial Restraint Can Also Undermine Constitutional Principles: An Irish Caution’ (2017) 36(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 259
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United Nations Human Rights Committee, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OHCHR) https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CCPR&Lang=en accessed 31 January 2026
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