Authored By: Soliana Dagnew
Addis Ababa University
Abstract
This article analyzes the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute in light of international law, focusing on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the Ankara Declaration signed between Ethiopia and Somalia. It explores historical and political tensions, legal principles such as sovereignty, state recognition, and maritime rights under UNCLOS, and evaluates the implications of bilateral agreements. While Ethiopia seeks maritime access to address its landlocked status, Somalia prioritizes territorial integrity. The paper concludes that the Ankara Declaration offers a more constructive legal and diplomatic pathway than Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland, which undermines Somalia’s sovereignty.
Introduction
The long-running conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia is fueled by historical tensions and Ethiopia’s persistent pursuit of maritime access. Despite being landlocked, Ethiopia has pushed to secure access to the sea, causing friction with Somalia, which values territorial integrity. The recent Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has exacerbated the situation by highlighting questions of sovereignty, legal rights, and international diplomacy.
Summary of the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia
Somalia and Ethiopia, which share an approximately 1,650-kilometer border, have strong historical, cultural, and commercial links. At the same time, there are significant historical, religious, strategic, and cultural conflicts between these two nations. For decades, Somalia and Ethiopia have competed and fought major battles.
In the sixteenth century, the Adal Sultanate, led by Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, began major wars against Ethiopia, posing a serious danger to the Ethiopian Empire. Centuries later, Somali claims to the Ogaden region rekindled strife, beginning in 1964 with Somali-backed attempts to conquer the area. This tension evolved into the Ogaden War (1977-1978), in which Somalia originally controlled the territory but was eventually destroyed by Ethiopian forces backed by the USSR and Cuba. Ethiopia engaged in Somalia in 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union split, claiming worries about national security caused by the emergence of radical organizations along its border.
Recent tensions come from Ethiopia’s long-standing desire for “access to the sea,” a historical issue. While Ethiopia has traditionally been a landlocked country, Eritrea formerly functioned as an exception by providing a coastal exit. The historical search for marine access continues to shape regional dynamics and governmental agendas.[1]
The MOU between Somaliland and Ethiopia and its effects on Somalia
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on January 1, 2024, by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Musa Bihi, who aspires to independence from the Somali Federal Republic, has emerged as the principal source of current problems with the Somali government.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia is a significant diplomatic milestone, demonstrating Somaliland’s rising legitimacy and ability to engage in direct bilateral contacts outside of Mogadishu. The MoU proposes that Ethiopia recognize Somaliland’s independence in exchange for access to port facilities and the development of a possible military base. This agreement also builds on the 2016 Berbera Port Utilization Agreement and focuses on three key areas: defense and security cooperation against external threats, including Al-Shabaab; a fair-trade agreement to facilitate Somaliland’s market access to Ethiopia’s expanding economy; and diplomatic advocacy at the IGAD and AU levels for Somaliland’s recognition as a sovereign state.
Ethiopia and Somaliland’s collaboration has drawn sharp criticism from Somalia and Al-Shabaab. Somalia considers Somaliland an integral part of its territory and views the Ethio-Somaliland partnership as an infringement on its sovereignty. In response to the MoU, Somalia expelled Ethiopia’s ambassador, blocked its participation in regional peacekeeping efforts, and issued a statement rejecting the agreement. Somalia also explicitly opposed Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state, asserting this would undermine Somalia’s territorial integrity.
For Somaliland, the MoU presents an opportunity to formalize trade relations with Ethiopia, capitalizing on the significant role of informal trade in its economy. It also solidifies its position as a diplomatic actor capable of forging strategic alliances, despite resistance from Somalia and opposition from groups like Al-Shabaab.
Somaliland
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty is “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.” For an agreement to be legal within this framework, it must be signed by recognized states with the power to engage in treaties. Because Somaliland is not officially recognized as a sovereign state, its ability to enter into treaties under the VCLT is uncertain. As a result, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland may lack legal status as a treaty under international law.
Recognizing a state is a unilateral step by existing governments that gives the entity complete legal standing in international relations. Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 but has struggled to receive significant international recognition. Ethiopia’s willingness to recognize Somaliland in exchange for strategic advantages calls into question the collective approach to state recognition. This move risks creating a precedent that could jeopardize regional peace, as the ideal of territorial integrity is protected by international frameworks such as the United Nations Charter and the African Union’s Constitutive Act.
The Montevideo Convention establishes four key characteristics for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government, and the ability to interact with other states.[2] Somaliland meets these criteria but is not recognized due to international reluctance. Its unilateral proclamation of independence resulted from the lack of a functional Somali administration amid a long civil conflict. Somalia’s ongoing instability, exacerbated by the threat posed by groups such as Al-Shabaab, strengthens Somaliland’s case for independence. However, recognition remains a state discretionary decision, driven more by political factors than legal foundations.
Somaliland’s status as a de facto state indicates its control over a defined area and a functioning government, despite the lack of formal recognition. Somaliland has sought international recognition for more than 30 years, allowing it to participate in world events and act as a stabilizing example in a conflict-ridden region.
Ethiopia’s connection with Somaliland raises difficult legal and political issues. The MoU allows Ethiopia to access the sea through Somaliland’s lease of 20 kilometers of coastline, in exchange for Ethiopia providing Somaliland recognition and a stake in Ethiopian Airlines. If carried out, this agreement could drastically alter the region’s geopolitical landscape, changing Ethiopia’s position as a landlocked country and furthering Somaliland’s drive for recognition.
This arrangement, however, has sparked controversy. The Somali government declared the pact null and void, citing infringement of its territorial integrity. Other international players and organizations have exercised caution, refraining from taking acts that could undermine Somalia’s de jure authority.
Finally, while Somaliland meets the Montevideo Convention’s criteria for statehood, the lack of formal recognition continues to impede its ambitions. Recognition remains the responsibility of the international community, which holds the key to changing Somaliland from a de facto entity to a fully recognized state on a global scale.
The recent Ankara agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia
The Ankara Declaration, brokered by Turkey, represents a great opportunity to deescalate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, potentially resolving their long-standing maritime conflict through diplomatic means. Türkiye’s historical and cultural links to both countries position it as an important facilitator in this process.
On July 2, 2024, Turkey sponsored indirect talks in Ankara between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministries, marking the first round of negotiations. The second round took place on August 12-13, and the third round is set for September 17.
Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambition
Ethiopia’s principal goal in the issue is to maintain “access to the sea.” A fundamental issue of disagreement is whether this access would be solely for business purposes or would also have military dimensions. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and other Somali authorities have publicly declared that commercial access, without any transfer of sovereignty, is acceptable given Ethiopia’s logistical requirements. However, military access is regarded as a “red line” by the Somali government and the Somali people, raising worries about territorial integrity and sovereignty.[3] Somalia emphasizes the importance of maintaining territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity. These principles are consistent with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which ensures the equal distribution of maritime resources among coastal governments.
Signing the Ankara Declaration
On December 12, 2024, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed the Ankara Declaration, mediated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This deal was reached after months of high tensions, with the goal of resolving a maritime dispute that posed a danger to bilateral and regional security.
The declaration addressed three critical issues. The first is territorial integrity, reaffirming Somalia’s sovereignty and implicitly rejecting Ethiopia’s earlier Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. The second is maritime access, granting Ethiopia access to Somali ports under Somali oversight, ensuring Ethiopian interests while preserving Somali authority. Lastly, future negotiations will establish a framework for finalizing commercial arrangements by February 2025, setting a four-month deadline. The declaration received international endorsements from the African Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Nature of the Agreement
The Ankara Declaration is a political commitment rather than a legally binding treaty. Its language, featuring phrases like “agreed to closely work together” and “pledged to resolve differences,” reflects its non-binding nature.[4] While this flexibility encourages initial cooperation, it also leaves the agreement vulnerable to shifts in political will and unequal power dynamics.
Non-binding agreements, such as declarations and MoUs, foster trust and adaptability but rely heavily on mutual goodwill, leaving them susceptible to divergent interpretations and unenforceable in the absence of legal mechanisms.[5] Weaker states, such as Somalia, are particularly at risk of exploitation by more powerful parties under such arrangements.[6]
Strategic Reaffirmation of Somali Sovereignty
The declaration’s unambiguous reaffirmation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty is a key feature. The agreement is consistent with international law concepts such as the African Union’s uti possidetis juris, which safeguards colonial-era borders,[7] and the Montevideo Convention’s statehood criteria, which prioritize sovereignty and unity.
By agreeing to “one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity,” the proclamation supports Somalia’s territorial claims while invalidating Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence. This also represents a strategic shift in Ethiopia’s policy, as it pulls away from engagements that could fuel Somaliland’s independence ambitions.
Maritime Access Under Somali Sovereignty
The declaration ensures Ethiopia’s access to Somali ports on the basis of Somali sovereignty. It establishes a framework for bilateral agreements, including contracts, leases, and other arrangements, to assure Ethiopia’s consistent, secure, and long-term access to and from the sea. However, the lack of explicit language in the agreement allows for potential misunderstanding, which Ethiopia could use to strengthen its grip over Somali ports.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) covers marine rights and obligations, including rules that allow landlocked countries such as Ethiopia to access the sea. While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea encourages collaboration to ease such access, it also emphasizes respect for coastal states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, however, confront considerable legal and political hurdles under international law.
Ethiopia’s position is exacerbated by the fact that it is not a signatory to UNCLOS. The concept mentioned in the UN Doc states that “no state can claim that the rights established by the Convention apply to that state if it is not a party.”[8] This prevents Ethiopia from using UNCLOS clauses to assert transit rights, leaving it completely reliant on negotiated bilateral accords like the Ankara Declaration. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed in its decision that landlocked governments do not have an inherent right to use the sea unless it is explicitly granted by treaties or agreements.[9] This verdict reaffirmed coastal nations’ ultimate jurisdiction over their marine territories and emphasizes the importance of Somalia’s approval for Ethiopian access.[10]
Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland complicates its maritime claims. Somaliland is not recognized as a sovereign state, and any maritime access arrangements involving this region must be negotiated with Somalia, the internationally recognized authority. By using the MoU to circumvent Somalia’s sovereignty, Ethiopia attempted to strengthen its bargaining position. However, this undermines its standing under international law and highlights the importance of Somalia framing Ethiopia’s access as a conditional privilege rather than an inherent right.
Sovereign Discretion and Bilateral Negotiations
According to UNCLOS, coastal states maintain sovereign discretion when giving transit rights to landlocked states. This principle gives Somalia a substantial advantage in negotiating Ethiopia’s access to Somali ports. Any future agreements must specifically limit Ethiopia’s use of Somali ports to economic objectives while barring military or strategic actions. To defend its sovereignty, Somalia must maintain openness, regulatory monitoring, and conformity to Somali laws under these accords.
Risks of Leasing Arrangements
Leasing arrangements, while providing Ethiopia with access to Somali ports, pose a threat to Somalia’s sovereignty. Historical instances include the United States’ lease of Guantanamo Bay and China’s lease of Hambantota Port, which show how unclear or poorly specified conditions can lead to quasi-sovereign power by the lessee. These instances underscore the significance of properly defining the scope and limits of such agreements in order to prevent infringements on sovereignty.
Somalia must adopt strong protections in leasing agreements to guarantee that Ethiopian access remains solely commercial. Provisions must specifically prohibit the building of naval bases and the militarization of leased facilities.
Without such safeguards, Ethiopia might rationalize a naval presence or other strategic efforts as commercial operations, potentially undermining Somali authority over its maritime region.[11]
Way forward
In order to resolve the current Ethiopia-Somalia conflict and maintain long-term regional peace, both nations must place a high priority on diplomatic communication while scrupulously upholding the rules of international law. While granting Ethiopia conditional commercial access to its ports, Somalia should maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty, making sure that any agreements expressly forbid military usage or strategic installations. In order to gain maritime benefits, Ethiopia must respect Somalia’s legal authority and avoid interacting with unrecognized entities like Somaliland. By keeping an eye on talks, mediating disputes, and supplying legal advice to avert any violations of sovereignty, the international community can monitor negotiations, mediate disputes, and provide legal guidance to avert violations of sovereignty.
Furthermore, to improve legal clarity and lower the likelihood of future challenges, agreements should be formalized through binding treaties rather than non-binding declarations or memorandum of understanding.
Conclusion
The future of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland is unknown, as Somalia continues to reject it, declaring sovereignty over Somaliland. While the MoU granted Ethiopia temporary access to Somali ports, its legitimacy and long-term usefulness are questioned, particularly considering Somalia’s objections. On the other side, the Ankara Declaration represents a more promising foundation for resolving the maritime conflict. Signed under the mediation of Turkey, it supports Somalia’s territorial integrity while providing Ethiopia access to Somali ports under Somali supervision. While the proclamation is not legally enforceable, it does provide a diplomatic channel for ongoing negotiations and may pave the way for a more stable and mutually beneficial outcome.
Reference(S):
[1] Franz Amadeus Dombrowski, ‘Some Ideas About the Historical Role of Ethiopia’s Access to the Sea’ (1984) 6 Northeast African Studies 171.
[2] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) art 1.
[3] Jama, ‘Ethiopia-Somaliland Sea Access Deal: Reactions and Implications’ The Somali Digest (2024).
[4] Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2013).
[5] Arnold D McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford University Press 1961).
[6] Oona A Hathaway and Scott J Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (Scribner 2017).
[7] Burkina Faso v Mali (Frontier Dispute) (International Court of Justice, Judgment of 22 December 1986) [1986] ICJ Rep 554.
[8] UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/5587 (1958).
[9]Bolivia v Chile (International Court of Justice, Judgment of 1 October 2018) [2018] ICJ Rep 1.
[10]James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2019).
[11] Salim Said Salim, ‘Maritime Access and Sovereignty: A Legal Analysis of the Ankara Declaration Between Ethiopia and Somalia’ (2024).
