State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow  Exceptions

Abstract

A fundamental tenet of international law, state sovereignty gives states the sole right to  govern their own internal affairs and forbids outside intervention. Enshrined in the UN  Charter, this idea is essential to preserving global peace and order. However, changing  international norms and global realities are posing a growing threat to the absolute character  of sovereignty. The fundamental tenets of state sovereignty—territorial integrity, political  independence, and non-intervention—as well as their acknowledged exceptions are examined  in this article. It examines the conflicts that exist between new ideas like international  criminal justice, humanitarian intervention, and sovereignty. The essay examines how these  exclusions, which are frequently defended by the necessity to uphold international peace and  security or redress human rights abuses, may jeopardize state sovereignty and be vulnerable to  political manipulation. The function of international organizations in handling these  challenging circumstances is also covered. In the end, the paper makes the case for a  sophisticated interpretation of state sovereignty that acknowledges its limitations while  maintaining its essential significance. 

1. Introduction

The shockwaves caused by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the resulting decisions of the  International Court of Justice ordering provisional measures, as well as UN resolutions  reiterating the prohibition on the use of force—have placed state sovereignty back at the heart  of the international legal order. Beyond this conflict, recent disputes before the ICJ and  recurring debates in the Security Council (whether concerning cross-border operations,  sanctions regimes, or territorial claims) illustrate the ongoing tension between state  independence and the demands of collective security, human rights, and international  cooperation. Historically, the term “sovereignty” appeared in the 13th century, while  “sovereign” spread from the 12th century, derived from superus (superior). Conceptually,  sovereignty gradually established itself from the 16th century onwards as a central legal  category, first thought of as an absolute, supreme and indivisible power – according to the  canonical formulation of Jean Bodin – then “domesticated” over the centuries, notably from  the second half of the 19th century and, decisively, with the Charter of the United Nations  which established sovereign equality, the prohibition of force (Article 2 §4) and non-State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow Exceptions

intervention as structuring principles. As Professor Laghmani has shown, the evolution of the  concept transformed a Leviathan-like power into a right to independence articulated with a  logic of equality and agreement, profoundly modifying its relationship to international law.  This initial absolutization was also discussed by Charles Rousseau, for whom an “absolute”  authority is untenable in a system of states interacting and limiting each other: absolute  internally, sovereignty can only be “relative” externally. In the present context – marked by  inter-state wars, cross-border interventions justified by self-defense, operations authorized (or  blocked) by the Council, and claims of interference based on the protection of populations – the question is not whether sovereignty subsists, but how it is reconciled with its own cardinal  principles and their narrow exceptions. The legislative and jurisprudential background, from  the UN Charter to contemporary ICJ decisions, shows a sovereignty that is both a pillar of the  international order and parameterized by strictly regulated exceptional regimes. 

This article argues that state sovereignty remains the cornerstone of the international legal  order, structured by three fundamental principles—the equality of states, the prohibition of the  use of force, and non-intervention—whose scope, applications, and exceptions today define  the delicate balance between state autonomy and collective governance.

2. The sovereign equality of states

2.1. Principle

Regardless of their differences (economic, social, political, etc.), all states have the same  rights and responsibilities within the international community, according to the fundamental  tenet of international law: the concept of sovereign equality of states. This idea is stated in the  United Nations Charter’s Article 2 “The Organization is founded on the principle of the  sovereign equality of all its members” and reaffirmed by General Assembly Resolution 26/25  “All States enjoy sovereign equality… notwithstanding differences of an economic, social,  political, or other nature”, is inspired by the philosophical concept of “natural equality among  human beings, extended to nations”. According to the concept of equality before the law, all  states are held to the same standards and get equal treatment under international law. The  Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that “all are equal before the law and are  entitled without discrimination to equal protection of the law”. However, imbalances brought  up by political, military, and economic differences across states raise doubts about how well  this principle is applied. In order to distort international relations and support the continuation  of an unequal international order, powerful governments with significant resources and State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow Exceptions influence might put pressure on smaller states. The necessity to address these structural  inequalities is demonstrated by the demand for a new international economic order.

2.2. Exception

These disparities are strengthened by specific exceptions to the sovereign equality  principle, which is a cornerstone of how international institutions operate. The Security  Council’s veto authority enables the five permanent members—China, the United States,  France, the United Kingdom, and Russia—to thwart any resolution, even one that has the  backing of the majority of other members. This privilege provides certain states undue control  over the Council’s decisions and is blatantly against the idea of sovereign equality. It was  historically justified by the role these powers played in the founding of the UN. The  undemocratic aspect of this scenario and its propensity to paralyze in the face of global crises  are points of criticism.

Vote weighting in international financial institutions: At the World Bank and IMF,  member nations’ financial contributions determine how much weight each vote has. For  instance, Votes are distributed at the IMF according to countries’ quotas, which are  established by their relative economic size. This system maintains global economic inequality  by giving wealthy nations disproportionate influence at the expense of poorer nations. Since  these institutions’ choices don’t always represent the will of all member states, this calls into  doubt their legitimacy and representativeness. This unfair treatment, which strengthens the  inequalities in the international system, cannot be justified by the claim that large financial  contributors have more interests to safeguard.

3. The non-use of force

3.1. Principle

A pillar of the modern international law system, the concept of non-use of force seeks to  forbid the use of armed force in interstate interactions. The United Nations Charter upheld this  idea in its article 2(4) of which stipulates that “Members of the Organization shall refrain in  their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or  political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of  the United Nations.”, which was first established by the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which prohibits  “resort to war for the settlement of international disputes.” By promoting the amicable  resolution of conflicts, this fundamental principle seeks to maintain global peace and security.

State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow Exceptions

But as the reality of international relations shows, this concept is frequently broken,  underscoring the boundaries of its use and the continued use of force as a tool of foreign  policy. Some rulings in international law, including those concerning armed conflicts in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo and the construction of the wall in Palestine, show how  difficult it is to implement this idea in geopolitical situations that are at odds.

Aggression, defined as “the use by a State of armed force against the sovereignty,  territorial integrity, or political independence of another State, or in any other manner  inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”, is the most serious violation of the  principle of non-use of force. Aggression is seen as a “supreme crime”. That includes other  transgressions like war crimes and crimes against humanity. It poses a serious threat to world  peace and directly erodes state sovereignty.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which is frequently used as an example of aggression,  serves as an illustration of the destabilizing effects of such acts on the global scene. The idea  of a “just war” founded on religious grounds originated from the historical perception that  fighting was a valid way to resolve conflicts. By adopting Article 8 of the Rome Statute, the  Kampala Conference (2010) made a significant distinction between the “crime of aggression”  (individual) and the “act of aggression” (state), enabling the prosecution of those who plan  and carry out acts of hostility.

3.2. Exception

Self-defense is a basic exception to the non-use of force norm recognized by international  law. According to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, “Nothing in the present Charter  shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if a Member of the  United Nations is the object of an armed attack.” Strict requirements must be met in order to  exercise self-defense: there must be an armed attack, the response must be necessary and  proportionate, the attack must be imminent, and there must be no alternative defense. The  International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua case, established that “the exercise of the right  of collective self-defense first presupposes that an attack has taken place.” Similarly, in the  Congo case, the Court reaffirmed that “self-defense is only available in cases of armed  aggression and not to protect perceived security interests”.

The idea of preventive war, which has historically been used to defend military actions  without evidence of aggression, is incompatible with the UN Charter. According to modern State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow Exceptions international law, only “anticipatory self-defense”, when confronted with an immediate threat,  is permitted. There is still disagreement and interpretation surrounding the use of self-defense,  such as in the case of the US operation in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001  attacks. Self-defense has also been used by some parties to defend military involvement in  Syria and Ukraine, underscoring the difficulty of implementing this idea in crisis settings.

4. The non- intervention

4.1. Principle

Fundamental to international law, the principle of non-intervention upholds each State’s  claim to sovereignty and independence, enabling it to conduct its internal and foreign affairs  free from outside action. The United Nations Charter, “Nothing in the present Charter shall  authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic  jurisdiction of any State”, reaffirms this principle, which is rooted in international custom.  Jules Basdevant defines intervention as “the action of a State which seeks to interfere in the  external or internal affairs of one or more other States in order to assert its views or interests”.  The General Assembly, in its Resolution 2131 (XX) of 1965, specified that it refers to “the  use of economic, political, or other measures to compel another State to subordinate the  exercise of its sovereign rights or to obtain from it any advantage whatsoever.” This  definition was expanded by Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970: “No State or group of States has  the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or  external affairs of another State… Not only armed intervention, but any other form of  interference or threat directed against the personality of a State or against its political,  economic, and cultural elements, is contrary to international law.” 

In crucial domains like defense, foreign policy, national security, and domestic policy, the  principle of non-intervention safeguards state sovereignty. Every state has the right to control  its institutions, laws, and policies as well as to handle its foreign affairs independently of  outside intervention. The ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion on the Status of Western Sahara, states  that “No rule of international law requires that the State have a specific structure.” The ICJ, in  the Nicaragua case, recalls that “The internal political orientations of a State fall within its  exclusive competence insofar as they do not violate international law. Every State has the  fundamental right to choose and implement as it sees fit its political, economic and social  system.” The African Court, emphasizes that the ratification of international treaties implies a  partial cession of sovereignty, but does not justify interference in internal affairs: “It cannot State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow Exceptions therefore invoke its sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in its internal affairs to  exclude the jurisdiction of the Court.”

4.2. Exception

Notwithstanding its significance, the non-intervention principle is fraught with difficulties and  varying interpretations. Interventionist ideologies that question the boundaries of state  sovereignty include democratic interference and humanitarian interference. The Final Act of  the Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993) emphasizes the interdependence between  democracy, development, and human rights, but insists on the promotion of democracy  without conditionality: “The promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental  freedoms, at the national and international levels, should be universal and carried out without  the imposition of any conditions.” The question of democratic legitimacy as a norm of  international law remains debated. The right of peoples to self-determination may imply a  right to democracy, but cannot legitimize external interference. A difficult conundrum arises  when humanitarian assistance is used to shield populations from grave human rights abuses. It  is valid whether it is sought by the State or approved by the Security Council. It is unlawful to  impose it without consent. On the other hand, if humanitarian relief is unbiased and neutral, it  is both morally and legally required. The Security Council, authorized an intervention to  restore democracy: “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to establish a multinational force… to facilitate… the prompt return  of the legitimately elected President.” These examples illustrate the tension between state  sovereignty and the protection of human rights, and the difficulty of reconciling these two  imperatives of international law. 

5. Conclusion

Sovereignty is no longer an absolute, but a legal framework articulating state autonomy  and common obligations. Structured by three principles—equality of states, prohibition of  force, non-intervention—it now operates through the prism of strict exceptions. The  contemporary challenge is twofold: preventing the instrumentalization of these exceptions and  strengthening institutional mechanisms to ensure predictability and impartiality. Far from  disappearing, sovereignty is transforming to remain the foundation of a rules-based  international order.

State Sovereignty Today: Core Principles and Narrow Exceptions

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