Authored By: Tanisha Shah
Kirit P Mehta School of Law (NMIMS)
Case: Shreya Singhal v/s Union of India
Citation: (2015) 5 SCC 1; AIR 2015 SC 1523
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of judgement: 24 March 2015
Bench: Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice R.F. Nariman
Case No.: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012
Relevant Legislations: Information Technology Act, 2000; Constitution of India, particularly Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2)
Introduction
There has been a lot of rapid growth of Internet which has resulted in a change in the way individuals talk to each other, get information and how they take part in public discourse. There are many platforms where the citizens can express their opinions to the public at large which creates a lot of regulatory issues for the state. All of this results in there being a strong need to address unlawful content and regulate it.
The tension between the law and the freedom of speech and expression was uncovered in Shreya Singhal v/s Union of India[1]. This case primarily talked about section 66A of the Information Technology Act 2000. This section said that if any information is sent by a communication device or a computer and is “grossly offensive,” “menacing,” “annoying” or “inconvenient” then it is criminal in nature to do so. This provision also carried a penalty of imprisonment upto 3 years and a fine[2].
The Supreme Court had then struck down this Section as it was unconstitutional in nature for violating Article 19(1)(a)[3] and did not fall under the ambit of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2)[4]. Simultaneously the court upheld Article 69A[5] and read down Section 79(3)(b) of the IT act.[6]
The judgement of Shreya Singhal is a landmark judgment as it protects the freedom of speech and extends that protection to online speech and expression. This case also established that any restrictions of online speech must also satisfy the specific requirements under Article 19(2)[7]. Furthermore, important principles were developed with regards to vagueness, over breadth, chilling effect etc making it one of the last foundational judgements with regards to the constitution of India and Article 19(1)(a)[8].
Facts of the case
Section 66A was established through an amendment of the IT act in 2008 which came into force in October 2009. As mentioned above this provision criminalised sending information through the computer that is offensive or menacing in nature or which was sent for any purpose which was inconvenient or annoying in nature. It also criminalised message for deceiving or misleading a person online[9].
Section 66A was under intense scrutiny and controversy after the arrest of Shaheen Dhara and Rinu Srinivasan in Maharashtra after they were arrested for making a Facebook post with regards to the shutdown of Mumbai after the death of the Shiv Sena Leader Bal Thackeray. There was concern amongst the people that individuals could be imprisoned just for expressing their opinions online which was violative of the freedom of speech and expression.
Therefore, Shreya Singhal a law student with other petitioners approached the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution [10]. They challenged Section 66A but with it that also questioned Section 69A and Section 79 of the IT Act,2000.
Legal Issues
The principal questions that were put before the court were:
- Whether Section 66A do the IT Act violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
- Whether the restrictions imposed under Section 66A could be justified under the grounds specified in Article 19(2)
- Whether Section 66A was unconstitutional because of its terminology
- Whether Section 69A of the IT Act was constitutionally applicable
- Whether Section 79 imposed unconstitutional obligations on Internet intermediaries.
Petitioners Arguments
The petitioners said that Section 66A[11] was violative of the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.
Their main argument was that the provision was very vague in nature and usage of words such as “grossly offensive,” “annoyance,” and “inconvenience” that did not have a proper legal definition was insufficient. Ordinary citizens were unable to prove was was the right or improper conduct and the police force had wide discretion in deciding whether a particular speech was offensive in nature or not.
It was also argued that Section 66A[12] was over broad because of the language of that section. It was further contended that the section could not be classified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2). The grounds provided under Article 19(2) are security of the state, public order, decency, or morality[13]. “Annoyance” or inconvenience” are not grounds that are specified under the Article 19(2) as reasonable restrictions or grounds for restricting speech.
The petitioners further argued that this section resulted in a chilling effect because any violation of it could result in direct criminal prosecution and so individuals might refrain from expressing opinions in general out of fear that the speech would be objectionable under Section 66A of the IT Act.
Respondents Arguments
The union government argues that section 66A[14] was constitutionally valid because it safeguarded the states dealing with harmful content online and helps regulate it.
The Government argued that since the Internet is available to everyone it is a powerful medium through which information could spread rapidly to millions of people and therefore it was necessary for the government to regulate the harms that electronic communication posed.
The Government further argued that the courts should interfere with a provision only when it violated the fundamental rights of a country clearly and not only because it can be misused by people.
Courts Reasoning and Critical Analysis
The court said that the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression is extremely important to them. It also relied on earlier judgements to emphasise the importance of the same. The court also explained that freedom of speech protects both the popular as wells as the unpopular viewpoints. It stated that the value of expressing these viewpoints was to enable the exchange of ideas that are competing in nature
A particularly important contribution of the judgement was the courts distinction between discussion, advocacy, and incitement. The court stated that discussion was an important part of Article 19(1)(a) [15]even if the cause is unpopular in nature. This statement made by the court is crucial because it refuses to treat an unpopular opinion as unlawful conduct.
The court then examined the actual language of Section 66A[16]. The definition of ‘information’ under Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act was wide-ranging and the scope of applicability was not clearly defined. The court observed that Section 66A covered information of every kind, including material with scientific, literary, or artistic value.[17] The core issue was that the Section did not distinguish between protected expression and harmful expression. Therefore, such ambiguity could lead to a situation of confusion wherein a person could be prosecuted because another Individual considered the communication annoying or offensive, regardless of the legitimacy of the political, artistic or social value of it. The Court has concluded that this directly affected freedom of speech and the public’s ability to participate in the “marketplace of ideas.”
The court then considered if they could justify the validity of Section 66A under Article 19(2).
The court then stated that the state cannot restrict someone’s speech or expression under the guise of general public interest and the restriction should be under the grounds listed specifically under Article 19(2). The court stated that a restriction justified under the ground of public order must have a remarkably close connection to public order and not a hypothetical one. Section 66A failed this test. Section 66A could be applied not only when when it disturbed public order but also when the communication affected only an individual and had no broader public inconvenience[18]. Therefore, Section 66A was not a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).
The court also discussed the vague nature of the Section. The court stated that a criminal law should provide sufficient clarity so an ordinary person can understand what conduct is prohibited and what conduct is not prohibited. The enforcement authorities of the state should also have a proper standard to prevent the arbitrary application of the same. The court stated that vague laws result in failing to provide fair notice to the citizens and they also allow the authorities enforcing the law to be arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. This meant that the same communication could be considered lawful by one person and unlawful by the other. The court therefore found the provision vague in nature.
The vague language of 66A was heavily controversial since it collided with fundamental freedoms since an individual could face criminal prosecution for making a statement would rather not make that statement at all. Thus, suppressing not only unlawful speech but also lawful speech. The existence of such uncertain and potentially severe legal consequences can discourage legitimate expression leading to a chilling effect on our constitutional rights under Article 19(1)(a).
Section 69A
Unlike 66A, the court upheld Section 69A[19] and the 2009 blocking rules as narrowly drawn and noted several safeguards. As per the provisions blocking could occur only on specified grounds connected to Article 19(2), the reasons had to be specified, and review committee was also established under the same. Thus, the court clarified that Internet content could be restricted provided there exists a legitimate constitutional basis and procedural safeguards.
Section 79
A similar balancing approach was adopted with Section 79.[20] The court recognised the practical difficulty of requirement of actual knowledge and obligation to remove unlawful material. Given that platforms such as Google and Facebook have a huge user base it is impractical for them to independently determine the legality of crores of complaints. Thus, the court interpreted that actual knowledge what arised through a court order or notification by the appropriate government or its agency concerning unlawful acts falling within the grounds recognised under Article 19(2).
Critical Analysis
Shreya Singhal is a landmark judgement because it widened the scope of free speech to a new technological environment. The court recognised that even though the medium of communication may change the constitutional rights do not disappear with technological development. The court recognised that section 66A subjective language gave enforcement authorities excessive discretion and potentially allowed a simple disagreement to become a basis of criminal prosecution. The court also rightly distinguished between discussion, advocacy, and incitement and unpopular political obsession cannot be equivalent to speech that incites unlawful conduct. However, it was acknowledged that online platforms can facilitate serious harms including harassment, threats, misinformation, and unlawful content. Completely unregulated online communication would therefore create its own difficulties. Rather than granting unrestricted online communication the judgement established that any state regulation must strictly need constitutional standards I.e., it must be legally grounded, defined, serve a legitimate purpose and include robust procedural safeguards. The courts decision regarding Section 69A demonstrates this balance. While 66A was struck down, 69A survived because its scope was limited to grounds specified in Article 19(2) and is accompanied by procedural safeguards highlighting that the courts approach was anti arbitrariness and anti vagueness and not anti regulation.
The ruling for Section 79 is also the same and equally as important. It is impossible for platforms to independently determine and regulate every single complaint which is considered unlawful in nature as it would result in excessive private censorship.
There is only one criticism with regards to this judgement which is that the courts place a huge burden or responsibility on the institutional actors. In the rapidly changing digital world the content can spread globally within minutes and courts may usually be slower than the technology that they want to regulate. Therefore, there is an ongoing tension between the speed at which content spreads online and procedural fairness.
Conclusion
By striking down Section 66A the Supreme Court protected online speech from being subjected to vague and subjective standards. Article 19(1)(a) protects not only popular or socially acceptable opinions but also discussion and advocacy of unpopular ideas. Therefore, Shreya Singhal shows a constitutional provision of lasting relevance. It established that fundamental freedoms should be protected while also regulating online speech at the same time and regulation should be consistent with guarantees of liberty, precision, and fairness.
Reference(S):
[1] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
[2] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 66A (India).
[3] Constitution of India, art. 19(1)(a).
[4] Constitution of India, article 19(2)
[5] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, Section 69A (India)
[6] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, Section 79(3)(b) (India)
[7] Supra 4
[8] Supra 3
[9] Supra 2
[10]Constitution of india, Article, 32
[11] Supra 2
[12] Supra 2
[13] Supra 4
[14] Supra 2
[15] Supra 3
[16] Supra 2
[17] Supra 2
[18] Supra 2
[19] Supra 5
[20] Supra 6