Authored By: Yuvraj Singh Rathore
University of Turin
1. Case Citation and Basic Information
- Case Name: Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge
- Court: Conseil d’État (Council of State), Assembly (Assemblée)
- Date of Judgment: 27 October 1995
- Case No.: 136727
- Collection: Recueil Lebon
- President: Mr Denoix de Saint Marc
- Rapporteur: Ms Laigneau
- Government Commissioner: Mr Frydman
- Legal Area: French Administrative Law – Municipal Police Powers, Public Order and Human Dignity1
2. Introduction
The case of Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, infamously known as the “dwarf-tossing” or “lancer de nain” case, concerned an entertainment activity staged in nightclubs in France during the twentieth century. The mayor prohibited the attraction under her municipal police powers, while the participant and the organisers challenged the legality of the prohibition. The case concerns the extent to which municipal police powers may be exercised to protect human dignity.
The case required the Conseil d’État to determine whether respect for human dignity could constitute a component of public order, and whether a municipal authority could lawfully ban an attraction even in the absence of the particular local circumstances ordinarily required. The case shows a tension between the protection of human dignity and the individual autonomy of the person concerned, who had voluntarily agreed to participate and was even remunerated for doing so.2
The significance of the case of Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge goes beyond French administrative law. The judgment became an important reference point in the broader legal debate surrounding human dignity, especially the tension between the protection of dignity and individual self-determination. This issue was subsequently brought before the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Wackenheim v France,3 where the legality of France’s prohibition was examined from the perspective of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.4 The development from the French administrative proceedings to the international proceedings demonstrates that the question raised by Morsang-sur-Orge, whether an individual’s consent can legitimise conduct considered inherently incompatible with human dignity, extends beyond the domestic exercise of police powers and into the wider field of international human-rights law.
3. Facts of the Case
The relevant facts and procedural history of the case are summarised as follows:
1. Proposed Attraction5
On the evening of 25 October 1991, a “dwarf-tossing” (“lancer de nain” in French) event was scheduled to take place at the Embassy Club nightclub in the town of Morsang-sur-Orge. The event involved spectators throwing a person with a physical disability (dwarfism), thereby using the person as a projectile.
2. The Mayor’s Order
The then mayor of Morsang-sur-Orge, Geneviève Rodriguez,6 issued an order dated 25 October 1991 prohibiting the attraction, acting under her municipal police powers.
3. The Challenge
Fun Production, the company involved in the attraction, and Manuel Wackenheim,7 identified as “M. X” in the judgment, the participating individual, challenged the mayor’s order before the Administrative Court of Versailles. The crucial fact here was that Wackenheim participated voluntarily, was remunerated, and had protective measures in place to ensure his safety.8
4. Decision of the Administrative Court of Versailles
On 25 February 1992, the Administrative Court of Versailles9 annulled the mayor’s order and ordered the municipality to pay 10,000 French francs in compensation. The court held that, even assuming the attraction infringed human dignity, the prohibition could not be justified in the absence of particular local circumstances.
5. Appeal to the Conseil d’État
The municipality of Morsang-sur-Orge appealed the Administrative Court’s judgment to the Conseil d’État on 24 April 1992.
4. Legal Issues
The Conseil d’État had to determine:
- Whether respect for human dignity constitutes a component of public order, in such a way that municipal police authorities can rely on it whenever exercising their powers.
- Whether the mayor could prohibit the dwarf-tossing in the absence of “particular local circumstances” posing a threat to public order.
- Whether the participant’s voluntary consent, remuneration, and the safety measures adopted for the attraction could prevent the prohibition from being justified on the grounds of human dignity.
- Whether the protection of human dignity justifies restricting lawful economic and occupational freedoms, including the freedom to work.
Hence, the central legal issue was whether the protection of human dignity, as a component of public order, could justify the exercise of municipal police powers to prohibit an attraction voluntarily accepted by the participant, even in the absence of particular local circumstances.
5. Arguments
Arguments of the Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge
The municipality argued that the mayor was entitled to prohibit the dwarf-tossing under her general municipal police powers. The prohibition was justified and lawful by virtue of the mayor’s duty to protect public order, particularly because the event was contrary to the principle of the dignity of the human being. The event in itself constituted the public-order problem, so the demonstration of a separate disturbance arising from local circumstances was not required.
The municipality also challenged the reasoning of the Administrative Court of Versailles, which had held that “particular local circumstances” were necessary before the mayor could intervene. The mayor’s office believed that the nature of the event itself justified the exercise of municipal police powers to ban it.
Arguments of Fun Production and Manuel Wackenheim
Fun Production, the organising company, and Manuel Wackenheim, the person with the disability who was being tossed, opposed the prohibition. Their main argument was that Wackenheim had participated voluntarily and received remuneration for doing so, and that all the necessary precautionary safety measures had been installed and adopted to protect him during the activity.
This challenge raised the question whether an activity voluntarily chosen by the person concerned could nonetheless be prohibited by public authorities on the grounds that it was incompatible with the principle of human dignity.
The issue of freedom of work and freedom of commerce and industry was also squarely raised, as the case involved the reconciliation of police powers with individual and economic freedoms.
6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The court begins by establishing the legal foundation of municipal police power, drawing its legitimacy from Article L. 131-2 of the Code des communes, which states that it is the duty of the authority to ensure “maintaining good order, safety, security and public health”.10
In a landmark statement, the court clarifies that “respect for human dignity is itself a component of public order”.11 Therefore, the attraction in itself constituted a disturbance of public order because of what it does to the participant, who is a human person and holds valuable dignity. Overturning the reasoning of the Administrative Court of Versailles, the court held that, even in the absence of a conventional physical or material disturbance, a violation of dignity is a legitimate ground for prohibiting such an activity. This changes the traditional approach to municipal police power, under which morality became relevant only in certain circumstances, as demonstrated by the Société Les Films Lutetia case of 1959.12
Finally, the court addresses the circumstances that might otherwise have supported allowing the activity. It states that even though the participant:
- participated voluntarily,
- was remunerated, and
- had protective measures and safety in place,
these circumstances did not prevent the prohibition from being lawful. Consent and individual freedom could not supersede the principle of human dignity. Human dignity had been recognised as a principle of constitutional value by the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel in 1994,13 shortly before Morsang. Even taking into account the freedom of work and the freedom of commerce and industry, the court concluded that these freedoms cannot prevent the prohibition of an activity that, while it might otherwise be lawful in nature, threatens public order.
7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
a. The Judgment
- The Conseil d’État allowed the municipality’s appeal.
- It annulled the judgment of the Administrative Court of Versailles of 25 February 1992.
- It rejected the claims of Fun Production and M. Wackenheim that had been brought before the Administrative Court of Versailles.
- It rejected their cross-appeal.
- It ordered Fun Production to pay the municipality 10,000 French francs in respect of costs under Article 75-I of the Law of 10 July 1991.
b. Ratio Decidendi
Respect for human dignity constitutes a component of public order, and a municipal police authority may prohibit an attraction that inherently violates human dignity even in the absence of particular local circumstances.
8. Critical Analysis
The case brings to light how self-determination and dignity can become conflicting principles. Where an individual freely chooses a certain kind of activity to earn a livelihood, which would otherwise be difficult given the individual’s circumstances, the freedom to work and to engage in commerce becomes crucial. Even so, the activity undermines human dignity, because making a person a projectile and launching them is clearly objectification, which is substandard for any human. Using Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law14 as a theoretical framework for understanding the hierarchy of legal norms, dignity sits at the absolute apex, whereas self-determination is a derived right which falls under autonomy and collective rights according to the hierarchy of norms, implying that an action that violates dignity can never be valid under self-determination.
Through this judgment, the court strengthened the distinction between disposable and non-disposable rights. In any given case, human dignity, being as broad a concept as it is, can never be disposed of, even if the individual consents to do so. It belongs to humanity as a moral and social community and not to an individual personally. The judgment also indirectly provides the state with more policing powers, as it identifies the safeguarding of human dignity and the prohibition of acts against it as the responsibility of the state. The case established a very strong legal principle, namely that human dignity is untradable, no matter what the circumstances are.
9. Conclusion
Strengthening the concept of human dignity within the broader legal framework was a significant development achieved by the Morsang case, which provided the reasoning that dignity should prevail over consent in order to protect not only the individual but also the value of humanity as a whole. By doing so, the judgment also places greater responsibility on the State and expands the scope of its powers to protect human dignity. Therefore, in particular circumstances, dignity may operate as a limit on individual autonomy. At the same time, such protection must be balanced against individual liberty and the risk of adopting an overly broad conception of dignity.
10. Reference(S):
a. Cases
- Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 27 October 1995, No 136727, Recueil Lebon.
- Conseil constitutionnel, Decision No 94-343/344 DC, 27 July 1994.
- Société Les Films Lutetia v Ville de Paris, Conseil d’État, 18 December 1959.
- Tribunal administratif de Versailles, 25 February 1992, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge.
- Wackenheim v France, Communication No 854/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (Human Rights Committee, 15 July 2002).
b. Legislation and Treaties
- Code des communes, art L 131-2 (version in force 25 October 1991).
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
c. Secondary Sources
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (2026) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/.
- Ville de Morsang-sur-Orge, ‘Morsang et le respect de la dignité humaine’ (2025) https://www.morsang.fr/morsang-et-le-respect-de-la-dignite-humaine/.
Footnote(S):
1 Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 27 October 1995, No 136727, Recueil Lebon.
2 Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 27 October 1995, No 136727, Recueil Lebon.
3 Wackenheim v France, Communication No 854/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (Human Rights Committee, 15 July 2002).
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
5 Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge (n 1).
6 Ville de Morsang-sur-Orge, ‘Morsang et le respect de la dignité humaine’ (2025) < [ https://www.morsang.fr/morsang-et-le-respect-de-la-dignite-humaine/ ]>
7 Wackenheim v France, Communication No 854/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (Human Rights Committee, 15 July 2002).
8 Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 27 October 1995, No 136727, Recueil Lebon.
9 Tribunal administratif de Versailles, 25 February 1992, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, discussed in Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 27 October 1995, No 136727.
10 Code des communes, art L 131-2 (version in force 25 October 1991).
11 Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 27 October 1995, No 136727, Recueil Lebon.
12 Société Les Films Lutetia v Ville de Paris (Conseil d’État, 18 December 1959).
13 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision No 94-343/344 DC, 27 July 1994
14 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (2026) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/ .