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Jacob Humphreys v The State

Authored By: Syhal Sookdeo

University of Kwa-Zulu Natal

Case Citation and Basic Information

The case of Jacob Humphreys v The State[1] was heard by the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa. The case citation is (424/12) [2013] ZASCA 20. The judgment was handed down on 22 March 2013 by Brand JA, whose judgments were concurred by Cachalia JJA, Leach JJA, Erasmus and Van der Merwe AJJA. The case focused mainly on the criminal liability in a case of fatality in a collision between a minibus taxi and a train, outlining the limits of dolus eventualis (legal intent) and conscious negligence. 

Introduction

The Humphreys judgment is an important decision in South African criminal law, providing a deep understanding of the elements of dolus eventualis in cases of extreme negligence. The accident, which claimed the lives of 10 school children, caused widespread anger among the public and helped to secure a conviction from the trial court for murder for the driver. The Supreme Court of Appeal however intervened and gave an important confirmation of objective legal standards to public opinion. The Court reaffirmed the strict requirement for murder conviction by breaking down the volitional element of legal purpose, which is what is meant by the term “conscious negligence” or “luxuria”.

Facts of the Case

The appellant, Jacob Humphreys, was a former railway shunter who, on his retirement from the railway, ran a shuttle service for school children in the Bellville area. He had been driving down this road for almost 10 years. On 25 August 2010 the appellant was driving fourteen children, aged from 7 to 16, in his minibus. He was in a T-junction area at Frederick Street and Buttskop Road, near a railway crossing at Blackheath. 

The appellant arrived at the intersection when there was a queue of parked cars awaiting to cross the railway in Buttskop Road. Witnesses from the crossing, including the driver at the front of the queue, said the red lights were flashing at the crossing at the time the accident occurred, indicating an oncoming train. The appellant ignored these warnings and pulled over to the right side of the waiting cars and continued into the lane that was meant for oncoming traffic. This was done on purpose to avoid the boom gate which had been lowered down on the eastern side of the crossing.

The minibus hit a train coming along the railway line on its left-hand side as it was entering the railway crossing. The train driver gave evidence that there was no time to avoid the accident as the time taken for the train to cross the line after the booms have lowered is about one minute. Ten children died on the spot as a result of the impact and the other four suffered serious injuries. The appellate court has found the appellant suffered injuries and was admitted to hospital. After recovering from his injuries, he was charged with ten counts of murder and four counts of attempted murder in the Western Cape High Court. They had found him guilty on all fourteen charges and had sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment (effective), which he appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

Legal Issues

The Supreme Court of Appeal had to resolve two main legal issues. The first question was whether the crash had been orchestrated by the appellant, as he had pleaded automatism, meaning that he had no recollection of the events which had happened leading up to the incident. The second, and most significant question, was whether the trial court had erred in finding that the appellant had the necessary intent in the shape of dolus eventualis to convict him of murder and attempted murder or whether his actions were only gross negligence (culpable homicide). 

Arguments Presented

The lawyers for the appellant argued the man’s actions were ‘luck’ and not deliberate. They argued that to turn around a U turn to knowingly drive into the path of an oncoming train was a “suicidal movement. The defence said that a man with the experience of working on the railway for 26 years, who knew what he was doing, could not have taken the risk, suggesting a state of automatism.

 On the other hand, the State contended that the conduct of the appellant was deliberate and voluntary. The State established on the basis of the evidence of the persons who survived the accident that on two prior occasions appellant was able to make the same illegal manoeuvre to avoid the booms. The State argued that the appellant subjectively believed the risk of a fatal collision existed and, with this in mind, recklessly acted and the elements of dolus eventualis were met. 

Court’s reasoning and analysis.

The initial phase of Brand JA’s efforts was to systematically break down the defence of automatism. The Court pointed out that the burden rests on the State to establish that an act was voluntary, but a sane person who engages in criminal acts is assumed to be conscious. An accused needing to upset this inference must prove a factual basis. The appellant did not present any expert medical opinion to prove “sudden unconsciousness”. Moreover, no evidence of an emotional trigger (severe stress, provocation, fatigue and so on) was found to account for such a rare psychological state. Most importantly, the evidence of his previous success with evading the booms showed that he was knowingly taking risks. The Court found that there was only retrograde amnesia after the collision and this does not detract from the voluntary nature of the act at the time of the act itself. 

After determining that the action was voluntary, the Court then addressed the element of intent. The appellant is known to have no desire (dolus directus) to kill his passengers. It was therefore the trial court that had been based on the principle of dolus eventualis, which is based on: (a) subjective expectation of death; and (b) reconciliation with that possibility. The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld that the appellant had a subjective expectation of collision. There is no reason to doubt that the appellant did not have this basic ‘cognitive foresight’ since that is common human experience which says that failing to pay attention to warning lights and ignoring booms is a ‘manifest risk’ of a fatal accident. 

But it is the second, the element of reconciliation, that the Court found profoundly misapplied. The trial court had confused the concept of reconciliation with extreme recklessness. Brand JA, in his reference to S v Ngubane,[2] highlighted that reconciliation is based on the premise that the perpetrator “takes the consequence into the bargain. The Court argued that the appellant must have foreseen the death of his passengers and in that light, he must have foreseen his own death. There was no evidence of the appellant being suicidal or that he was indifferent to his own life and, therefore, it was only reasonable to put him to death, that he actually felt there was no possibility of collisions. It had been reinforced by his previous achievements at beating the train at the very same crossing. For this reason, the appellant did not accept the bad results, making it impossible to say that he had acted with the intent to cause them. Therefore, the volitional element of dolus eventualis was missing. 

Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

The appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the conviction for murder and attempted murder was upheld. Ten charges of murder were dropped and changed to ten charges of culpable homicide. The four convictions for attempted murder were meaningless as the crime of “attempted culpable homicide” is not recognised in South African law, and one cannot intend to be negligent.

As far as the punishment is concerned, the Court considered the gravity of the appellant’s negligence and the personal situation of the appellant. The appellant’s behaviour was a flagrant violation of the reasonable standard of driving and worse, a breach of the trust in him that the parents of the children have placed on him. Given his clean criminal record, his past in the community and that sentencing shouldn’t be made by community outrage, the Court believed that an effective sentence of 8 years imprisonment was warranted. The sentence was dated back to 28 February 2012.

Critical Analysis

The Humphreys decision is a textbook example of judicial restraint and careful application of the rules of law. The most important role the judgment plays is to firmly demarcate the concepts of luxuria (conscious negligence) and dolus eventualis (legal intent). Trial courts are often drawn into a state of moral outrage and are tempted to consider gross negligence to be murder in cases where there is a large loss of life. In contrast, the judgment of the brand JA establishes that murder cannot be established even if the individual’s actions are abhorrent or reckless, where there is only the general acceptance of the risk of death.

The Court’s reasoning about the appellant’s own death is of special interest. The Court rested on the irrefutable human reality of the appellant having to accept his own death so as to accept the deaths of his passengers by making note that the concept of dolus eventualis was an abstract one. This deduction is correct and is able to differentiate between the calculating killer who takes the collateral damage and the arrogant gambler who foolishly thinks he can beat the odds. The 20-year sentence was reduced to eight years, which was hard for the families of victims and the public to accept, but the appellate courts were expected to be uncompromisingly objective in maintaining the rule of law.

Conclusion

The judgment in Humphreys v The State is a breaking precedent for criminal intent in fatal car crashes. The Court’s decision to reject the merging of extreme negligence with legal intent has helped to ensure that the legal standards for murder are clearly in place. The case is a testament to the dangers of careless driving and serves as a reminder of the importance of adhering to objective legal standards when determining criminal liability, instead of focusing on the tragic nature of the incident.

Table of Cases

Humphreys v The State (424/12) [2013] ZASCA 20

S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A)

Legislation

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977

[1] Humphreys v The State (424/12) [2013] ZASCA 20.

[2] S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A).

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