Authored By: Carola Borriero
University of Edinburgh
Case Name:
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v Uruguay)
Citation: Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) Judgment, 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14.
Court: International Court of Justice
Date of decision: 20 April 2010
Bench: Vice-President Tomka; Judges Koroma, Al-Khasawneh, Simma, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf and Greenwood; Judges ad hoc Torres Bernárdez and Vinuesa.
- Introduction
The case of Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay concerned Uruguay’s decision to authorise the construction of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay, the shared international watercourse border between Argentina and Uruguay. Argentina claimed Uruguay was in breach of the 1974 Statute of the River Uruguay by failing to notify and consult Argentina before approving the projects. Additionally, Argentina argued that Uruguay failed to protect the river from environmental damage. The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) was required to consider cooperational procedural duties between states and their substantive obligations to prevent transboundary environmental damage. Significantly, the ICJ held that an environmental impact assessment (‘EIA’) had become a requisite under general international law when an upcoming initiative presented risks of important adverse transnational effects. Hence, this judgement marked a turning point in international environmental law, despite the Court’s high threshold to prove actual environmental harm.
- Facts of the Case
The River Uruguay is governed by the Statute of the River Uruguay 1975 and forms part of the border between Argentina and Uruguay. The 1975 framework established rational and equitable utilisation of the river and brought about the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) to assist cooperation between the two States.
The dispute arose from Uruguay’s planned construction of pulp mills on the Uruguayan bank of the river. It was authorised in 2003 and the job was to be carried out by the Spanish company ENCE near Fray Bentos. Argentina opposed the project and claimed that Uruguay was required under the 1975 Statute to notify and consult it through CARU before giving any authorisation to the works. In 2005, a secondary project by the Finnish company Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab was authorised. Uruguay also authorised the construction of a port terminal associated with the Botnia mill.
Argentina argued these projects were a serious environmental risk to the shared river, and that Uruguay had not proceeded as established by the 1975 Statute failing to fulfill notification and consultations provisions. The case became increasingly controversial, sparking protests and blockades on behalf of Argentinians objecting to the pulp mills construction.
In May of 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings before the ICJ claiming that Uruguay had violated procedural and substantive obligations of the 1975 Statute. Argentina also sought provisional measures. The ENCE project was suspended and later abandoned, while the Botnia project persisted and began operation in November 2007.
Argentina claimed that the mill’s operation had created significant environmental harm to the River Uruguay, specifically deteriorating its water quality and damaging its aquatic life. Uruguay denied these allegations and upheld that everything was compliant with the relevant environmental standards. Uruguay also claimed there was a lack of convincing evidence of substantial environmental damage.
In this case, the ICJ had to rule on whether Uruguay had complied with the 1975 Statute’s procedural requirements prior to authorising the projects and on whether its conduct had violated the substantive obligation to protect the river and surrounding environment.
- Legal Issues
Issue 1: Whether Uruguay breached the procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute by failing to notify and consult Argentina through CARU before authorising the construction and operation of the pulp mills.
Issue 2: Whether Uruguay breached its substantive obligations under the 1975 Statute by failing to protect and preserve the River Uruguay and to prevent pollution and other environmental harm.
Issue 3: Whether general international law required Uruguay to carry out an environmental impact assessment before authorising activities that could cause significant transboundary environmental harm.
- Arguments Presented
4.1 Argentina’s Arguments
Argentina argued that Uruguay was in violation of Articles 7-12 of the 1975 Statute by authorising the projects without first following the prescribed notification and consultation procedure. As contended by Argentina, these provisions required Uruguay to provide CARU with information concerning the proposed works before granting the relevant environmental authorisations. This procedure was not a simple administrative formality, it rather had the intent to give Argentina the opportunity to determine the potential effects on the shared river and to facilitate inter-state cooperation prior to making any irreversible decisions.
Argentina also claimed that Uruguay had breached Article 35, 36 and 41 which consisted of its substantive obligations. In Argentina’s view, Uruguay was required to ensure the rational and equitable use of the river, protect its aquatic environment and prevent pollution. In support of this claim, Argentina presented scientific evidence concerning the potential impacts of the mill’s effluent on water quality, aquatic life, and the overall ecological balance of the Uruguay river.
Additionally, Argentina adopted a precautionary approach, arguing that uncertainty in the scientific evidence should not prevent protective measures to be established by States. It also maintained that Uruguay should be held responsible where potentially significant environmental risks existed, despite the scientific evidence not being able to conclusively ascertain damage.
4.2. Uruguay’s arguments
Uruguay counterargued that it had complied with its procedural and substantive obligations under the 1975 Statute and maintained that the notification procedure did not prevent it from carrying out the domestic environmental authorisation process. Moreover, it claimed that Argentina had been informed of the pulp mills projects and that the relevant authorities had cooperated and interacted through CARU.
Regarding the substantive claims specifically, Uruguay argues that Argentina had failed to demonstrate any actual environmental damage caused by the Botnia mill, relying on scientific evidence proving that the mill utilised modern technology that was in full compliance with environmental standards. Uruguay also insisted that the burden of proof remain with the applicant State, and that the precautionary approach could not eliminate the requisite of real and convincing evidence.
- Court’s Reasoning & Analysis
The procedural obligations under Articles 7-12 of the 1975 Statute were examined first. The ICJ treated the notification and consultation mechanisms as an indispensable component of the treaty’s institutional framework rather than a mere administrative formality. The scope of the procedure was to provide parties with facilitated cooperation opportunities and determine risk potentiality on the shared river prior to authorisation of works.[1]
The Court held that Uruguay failed to inform CARU of the planned projects before issuing the initial environmental authorisations, hence finding that Uruguay was in breach of its procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute. This ruling was particularly noteworthy as the ICJ differentiated between the existence of a procedural obligation from the question of whether the projects had actually caused environmental damage.[2]
Secondly, Uruguay’s substantive obligations to protect the river were examined. The Court recognised that States must exercise due diligence over activities carried out within their national territory in order to prevent enduring environmental harm to second States. However, due diligence obligation consists in taking appropriate measures to prevent damage from occurring, not a guarantee of such not happening. Consequently, the ICJ assessed the evidence relating to the mill’s advanced technology, emissions report and potential effects on water quality and aquatic organisms.
The Court gave considerable importance to the scientific evidence presented. It considered data on substances being discharged into the Uruguay river as well as comparing conditions before and after the construction and operation of the mill. As a result, the ICJ held that Argentina had failed to satisfy the burden of proof regarding Uruguay failing to exercise the required level of due diligence or that the mill had adverse effects, rejecting Argentina’s substantive claims.[3]
Nevertheless, the Court made a meaningful contribution to international environmental law by finding that where a proposed industrial activity creates a risk of significant adverse transboundary impact, particularly where a shared resource is involved, an EIA is a requisite under general international law. The ICJ linked this requirement to wider duties of due diligence, vigilance and prevention. Additionally, it made clear that international law does not need every EIA to follow a singular specific format as they must depend on the circumstances of each proposed project.[4]
The Court therefore signaled the distinction between procedural environmental protection and substantive environmental harm. While Uruguay was in violation of its procedural obligations, Argentina had failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a substantive breach.
- Judgement & Ratio Decidendi
With 13 votes to 1, the ICJ found that Uruguay had breached its procedural obligations under Articles 7-12 of the 1975 Statute. On the other hand, by votes 11 to 3, it held that Uruguay had not breached its substantive obligations under Articles 35, 36 and 41. The Court considered that a declaration of procedural violation was sufficient satisfaction and, consequently, did not require Uruguay to dismantle the mills or terminate its operations.
The main ratio regarding the procedural aspect was that Uruguay was legally bound to comply with the notification and consultations framework established by the 1975 Statute before authorising activities covered by the agreement.
Furthermore, the ICJ found that general international law requires an EIA where a proposed activity may cause significant adverse transboundary environmental effects, particularly in relation to a shared resource.[5]
The Court’s broader observations about the appropriate content of an EIA should be distinguished from the findings that were strictly required to solve the dispute. Despite the ICJ’s findings of the lack of substantive breach mostly relied on its assessment of the evidence concerning Uruguay’s conducts and alleged environmental harm, the customary-law recognition of EIA is still of high importance in international environmental law.
- Critical Analysis
The most important contribution of Pulp Mills was the recognition of EIAs as requirements under general international law. At the time, uncertainty surrounded transboundary EIA’s statuses under customary international law but, by linking EIAs to principles of prevention and due diligence, the Court has strengthened the procedural dimension of international environmental protection. According to Payne, the judgement is a significant turning point for both environmental law and in the more general framework governing shared watercourses.[6] Since Pulp Mills the principle has been relied upon by international tribunals and courts, showcasing its continued relevance in the international legal sphere.
The judgement was also important in demonstrating that environmental protection cannot be simply viewed as separate from inter-state cooperation. Procedural requirements of the 1975 statute were specifically designed to ensure that potentially harmful activities were dealt with jointly rather than unilateral decision-making. By holding that Uruguay was in violation of these requirements, the ICJ reinforced the significance of procedural cooperation, especially with regards to shared natural resources.
Despite its clear impact on the advancement of international environmental law, the judgement can be criticised for its limited consequences. Even after finding that Uruguay was in breach of the treaty’s notification and consultation mechanism, the ICJ considered a declaration to be sufficient as no substantive environmental violation had been established. Arguably, this weakened the connection between procedural and substantive environmental protection. Procedural obligations are intended to help prevent harm, so treating their violation as having limited consequences where no substantive harm can be demonstrated can be undermining their initial purpose.[7]
The Court’s analysis of scientific evidence is also open to criticism. Environmental disputes tend to involve complex scientific evidence and uncertainty. Waiting for conclusive evidence of actual damage could go in favour of the State undertaking the potentially harmful activity, which in this case would have been Uruguay. Yet, the ICJ still maintains the usual allocation of the burden of proof requiring Argentina to substantiate its substantive claims.
Therefore, the Pulp Mills case presents friction at the core of international environmental law: on one hand, the ICJ bolstered preventive environmental governance approaches by recognising EIAs as customary international law, while on the other, its approach to proof of substantive damage remains skewed. This makes this judgement both a landmark case in environmental litigation and the exemplification of the limits of international adjudication concerning the relationship between scientific uncertainty and the establishment of environmental harm.
- Conclusion
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay represents a significant development of international environmental law. The ICJ held that Uruguay had violated its procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute by failing to comply with the required mechanism of notification and consultation, while also finding evidence to be insufficient concerning the substantive breach of pollution and environmental damage.
The judgement’s noteworthiness mainly lies with the recognition of environmental impact assessments being a requirement under general international law where a proposed activity presents potential risks of significant adverse transboundary impacts. This shifted the EIA from a domestic and treaty-based procedure into a part of customary international environmental law.
Concurrently, this case shows that acknowledging prevent obligations does not necessarily equate to an easier enforcement of environmental protection. The Court’s high threshold regarding the burden of proof led to the procedural breach only being declaratory, in spite of the genuine environmental concerns central to this dispute. In future international environmental law litigations, the balance between scientific uncertainty, precaution, proof of harm and due diligence is one that must be carefully examined. Precisely for this reason, Pulp Mills continues to remain a landmark case showcasing advancements in international environmental law while also exposing difficulties that continue to constrain its effectiveness.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
International Court of Justice
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma) [2010] ICJ Rep 108
Payne CR, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment as a Duty under International Law: The International Court of Justice Judgment on Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay’ (2010) 1(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation 317
Merkouris P, ‘Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay): Of Environmental Impact Assessments and “Phantom Experts”’ (The Hague Justice Portal, 15 July 2010)
International Court of Justice, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Written Statement, 22 March 2024
[1] Panos Merkouris, ‘Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay): Of Environmental Impact Assessments and “Phantom Experts”’ (The Hague Justice Portal, 15 July 2010) 6 n 43; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 62 [93].
[2] Ibid 6 n 40; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 32 [79].
[3] Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 72 [162], 73 [164].
[4] Merkouris, (n 1) 9 n 63; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 83 [205].
[5] International Court of Justice, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Written Statement of [party], 22 March 2024, 44 [101].
[6] Cymie R Payne, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment as a Duty under International Law: The International Court of Justice Judgment on Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay’ (2010) 1(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation 317, 317.
[7] Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma) [2010] ICJ Rep 108, 113–115 [20]–[22], 116 [26].

