Authored By: Dami Kalejaiye
University of Cambridge
- Case Citation and Basic Information
Full case name: R v Jogee (the Court of Appeal of England and Wales); Ruddock v The Queen (the Court of Appeal of Jamaica)
Citation: [2016] UKSC 8
Court: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (joint panel).
Date of decision: 18 February 2016.
Bench composition : Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Hughes, Lord Toulson, Lord Thomas (Five-Judge panel).
- Introduction
R v Jogee [1]is a landmark decision the Supreme Court and the Privy Council made regarding the law of secondary liability, known as joint enterprise in English criminal law. The appeal was heard jointly with the Privy Council appeal of Ruddock v The Queen[2], which raised the same legal point, but this case summary focuses solely on the Jogee appeal[3]. For over 30 years, courts applied ‘parasitic accessorial liability’ (para 2)[4], a doctrine where a secondary party is convicted for foreseeing that the principal might commit the offence, without needing to have intended to partake in that offence. This case is significant because the Supreme Court abandoned this position, arguing it was based on a “wrong turning”[5] (para 79). It restored the legal position of intention, specifically the intention to assist or encourage the principle, to establish secondary liability.[6]
- Facts of the Case
On the evening of 9 June 2011, Jermaine Jogee and his friend, Mohan Hirsi, went to Naomi Reid’s house in Leicester, whose partner, Paul Fyfe, was expected to return. Both men had been drinking and taking drugs that evening. While at the house, Jogee picked up a kitchen knife and threatened to stab a man from an earlier encounter. Reid asked both men to leave because she was expecting Fyfe to return, which they did, but mentioned that they did not fear him and would deal with him.
Hirsi then returned and was present when Fyfe arrived. Reid told Jogee to fetch Hirsi, which he did, but both of them returned minutes later (after 2am on 10 June). Hirsi entered Reid’s home and got into a heated confrontation with Fyfe. Jogee was standing outside, shouting to Hirsi to do something to Fyfe and threatening to hit Fyfe’s head with a bottle. Hirsi stabbed Fyfe with a knife he took from the kitchen. Fyfe died from the stab wound.
Although Jogee did not stab Fyfe, he was convicted of murder as a secondary party under the parasitic accessorial liability doctrine. It was argued that Jogee’s foresight that Hirsi might commit a crime and his participation through encouragement made him liable[7]. This standard was established in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen (1985) [8]and later applied in R v Powell; R v English (1999). [9]
- Legal Issues
Issue 1: Whether foresight that the principal offender might commit an offence is sufficient to establish a secondary party’s liability, or whether evidence of a secondary party’s intent to assist or encourage the offence is required.
Issue 2: Whether the Supreme Court should overturn the foresight test established in Chan Wing-Siu (1985).
Issue 3: What effect the Supreme Court’s decision to overrule Chan Wing-Siu would have on defendants previously convicted under this precedent, including whether they are entitled to appeal and on what basis.[10]
- Arguments Presented
- Appellant’s Arguments: Jogee
Jogee argued that Chan Wing-Sui v The Queen [11](1985) was flawed and should be overruled because it conflated the legal distinction between foresight and intention. He argued that criminal law requires proof of an individual’s state of mind (mens rea). [12]For a secondary party, this should mean the intention to assist or encourage the principle in committing the crime. However, the existing rule allowed people to be convicted of murder based on foresight that the principal might commit a crime, without the prosecution needing to prove intention. Jogee relied on R v Anderson and Morris (1966), which established shared intention between individuals in a joint enterprise[13]. This was argued to be the correct legal position before Chan Wing-Siu deviated from it. Jogee argued that it created unjust outcomes as a secondary party could receive the same sentence as the principal, despite being assessed on a lower threshold. [14]
- Respondent’s Arguments: The Crown
The Crown argued that the Chan Wing-Sui test is not flawed and does not need to change. It has been applied to various joint enterprise cases for approximately 30 years[15]. It also argued that requiring the prosecution to prove mens rea of each individual in joint enterprise cases is difficult and that was of utmost importance was holding the people involved in the crime accountable.
Based on this argument, it maintained Jogee’s guilt as his shouting encouragement to Hirsi and threatening to harm Fyfe with a bottle, combined with foreseeing that Hirsi might harm someone with a knife, satisfied the legal test for secondary liability.[16]
- Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first considered whether foresight that the principal might commit an offence is sufficient to establish secondary liability. After analysing the previous rulings in common law, they accepted Jogee’s argument that foresight and intention are conceptually different [17]. Foresight is a prediction that a crime might occur, whereas intention is aiming to create a specific outcome from one’s actions. Therefore, convicting a secondary party of murder on the basis of foresight is inconsistent with the mens rea principle[18]. On the basis that foresight was only useful as evidence for intention, the Court concluded that a secondary party is criminally liable if they intend to assist or encourage the principal offender to commit the offence[19].
The Court then considered whether it should abandon Chan Wing-Siu despite the Crown’s argument that it had been used as a precedent for approximately 30 years. It rejected this argument, arguing it does not make sense to keep an erroneous precedent because of its longevity[20] . The Court also rejected the Crown’s argument that foresight was necessary to prevent individuals involved in group violence from evading liability because criminal law accounts for the different degrees of guilt[21]. Given that secondary liability is a matter of common law, the Supreme Court was within its power to abolish parasitic accessorial liability and overruled the Chan Wing-Siu precedent.[22]
The Court finally considered the impact of this decision for defendants convicted under the previous legal test. It explained that finding the prior legal test to be incorrect did not automatically mean every conviction made using this standard has grounds for appeal. [23]Defendants who wanted an out-of- time appeal would need consent from the Court of Appeal, who would then determine if the appeal were justified if there is proof of ‘substantial injustice’[24]. As a result, the Court distinguished between correcting the law and assessing the validity of the convictions, which requires the circumstances underlying each conviction to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
- Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
- The Decision
The Jogee appeal was allowed, in a unanimous decision delivered by Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson[25]. Jogee’s murder conviction was set aside. Since the Supreme Court does not retry facts, Jogee’s case was sent to the Crown Court for reconsideration under the new test: whether Jogee intended to assist or encourage the offender in the act[26]. The Crown Court subsequently convicted him of manslaughter. [27]
- Ratio decidendi:
A secondary party can only be convicted if they intend to assist or encourage the principal offender to commit the offence. Foresight alone cannot establish secondary liability and is only relevant as evidence to infer intention. [28]
- Critical Analysis
- Significance of the decision
The judgement in R v Jogee marked a paradigm shift in the laws governing secondary liability and in English criminal law. It removed the parasitic accessorial liability doctrine, which was used for over 30 years, which highlights how seriously the Supreme Court viewed this legal error.[29]
- Implications and Impact
The decision to return to the pre- Chan Wing-Siu position impacts defendants who are secondary parties in group violence, as well as prosecutors and police, who must focus their attention on establishing intention rather than foresight. The availability of manslaughter as an alternative to murder gives courts greater flexibility to impose a sentence proportionate to the defendant’s level of involvement and culpability. [30]
Critical Evaluation
A major strength of Jogee is the Court exposing and fixing a legal inconsistency in how people involved in the same crime were treated. A secondary party would receive an identical mandatory life sentence as the principal offender, despite being subject to a lower threshold of guilt.[31] Jogee brought back “the mental element of the secondary party back into broad parity with what is required of the principal” by ensuring that people convicted of the same offence should be assessed on an equivalent standard of culpability. [32]
However, the judgment does not fully explain how much foresight is sufficient to allow a jury to infer intention. Although the Court clearly stated that foresight is evidence of intention rather than a substitute for it, this distinction may be difficult to apply in practice. [33]If a jury can infer intention from relatively limited evidence that a defendant anticipated violence, this blurs the boundary between foresight and intention, described by scholars as a “logical gap”. [34]This means the difference between the old and new tests may become less evident.
The Jogee judgement doesn’t realistically encapsulate how rapidly group or gang-related violence unfolds. Group confrontations tend to escalate very quickly, with individuals reacting quickly and unpredictably to the current situation rather than a plan[35]. Requiring the prosecution to prove that a particular defendant intended to assist or encourage a specific offence is therefore challenging, as the Jogee test assumes a level of rationality and intention behind each action. This creates a gap between the Court’s normative goals and the realities of how group violence occurs.
Another weakness is the limited consequences for those already convicted under the previous legal test. R v Johnson (2016) applied Jogee’s ‘substantial injustice’ test to several appellants convicted under the former foresight-based approach. Most of the appellants did not meet the threshold required to reopen their convictions[36]. This suggests that, despite the significance of Jogee, its ability to remedy the consequences of a past legal error is extremely limited.
- Conclusion
Overall, R v Jogee fundamentally reshaped the law of secondary liability by restoring intention to assist or encourage, rather than foresight, as the basis for establishing complicity. In doing so, the Court revived the principle of mens rea and established a coherent precedent for individual criminal responsibility. Notwithstanding, the continued reliance on foresight as evidence of intention, the uncertainty surrounding its application in spontaneous group violence and the restricted opportunity for defendants convicted under the previous approach has undermined its impact.
Reference(S):
Cases
R v Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 QB 110
Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168
R v Powell; R v English [1999] 1 AC 1
R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8
R v Johnson [2016] EWCA Crim 1613
Secondary Sources
‘Jogee and “West Side Story” – Still Unresolved Endings?’ (LSE Law Review Blog, 28 May 2021) https://blog.lselawreview.com/2021/05/28/jogee-and-west-side-story-still-unresolved-endings/ accessed 29 August 2026
‘Press Summary: R v Jogee (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 8; Ruddock (Appellant) v The Queen (Respondent) (Jamaica) [2016] UKPC 7’ (Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 18 February 2016)
UK Supreme Court, Joint Enterprise Debate Day Information Pack
Susannah Tromans, Complicity, Jogee, and the Principles of Criminal Law (MJur thesis, University of Birmingham 2019)
Glanville Williams, ‘Oblique Intention’ (1987) 46(3) Cambridge Law Journal 41
[1] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8.
[2] Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKPC 7.
[3] Press Summary: R v Jogee (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 8; Ruddock (Appellant) v The Queen (Respondent) (Jamaica) [2016] UKPC 7′ (Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 18 February 2016).
[4] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [2].
[5]R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [79].
[6] Press Summary’ (n 3).
[7] Press Summary’ (n 3).
[8] Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168.
[9] R v Powell; R v English [1999] 1 AC 1.
[10] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [61-73, 79-87, 100]
[11] Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] (n 8)
[12]R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [9-10].
[13] R v Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 QB 110
[14] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [84].
[15] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [55-[56].
[16] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [104]; ‘Press Summary’ (n 3).
[17] [17]R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [73].
[18] Glanville Williams, ‘Oblique Intention’ (1987) 46(3) CLJ 417.
[19] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [87], [90].
[20]R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [81]-[82].
[21] Press Summary’ (n 3); R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [83].
[22] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC8 [85].
[23] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [100].
[24] R v Jogee ( n 23); Press Summary’ (n 3)
[25] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [1].
[26] ‘Press Summary’ (n 3).
[27]UK Supreme Court, Joint Enterprise Debate Day Information Pack.
[28]R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [87]; ‘Press Summary’ (n 3).
[29] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [79-81].
[30] ‘Press Summary’ (n 3).
[31] R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [84].
[32] ‘Press Summary’ (n 3)
[33] Jogee and “West Side Story” – Still Unresolved Endings?’ (LSE Law Review Blog, 28 May 2021) https://blog.lselawreview.com/2021/05/28/jogee-and-west-side-story-still-unresolved-endings , accessed 29 August 2026.
[34] Glanville Williams (n 18)
[35] Susannah Tromans, Complicity, Jogee, and the Principles of Criminal Law (MJur thesis, University of Birmingham 2019).
[36]R v Johnson [2016] EWCA Crim 1613.

