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Economic Freedom Fighters and another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others

Authored By: Onwabe

University of Zululand

  1. Case citation and basic Information

Case: Economic Freedom Fighters and another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others

Case number: CCT 35/24

Court: Constitutional Court of South Africa

Date of Judgement: 8 May 2026

Coram: Maya CJ, Madlanga ADCJ, Kollapen J, Majeidt J, Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Rogers J, Seegobin AJ, Theron J, Tolmay AJ and Tshiqi J.[1]

      2. Introduction

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 establishes a system in which public power is exercised within constitutional limits. This principle becomes particularly important where allegations concern the President, who occupies the highest executive office. Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others concerned the constitutional validity of Rule 129I of the Rules of the National Assembly and the National Assembly’s decision not to refer an Independent Panel’s report concerning President Cyril Ramaphosa to an Impeachment Committee.[2]

The case arose from the Phala Phala controversy and required the constitutional Court to consider the relationship between parliamentary autonomy, majoritarian democracy and presidential accountability. Three judgements were delivered. Maya CJ and Majiedt J concluded that Rule 129I was unconstitutional although for different reasons, while Kollapen J concluded that the rule was constitutionally valid.[3]

  1. Facts of the Case

The matter originated from a burglary at President Cyril Ramaphosa’s Phala Phala Wildlife Game Farm and the circumstances surrounding the theft of foreign currency. The allegations concerning the money and the manner in which the incident was subsequently dealt with led to calls for an investigation whether the president had committed conduct falling within section 89(1) of the Constitution.[4]

Section 89(1) provides for the removal of the President by the National Assembly on specified constitutional grounds, including a serious violation of the constitution or law and serious misconduct.[5]

An Independent Panel chaired by former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo was appointed to conduct a preliminary assessment of the allegations, including matters concerning the foreign currency, and the investigation into the burglary.[6]

The Panel was not required to determine whether the President was guilty of an impeachable offence. Its task was to determine whether the information disclosed sufficient evidence to warrant the further operation of section 89 process. The panel ultimately found prima facie evidence that the President may have committed serious violations of the Constitution or law and serious misconduct.[7]

The Panel’s report was submitted to the National Assembly under Rule 129I.On 13 December 2022, the National Assembly voted not to refer the report to an Impeachment Committee, with 214 members voting against the referral and 149 in favour.[8]

The Economic Freedom Fighter (EFF) and the African Transformation Movement (ATM) subsequently approached the Constitutional Court. They challenged both the constitutional validity of Rule 129I and the validity of the National Assembly’s vote.

  1. Legal Issues

The principal issue was whether Rule 129I was consistent with the Constitution, The court also considered whether the National Assembly’s vote of 13 December 2022 was constitutionally valid and whether the constitutional court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the challenges.[9]

The case therefore required the Court to consider the proper balance between parliamentary autonomy and majoritarian democracy, on the one hand, and constitutional accountability and transparency, on the other.

  1. Arguments Presented

The applicants argued that Rule 129I was unconstitutional because it permitted the National Assembly to act as a gatekeeper to the impeachment process. They contended that, once the independent Panel had found sufficient evidence to warrant further consideration, the matter should proceed to an Impeachment Committee so that the allegations could be properly investigated.[10]

The applicants further argued that the National Assembly’s decision undermined Parliament’s constitutional responsibility to hold the Executive accountable because the process was terminated before the allegations were fully investigated.[11]

The respondents defended Rule 129I primarily on the basis of parliamentary autonomy and the separation of powers. They argued that section 89 confers the power to remove the President upon the National Assembly and does not require Parliament to pursue an impeachment inquiry whenever an Independent Panel makes a positive preliminary finding.[12]

       6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

Maya CJ, writing the first judgement, held that the Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the challenge to Rule 129I. She concluded that section 89(1) imposes constitutional obligations upon the National Assembly to establish an effective mechanism for presidential accountability. In her view, the mechanism adopted by Parliament had to be capable of fulfilling that constitutional purpose in practice.[13]

Maya CJ considered Rule 129I constitutionally defective because it placed the National Assembly in the position of a gatekeeper capable of terminating the process at an early stage. She reasoned that this created a risk that section 89(1) could be frustrated and that the accountability mechanism could become ineffective.[14]

Kollapen J agreed that the Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction concerning the challenge to Rule 129I but reached a different conclusion on its constitutionality. He held that the rule was constitutionally valid because section 89 creates a permissive power in the National Assembly to remove the President. In his view, the Constitution does not require the National Assembly to proceed with an impeachment inquiry merely because the Independent Panel has made a positive finding.[15]

Kollapen J further distinguished the challenge the rule from the challenge to the National Assembly’s vote. He considered the vote to be an exercise of Parliament’s permissive power and concluded that the Constitutional Court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over that challenge.[16]

Majied J, writing the third judgement, agreed with Maya CJ that Rule 129I was unconstitutional, but for different reasons. He focused on whether the rule enabled the National Assembly to fulfil the constitutional responsibility imposed upon it by section 89(1), read with section 55 of the Constitution and the Court’s earlier decision in Economic Freedom Fighters II.[17]

Majiedt J emphasized that accountability is a central constitutional value that Parliament must establish an effective mechanism for holding the President accountable.[18] He identified two principle defects in Rule 129I: it deprived the full National Assembly of the opportunity to determine whether a ground for impeachment existed and it could prevent the factual issues relevant to that determination from being properly ventilated.[19]

Majiedt J therefore concluded that Rule 129I undermined Parliament’s constitutional accountability function by allowing the process to be terminated before the allegations could be properly investigated. He considered this inconsistent with the constitutional purpose of section 89(1), particularly because the impeachment Committee provided the appropriate forum for further investigation and consideration.

  1. Judgement and Ratio Decidendi

The Constitutional Court unanimously held that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge to Rule 129I. By majority, the court declared Rule 129I unconstitutional and invalid. The National Assembly’s decision of 13 December 2022 was also declared invalid, and the Independent Panel’s report was referred to an Impeachment Committee.[20]

Importantly, the court did not determine whether President Ramaphosa had committed an impeachable offence or whether he should be removed from office. Those questions remained within Parliament’s constitutional responsibility.

The ratio decidendi of the majority judgment is that Parliament’s mechanism for giving effect to section 89(1) must provide an effective means of presidential accountability. Rule 129I was unconstitutional because it permitted the process to be terminated before the allegations could receive the further investigation and consideration necessary for Parliament to fulfil it’s constitutional function.[21]

  1. Critical Analysis

The judgement is significant because it reinforces that parliamentary authority, although democratically derived, remains subject to constitutional supremacy. The majority correctly recognized that presidential accountability requires more than the existence of a formal procedure; the procedure must be capable of operating effectively. Rule 129I allowed the National Assembly to terminate the process before the allegations could receive further investigation contemplated by the constitutional framework.[22]

Kollapen J’s reasoning nevertheless has considerable merit. His emphasis on Parliament’s democratic authority and separation of powers reflects the constitutional decision to entruct the removal of the removal of the President to the National Assembly. He was also correct to caution against the Judiciary for substituting its own political judgement for that of elected representatives.[23]This protects the institutional independence of Parliament and prevents constitutional review  from becoming judicial supervision of every parliamentary decision.

However this approach is less convincing when applied to Rule 129I. The issue was not whether Parliament possessed the ultimate power to remove the President. It did. The concern was whether Parliament could structure the preliminary stage of the process in a manner that permitted political majorities to prevent further investigation even where the Panel had found sufficient evidence to warrant the section 89 process.[24]In my view, allowing the process to end at that stage risks weakening accountability and transparency because the allegations may never receive the fuller investigation and public ventilation contemplated by the constitutional mechanism.[25]

The majority’s reasoning is therefore more persuasive. It does not transfer parliament’s impeachment power to the Judiciary or determine the President’s guilt. Instead, it requires Parliament to exercise its existing constitutional responsibility through an effective mechanism. This strikes a more appropriate balance between parliamentary autonomy and constitutional accountability.

The judgement also illustrates the principle underlying The Lawgiver, the Judge and the Executive: no holder of public power exists above the Constitution. Parliament exercises legislative authority, the President exercises executive authority and the Judiciary exercises judicial authority, but each remains constrained by constitutional supremacy. Democratic legitimacy therefore cannot, by itself, justify a procedure that undermines accountability. The strength of the judgement lies in reaffirming that constitutional government requires both democratic representation and effective mechanisms for holding those who exercise public power accountable.

  1. Conclusion

The Phala Phala judgment demonstrates the importance of maintaining a balance between parliamentary autonomy and constitutional accountability. Although Kollapen J’s emphasis on democratic representation and separation of powers is important, the majority’s approach is more persuasive because it recognizes that Parliament’s constitutional responsibility must be supported by an effective accountability mechanism. The Court did not determine whether President Ramaphosa was guilty of as an impeachable offence or whether he should be removed from office. Instead, it ensured that the constitutional process could operate without being prematurely terminated by Rule129I.[26]

Ultimately, the judgement confirms that democratic authority is exercised within the limits of constitutional supremacy. Parliament retains its constitutional role cannot be exercised through procedures that undermine the effectiveness of accountability itself. In this sense, the judgement reinforces the principle that no branch of giverment, regardless of its democratic legitimacy, stands above the Conatitution.

Reference(S):

[1] Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2026] ZACC 17 (CC) CCT 35/24.

[2] Ibid paras 1-7.

[3] Ibid paras 2-6.

[4] Ibid paras 10-25.

[5] Constitution of the republic of South Africa, 1996 s 89(1); Eff v Speaker (n 1) paras 10-12

[6] Eff v Speaker (n 1) paras 18-24.

[7] Ibid paras 21-24

[8] Ibid para 25.

[9] Ibid paras 34-35.

[10] Ibid paras 30-32

[11] Ibid paras 27-32.

[12] Ibid paras 33-36.

[13] Ibid paras 86-92,137-146.

[14] Ibid paras 137-146.

[15] Ibid paras 175-184, 220-229.

[16] Ibid paras 183-184, 245-301.

[17] Economic freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another [2017] ZACC 47; 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC) (‘EFF II), EFF v Speaker (n 1) paras 30-310.

[18] EFF v Speaker (n 1) paras 305-315.

[19] Ibid para 314-315.

[20] Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of National Assembly and Others [2026] ZACC 17 (CC) para 388.

[21] Ibid paras 336-379.

[22] Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2026] ZACC 17 (CC) paras 143-146.

[23] Ibid paras 175-184.

[24] Ibid paras 183-184, 220-229.

[25] Ibid paras 346-353.

[26][26] Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2026] ZACC 17 (CC) paras 3-7.

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