Authored By: Mohd Meezan
SAGE University, Bhopal
Abstract
In environmental law, the line that defines a thing often decides how far it is protected. This article examines that idea through the Supreme Court of India’s treatment of the Aravalli Range. On 20 November 2025 the Court accepted a uniform, elevation-based definition of the “Aravalli Hills” and “Aravalli Range” for regulating mining; on 29 December 2025 it took suo motu cognisance of the backlash and placed its own directions in abeyance. The article argues that classification is itself a form of regulation, tests the 2025 definition against settled principles of Indian environmental jurisprudence, and proposes a framework for balancing conservation and development.
Keywords: Aravalli, environmental law, definition, mining, precautionary principle, public trust, Article 21
I. Introduction
The Aravalli Range, stretching roughly 670 kilometres across Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and Gujarat, is among the oldest fold-mountain systems in the world. It checks the spread of the Thar desert, recharges groundwater in water-stressed districts and sustains wildlife corridors that serve the National Capital Region. What has long been unsettled is a deceptively simple legal question: what, precisely, is the Aravalli?
The question matters because mining leases, construction approvals and enforcement actions all depend on whether a parcel is legally “Aravalli”. States have used different tests, so a hill protected in one State could be quarried in another. The Supreme Court’s attempt to settle the matter with one uniform definition produced one of the sharpest controversies in recent Indian environmental law, and a rare instance of the Court revisiting its own directions within weeks.
This article asks whether the definition withstood scrutiny against the Court’s own jurisprudence, and what the episode teaches about science, judicial supervision and the conservation-development balance. The litigation is ongoing, and the analysis reflects the position as of November 2026.
II. Legal Background
No single statute defines the Aravallis. Protection has been assembled from several instruments: the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, under which large tracts in Haryana are notified; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (now the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, as amended in 2023); the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, under which a 1992 notification restricted activities in parts of Alwar and Gurgaon; the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; and regional plans such as the NCR Regional Plan, which designates a Natural Conservation Zone. Whether a given hill is protected therefore depends on which instrument reaches it and how each State has recorded its hills.
The Supreme Court became the principal regulator through two continuing mandamus proceedings: M.C. Mehta’s litigation on environmental degradation in and around Delhi, and the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad forest case. In Godavarman ((1997) 2 SCC 267) the Court gave “forest” its dictionary meaning rather than confining it to notified forests, protecting land by ecological reality rather than administrative label. In Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum ((1996) 5 SCC 647) and Lafarge Umiam Mining ((2011) 7 SCC 338) it embedded the precautionary principle and sustainable development in Indian law.
Before 2025, the Forest Survey of India’s 2010 approach identified Aravalli hills by a slope criterion (three degrees or more) with a 100-metre buffer, tied to the shape of the terrain rather than a single height.
III. The 20 November 2025 Judgment
In May 2024 the Court constituted a committee to recommend a uniform definition, because States applied inconsistent criteria when granting mining permissions. The committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) and including the Aravalli States, reported in 2025. On 20 November 2025, in In Re: Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges and Ancillary Issues, the Court accepted its recommendations:
Aravalli Hill: any landform in the notified Aravalli districts rising 100 metres or more above local relief (measured from the lowest encircling contour line), with its supporting slopes.
Aravalli Range: two or more such hills within 500 metres of each other, with the intervening valleys and slopes.
The Court also directed a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining and barred new leases until it was finalised. Reports indicate that certain critical minerals were treated differently.
The case for the definition deserves a fair statement. Uniformity stops operators shopping between States, and enforcement officers need an objective test. The Union maintained that, with the lease freeze, more than 90 per cent of the Aravalli region would stay protected.
The objections were substantial. A single height threshold treats a mountain system as a set of tall peaks, though lower ridges and connecting hills perform much of the recharge, habitat and dust-suppression work. The Court itself later questioned whether the finding that only 1,048 of 12,081 mapped hills met the 100-metre test was scientifically sound; on that ratio, roughly nine in ten mapped hills would fall outside the definition. It also asked whether confining the “range” to areas within 500 metres of qualifying hills widened the “non-Aravalli” category, exposing terrain that is ecologically contiguous but technically excluded.
IV. The Suo Motu Correction
The public reaction was swift. On 21 December 2025 the Union government defended the definition. The Court took suo motu cognisance on 27-28 December, and on 29 December a vacation Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices J.K. Maheshwari and A.G. Masih placed the committee’s recommendations and its own 20 November directions in abeyance, observing that they were being misconstrued. Notice went to the Union and the four Aravalli States.
The proceedings then advanced in three steps. On 21 January 2026 a Bench including Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul M. Pancholi extended the abeyance and warned that illegal mining can cause irreversible damage. In February the Court directed status quo on mining and related activities. In May 2026 it constituted a five-member High-Powered Committee, chaired ex officio by Kanchan Devi, Director General of the Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education, to review the Centre’s report independently and resolve “critical ambiguities”. The committee missed its first deadline of 31 August 2026, and on 7 September 2026 the Court rejected its request for time until February 2027, fixing 30 November 2026 as a non-extendable deadline and allowing interim reports on urgent issues.
Three features stand out. The Court acted on its own motion; it treated its judgment as provisional once its factual base was doubted; and it replaced an executive-led committee with an independent body, recognising that the source of expertise affects legitimacy.
V. Analysis
A. Classification as regulation
Environmental statutes rarely protect “nature” in the abstract; they protect defined categories such as “forest”, “wetland” or “protected area”. Entry into the category is the decisive legal event, and the criteria for entry mark the outer boundary of protection. A narrow definition can therefore shrink the protected estate without repealing a single provision.
B. Precaution and the burden of proof
The precautionary principle shifts the burden to the proponent of an activity where serious or irreversible harm is possible. Applied to classification, it favours inclusion where the science is uncertain. A 100-metre threshold is not self-evidently a measure of ecological function, and the Court’s own later questioning suggests the definition did not meet this standard.
C. Public trust and intergenerational equity
In Goa Foundation ((2014) 6 SCC 590) and Common Cause ((2017) 9 SCC 499), both on mining of finite mineral resources, the Court stressed that natural resources are held in trust for present and future generations. The groundwater and desertification-control services of the Aravallis cannot be restored on any human timescale once the landform is gone. A classification that withdraws protection must be justified against that standard, not administrative convenience.
D. Article 21 and non-regression
Article 21 has been read to include the right to a healthy environment, and Articles 48A and 51A(g) impose duties to protect it. Comparative law also recognises non-regression: levels of protection, once attained, should not be reduced without compelling justification. Indian courts have not adopted it as a settled doctrine, so it is a persuasive argument, not binding law. Yet a rule widely read as removing protection from most mapped hills was perceived as regression, and the Court’s pause is consistent with that instinct.
E. Uniformity and independent expertise
The 2025 exercise was right to seek uniformity across four jurisdictions. The lesson is that a uniform rule needs a uniform scientific base, achieved by raising the floor rather than adopting the lowest common denominator. Likewise, deference to expert committees is appropriate only where the body is independent of the interests under review and its methodology can be examined. The first committee was chaired by a ministry official and included the very governments that administer mining.
VI. A Framework and Recommendations
The controversy is sometimes framed as environmentalists against the mining sector. The better view is that it concerns how to decide. Six principles follow from the analysis:
Function before form. Define protected terrain by slope, continuity, recharge and habitat connectivity, using height as one input among several.
Presumption of inclusion under uncertainty. Treat contested landforms as protected pending ground-truthing.
Independent, transparent science. Publish datasets and methodology, and use committees independent of mining and construction departments.
Activity-specific regulation. Within the protected zone, prohibit the most damaging activities, condition others, and keep any critical-mineral exception narrow, reasoned and reviewable.
Planning before permitting. Finalise the Management Plan for Sustainable Mining, with carrying-capacity assessments, before any new lease.
Monitoring and accountability. Use satellite monitoring and ground audits, and hold officials answerable for illegal mining.
For the Union and the States, the definition should be notified by statute or binding notification, so that protection does not rest solely on court orders, and integrated with land records, mining cadastres and regional plans. For litigants, challenges are strongest when they attack the method of classification (its scientific basis, the independence of the expert body, consistency with Godavarman) and rest on remote-sensing data and expert affidavits. They should also be ready to meet the counter-argument that bright-line tests promote certainty.
VII. Conclusion
The Court’s handling of the Aravallis in 2025 and 2026 is instructive because it corrected itself. The November 2025 definition was an honest attempt to cure real regulatory inconsistency, but it relied on a single numerical criterion ill-suited to a fragmented, functionally continuous mountain system. The suo motu pause, the status-quo order and the independent High-Powered Committee return the Court to the ecology-first reasoning of its earlier jurisprudence.
In environmental law, classification is regulation: whoever draws the line decides what the law protects. A defensible line rests on science, is adopted through a transparent and independent process, leans towards precaution under uncertainty, and sits within a plan that lets development proceed inside ecological limits. The committee’s final report, due by 30 November 2026, will test whether that lesson has been learned.
Principal Authorities
Cases: In Re: Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges and Ancillary Issues (Supreme Court of India, 20 November 2025 and later orders); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985); T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267; Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647; Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 338; Goa Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590; Common Cause v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 499.
Statutes: Constitution of India, Articles 21, 48A and 51A(g); Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.
Sources consulted (October 2026): reports in Down To Earth, The Leaflet, Supreme Court Observer, Deccan Herald, LawBeat and All India Radio.
Disclaimer: This article is an academic analysis based on publicly reported material and is not legal advice.

