Authored By: Thabo Marselino Adriaanse
University of South Africa
Case: Frazer v Children’s Court, Pretoria North, and Others
Citation: (CCT 31/96) [1997] ZACC 1; 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC); 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC)
Court: Constitutional Court of South Africa
Date of decision: 5 February 1997
Judge/s: Mohamed DP, unanimous.
Introduction.
This summary joins past and present law on unmarried fathers. Before 1994, South African law said a child born out of wedlock needed only the mother’s consent for adoption. Section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 dispensed with the father’s consent in all circumstances, regardless of age or bonds of the child.[1] Fathers had no voice. With the Interim Constitution, equality became the first purpose, and section 8(2) prohibited discrimination on grounds of gender and marital status.[2] The Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others case is the turning point where that voice pierced the gates. The Court found that s18(4)(d) violates s8(2) as presumptively unfair and suspended invalidity for two years under section 98(5) for Parliament to rectify this through the formulation of new law.[3] This is why it is a landmark case: it led to the Natural Father’s Act 86 of 1997 and today secures rights for unmarried fathers under s21 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.[4] This summary covers the facts, issues, arguments, reasoning, and order, and compares it with Hugo specifically in our critical analysis section, where discrimination was found to be fair under s8(3)(a).
Facts of the Case.
Fraser, a systems developer, and Naudé, a violinist at the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), lived together as man and wife in Melville and Malvern from 1994 to 1995 without a formal marriage. Their son Timothy was born on 12 December 1995, and it is commonly believed that Fraser is the father. Even before birth, Naudé had decided that adoption would be best, while Fraser resisted and wanted to keep the child.[5] In fact, he applied to adopt Timothy himself, as a prospective parent.[6] His urgent interdicts in the Witwatersrand Local Division (WLD) in December 1995 and February 1996 to stop the adoption from happening failed, unfortunately. Then, on 23 February 1996, the Children’s Court Pretoria North granted the adoption to third respondents under s 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, which only required the mother’s consent, since the child was illegitimate.[7] In continuance of his pursuit to rectify this, he brought a review in the Transvaal Provincial Division (TPD) on 11 March 1996, where Preiss J set the adoption aside on the 24th of May 1996 and referred the constitutionality of s18(4)(d) to the Constitutional Court under s102(1) of the Interim Constitution as a violation of s8(2), the right to equality.[8]
Legal issues.
Issue 1: Whether section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 violates section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution?[9]
Issue 2: Whether discrimination on the grounds of gender and marital status under section 18(4)(d) is unfair in terms of section 8(4) of the Interim Constitution and justifiable under section 33(1)?[10]
Issue 3: Whether the appropriate remedy for such inconsistency is a declaration of invalidity suspended for two years in terms of section 98(5) of the Interim Constitution to allow Parliament to correct the defect?[11]
Arguments Presented.
Frazer argued that section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 authorises unfair discrimination under section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution. This, in turn, gives every mother an automatic right, subject to section 19, to withhold her consent to the adoption of the child, while it remains denied to every unmarried father, regardless of the age of the child or circumstance. Leading to unfair results, especially for those fathers who want to be present in the lives of the mother and children. Meaning that fathers of 18-year-olds, with the strongest bonds, have no rights, while mothers with no interest in the child in the first few months after birth do.[12] The perfect example of discrimination on the grounds of marital and gender status: married fathers get to give consent, while unmarried fathers do not.[13] He also goes on to point out the fact that matrimonial unions are discriminated against, specifically section 27, where the definition of customary unions under section 35 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 is found. And any justification for discriminating against fathers is ‘destroyed’ by the latter.[14]
However, the second and third respondents argued that the biological difference justifies some differentiation initially, as the mother nurtures and breastfeeds the child after birth for a certain period of time. They relied on the protection of single mothers, avoiding delays, and said that their purpose is aimed at the best interests of the child, so to justify the limitation under section 33 is reasonable and necessary “in an open and democratic society based on freedom and security”.[15] But the Court, per Mahomed, Deputy, found that this justification, under section 33, is unreasonable and thus left Parliament the opportunity to formulate a new law eventually.[16]
Reasoning and Analysis.
The Court interpreted section 18(4)(d) as a blanket exclusion. It gives every mother the automatic right, subject to section 19, but denies it to unmarried fathers regardless of the child’s age or circumstances.[17] The Court rather realised that equality is the very heart of the Constitution and it defines the constitutional ethos, through the preamble, which set the scene for a new era of our Constitution. It read Section 8 as the core of the constitutional ethos.[18] The Court then relied on other cases to show that even other marriages that are prone to polygamy due to their culture or religious practices may also suffer discrimination under Section 27, which deems customary unions as marriages as well (Ismail v Ismail).[19] It considers Re MacVicar, where a similar provision was held.[20] It accepted that perhaps differentiation could apply to the extent that, in the case of a mother, nurturing and breastfeeding a young child could be reasonable for the period when the child needs such care, but rejected the blanket rule beyond that. Because fathers with 18-year-olds, with whom they share stronger bonds than the mothers do after those first few months of nurturing, have no rights. It is unfair and unreasonable for unmarried fathers not to have the same rights as married fathers, especially when it comes to consenting to the adoption of their children, but all mothers can, regardless of their marital status.
Section 33 was applied in this regard as a test to see whether the limitation is indeed justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. Balancing the need to be sensitive to deeply disadvantaged mothers against the equality rights of fathers, which, in turn, the blanket ban fails to do proportionately.[21] Thus, the reason for the remedial approach through the declaration of invalidity for two years under section 98(5) is for Parliament to restore this balance and prevent further chaos in the adoption system.[22]
Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
The decision:
The order was that section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 is inconsistent with section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution to the extent that it dispenses in all circumstances with the consent of fathers of children born out of wedlock. This discriminates on the basis of gender and marital status. This invoked a declaration of invalidity, suspended for two years under section 98(5) to enable Parliament to formulate appropriate legislation, having regard to the interests of justice and good government and the deep disadvantage of single mothers.[23]
Ratio Decidendi:
The law cannot exclude every unmarried father from adoption consent, because it will then continue to unjustly discriminate against even those married under customary unions or religious marriages, as well as break the bonds built by fathers of 18-year-olds. This led to an anomalous result where the fathers of these older children continue to have no rights, while mothers, despite their marital status, retain a relationship with the child after the nurturing and breastfeeding period after birth, and/or with no interest always does.[24] This blanket exclusion on the listed grounds of gender and marital status is presumed unfair, unjust, and unreasonable under section 33 as an open and democratic society.[25]
Comparison with Hugo and Critical Analysis.
The link between Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) and the President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) is the same section 8(2), but different in section 8(3)(a) and 8(4) outcomes. In Fraser, Section 18(4)(d) discriminated on gender and marital status because the father’s consent was overlooked or carried no weight without a marriage certificate, regardless of the age and the bond he had with the child. This is unfair and presumed unfair under the listed grounds.[26] In Hugo, the President understood that it was necessary to pardon the sentences of mothers with children under the age of 12 to prison, and not fathers. This also discriminates on gender, but the majority, per Goldstone J, held the decision as fair under section 8(3)(a) to help women who bear an unequal share of the child-rearing burden in South African society, as the primary caregivers and nurturers for young children.[27]
I agree with Kriegler J’s dissent when looking at paragraphs 73, 74, 78, 83, and O’Regan J’s paragraphs 109-111. When we say that a primary caregiver equals a mother, we once again fall into a stereotype, which remains the root cause for why many fathers or men continue the relic of patriarchy, another form of inequality. This keeps the identities of people limited, stunted, and controlled by society, a kryptonite to individual freedoms of both men and women. The majority errs by relying on generalisation, which is the result of disadvantage, thus needing the application of section 33 at the section 8(4) stage.[28] The early release of 440 women based on societal norms or views of women benefits these women more than the rest of South African women who already suffered under the burden of these social norms, and are stuck being in the home as caregivers while men are given secondary roles. This limited benefit cannot continue to justify reinforcing a societal view that is the root cause of inequality.[29] This now penalises caregiving fathers like Fraser, who wanted to be present, including Hugo. Thus, it now makes sense as to why the two-year suspension for rectifying this invalidity was a needed approach by Fraser: to formulate new legislation, sensitive to the deep disadvantages of single mothers, which became the Natural Fathers Act 86 of 1997 and now the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 s21, as a remedy and to restore balance.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Fraser compared old law and new law, showing law must move on and adapt from status to substance. In Fraser, a father was denied a voice concerning the adoption of his child, a child he was willing to be present for, but the mother was not challenged only because a marriage certificate was not signed. The law cannot exclude every unmarried father, regardless of the child’s age, circumstances, or bonds shared. That leads to anomalous results where fathers of eighteen-year-olds sharing strong bonds will continue to have no rights while mothers with no interest in the children always do. Such blanket exclusion based on gender and marital status is presumed unfair and not justified under section 33, as an open and democratic society should be. The order was declared invalid, but the remedy was suspended for two years under section 98(5) to enable Parliament enough time to formulate new legislation to restore the inequalities of the past and have regard to the interests of justice and good government, as well as tending to the deep disadvantages of single mothers under the obesity of stereotypical societal norms. This new legislation became the Natural Fathers Act, then the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, section 233 for adoption consent and section 21 for parental responsibilities and rights. This is the balance our society needed and proof that our law needs to continue making room for change.
Reference(S):
Table of cases
Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North, and Others 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC)
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)
Table of Legislation.
Children’s Act 38 of 2005
[1] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 4.
[2] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 24
[3] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, paras 7-10 and 15-16
[4] Children’s Act 38 of 2005 s21(1)(a)-(b)
[5] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, paras 1-2
[6] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 4.
[7] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, paras 3-6
[8] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, paras 7-9 and para 11.
[9] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, paras 24-26.
[10] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 15 (s8(4) presumptions of unfairness) and paras 42-43 (s33(1) justification analysis).
[11] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, paras 44-46 (remedy under s98(5)).
[12] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 25.
[13] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 26.
[14] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 22.
[15] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 25.
[16] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 43.
[17] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 26.
[18] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 20 and 24.
[19] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 21; see footnote 12.
[20] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 36.
[21] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 44.
[22] Ibid
[23] Ibid
[24] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 25.
[25] Ibid
[26] Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others, para 15 read with para 16.
[27] President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo paras 37-41.
[28] President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo para78.
[29] President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo para 83.

