ARTICLE REVIEW ON “PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA” by Parmanand Singh

In “Protection of Human Rights Through Public Interest Litigation in India,” the author Parmanand Singh notes a critical examination of the evolution, mechanisms, and the socio-political impact of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India, which is used as a tool for safeguarding human rights for citizens. He analyses how the Supreme Court of India moved from a rigid, colonial-era Anglo-Saxon model of arbitration to a more proactive and “homegrown” system that is designed to protect the rights of marginalised citizens of our country.

KEY ARGUMENTS:

The author mentions that PIL came into existence from the post-Emergency period (1975-1977) and its historical context. The Supreme Court of India, shaken by its failure to protect civil rights and liberties during the Emergency, led by Justices V.R. Krishna Iyer and P.N. Bhagwati, strived to redeem its image by providing access to justice to everyone. They achieved this by removing the traditional rule of locus standi and therefore allowing citizens to file petitions on the behalf of those people unable to receive access to courts due to poverty or disability.

Paramanand Singh emphasizes on the “Social Action Litigation” roots of PIL, mentioning that it was intended as an instrument for social change on the behalf of the oppressed and victimised classes of society in the very beginning.

He divides the unique features of PIL into five domains:

1. Expanding Rights through Article 21: The Supreme Court redefined the Right to Life from a mere animalistic existence to a right to live with human dignity, that included speedy trials and education about rights.
2. Democratization and Epistolary Jurisdiction: where a simple letter or telegram could be treated as a writ petition.
3. New Reliefs: creating innovative remedies like interim compensation for victims of state lawlessness.
4. Creeping Jurisdiction: ensuring that state institutions like jails and mental asylums are continuously monitored judicially.
5. Investigative Legislation: when the state might be withholding evidence, socio-legal commissions and official investigators may be used to find required facts.

CORE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES:

The article has detailed specific areas where Public Interest Litigation has intervened:

1. Prisons and Custodial Violence: Cases like Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (releasing 40,000 undertrials), Anil Yadav v. State of Bihar (addressing the blinding of prisoners), Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa.
2. Gender Justice and Protection: Cases like Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (establishing guidelines against sexual harassment in workplaces), Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India, Gang Rape of Guntaben that also provided rehabilitation for rape victims.
3. Bonded and Child Labour: Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, M.C. Mehta v, State of Tamil Nadu for the court’s role in pushing for legislative and executive action.

THE ROLE OF NHRC:

The author also mentions the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which was established in 1993. While Paramanand Singh acknowledges its role in highlighting custodial deaths and providing compensation, he concludes that the body remains a “post-office” entity; primarily only calling for reports from the government without making any legally binding decisions.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS:

STRENGTHS OF THE ARTICLE:

The article’s primary strength lies in its empirical grounding and doctrinal depth. Paramanand Singh does not just praise the judiciary, he offers a “critique of judicial responses”. This article provides a clear trajectory of how judicial activism evolved from a protective shield to a broad tool for governance by tracing the timeline from Hussainara Khatoon (1979) to the late 1990s.

Another strength is the distinction between the Indian and American versions of PIL. The author correctly identifies that while the American PIL focused on “civic participation” and consumerism, Indian PIL (or Social Action Litigation, as mentioned by Upendra Baxi) was a struggle against “state repression” and “governmental lawlessness”. This difference is important for understanding the unique constitutional role of the Indian Supreme Court as a “people’s court”.

WEAKNESSESS AND LIMITATIONS:

A visible weakness in the article is the pessimism regarding the implementation. While the author provides evidence of the court’s limited capacity to monitor the directions it gave (for example, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha), he does not offer much in the way of structural solutions beyond “developmental programmes”. Adding to this, the section on the NHRC is largely descriptive and lacks an in-depth analysis of why the legislative framework purposely kept the commission’s powers recommendatory.

Additionally, as the article was written in 2000, it predates the massive surge in digital-era PILs. Although it correctly identifies the “overload of judicial commitments,” it failed to anticipate how the RTI Act and social media would complicate the “episodic” nature of litigation that the author laments.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

The article is an influential contribution to the discourse on Compensatory Jurisprudence, serving as a vital historical record of the “golden era” of judicial activism in India. It documents the procedural dismantling of legal barriers from colonial times, specifically the relaxation of locus standi and the introduction of “epistolary jurisdiction” (treating letters as petitions). The author highlights how the court shifted from a “sovereign immunity” mindset to a “public law doctrine” where the state is absolutely liable for human rights violations. This is best shown in his analysis of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa.

Adding to this, the article contributes to the understanding of the Separation of Powers in the Indian context. By describing “creeping jurisdiction,” the author provides a framework for students of law to debate if the judiciary is “taking over the administration” of the state institutions or simply filling a legislative vacuum.

RELEVANCE OF ARGUMENTS:

Paramanand Singh’s argument regarding the “middle-class appropriation” of PIL remains very relevant today. In contemporary India, PILs are frequently used for urban planning, environmental issues, and political disputes. His warning that this “might dilute the original commitment” to the oppressed and lower classes is a critique that goes on to resonate in modern legal debates about judicial overreach. Adding to this, the evidence presented regarding the failure of the Bandhua Mukti Morcha directions remain a powerful testament to the limits of judicial power, serving as a reminder that court orders cannot substitute for executive political will.

COMPARITIVE EVALUATION AND STRUCTURE:

COMPARITIVE CONTEXT AND BROADER DISCOURSE:

To fully appreciate this article written by Paramanand Singh, it must be compared with Upendra Baxi’s works, whom the author cites multiple times in his article. Upendra Baxi coined the term “Social Action Litigation” (SAL) to emphasize the present struggle for justice, whereas Singh uses “Public Interest Litigation” (PIL) while acknowledging Baxi’s preference. While Baxi’s work was arguably more optimistic and theoretical, Singh’s 2000 review is more pragmatic and sceptical. This reflects the difference between the times, where it is seen that judicial orders often go unimplemented. Upendra Baxi wanted to distinguish the Indian model from the American model of PIL (which is why he coined the term SAL), as the latter focused on lobbying and consumerism. Singh acknowledges this difference, putting forward a view that Indian PIL native to the country, born of state repression during the Emergency rather than Western liberal pluralism.

Singh’s analysis of the “middle-class takeover” of PIL also invites comparison with later scholars such as Anuj Bhuwania. In Courting the People (2017), Bhuwania argues that PIL’s procedural flexibility, which Singh saw as a tool for justice, later became “judicial populism,” enabling courts to bypass due process to the disadvantage of the poor, as seen in slum eviction cases. Singh’s article captures this transition: he treats relaxed procedure as necessary for helping the poor, while Bhuwania critiques it as a source of judicial tyranny. Thus, Singh’s work bridges the idealism of the 1980s and the realism of the post-2010s.

Regarding the NHRC, the author, Paramanand Singh’s description of it as a body that merely “calls for reports” aligns with the later characterisation by former NHRC chairperson H.L. Dattu, who notably called the commission a “toothless tiger” in 2016. Singh’s analysis confirms that this structural weakness was evident even in the commission’s infancy.

CONCLUSION AND FINAL EVALUATION:

The article fits into the broader legal discourse as a candid “report card” of the first two decades of Pil. Unlike accounts that often glorify judges like justice Krishna Iyer and P.N. Bhagwati without hesitation, Singh adopts a balanced approach, acknowledging the “legitimacy” PIL brought to the post-Emergency courts but refuses to ignore the implementation gap. His critique that “judicial activism on child labour has been unsatisfactory” contrasts sharply with the court’s own self-congratulatory rhetoric in cases like M.C. Mehta, placing Singh firmly in the camp of realistic socio-legal scholars who value outcomes over judicial pronouncements.