Authored By: Molebogeng Sambo
North West University
At a media briefing on the 6th of July 2025, Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) for KwaZulu-Natal, claimed that a highly skilled criminal syndicate had penetrated law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), and associated establishments. [1]President Cyril Ramaphosa established a judicial panel of investigation in response to allegations of conspiracy between politicians, senior police officers, prosecutors and elements of organised crime.
This article contends that the Madlanga Commission, also known as the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Criminality, Political Interference, and Corruption in the Criminal Justice System, is an essential constitutional tool for revealing systematic capture of the criminal justice system. Although the Commission’s preliminary conclusions and probe referrals show the importance of commissions under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution, the Commission’s final success hinges on how well its recommendations are carried out in order to rebuild public confidence and institutional integrity.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The President appointed the Commission in accordance with section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996,which grant the Head of State the authority to form commissions of inquiry[2]. The Commission was formally created and its terms of reference outlined in Proclamation Notice 269 of 2025, which was published in Government Gazette No. 53048 on July 23, 2025. [3]
The Commissions Act 8 of 1947, which grants the Commission the same authority as a High Court to call witnesses, administer oaths, and order the production of documents, governs its operations[4]. Its operations were further directed by regulations and guidelines that were released in August 2025. Advocates Sesi Baloyi SC and Sandile Khumalo SC support the retired Constitutional Court justice and former Acting Deputy Chief Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga, who serves as the Commission’s chair.[5]
According to the terms of reference, the Commission must look into claims that drug cartels and other criminal syndicates have unduly influenced or infiltrated the SAPS (including the Political Killings Task Team and Crime Intelligence), metropolitan police departments, the NPA, the State Security Agency, judges, and the Department of Correctional Services. In addition, the Commission must assess political meddling, the efficiency of oversight procedures, the suitability of laws and offer suggestions for criminal prosecutions, disciplinary actions as well as institutional reforms.[6]
KEY EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
On the 17th of September 2025, public hearings began with testimony from Lieutenant-General Mkhwanazi. He described alleged political meddling, including the dissolution of the KwaZulu-Natal Political Killings Task Team and connections between high-ranking authorities and organised crime. Lieutenant-General Dumisani Khumalo, the director of Crime Intelligence and the National Commissioner General Fannie Masemola were next to face charges of fraud and corruption. The “Big Five” cartel, a Gauteng-based group allegedly involved in drug trafficking, tender fraud, contract killings, hijackings, and extortion with apparent political ties, was revealed by Khumalo’s evidence.[7]
A number of senior SAPS officers and officials from the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department (EMPD) were referred for criminal investigation and potential suspension in the first interim report, which was submitted on the 17th of December 2025, and it found prima facie evidence of wrongdoing. President Ramaphosa agreed to these suggestions[8]. On 29th of May 2026, a second interim report was issued following more hearings with witnesses from the SAPS, EMPD, and Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department.[9]
Specific events, such as the disappearance of substantial amounts of cocaine from Hawks facilities and alleged unethical links between police officers and criminal personalities, have been the subject of hearings. In contrast to merely retroactive investigations, the Commission’s staged approach airing allegations, permitting comments from those implicated, and assessing evidence has made real-time accountability actions, such as suspensions and referrals, possible.[10]
The amount of evidence and the necessity to fully fulfil its mandate are reflected in the Commission’s term extensions, most recently to the 16th of November 2026 for the final report.[11]
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Madlanga Commission tackles the capture of institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law, which poses a serious threat to it. Commissions under section 84(2)(f) have an investigative and advising role,although their conclusions are not legally binding on the President, they provide public records and recommendations that have the potential to spark prosecutions and reform. By concentrating on current infiltration rather than past occurrences and permitting prompt referrals, the Commission expands upon the State Capture Commission in this regard.[12]
Its merits include the scope of its terms of reference, the seniority of its leadership, and the fact that most hearings are held in public, which improves openness. Political meddling and evidence of the “Big Five” have already led to institutional reactions, such as criminal referrals and suspensions. These results show that commissions are more than just historical documents,they can serve as active instruments of accountability.
Challenges still exist. The Commission’s dependence on presidential extensions highlights the time and resource limitations that come with complicated investigations. Protective measures have been required due to witness safety concerns, underscoring the dangers of looking into such syndicates. Furthermore, the executive and prosecuting agencies are responsible for carrying out the recommendations. If the Commission doesn’t take decisive action, it could become part of a series of investigations whose conclusions are forgotten. Deeper systemic solutions beyond individual responsibility are also needed to address the structural vulnerabilities of specialist units like Crime Intelligence and the Hawks, as well as the sufficiency of current oversight regulations.
CONCLUSION
The extent of suspected criminal and political infiltration into South Africa’s criminal justice system has already been made clear by the Madlanga Commission. The constitutional value of section 84(2)(f) commissions in combating institutional capture is confirmed by its interim reports and referrals. However, exposure by itself is not enough. The final report, which is anticipated by mid-November 2026, must provide specific, doable suggestions for improved monitoring, legislative change, and the long-term dismissal of compromised officials.
It is submitted that the Commission’s conclusions should be interpreted by Parliament and the executive branch as a call for immediate institutional rebuilding. South Africa can only re-establish the fundamental tenet that no individual or group is above the law and restore the integrity of its criminal justice system through strict application.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Statutes
Commissions Act 8 of 1947 (S. Afr.).
Cases
President of the Republic of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football Union, 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC).
Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State v. Zuma, [2021] ZACC 2.
Legislative and Administrative Materials
Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa No. 269 of 2025, Government Gazette No. 53048 (23 July 2025) (S. Afr.).
Other Authorities
BBC News. Madlanga Commission: ‘Gifts’ from a Lover and ‘Botched’ Cocaine Raids – the Police Inquiry Gripping South Africa. May 30, 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce9p5e1jg72o.
Corruption Watch. Madlanga Commission Terms of Reference Gazetted. July 28, 2025. https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/madlanga-commission-terms-of-reference-gazetted/.
Daily Maverick. Lessons from Zondo Teach the Madlanga Commission to Catch Corrupt Cops in Real Time. July 19, 2026. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-07-19-zondo-exposed-the-corruption-now-madlanga-is-closing-the-net/.
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Criminality, Political Interference and Corruption in the Criminal Justice System. About. https://criminaljusticecommission.org.za/about.php (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Criminality, Political Interference and Corruption in the Criminal Justice System. Media Statement: Madlanga Commission Submits Second Interim Report to President Cyril Ramaphosa. May 29, 2026. https://criminaljusticecommission.org.za/uploads/MADLANGA_SECOND_INTERIM_29052026.pdf.
Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. President Cyril Ramaphosa Welcomes Madlanga Commission Interim Report. Jan. 29, 2026. https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-welcomes-madlanga-commission-interim-report-29-jan.
The Citizen. Madlanga Commission’s Lifespan Extended Again. July 9, 2026. https://www.citizen.co.za/news/madlanga-commission-november-extension-ramaphosa/.
TimesLIVE. A Year of Madlanga: The Inquiry Investigating Corruption, Crime and Political Interference. July 6, 2026. https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2026-07-06-a-year-of-madlanga-the-inquiry-investigating-corruption-crime-and-political-interference/.
[1] See Judicial Comm’n of Inquiry into Criminality, Political Interference and Corruption in the Crim. Just. Sys. (Madlanga Comm’n), About, https://criminaljusticecommission.org.za/about.php (last visited Aug. 5, 2026);
[2] The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 84(2)(f).
[3] Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa No. 269 of 2025, Gov’t Gazette No. 53048 (23 July 2025) (S. Afr.).
[4] Commissions Act 8 of 1947 (S. Afr.).
[5] Madlanga Comm’n, supra note 1; see also Corruption Watch, Madlanga Commission Terms of Reference Gazetted (July 28, 2025), https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/madlanga-commission-terms-of-reference-gazetted/.
[6] Proclamation No. 269 of 2025, supra note 3, Schedule (Terms of Reference).
[7] TimesLIVE, A Year of Madlanga: The Inquiry Investigating Corruption, Crime and Political Interference (July 6, 2026), https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2026-07-06-a-year-of-madlanga-the-inquiry-investigating-corruption-crime-and-political-interference/.
[8] Presidency of the Republic of S. Afr., President Cyril Ramaphosa Welcomes Madlanga Commission Interim Report (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-welcomes-madlanga-commission-interim-report-29-jan.
[9] Madlanga Comm’n, Media Statement: Submission of Second Interim Report (May 29, 2026), https://criminaljusticecommission.org.za/uploads/MADLANGA_SECOND_INTERIM_29052026.pdf.
[10] BBC News, Madlanga Commission: ‘Gifts’ from a Lover and ‘Botched’ Cocaine Raids (May 30, 2026), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce9p5e1jg72o; Daily Maverick, Lessons from Zondo Teach the Madlanga Commission to Catch Corrupt Cops in Real Time (July 19, 2026), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-07-19-zondo-exposed-the-corruption-now-madlanga-is-closing-the-net/.
[11] The Citizen, Madlanga Commission’s Lifespan Extended Again (July 9, 2026), https://www.citizen.co.za/news/madlanga-commission-november-extension-ramaphosa/; Presidency Statement (July 9, 2026).
[12] President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union, 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) [hereinafter SARFU III]; Sec’y of the Judicial Comm’n of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture v. Zuma, [2021] ZACC 2.
