Authored By: Emir Nezir
UNSA-Laws School in Sarajevo
Abstract
As we enter an era of increasingly widespread use of digital media and various forms of social media, alongside the normalization of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, new challenges are emerging in efforts to protect electoral processes and voters themselves. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) represents a particularly complex form of interference, as it often operates within a legally undefined space between political expression, propaganda, disinformation, and coordinated foreign influence.
It should be noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina is already significantly vulnerable to such activities. Political polarization, institutional weakness, deficiencies in the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and numerous other factors contribute to this vulnerability.
This paper examines whether the current legal framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina is adequate to protect against FIMI during the 2026 electoral process, and identifies the key strengths and weaknesses of the existing democratic framework.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2026 Elections, electoral law, foreign information manipulation, FIMI, AI
Introduction
Free elections are one of the fundamental elements of a democratic society. The legitimacy of public authorities depends not only on the formal organization of elections, but also on whether voters are able to freely formulate and express their political preferences, without coercion or manipulation. The development of digital communication has significantly transformed the environment in which this process takes place. Political information can now be created, amplified, and disseminated across borders within seconds, often without a clear distinction between domestic political communication and foreign interference.
Contemporary electoral processes are facing a new era of challenges. As noted above, the technological advances of the 21st century have brought about a profound transformation. This has also ushered in a new era of legal and security challenges, in which, alongside existing threats, new hybrid threats have emerged. In this context, the concept of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) has become a central issue in protecting democratic integrity within the international and European legal framework. FIMI is the intentional and coordinated manipulative activity of foreign state or state-linked actors aimed at distorting the information environment and undermining trust, democratic processes, or security. Its objective is also to destabilize political processes, undermine trust in institutions, and directly influence the electoral will of citizens.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose electoral system is already burdened by complex constitutional and legal arrangements and ethno-national divisions, the forthcoming 2026 General Elections represent a critical point of vulnerability. The domestic normative framework largely fails to recognize contemporary forms of digital interference, such as opaque foreign financing of online campaigns, bot networks, and the use of generative artificial intelligence. An additional challenge arises from the fragmented jurisdiction of regulatory bodies, leaving the online sphere in a legal vacuum.
This paper analyzes the existing legal gaps in the electoral and media legislation of BiH, explores the scope of harmonization with the Digital Services Act and other standards of the European Union, and offers de lege ferenda [1]recommendations for the legal protection of the electoral process in 2026.
Defining the FIMI concept and the constitutional-legal framework of freedom of expression
The concept and acronym of FIMI were coined by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to describe the interference of a foreign power in the information sphere.
FIMI differs from domestic information manipulation, sometimes referred to as DIMI, which may be promoted and exploited by internal actors such as political factions, extremist organizations, individuals, or other local entities. From a legal perspective, it is crucial to distinguish between the content itself (which may contain disinformation) and the conduct or method involved (including inauthentic networks, concealed financing, the use of algorithms, and microtargeting of voters).
The legal problem arises because FIMI operates in a grey area between freedom of expression and hybrid threats to electoral sovereignty. FIMI does not automatically constitute a criminal offence; rather, it is a broader phenomenon.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects freedom of expression. This encompasses the right to hold and express opinions, as well as the right to receive and impart information and ideas.
It is particularly important to note that this protection does not extend only to “neutral” or uncontroversial political views. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently emphasized that protection also extends to expression that may offend, shock, or disturb the State or any section of the population.
This is particularly significant in the context of FIMI, which employs various methods to disseminate disinformation. One example that may arise during an election campaign is the claim: “The biometric voting system is unreliable.” FIMI may encompass both lawful and unlawful forms of conduct, requiring a differentiated legal response depending on the nature, coordination, attribution, and effects of the activity.
When a State restricts freedom of expression, the restriction must satisfy the established test under Article 10(2), commonly known as the three-part test under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This test comprises three standards: prescribed by law, legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society. The three-part test requires every restriction on freedom of expression to be based on a clear and foreseeable legal rule and directed exclusively toward the protection of legitimate state and societal interests, such as security and electoral rights. In addition, the measure applied must be strictly proportionate to that aim, meaning that the democratic order must be protected with the least possible interference with the rights of citizens and the media.
It should be emphasized that there is a certain risk associated with overly broad statutory prohibitions and arbitrary interpretation, which may itself be exploited as a means of spreading disinformation. Legal norms must be sufficiently clear and foreseeable to enable individuals to understand what conduct may result in sanctions.
Existing legal and institutional framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina
BiH Election Law and the role of the CIK
The BiH Election Law, especially Chapter 7 (Election campaign is actions and procedures in the period that begins 30 days before the day of the election and ends with the beginning of the period of twenty-four (24) hours before the opening of the polling stations, during which the political entity introduces voters and the public with its programs and candidates for the upcoming elections in the manner established by law) is focused on traditional forms of political advertising: print media, electronic media (TV and radio) and rallies. Although the High Representative made significant changes in the decisions of 2022 and 2024 regarding the transparency of the election process and sanctioning the misuse of public resources, the regulation of the digital election campaign remains completely rudimentary.
Content-based prohibitions most commonly concern hate speech and incitement to violence. The mechanisms available to the CIK do not include monitoring of digital advertising conducted from abroad, nor do they impose a legal obligation on political parties to disclose the sources and expenditures associated with targeted online advertising on platforms such as Meta, X, or TikTok. This represents one of the key problems. It may therefore be emphasized that the current state of the legal framework is not keeping pace with technological developments.
Competencies of the RAK and status of online portals
The Communications Regulatory Agency (RAK) has sanctioned powers over TV and radio broadcasters. This enables certain control over the narratives, with the fact that online portals, social networks, online media are not under the authority of RAK. The Press and Online Media Council in BiH operates on the principle of self-regulation through the Press and Online Media Code. Self-regulation, although essential for the freedom of the media, has no legal force, issued warnings have no financial or legal consequences, and is therefore completely ineffective against organized FIMI operations.
Distorted legal framework
Although the criminal codes applicable in Bosnia and Herzegovina—at the state, entity, and Brčko District levels—contain specific chapters concerning criminal offences against electoral rights, their scope remains extremely limited.
Existing statutory descriptions of offences (such as “electoral fraud” or “denial of electoral rights”) are normatively rooted in the analogue era and are primarily designed to address physical obstruction at polling stations or within polling committees. The legislative framework reveals serious deficiencies and a lack of preparedness for contemporary digital threats, as it contains no specific criminal offences addressing forms of hybrid interference. Due to these normative gaps, there has to date been no judicial precedent or initiated proceeding in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning the operation of automated bot networks, the use of generative artificial intelligence, or concealed foreign financing of psychological and propaganda campaigns aimed at electoral engineering.
Key legal challenges ahead of the 2026 general elections
Nontransparency
It should be emphasized that the Law on Financing Political Parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina expressly prohibits the acceptance of financial resources from foreign states and foreign natural or legal persons. However, the payment for digital advertisements, the hiring of bot farms, or the engagement of foreign PR agencies for electoral manipulation may be conducted through intermediaries, cryptocurrencies, or direct payments abroad. The existing financial auditing mechanisms within the CEC lack the capacity to monitor international digital transactions.
The use of generative AI
The increasing accessibility of generative AI technology enables the creation of convincing video and audio recordings (deepfakes) of candidates. The Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not address any obligation to label AI-generated content, leaving substantial room for serious manipulation of the electorate at times when a timely rebuttal may be impossible to disseminate.
Conclusion
Ahead of the 2026 General Elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces an urgent need for electoral and legislative reforms. Ignoring the digital dimension and external interference directly threatens the sovereignty of the popular will and the constitutional order. Comprehensive amendments to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina should establish precise definitions of digital political advertising and synthetic media, together with a strict obligation to visibly label (watermark) all content created using artificial intelligence. In parallel, it is necessary to establish a publicly accessible and transparent register of digital advertisements disseminated by political entities, thereby enabling full insight into the sources and amounts of funds spent. With regard to concealed and undeclared foreign financing of online campaigns, legislative policy must become considerably more stringent, providing for automatic disqualification of candidates and substantial financial penalties.
Comparative models in other European countries clearly demonstrate that a statutory prohibition alone remains ineffective without strong institutional capacity. For example, France adopted specific legislation against information manipulation during electoral periods as early as 2018, granting regulatory authorities and courts powers to remove, under expedited procedures, manipulative content financed from abroad, while requiring digital platforms to provide greater transparency concerning algorithms and advertising. Following similar European practices, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CEC) should establish specialized digital-integrity teams capable of monitoring, in real time, the compliance of online campaigns with financial flows. In addition, following the approach of the EU Digital Services Act, large technology companies should be legally required to appoint official legal representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby enabling direct and timely communication with the CEC and the Communications Regulatory Agency. Finally, the reform package should also include amendments to the criminal codes introducing new criminal offences sanctioning the malicious use of bot networks and deepfake technologies, thereby creating a comprehensive legal safeguard for forthcoming electoral cycles.
Refrence(S):
Primary Jurisprudence & Case Studies
Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECtHR Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06): Grand Chamber Judgment of 22 December 2009.
Case of Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECtHR Application no. 3681/06): Judgment of 15 July 2014.
French Constitutional Council Decision (Décision n° 2018-773 DC du 20 décembre 2018):
Key Legislation & Regulatory Frameworks
European Union Frameworks
Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act – DSA):
EEAS Strategic Framework on FIMI: European External Action Service 1st and 2nd Reports on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats.
Comparative National Legislation
French Anti-Information Manipulation Law (Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information):
Domestic Legislation (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of BiH, nos. 23/01, 7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 25/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 48/06, 63/08, 15/10, 31/14, 23/16, 38/16, 54/18, 80/22, and 18/24 – High Representative Integrity Package).
Law on Financing of Political Parties of BiH (Official Gazette of BiH, no. 95/12).
Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of BiH, nos. 3/03 … 35/23) — Chapter XIV: Criminal Offences Against Electoral Rights and Voting.
Scholarly & Official Policy Reports
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission): Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor) and Joint Report on Digital Technologies and Elections (CDL-AD(2019)016).
European External Action Service (EEAS): EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats (Focusing on the EU FIMI Toolbox).
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections Election Observation Mission Final Report (for precedent election cycles analyzing digital media gaps).
[1] Lex ferenda is a Latin expression that means “future law” used in the sense of “what the law should be” (as opposed to lex lata – “the current law”)
