Power, Silence and Sexual Harassment

INTRODUCTION:

Sexual harassment is often understood as an act committed by an individual against another individual. Such an approach, however, overlooks a critical question: what happens when the institution responsible for providing protection fails to respond? In Pakistan, this question has acquired increasing legal significance as the law has moved beyond a narrow understanding of sexual conduct towards gender-based discrimination, abuse of power, hostile environments and retaliation.

Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010, especially post amendment in 2022, has greatly broadened the scope of coverage under the law with regard to both the individuals it covers as well as the locations where the said individuals are employed. Students, interns, trainees, as well as other types of employees, are now included in the ambit of the law, while educational institutions are explicitly mentioned as being considered workplace.¹ In 2023, Nadia Naz ruled that harassment can be gender-based without the desire for sexual contact.²

However, institutional protection is not always a result of legal development. Inquiry panels might be ineffective, complaints may go unattended, fear of reprisal among the complainants might deter them, and institutional authority might regard harassment as an issue of personal misconduct rather than institutional failure.

This article posits that the legal regime of harassment in Pakistan has advanced to a great extent, but its success depends on institutional accountability. By way of a study of legislation and case law regarding workplaces and educational institutions, the article proves that institutional muteness in itself may defeat the purpose of harassment law. The article also highlights the need for institution to prevent harassment, attend to complaints, protect complainants, and penalize its failure in institutional accountability.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN PAKISTAN:

The legal structure in Pakistan in relation to workplace harassment is largely defined by the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 which was recently significantly amended in 2022. The new Act marks a clear shift from the previous limited understanding of workplace harassment.

Expansion of the Statutory Definition:

Section 2(h) of the Act acknowledges that there are two different types of harassment that have been defined in the law. The first type is associated with unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, stalking and cyber-stalking or other verbal, visual, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature that affects the working environment. This may also include retaliation and acts that make employment conditional on submission to an unwelcome demand.

The latter limb is especially significant for the emergence of Pakistani harassment jurisprudence. According to Section 2(h)(ii), there shall be discrimination on the grounds of gender irrespective of whether the acts are of a sexual nature or not. Hence, the legislation no longer takes for granted that harassment must be motivated by sexual intent or sexual behavior.

This particular amendment also provided wide protection to people in a very broad manner. “Complainant” is defined as anyone, even a former employee, as well as a parent or guardian of a minor under certain circumstances. “Employee” now explicitly covers any student, intern, trainee, freelancer, performer, sportsperson, domestic worker, apprentice, volunteer and anyone else who works without remuneration.

This broadening has special significance for educational establishments. Firstly, Section 2(l) includes educational institutes in the definition of “an organization”, and, secondly, Section 2(n) covers “workplace” so extensively that it also covers educational institutes and any work-related activity apart from traditional workplace.³ This means that the power dynamic in which harassment may arise does not cease just because the nature of the relationship has changed from employment to academic.

Institutional Duties:

The Act goes beyond criminalizing and criticizing individual behavior. It imposes certain responsibilities on institutions. For instance, section 3 mandates that each organization must form an Inquiry Committee comprising three people, one of whom must be a woman. Section 4 also provides procedural safeguards relating to the conduct of inquiries.³

The legislation mandates notification of the accused, the right to answer, evaluation of the evidence and procedure in general. At the same time, complainants and witnesses are not subjected to any retaliatory measures and are ensured a non-hostile environment during the inquiry process.³

Section 11 makes organizations responsible for the implementation of the Act and its Code of Conduct. In addition, the Code identifies certain acts of misconduct which include abuse of power, hostile environment and retaliation.³

It is thus clear from the statutory framework that there exists one major aspect, and that is that the duty of an organization does not begin when there is conclusive evidence of harassment. Instead, it starts with prevention and reporting.

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF HARASSMENT IN PAKISTAN:

An important change in the judiciary in the formation of Pakistan’s harassment laws is that of harassment being seen as more of a gender discrimination issue rather than an issue of sexual behavior.

The Restrictive Approach: Nadia Naz (2021)

In Nadia Naz v President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD 2021 SC 784, the Supreme Court has taken a somewhat narrow view on the interpretation of section 2(h) of the 2010 Act. For the Court, the definition of the statutory term harassment necessarily involved an element of sex.⁴

What is important about the case is not only its interpretation of section 2(h), but also the problems it posed. Should harassment be limited to conduct that had an explicitly sexual dimension, then conduct that was discriminatory, humiliating, intimidating, or exploitative of institutional power due to the perpetrator’s gender could be excluded from the statutory definition of sexual harassment despite the harmful results it caused.

This means that there is a conceptual problem with harassment law: Sexual harassment does not have to be driven by sexual motives, and may simply be a way to exercise power against an individual due to their gender.

The Jurisprudential Shift: Nadia Naz (2023)

In this case, the Supreme Court took up the matter during the review proceedings in Nadia Naz and Another v. President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Others, PLD 2023 SC 588. In this case, the Court changed its approach to an earlier case and applied a purposive construction of the relevant statute.⁵

Here the Court held that terms “sexual” and “sexually” used in a particular statutory context may refer to the concept of gender rather than sex only. This way, harassment may take place because of gender-based discrimination, humiliation, hostility, exploitation or inequality of power even if there is no sexual motive behind the behavior.⁵

This was a notable jurisprudential shift since the notion of power became central in defining harassment. The Court held that harassment may be found if certain behavior affects the work or the work atmosphere of a person or punishes a person for rejecting the inappropriate request.⁵

Further, the Court linked harassment to dignity and inequality, thus moving the statutory regime closer to the constitutional principles of Article 14, 25, and 34 of the Constitution.⁵

The significance of Nadia Naz, however, is more than just a mere statutory interpretation exercise. It shifts the question in law from “Is the conduct sexual in nature?” to the wider question of whether the conduct amounted to discrimination, abuse of power, or a degrading environment.

Muhammad Din and Informal Power:

This principle was followed in Muhammad Din v Province of Punjab through Secretary, Population Welfare, Lahore and others, PLD 2025 SC 354 in which various allegations such as harassment, abuse, defamation, unauthorized audio taping and misconduct in relation to a female doctor have been made. In this case, the Court has sustained the disciplinary action taken by virtue of the revised statute.⁶

The significance of this ruling is that harassment need not always be between the parties in terms of a traditional superior/subordinate relationship. The new legislation recognizes that power can be exerted in an informal manner in the form of professional, social and institutional authority or otherwise.

The importance of this issue becomes clear in the context of educational institutions where power might be exerted in terms of grading, research mentoring, recommendations, scholarships, job offers and other academic resources, but without having a formal employment hierarchy.

This means that there may be no employment hierarchy at all, but there is an existence of a considerable amount of power disparity.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ACADEMIC POWER:

Institutions of learning provide a special kind of vulnerability in that educational interactions may contain a combination of authority, dependence and evaluation. The learner might be dependent on the instructor for marks, guidance, references or progression, making it especially hard to resist misconduct.

The Lahore High Court grappled with the issue of vulnerability in Asif Saleem v Chairman, Board of Governors, University of Lahore, PLD 2019 Lahore 407. In this case, the petitioner, who was both an assistant professor and a PhD scholar, was charged with sending vulgar messages to a female student, compelling her to come to his residence and incorporating sexual elements in the academic conversation. He was dismissed from the university and removed from the PhD program.⁷

The High Court found for the institutional action, noting explicitly that the Act was not limited to an ordinary master-servant relationship. The Court understood that the scope of its protection included instances where harassment was the result of abuse of position.⁷ Moreover, the Court took into account the constitutional principles of dignity, equality, and the involvement of women in public affairs.⁷

In this case, one can see clearly why education institutions cannot approach the issue of harassment as a personal affair of a teacher and his/her student. The very environment created by the institution allows such misconduct to occur.

There is one more Supreme Court ruling which highlights the institutional aspect of the issue under discussion. In Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary Punjab v Shazia Iqbal, 2026 SCP 218, the Court examined the liability of a headmistress who did not act in a proper manner when allegations of harassment and threats against female teachers were brought against a male employee. The Supreme Court upheld a five-year forfeiture of previous service.⁸

The Court stressed the unique duty on the part of educational institutions to create a safe environment and ordered the education authorities to see that there was effective enforcement of protections against harassment. The Court also ordered the creation of in-house Inquiry Committees so that the teachers could complain directly and not rely on the institutional head alone.⁸

This ruling is important because it places an emphasis not on the perpetrator but on the administrator who does nothing.

This makes the legal issue more expansive and now includes not just what the perpetrator did, but what the institution knew, what it had to do, and what it actually did.

CRITICAL EVALUATION: WHEN INACTION AMOUNTS TO LEGAL FAILURE:

While there once may have been a lack of law to address sexual harassment issues in Pakistan, the current problems lie in the gap between legal rights and their execution by the institutions involved.

The legislation provides for duties of the institutions, but the effectiveness of such duties hinges on the impartiality of the internal mechanisms. A committee of investigation under the control of people in the same hierarchical structure is likely to discourage complaints against a person who holds a very influential position within the institution. Likewise, if a person is afraid of academic, professional or reputational repercussions, the fact that there is a complaint procedure is of no consequence at all.

The failure of institutions to act can lead to a second type of harm, the message is sent out that it is up to the victim to fix the conduct, which should have been the duty of the institution anyway.

It makes the situation worse if retaliation takes place after the filing of the report of harassment. Retaliation is mentioned explicitly as conduct prohibited under the new legislation, considering the fact that the impacts of harassment may transcend beyond the act itself.³ Complainants might experience exclusion, discrimination, or damage to their reputation after reporting.

It is thus clear that the issue of institutional responsibility and the liability of the perpetrator of harassment need to be separated. An institution does not perform the initial act of harassment, but there can still be circumstances where it facilitates the commission of the act.

It does not mean that institutions will automatically hold everyone who files an allegation liable for punishment. Procedural due process is very important. Section 4 of the Act ensures that the accused be given notice and an opportunity to contest the charges.

The proper balance therefore is neither one of automatic sanctions nor silence from institutions. Rather, it is one where complaints are taken seriously, investigations are conducted objectively, complainants and witnesses are afforded protection, those accused of the offenses are given due process, and institutions are subject to sanctions for intentionally or unintentionally neglecting their legal obligations.

This was clearly shown in the case of Shazia Iqbal decided by the Supreme Court recently. In this case, institutional responsibility was found to extend to those who had the ability to act yet failed to do so.⁸ This is particularly significant as the viability of harassment laws should not be contingent upon the bravery of individuals alone.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:

Development of Pakistan may be appropriately contrasted with the course taken by the Supreme Court of India in Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011. Absent of special legislation, the Indian Supreme Court has made judicial guidelines for employers to prevent and respond to workplace sexual harassment.⁹ Sexual harassment was viewed as an offence against the right to equality and dignity under the Constitution, and preventive duties have been laid on institutions.

Importance of Vishaka is that institutional measures for preventing sexual harassment cannot take a secondary place to individuals’ responsibilities. Workplaces need to be organized in such a way that harassment is prevented and complaints dealt with.

Pakistan has advanced from the stage of a legislative void encountered in Vishaka. 2010 Act and its amendment in 2022 constitute legislative framework which, in many aspects, extends protection afforded in Vishaka. In particular, it takes into account the interests of students, institutions of education, gender discrimination and atypical work relations.

Nonetheless, the comparative experience still holds value. The importance of the legal protection depends on the need for institutions to turn statutory rights into practical safety measures.

In the international context, the ILO’s Violence and Harassment Convention 2019 (No 190) equally follows the approach of giving a wide meaning to violence and harassment in the world of work.¹⁰ Although international norms cannot be said to dictate what the domestic Pakistani law should look like, they are helpful in the assessment of whether legal frameworks fulfill their task properly.

The Pakistani problem, however, is not about broadening the definition of harassment even more. It is about making sure that the already existing one is put into practice by institutions able to act independently and quickly.

CONCLUSION:

There have been considerable changes in the legislation of Pakistan in relation to sexual harassment. The 2022 amendment of legislation expanded the notion of harassment, extended the scope of protection to students and others, provided for educational institutions explicitly and included discrimination based on gender as well as retaliation. These amendments were confirmed and developed further in judicial practice with particular regard to the interpretation of the notion of harassment in Nadia Naz case and then the recognition of power dynamics in Muhammad Din.¹⁵

However, it should be kept in mind that the existence of broad legislative definitions does not guarantee protection per se. The main point here is whether the institutions meet their obligations. Asif Saleem set the example of the need to address harassment in academic settings, while Shazia Iqbal showed that institutions cannot just ignore harassment in their communities.⁷ ⁸

This is to say that harassment law must be viewed as an institutional structure, rather than just as a means of punishing individuals. Universities, employers and other organizations must have independent investigation structures, must protect complainants and witnesses from retaliation, must keep things confidential, must train people within the institution and must take actions when it is needed.

What the matter comes down to is whether or not the person who engaged in the behavior of harassment will be identified. At the same time, one must determine whether the organization had recognized the danger, how it reacted to the complaint and whether it had done everything it should have according to the law.

FOOTNOTE(S):

Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010, ss 2(e), 2(f), 2(l), 2(n), as amended by the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act 2022.

Nadia Naz and another v President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others PLD 2023 SC 588, paras 4, 12, 14. The Supreme Court’s 2023 judgment expressly reconsidered its earlier interpretation of s 2(h).

Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010, ss 2(h), 3, 4, 11 and Schedule.

Nadia Naz v President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 SC 784. The 2021 decision adopted a narrower understanding of the statutory definition of harassment.

Nadia Naz and another v President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others PLD 2023 SC 588, paras 4, 8, 12, 14.

Muhammad Din v Province of Punjab through Secretary, Population Welfare, Lahore and others PLD 2025 SC 354. The Supreme Court upheld disciplinary action under the expanded 2010 Act and recognized the relevance of gender-based discrimination and informal power dynamics.

Asif Saleem v Chairman, Board of Governors, University of Lahore PLD 2019 Lahore 407, paras 8–13, 24–27. The case concerned allegations of sexual harassment by a university teacher against a female student and the consequent institutional disciplinary action.

Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary Punjab v Shazia Iqbal, CP Nos 851-L and 1379-L of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 13 May 2026, 2026 SCP 218. The Supreme Court emphasized the responsibility of educational institutions and their heads to address harassment and directed meaningful enforcement measures.

Vishaka v State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011; (1997) 6 SCC 241. The Supreme Court of India developed judicial guidelines addressing workplace sexual harassment in the absence of dedicated legislation.

International Labor Organization, Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No 190). The Convention provides an international framework concerning violence and harassment in the world of work.

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Primary Sources:

Legislation:

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973.

Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010, Act IV of 2010.

Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act 2022, Act V of 2022.

Cases:

Asif Saleem v Chairman, Board of Governors, University of Lahore PLD 2019 Lahore 407.

Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary Punjab v Shazia Iqbal, CP Nos 851-L and 1379-L of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 13 May 2026, 2026 SCP 218.

Muhammad Din v Province of Punjab through Secretary, Population Welfare, Lahore and others PLD 2025 SC 354.

Nadia Naz v President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 SC 784.

Nadia Naz and another v President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others PLD 2023 SC 588.

Comparative and International Sources

Vishaka v State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011; (1997) 6 SCC 241.

International Labour Organization, Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No 190).

Secondary Sources:

International Labour Organization, Violence and Harassment in the World of Work.

Palvasha Shahab, Understanding Sexual Harassment at the Pakistani Workplace (Legal Aid Society 2020).

Catharine A MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (Yale University Press 1979).

Institutional Materials

Higher Education Commission, Policy on Protection against Harassment in Higher Education Institutions.

Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Code: Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010.