THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN INDIA: PRIVACY AND DIGITAL RECORDS

ABSTRACT

The rapid digitisation of information has transformed the meaning of privacy and publicity. Information that was once difficult to locate can now be retrieved within seconds through search engines and online legal databases. This creates significant consequences for individuals whose names remain associated with criminal, civil or matrimonial proceedings even after the proceedings have concluded. The Right to Be Forgotten (RTBF) has consequently emerged as an important aspect of informational privacy in India.

Although the Indian Constitution does not expressly recognise a statutory Right to Be Forgotten, its development can be traced through the constitutional right to privacy under Article 21. The Supreme Court’s decisions in R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu and Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India provide the foundation for protecting personal information and informational autonomy. Subsequent High Court decisions, including Vasunathan v Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India, Subhranshu Rout v State of Odisha, Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v Quintillion Business Media Pvt Ltd and Vysakh KG v Union of India, have further developed the Indian approach.

The recent Delhi High Court decision in Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v Union of India & Ors and Connected Matters provides significant guidance on the relationship between privacy and online judicial records. This article argues that RTBF should not be understood as an unrestricted right to erase judicial history. Instead, it should operate as a proportionate protection against disproportionate digital discoverability. Judicial records should ordinarily remain preserved, while appropriate cases may justify de-indexing, delinking or, exceptionally, masking of personal identifiers.

The article further examines RTBF in relation to the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, the Right to Information Act 2005, open justice and comparative European jurisprudence. It proposes a proportionality-based framework for Indian courts and recommends institutional safeguards to balance privacy with transparency, freedom of expression and preservation of legal history.

Keywords: Right to Be Forgotten, privacy, Article 21, informational privacy, digital records, de-indexing, judicial records, open justice, DPDP Act.

I. INTRODUCTION

The development of the internet has fundamentally changed the relationship between individuals and information. In the pre-digital era, an old newspaper report or judicial decision might have remained publicly accessible, but locating it often required considerable effort. Today, a person’s name can reveal years-old allegations, criminal proceedings, matrimonial disputes and judicial records within seconds.

This transformation has created a new form of privacy concern. The problem is not necessarily that the information is inaccurate. In many cases, the information may have been accurate when published. The difficulty arises when the information remains permanently accessible without sufficient context regarding the final outcome of the proceeding.

For example, a person who was accused of an offence but subsequently acquitted may continue to be identified online primarily through the original allegation. Similarly, a matrimonial proceeding that was concluded years ago may continue to appear whenever the parties’ names are searched. The formal legal dispute may have ended, but its digital consequences may continue indefinitely.

This situation has contributed to the development of the Right to Be Forgotten (RTBF). Broadly, RTBF refers to an individual’s ability, in appropriate circumstances, to seek removal, restriction or reduced accessibility of personal information that is no longer necessary, relevant or proportionate to remain publicly discoverable.

The concept gained international recognition through Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), where the Court of Justice of the European Union recognised circumstances in which individuals could request search engines to remove links associated with searches of their names.1 The General Data Protection Regulation subsequently recognised a right to erasure under Article 17, subject to several exceptions.2

India does not presently have a single, comprehensive statutory provision creating an unrestricted RTBF. Instead, the right has largely developed through constitutional privacy jurisprudence and High Court decisions.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India recognised privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution and emphasised dignity, autonomy and informational privacy.3 Justice Kaul’s opinion specifically discussed the concept of a right to be forgotten, while acknowledging the need to balance it against competing interests.4

The Indian debate has become particularly important with the increasing availability of judicial records online. The challenge is to protect individuals from disproportionate digital exposure without compromising open justice.

This article therefore examines whether India can develop an RTBF framework that protects privacy while preserving judicial transparency.

Research Objective

The principal objective of this article is to examine the development of RTBF in India and to identify a legally sustainable balance between informational privacy and public access to judicial records.

Research Question

The central question is: How can India protect the Right to Be Forgotten without undermining open justice and access to judicial records?

Central Argument

This article argues that the Indian RTBF should be understood primarily as a right against disproportionate digital discoverability, rather than an unrestricted right to erase information or judicial history.

The preservation of a public record and unrestricted name-based digital dissemination should be treated as two separate questions. Where privacy interests substantially outweigh continuing public interest, courts should prefer the least restrictive remedy, such as de-indexing or delinking, while preserving the underlying record.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A. Right to Privacy under Article 21

Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Through judicial interpretation, Article 21 has expanded to protect several aspects of individual dignity and autonomy.

The recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Puttaswamy marked a significant development in Indian constitutional law. The Court recognised privacy as an essential element of dignity, liberty and personal autonomy.5

Informational privacy is particularly relevant to RTBF because digital technology allows personal information to be collected, stored, analysed and redistributed on a large scale.

The constitutional foundation of RTBF therefore lies not in a power to rewrite history, but in protecting an individual’s ability to control the continuing exposure and use of personal information.

However, privacy is not absolute. It must be balanced against legitimate public interests, freedom of expression, access to information, open justice and preservation of historical records.

B. Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 represents India’s principal legislative framework for personal-data protection.

Section 12 provides rights relating to correction, completion, updating and erasure of personal data, subject to the requirements of the Act and applicable law.6

However, Section 12 should not be treated as a complete statutory RTBF applicable to all judicial records. The Act primarily regulates processing of digital personal data within its statutory framework.

Section 17 is particularly significant because it provides exemptions for certain processing, including processing by courts and tribunals where necessary for the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.7

Thus, the DPDP Act strengthens the broader legal recognition of informational privacy but does not eliminate the need for judicial balancing in cases involving online court records.

C. Information Technology Framework

The Information Technology Act 2000 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 provide a regulatory framework concerning intermediaries and online content.

These provisions become relevant where courts direct search engines or other intermediaries to restrict access to information.

The legal significance lies in distinguishing between removing information from existence and restricting the manner in which it can be discovered.

III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

A. R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu

In R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court considered the relationship between privacy and publication. The judgment recognised protection against unauthorised publication of certain private information while also distinguishing information contained in public records.8

Although the decision predates the modern internet, its reasoning remains relevant to RTBF because it demonstrates that privacy rights and public records must be carefully distinguished.

The case provides an early foundation for understanding that information entering the public domain may receive different treatment from genuinely private information.

B. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India

The nine-judge Bench decision in Puttaswamy fundamentally altered Indian privacy jurisprudence.

The Court recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right and linked it with dignity, autonomy and individual choice.9 Justice Kaul’s separate opinion discussed the concept of the Right to Be Forgotten and recognised the importance of controlling one’s digital footprint.10

However, the judgment did not establish an absolute right to erase personal information. It acknowledged the need to balance privacy against other legitimate interests.

This principle has become the constitutional foundation for later RTBF cases.

C. Vasunathan v Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka

In Vasunathan, the Karnataka High Court dealt with a request concerning the online availability of a matrimonial proceeding.

The Court granted relief aimed at preventing the petitioner’s name from appearing through ordinary internet searches while retaining the complete judicial record.

The decision is important because it demonstrates an early distinction between preserving a judgment and restricting name-based online discoverability.11

D. Subhranshu Rout v State of Odisha

In Subhranshu Rout, the Orissa High Court considered privacy concerns relating to the circulation of sexual material and discussed the Right to Be Forgotten.

The decision highlighted the importance of protecting victims from continuing digital dissemination and demonstrated that RTBF principles can operate in the context of dignity, privacy and protection against online abuse.12

E. Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India

In Jorawer Singh Mundy, the petitioner had been acquitted but sought protection from the continuing online availability of the criminal judgment.

The Delhi High Court granted interim relief directing that the judgment should not appear through ordinary search-engine results while preserving the underlying judgment.

The decision is significant because the Court addressed the harm caused by the continuing digital discoverability of an old criminal proceeding rather than requiring destruction of the judicial record.13

F. Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v Quintillion Business Media Pvt Ltd

In Zulfiqar Ahman Khan, the Delhi High Court considered privacy concerns arising from online publication and referred to the Right to Be Forgotten and the right to be left alone.14

Although the dispute arose in a different factual context, the decision contributed to the broader Indian recognition of informational privacy in the digital environment.

G. Vysakh KG v Union of India

The Kerala High Court adopted a more cautious approach in Vysakh KG. The Court was reluctant to establish a general judicial power to erase or redact criminal proceedings and emphasised the need for a broader legislative framework.

At the same time, the Court recognised that masking or anonymity may be appropriate in sensitive categories of cases.15

The decision demonstrates the absence of complete uniformity in Indian RTBF jurisprudence and reinforces the need for consistent judicial standards.

IV. LAKSH VIR SINGH YADAV: A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v Union of India & Ors and Connected Matters, delivered on 29 May 2026, provides an important recent development concerning RTBF and online judicial records.16

The petitions involved different categories of individuals, including persons who had been acquitted, persons whose proceedings had been concluded and individuals whose names appeared in judicial records in sensitive circumstances.

The Court recognised the connection between RTBF and informational privacy but did not treat the right as absolute.

The decision is particularly important because it identifies different forms of relief rather than treating RTBF as synonymous with deletion.

A. De-indexing

De-indexing prevents a particular webpage from appearing in search-engine results generated by a person’s name. The original material remains online. This is generally the least intrusive remedy because it limits discoverability without destroying the source.

B. Delinking or Name-Based Restriction

A more specific remedy can restrict name-based searching in legal databases while preserving access through other identifiers such as case number, citation, court or date.

Such an approach can protect individuals from casual name-based searches without preventing lawyers, researchers and courts from locating the judgment.

C. Masking

Masking involves concealing personal identifiers from the publicly available version of a judicial record.

Because masking directly affects the presentation of the judicial record, it is more intrusive and should therefore be reserved for exceptional circumstances.

It may be particularly appropriate where legislation already protects identity, such as in cases involving victims of sexual offences.

D. Significance of the Decision

The importance of Laksh Vir Singh Yadav lies in its recognition that the question is not simply whether a judicial record should exist online.

The more precise question is: To what extent should an individual’s identity remain continuously and automatically discoverable through digital searches?

This approach supports a distinction between public access and digital amplification.

V. OPEN JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

Open justice is fundamental to the functioning of the judicial system.

Public access to judgments promotes transparency, accountability, consistency and confidence in courts. Legal researchers, lawyers, journalists and citizens depend upon access to judicial records.

An unrestricted RTBF could therefore create serious risks. If courts routinely deleted judgments merely because an individual experienced reputational harm, important legal history could disappear.

However, the opposite extreme is equally problematic.

Digital records can make information significantly more accessible than it was in its original form. A judgment that once required a physical visit to a court or library can now be retrieved instantly through a person’s name.

Therefore: Preservation of a public record does not necessarily require unlimited name-based digital discoverability.

The objective should be to protect open justice while preventing disproportionate digital amplification.

De-indexing and delinking provide particularly useful solutions because they preserve the underlying judicial record.

VI. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND RIGHT TO INFORMATION

The RTBF must also be considered alongside the Right to Information Act 2005.

Section 8(1)(j) recognises protection concerning personal information, subject to the statutory public-interest framework.17

RTI and RTBF operate in different directions. RTI promotes transparency and accountability, whereas RTBF seeks to prevent disproportionate continuing exposure of personal information.

A claim involving corruption, abuse of public office or matters of significant public importance will therefore generally attract stronger public-interest considerations.

Conversely, an old matrimonial dispute involving private individuals may have little continuing public relevance.

The proper approach is therefore not to create a blanket hierarchy between privacy and transparency, but to assess the nature, purpose and continuing relevance of the information.

VII. DIGITAL STIGMA AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSION

RTBF has an important sociological dimension because digital information can create permanent reputational associations.

Erving Goffman’s theory of stigma explains how individuals can become socially discredited because of characteristics or information associated with them.18

The digital environment can intensify this process.

A person may have been formally acquitted, but a search engine may continue to display the original allegation prominently. Employers, professional organisations or members of the public may encounter the allegation before discovering the final outcome.

This creates what may be described as digital stigma permanence.

The problem is therefore not merely technical. It affects social reintegration and the possibility of moving beyond a concluded legal dispute.

RTBF can respond to this problem without creating historical amnesia. The law can preserve the record while reducing disproportionate personal amplification.

VIII. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A. European Union

The European Union provides the most developed statutory model of RTBF.

Article 17 of the GDPR establishes a right to erasure in specified circumstances but contains exceptions relating to freedom of expression, legal obligations, public interest, archiving, research and legal claims.19

In Google Spain, the CJEU distinguished between the original publisher and the search engine’s role in making information accessible through name-based searches.20

This distinction is highly relevant to India because the harm may arise from search-engine indexing rather than from the existence of the original publication.

B. Hurbain v Belgium

In Hurbain v Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights considered whether anonymisation of historical journalistic material could be compatible with freedom of expression.

The decision demonstrates that privacy protection does not necessarily require destruction of historical material.21

The European experience therefore supports a flexible approach based on proportionality and context.

India need not simply copy European law. However, the principle that remedies should be tailored to the specific harm is particularly valuable.

IX. PROPORTIONALITY FRAMEWORK FOR INDIA

Indian courts should adopt a structured proportionality test when considering RTBF claims.

1. Legal Outcome

The court should examine whether the individual was convicted, acquitted, discharged, or whether the proceedings were quashed or otherwise concluded.

2. Nature of Information

Private and sensitive information should generally receive greater protection than information involving public duties, corruption or public safety.

3. Status of the Individual

Public figures and public officials may attract greater scrutiny regarding conduct connected with their public functions.

4. Passage of Time

The court should consider whether the information continues to possess genuine public relevance after the passage of time.

5. Continuing Public Interest

The applicant’s privacy interest must be balanced against legitimate public interest in continued access.

6. Actual Harm

Courts should consider evidence of professional, social, personal or reputational harm caused by continued digital discoverability.

7. Least Restrictive Remedy

The court should select the remedy that interferes least with open justice. The preferred hierarchy should ordinarily be: De-indexing → Delinking → Masking.

8. Accuracy and Context

The court should determine whether the online information is accurate and whether the final legal outcome is adequately represented.

RTBF should not become an alternative form of defamation law. Accurate information may still justify restriction where its continued digital prominence has become disproportionate, but the remedy must remain carefully tailored.

X. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Standardised Judicial Guidelines

High Courts should develop common practice directions for RTBF applications. These should identify relevant factors, procedural requirements and appropriate remedies.

B. Graduated Remedies

Courts should adopt a hierarchy of remedies beginning with de-indexing and delinking and moving towards masking only where necessary.

C. Privacy Protocols for Judicial Records

The digital publication system should contain safeguards for legally protected identities, including children and victims of sexual offences.

D. Effective Compliance Mechanisms

Courts should establish secure and authenticated procedures for communicating de-indexing or masking directions to search engines and online legal databases.

E. Preservation of Complete Judicial Records

Any restriction on public discoverability should not result in destruction of the original judicial record. Complete records should remain preserved for courts, authorised researchers and legitimate historical purposes.

F. Reasoned and Reviewable Orders

RTBF orders should clearly specify the information covered, the reason for granting relief, the remedy imposed, the parties required to comply, and whether the order should be reviewed after a specified period.

This would improve consistency and prevent arbitrary restrictions. Over time, India should develop national guidelines identifying common RTBF factors while preserving judicial discretion.

XI. THE RIGHT AGAINST DISPROPORTIONATE DIGITAL DISCOVERABILITY

The principal argument of this article is that Indian RTBF jurisprudence should move beyond the binary idea of deletion versus accessibility.

Digital technology permits more nuanced solutions.

A judicial record can remain available. Its citation can remain searchable. Researchers can locate it. Courts can preserve the original version.

At the same time, an individual’s name need not automatically function as a permanent gateway to every historical legal proceeding involving that person.

This article therefore proposes the concept of a Right Against Disproportionate Digital Discoverability.

This is not proposed as a new statutory right but as a conceptual framework for interpreting existing constitutional and legal protections.

The concept recognises that the harm may arise not from the existence of information but from its permanent availability, instant name-based retrieval, algorithmic amplification, absence of context and repeated association with an individual’s identity.

The distinction can therefore be expressed as follows: A public record may remain public without remaining permanently name-searchable in every context.

Similarly: Preservation of legal history does not require unlimited digital amplification of personal identity.

This approach offers a middle path between two undesirable extremes: unrestricted digital exposure and complete historical erasure.

XII. CONCLUSION

The Right to Be Forgotten has become increasingly important in India because digital technology has changed the practical meaning of publicity.

An allegation that once disappeared into physical archives can now remain permanently searchable. A concluded legal proceeding can therefore continue to affect an individual’s reputation, employment and social identity long after the formal dispute has ended.

Indian constitutional law provides a strong foundation for addressing this problem. R Rajagopal established important principles concerning privacy and public records. Puttaswamy transformed privacy into a fundamental constitutional right and provided the foundation for informational privacy. Subsequent High Court decisions have explored different forms of RTBF relief.

The 2026 Delhi High Court decision in Laksh Vir Singh Yadav marks an important development because it distinguishes between preservation of judicial records and restrictions on their digital discoverability. The use of de-indexing, delinking and masking demonstrates that privacy protection does not necessarily require destruction of legal history.

At the same time, RTBF cannot be absolute. Open justice, freedom of expression, public accountability, historical preservation and the public interest must remain protected.

The appropriate solution is therefore a proportionality-based and graduated framework.

Courts should examine the legal outcome, nature of information, status of the individual, passage of time, continuing public interest, actual harm, accuracy and the availability of less restrictive remedies.

The preferred approach should generally be: Preserve the record → restrict disproportionate discoverability → use masking only when necessary.

The Right to Be Forgotten should consequently not be understood as a right to rewrite history.

It should be understood as a right to prevent disproportionate digital perpetuation of the past.

The central challenge for Indian law is therefore not whether society should remember its legal history, but whether technology should remember everything, forever and without context.

A mature RTBF framework can answer this challenge by preserving judicial transparency while recognising that human beings should not necessarily remain permanently defined by every legal event associated with their names.

FOOTNOTE(S):

1. Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12) EU:C:2014:317.

2. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), art 17.

3. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.

4. ibid [629]–[647] (Kaul J).

5. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.

6. Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 12.

7. ibid, s 17.

8. R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632.

9. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.

10. ibid [629]–[647] (Kaul J).

11. Sri Vasunathan v Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 424.

12. Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul v State of Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 878.

13. Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2306.

14. Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v Quintillion Business Media Pvt Ltd, 2019 (175) DRJ 660.

15. Vysakh KG v Union of India and Other Connected Cases, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337.

16. Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v Union of India & Ors and Connected Matters, W.P.(C) 1021/2016 and connected matters (Delhi High Court, 29 May 2026).

17. Right to Information Act 2005, s 8(1)(j).

18. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Prentice-Hall 1963).

19. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), art 17(3).

20. Google Spain (n 1).

21. Hurbain v Belgium App no 57292/16 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 4 July 2023).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. CASES

Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12) EU:C:2014:317.

Hurbain v Belgium App no 57292/16 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 4 July 2023).

Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2306.

Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.

Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v Union of India & Ors and Connected Matters, W.P.(C) 1021/2016 and connected matters (Delhi High Court, 29 May 2026).

R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632.

Sri Vasunathan v Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 424.

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul v State of Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 878.

Vysakh KG v Union of India and Other Connected Cases, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337.

Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v Quintillion Business Media Pvt Ltd, 2019 (175) DRJ 660.

B. LEGISLATION

Constitution of India 1950.

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023.

Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023.

Information Technology Act 2000.

Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021.

Right to Information Act 2005.

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation).

C. BOOKS AND REPORTS

Goffman E, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Prentice-Hall 1963).

Mayer-Schönberger V, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton University Press 2009).

Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India, A Free and Fair Digital Economy: Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians (Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology 2018).