Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others

1. Case Citation and Basic Information

Full Case Name: Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others

Citation: (2024) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1966) 1; Suit No. SC/CV/343/2024

Court: Supreme Court of Nigeria (exercising original jurisdiction under section 232 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999)

Date of Decision: 11 July 2024

Bench: Lawal Garba, JSC (presiding); Emmanuel Agim, JSC (delivered the lead judgment); Chioma Nwosu-Iheme, JSC; Haruna Tsammani, JSC; Moore Adumein, JSC; Habeeb Abiru, JSC (dissenting); Yammama Tukur, JSC

2. Introduction

This case concerns the constitutional status and financial independence of Nigeria’s 774 Local Government Councils under the 1999 Constitution.¹ For more than two decades, state governors have been accused of misappropriating local government resources channelled through the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA), and of replacing democratically elected councillors with governor-appointed caretaker committees.² The Attorney-General of the Federation invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking declarations and orders to end this practice.³ The judgment is widely regarded as the most significant in a generation on the constitutional relationship between the federal, state, and local tiers of government, and it will have a direct impact on how public revenue reaches the grassroots.⁴

3. Facts of the Case

Section 162 of the Constitution provides that revenue generated into the Federation Account is to be shared between the Federal Government, the thirty-six States, and the 774 Local Government Councils.⁵ Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the amount attributable to Local Governments under each State has been paid into what is known as a “State Joint Local Government Account,” from which allocations must be paid out by the State Government as provided by that State’s Constitution.⁶

In practice, however, many State Governors withheld such money, diverted it, or spent it on projects unrelated to local government administration, leaving the 774 councils unable to finance basic services such as primary healthcare, waste collection, and rural infrastructure.⁷

Further, several State Governors dissolved democratically elected local government councils before their elected terms ended, replacing them with “caretaker committees” or “transition committees” appointed by, and answerable to, the Governor rather than the people.⁸ This practice was alleged to be a mechanism for subordinating local government to the executive and for undermining the constitutional commitment to democratic local government.⁹

In May 2024, the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Lateef Fagbemi, SAN, brought an Originating Summons before the Supreme Court against the Attorneys-General of all 36 States, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction in cases of conflict between the Federal Government and the States.¹⁰ The Federal Government sought three declarations: that State Governments’ withholding of local government funds was unconstitutional; that only democratically elected councils were entitled to receive funds from the Federation Account; and that the Federal Government had the right to pay funds directly to Local Government Councils where the State-administered channel had failed to perform its constitutional function.¹¹

4. Legal Issues

• Issue 1: Whether a State Government may receive, withhold, or spend money credited to Local Government Councils in the State Joint Local Government Account for any purpose other than local government administration.
• Issue 2: What position a Local Government Council run by a caretaker committee, rather than by elected officials, occupies in claiming funds from the Federation Account.
• Issue 3: Whether, on a proper reading of sections 7(1) and 162 of the Constitution, the Federation has the right to pay allocations directly into Local Government Council accounts, regardless of the State Joint Local Government Account mechanism provided for in section 162(5)–(6).
• Issue 4: Whether the replacement of democratically elected Local Government Councils with caretaker committees by State Governors conforms with the constitutional guarantee of “a system of local government by democratically elected local government councils” under section 7(1).

5. Arguments Presented

5.1 Plaintiff’s (Attorney-General of the Federation’s) Arguments

Counsel for the Federation argued that section 7(1) of the Constitution guarantees local government as a distinct tier of governance administered by democratically elected councils, and that this guarantee is rendered meaningless if State Governments may starve councils of funds or replace elected officials with appointees. It was submitted that section 162(5)–(6), properly construed by reference to its underlying purpose, was never intended to authorize States to intercept or misapply local government revenue; the joint account mechanism was, historically, adopted only to ease the logistics of fund collection, not to subordinate local government finance to state discretion.¹² The Federation relied on the mischief rule of interpretation and on the earlier holding in Attorney-General of Abia State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2006) to argue that the constitutional guarantee could only be secured by allowing direct payment of allocations to Local Government Councils from the Federation Account, given that allocations paid through the prescribed channel had been routinely and grossly misapplied.¹³

5.2 Defendants’ (Attorneys-General of the 36 States’) Arguments

The States, represented by their respective Attorneys-General, opposed the suit on the ground that section 162(5) and (6) of the Constitution clearly and unambiguously provided for payment into the State Joint Local Government Account, and that no interpretation of those subsections could dictate otherwise. They argued that the administration of local government, including how payments are disbursed, falls within the State’s constitutional competence under section 7, and that any change to the constitutional payment system is a matter for constitutional amendment by the National Assembly, not for the courts. A few States also submitted that the composition of local government councils and the tenure of councillors were political and administrative matters within the residual powers of State Houses of Assembly, and that the Federation could not interfere with States in managing their local governments.¹⁴

6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

Adopting a purposive and historical approach to constitutional interpretation, Agim, JSC delivered the lead judgment. The Court traced the history of local government funding under the 1979 Constitution, which had allowed direct transfer of funds from the federal government to local government, and explained that the subsequent constitutional amendments introducing the joint account mechanism were intended to ease the administrative burden on local government officials travelling to collect funds, not to give States discretion to withhold or divert them. The majority applied the mischief doctrine and concluded that a State Government’s “continual failure” to pass on allocations was precisely the mischief section 162 of the Constitution was intended to prevent, and that a literal reading of subsections (5) and (6) would permit conduct contrary to the provision’s purpose.¹⁵

On the question of democratic legitimacy, the Court held that section 7(1) of the Constitution guarantees all Nigerians a right to local government administered through democratically elected councils, and that a State Government’s replacement of elected councils with appointed caretaker committees infringes this right and cannot be permitted to continue, however administratively convenient it may be for the State. The majority rejected the argument that the dispute was a non-justiciable political question, reasoning that where the action of a state official “plainly offends an explicit constitutional guarantee,” the Court must remove it from the category of political questions the courts decline to hear. (Note: this quoted passage should be verified against the primary judgment text for exact wording before publication.) The Court further found that the Federation bears a residual constitutional duty to ensure that money earmarked for Local Government Councils reaches them, and that this duty carries with it a constitutional right to direct payment where the normal channel has failed.¹⁶

Abiru, JSC, dissented. He held that section 162(5) and (6) is explicit and self-explanatory, and does not admit or accommodate direct payment of Local Government funds from the Federation Account to the Councils themselves. In his view, the majority had substituted a broad, purposive interpretation for the natural meaning of the constitutional text, thereby assuming the role the Constitution assigns to the National Assembly as the body vested with amendment power. He cautioned that where a constitutional clause is clear, invoking interpretative principles such as the mischief doctrine to “fill in perceived gaps” is a misdirection, however well-intentioned the underlying policy concern.¹⁷

7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

The Decision

By a six-to-one majority, the Supreme Court granted the reliefs sought by the Attorney-General of the Federation. The Court declared unlawful the retention, withholding, or misapplication by State Governments of money credited to Local Government Councils in the State Joint Local Government Account. It further held that the dissolution of democratically elected Local Government Councils and their replacement with caretaker committees is unconstitutional under section 7(1), which requires that allocations from the Federation Account be made only to democratically constituted councils. The Court directed that, going forward, allocations to Local Government Councils be paid directly from the Federation Account, through the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission and the Federation Account Allocation Committee, rather than through the State Joint Local Government Account, which the Court found had failed to perform its constitutional function.¹⁸

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi is that a State Government has no constitutional authority to withhold, divert, or apply to other purposes money constitutionally allocated to Local Government Councils, and that only democratically elected Councils are entitled to receive such allocations. Where the constitutionally prescribed disbursement channel is repeatedly abused, defeating the guarantee of local government autonomy in section 7(1), the Federation has a lawful means of ensuring that allocations from the Federation Account reach Local Government Councils directly, without passing through the State as intermediary.¹⁹

8. Critical Analysis

8.1 Significance of the Decision

This judgment is the most significant Supreme Court ruling on fiscal federalism in Nigeria since the return to democracy in 1999. It affirms that local government, as a third tier of government alongside the States and the people, holds constitutionally protected status and distinct powers, and it marks the first time the Court has mandated a structural change in how funds are transferred between the tiers, rather than issuing declaratory rulings confined to specific instances of executive misconduct.²⁰

8.2 Implications and Impact

The decision required the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission to overhaul the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) so that all 774 local government councils could receive monthly allocations directly, removing governors’ control over local council finances. In principle, the ruling should improve service delivery at the grassroots and increase local authorities’ accountability to voters rather than to State Governors. In practice, however, implementation has been uneven: reports more than a year after the judgment showed several States still managing allocations in the old manner, while the Federal Inter-Ministerial Committee established to implement the judgment achieved limited success in securing compliance — reflecting the gap between constitutional text and Nigeria’s administrative realities.²¹

8.3 Critical Evaluation

The majority’s approach is methodologically sound and responds to a well-established pattern of gubernatorial misconduct that a narrower, text-based reading would have left unremedied; it also gives practical effect to the democratic guarantee in section 7(1). The dissent, however, identifies a genuine interpretive difficulty. The majority’s willingness to depart from the apparent meaning of section 162(5) and (6), though undertaken in good faith, sits uneasily with the general principle that where constitutional text is clear, it should be applied as written rather than judicially rewritten.²² The decision is also open to criticism on enforceability grounds: it established no independent compliance mechanism or sanctions for non-compliance, and the record since 2024 suggests limited political will to implement it.²³ An alternative approach — a court-supervised transitional audit of SJLGA accounts, paired with a strong declaratory judgment protecting the constitutional purpose — might have achieved the same substantive outcome without raising the separation-of-powers concerns the dissent identifies.

9. Conclusion

Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others settled a long-standing controversy over control of local government funds, holding that control must rest with elected Councils rather than appointed caretakers, and that local government allocations must be paid directly to the Councils. The case’s central holding is that section 7(1) of the Constitution guarantees a judicially enforceable local government autonomy, capable, where necessary, of overriding an existing but misused disbursement mechanism. While the judgment is likely to be remembered as the high-water mark of judicial involvement in Nigerian fiscal federalism, its lasting significance will turn on implementation. Several States have yet to comply, suggesting that the contest between State and Local Government autonomy and direct disbursement is not over, and that further litigation — or a constitutional amendment expressly providing for direct disbursement — may be necessary before the judgment is fully realized.

Note(S):

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 7(1); s 162.
2. Oyeyemi Oke, Chukwuemeka Ozuzu and David Akpeji, ‘The Supreme Court’s Decision in Attorney General of the Federation and Attorney General of Abia State & 35 Others: Appraising the Fiscal Implications of Local Government Autonomy’ (AO2Law, 18 August 2024).
3. Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (2024) 17 NWLR (Pt 1966) 1 (SC).
4. ‘Supreme Court’s July 11, 2024, Landmark Judgment Affirming the Autonomy of Local Government Councils – A Triumph for Fiscal Federalism’ Daily Trust (Abuja, 14 July 2024).
5. Constitution (n 1) s 162(1), (3).
6. ibid s 162(5)–(6).
7. Oke, Ozuzu and Akpeji (n 2).
8. ‘Nigerian Federalism and Local Government Autonomy: A Necessity for the Creation of the Office of Attorney-General of Local Government Council’ (TheNigeriaLawyer, 16 August 2024).
9. Constitution (n 1) s 7(1).
10. Constitution (n 1) s 232; Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (n 3).
11. Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (n 3).
12. ibid (Agim JSC).
13. Attorney-General of Abia State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt 1005) 265 (SC).
14. Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (n 3) (Abiru JSC, dissenting).
15. ibid (Agim JSC).
16. ibid.
17. ibid (Abiru JSC, dissenting); see also ‘Supreme Court judgment on LG autonomy’ The Nation (Lagos, 8 December 2024).
18. Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (n 3).
19. ibid (Agim JSC).
20. Oke, Ozuzu and Akpeji (n 2).
21. ‘Two years after, FG fails to implement Supreme Court judgment’ The Sun (Lagos, 24 June 2026); ‘Autonomy battle: States defy Supreme Court, control N10tn LG allocations’ The Punch (Lagos, 13 July 2026).
22. Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (n 3) (Abiru JSC, dissenting).
23. ‘LG Autonomy: Why Supreme Court Must Reverse Itself (4)’ Independent Newspaper Nigeria (28 August 2025); The Sun (n 21).