The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui

Case Name: 

The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 

Year of Decision: 2009  

Court: International Criminal Court, Appeals Chamber  

Official Citation: ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga  against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the  Case (Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Court, 25 September 2009)  

Introduction  

On 25 September 2009, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC)  delivered its landmark judgment in The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo  Chui, resolving a seminal challenge to the Court’s admissibility jurisdiction.1 The interlocutory  appeal was initiated by Germain Katanga, who contested a Trial Chamber II decision that had  declared his case admissible.2 The primary parties involved in this critical litigation were the  Appellant, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, and the Government of the Democratic Republic  of the Congo (DRC) acting as the sovereign State with concurrent territorial jurisdiction.3 The  underlying case arose from the brutal Ituri conflict, specifically the 24 February 2003 attack on  the village of Bogoro, which led to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.4 Although Katanga was arrested by Congolese authorities in March 2005 and detained on  domestic offenses, the DRC subsequently closed these proceedings to cooperate with the ICC,  prompting the defense to challenge the admissibility of the case under the statutory principle  of complementarity.5 

The jurisprudential and systemic significance of this judgment lies in its authoritative  interpretation of Article 17 of the Rome Statute.6 The Appeals Chamber formalized a strict  two-step admissibility framework, establishing that the question of domestic activity must  precede any qualitative assessment of state willingness or capacity.7 While Trial Chamber II  had focused on the concept of unwillingness, concluding that the DRC’s decision to cede  jurisdiction to the ICC constituted a second form of cooperative unwillingness, the Appeals  Chamber rejected this subjective expansion.8 Instead, the Chamber introduced the doctrine of  national inaction, ruling that if a State is entirely inactive regarding a specific suspect and Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber clarified the demarcation of cooperative surrender under  Article 17(1)(b) of the Statute.11 The Chamber ruled that a State’s decision to close its domestic  proceedings to facilitate a suspect’s transfer to the ICC does not constitute a “decision not to  prosecute”.12 Rather than shielding the individual, such action ensures they face justice before  an international tribunal.13 Treating collaborative transfers as a bar to admissibility would  create an absurd impunity gap where neither the sovereign State nor the Court could exercise  jurisdiction.14 By validating this cooperative model, the judgment solidified the doctrine of  consensual complementarity. 15 This transforms the ICC’s operational relationship with  domestic judiciaries and establishing its early caseload through state consent.16 

Case Facts  

Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued a warrant for Germain Katanga’s arrest on 2 July 2007,  which led to his surrender and transfer to the detention centre in The Hague on 18 October  2007.17 Following the confirmation of charges, Katanga challenged the admissibility of his  case under the Rome Statute’s complementarity framework.18 On 12 June 2009, Trial Chamber  II issued an oral decision dismissing his admissibility challenge, prompting Katanga to lodge  an immediate appeal before the Appeals Chamber.19 

The admissibility of the case turned on the domestic state action of DRC.20 While Katanga had  been in domestic custody on generalized charges since March 2005, the DRC formally closed  its national proceedings against him on 17 October 2007.21 Crucially, this state action, executed  by the Auditeur Général près la Haute Cour Militaire in Kinshasa, was not a decision not to  prosecute; rather, it was a procedural step designed specifically to facilitate Katanga’s  surrender and ensure the joinder of all relevant proceedings before the international forum.22 

In terms of the prosecutorial context, the DRC confirmed that it had not initiated any domestic  investigations into the specific Bogoro incident for which Katanga was charged before the  ICC.23 The Chief Prosecutor of the High Military Court in Kinshasa explicitly stated in writing  that no domestic investigations had been opened against Katanga regarding the 24 February  2003 attack on Bogoro.24 This lack of domestic activity was further confirmed by the DRC  Government in its official observations. This has verified that no national proceedings of any  kind had been undertaken to establish Katanga’s criminal responsibility for this conduct, leaving the domestic military justice system entirely inactive regarding the specific incident  charged in the ICC warrant.25 

Legal Issues & Arguments  

The interlocutory appeal of Germain Katanga brought several key legal issues before the ICC  Appeals Chamber. Procedurally, the first issue concerned the correct statutory interpretation of  the time limit under Article 19(4) of the Rome Statute, specifically when the commencement  of the trial occurs.26 The second issue focused on prosecutorial disclosure obligations at the  warrant stage under Article 58, raising the question of whether the Prosecutor’s failure to  disclose domestic arrest documents to the Pre-Trial Chamber constitutes a procedural defect  that would render a case inadmissible.27 Substantively, the third and fourth issues examined  the legal definition and boundary of unwillingness under Article 17(2) and whether it can be  judicially expanded or conflated with inability under Article 17(3).28 The final issue addressed  the rights of the accused under Article 67, questioning whether cooperative burden-sharing  between the territorial State and the Office of the Prosecutor deprives the defendant of a real,  effective right to challenge admissibility.29 

In navigating these issues, the appellant and the responding parties presented fundamentally  opposing legal theories. 30 Regarding the procedural issues, Katanga argued that the Trial  Chamber erred by equating the commencement of the trial with the mere constitution of the  Trial Chamber, arguing instead for a flexible interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of  trial.31 He further contended that the Prosecutor’s non-disclosure of domestic Kinshasa military  arrest records, which referenced attacks in Bogoro, deprived the Pre-Trial Chamber of the  factual information required to evaluate admissibility proprio motu.32 On the substantive issues,  Katanga asserted that Article 17(2) provides an exhaustive list of unwillingness criteria, meaning the Trial Chamber erred by inventing a cooperative form of unwillingness.33 He  maintained that the DRC’s surrender of jurisdiction was a practical consequence of judicial  inability in eastern Congo, not unwillingness. 34 Allowing a state to unilaterally waive  complementarity through consensual burden-sharing, he argued, violated the fair trial rights of  the accused by rendering admissibility challenges theoretical and illusory.35 

Conversely, the Prosecution and the DRC countered that because the Congolese authorities had  closed domestic proceedings and remained entirely inactive regarding the Bogoro charges, the  case was automatically admissible.36 They urged the Court to adopt a sequential, two-step  admissibility test under which the question of unwillingness or inability is reached only if  active national investigations or prosecutions are ongoing at the time of the challenge.37 Under  this framework, the DRC’s state of objective inactivity resolved the jurisdictional conflict in  favor of the ICC.38 This renders any qualitative evaluation of the DRC’s willingness, inability,  or subjective motives entirely irrelevant to the admissibility determination.39 

Court’s Decision and Reasonings  

The Appeals Chamber of the ICC unanimously dismissed Germain Katanga’s admissibility  appeal and confirmed that his case was admissible, a final judgment that rested on a strict,  sequential interpretation of Article 17 of the Rome Statute.40 In confirming admissibility, the  Appeals Chamber held that a case’s admissibility is fundamentally determined by the objective  existence of domestic proceedings, which serves as the procedural gateway to any evaluation  of willingness or ability. 41 Because the DRC was entirely inactive regarding the specific  conduct charged in the ICC’s warrant, the Appeals Chamber formulated the doctrine of national  inaction, ruling that the absence of parallel domestic proceedings automatically resolves any  jurisdictional conflict in favour of the ICC.42 By linking its judgment directly to this objective  state of domestic inactivity, the Appeals Chamber established that evaluating a State’s  subjective unwillingness or inability when no domestic case exists would be to put the cart  before the horse. Significantly, this renders any qualitative assessment under Article 17(1)(a)  and (b) legally irrelevant.43 

This sequential analytical framework represents a major jurisprudential evolution in the  interpretation of the principle of complementarity. The Appeals Chamber clarified that under  Article 17(1)(a) and (b), the initial questions to ask are whether there are ongoing investigations  or prosecutions, or whether there have been past investigations and the State has decided not  to prosecute.44 Only if the answers to these initial questions are in the affirmative does the  Court proceed to the second step of evaluating whether those proceedings are genuine or if they  are vitiated by the State’s unwillingness under Article 17(2) or inability under Article 17(3).45 This rigid two-step sequence was designed to ensure that the ICC remains a court of last resort  while preventing the Court from conducting intrusive evaluations of a cooperative State’s  judicial willingness and capability when that State is not actively pursuing the case. 46 In  Katanga’s case, because the DRC was inactive regarding the Bogoro attack at the time of the challenge, the first-step inquiry was answered in the negative, rendering the case admissible  without further qualitative review.47 

Crucial to this outcome was the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning regarding the legal  characterisation of the DRC’s cooperative surrender, which rejected the defense’s attempt to  expand the scope of Article 17(1)(b). The Appellant argued that the decision of the Congolese  Auditeur Général près la Haute Cour Militaire on 17 October 2007 to close domestic  proceedings against him was equivalent to a “decision not to prosecute.” 48 However, the  Appeals Chamber ruled that a State’s decision to close its domestic file specifically to cede  jurisdiction and facilitate a suspect’s surrender to the ICC does not constitute a “decision not to  prosecute” within the meaning of the Statute.49 The Court reasoned that closing a case for  transfer does not reflect a sovereign intent to let the suspect evade justice. Rather, it is a  collaborative step to ensure they face trial before an international tribunal. 50 To classify  cooperative surrender as a bar to admissibility would create a dangerous impunity gap where  the act of surrendering a suspect would block both domestic and international prosecution,  defeating the fundamental purpose of the Rome Statute.51 

Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Appellant’s extensive due process and fair trial  arguments. It clarifies that the precise role of the accused within the complementarity regime.  Katanga argued that allowing a State to unilaterally cede jurisdiction through bilateral “burden sharing” deprived him of his right to an effective admissibility challenge and violated his fair  trial rights under Article 67.52 The Appeals Chamber dismissed this argument as misconceived,  explaining that the admissibility criteria of Article 17 are exhaustive and strictly bound by the  text of the Statute. 53 The Court clarified that complementarity is a structural mechanism  designed to resolve jurisdictional competition between concurrent sovereign States and the ICC,  rather than a subjective personal right of the accused to choose their forum.54 While the Statute guarantees robust due process protections during trial, an accused does not possess a right to  demand a domestic prosecution, nor are admissibility challenges under Article 19 the proper  procedural vehicle to raise general complaints regarding domestic human rights violations or  detention conditions.55 

Finally, the Appeals Chamber disposed of the procedural grounds of appeal concerning timing  and prosecutorial disclosure. Regarding the first ground, which contested Trial Chamber II’s  interpretation of the “commencement of the trial” deadline under Article 19(4), the Appeals  Chamber declined to rule on the merits.56 The Court noted that the Trial Chamber’s temporal  analysis was obiter dicta and caused no material prejudice to Katanga, as the Trial Chamber  had proceeded to evaluate the full substantive merits of his admissibility challenge anyway.57 Regarding the second ground, which alleged a prosecutorial non-disclosure defect at the arrest  warrant stage, the Appeals Chamber held that admissibility must be judged based on the facts  as they exist at the time of the admissibility proceedings, not retrospectively at the time of the  arrest warrant’s issuance.58 The Appeals Chamber emphasized that admissibility is ambulatory  and must reflect the current status of domestic activity, ruling that using admissibility appeals  to litigate prior Pre-Trial Chamber decisions under Article 58 would undermine the coherence  of the appellate process.59 

Critical Analysis and Conclusion  

The primary jurisprudential strength of the Appeals Chamber’s strict textual reading of Article  17 lies in its promotion of legal certainty and predictability regarding the ICC jurisdictional  boundaries. 60 By separating the objective threshold of state activity from the subjective  evaluation of genuineness, the Court established a bright-line rule that effectively advances the  Rome Statute’s teleological mandate to end impunity.61 This literalist approach prevents states  from utilizing abstract promises of reform, legislative transitions, or procedural delays to  insulate suspects from international scrutiny.62 Under this framework, domestic proceedings  must directly mirror the ICC’s case, meaning that states must either genuinely and actively  investigate the specific conduct at issue or cede jurisdiction to the Court. Thus, the Katanga precedent ensures that sovereign jurisdictions cannot block international intervention through  bad-faith inactivity, solidifying the Court’s role as an indispensable judicial safety net.63 

However, the validation of consensual complementarity through voluntary state inaction  introduces severe systemic limitations that risk undermining the primary responsibility of states  to prosecute international crimes domestically. By ruling that a state’s decision to close its  domestic proceedings to facilitate surrender constitutes inaction rather than a “decision not to  prosecute” under Article 17(1)(b), the Appeals Chamber essentially normalized self-referrals.⁵  This interpretation compromises the foundational principle of last resort by allowing sovereign  states to outsource politically sensitive, financially burdensome, or logistically challenging  trials to The Hague.64 Consequently, this model transforms the ICC into a surrogate court of  first resort and leaves a massive domestic impunity gap.65 Because the ICC can only prosecute  a handful of high-level leaders, and the domestic system has voluntarily stepped aside, mid level and low-level perpetrators on the ground face no domestic prosecution. Furthermore, this  dynamic facilitates the political capture of the Court, allowing states to deploy the ICC’s  

60 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187  UNTS 3, art 17; see also Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment on the Appeal  of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of  the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Appeals Chamber (25 September 2009) para 75. stigmatizing power selectively against non-state rebel groups while insulating state actors from  concurrent international scrutiny.66 

The broader strategic implications of this precedent are highly restrictive for future defendants  attempting to contest admissibility on due process grounds. By framing complementarity as a  structural mechanism designed solely to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between sovereign  states, the Appeals Chamber systematically subordinated the human rights of the accused to  the goal of ending impunity.67 Under this state-centric framework, the Court rejected the due  process thesis, confirming that Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute cannot be utilized as an  independent procedural tool to enforce fair trial standards during admissibility hearings.68 This  jurisprudence effectively minimizes the natural judge principle, denying defendants any legal  standing to demand a domestic trial on human rights grounds if the sovereign state has  consented to ICC intervention or chosen domestic inactivity.69 Consequently, future defendants  face a nearly insurmountable threshold when challenging admissibility, as the Court has  prioritized its anti-impunity mandate over its potential role as a human rights guardian.70 

Reference(S):

Table of Cases  

International Criminal Court (ICC) 

• Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre  Bemba Gombo against the Decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 on  Admissibility) ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3, Appeals Chamber (19 October 2010).  
• Prosecutor v Katanga (Information to the Chamber on the Execution of the Request for  the Arrest and Surrender of Germain Katanga) ICC-01/04-01/07-40, Registrar (22  October 2007).  
• Prosecutor v Katanga (Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga) ICC-01/04-01/07-1- US-tENG, Pre-Trial Chamber I (2 July 2007).  
• Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr.  Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the  Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Appeals Chamber (25 September  2009).  
• Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Motion Challenging the  Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07-949, Defence (11 March 2009).   Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Oral Decision on Admissibility)  ICC-01/04-01/07-T-67-ENG, Trial Chamber II (12 June 2009).  
• Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Reasons for the Oral Decision on  the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, Trial  Chamber II (16 June 2009).  
• Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Judgment on the Appeal  of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 Oct.  2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi”)  ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Appeals Chamber (24 July 2014).  

Domestic Cases 

• Kinshasa High Military Court, Decision of the Auditeur Général (17 October 2007)  ICC-01/04-01/07-40-Anx3.6. 

Table of Treaties  

• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into  force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3.  

Secondary Sources  

Books and Journal Articles 

• Batros B, ‘The Evolution of the ICC Jurisprudence on Admissibility’ in Stahn C and El  Zeidy MM (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From  Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011).  
• Benzing M, ‘The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court:  International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against  Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 591.  
• Birnbaum SC, ‘Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48  Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 307.  
• Bitti G and El Zeidy MM, ‘The Katanga Trial Chamber Decision: Selected Issues’ (2010)  23 Leiden Journal of International Law 319.  
• Burke-White WW, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and  National Courts in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law  Journal 53.  
• Crow K, ‘The Merits or the Messenger?: Complementarity and the Referral Process in  the ICC’s Application of Article 17’ (2017) 26 Florida State University Journal of  Transnational Law & Policy 53.  
• De Vos CM, ‘Mirror Images? Complementarity in the Courtroom’ in Complementarity,  Catalysts, Compliance: The International Criminal Court in Uganda, Kenya, and the  Democratic Republic of Congo (Cambridge University Press 2020).  
• El Zeidy MM, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law:  Origin, Development and Practice (Brill 2008).  
• Hansen TO, ‘A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility  Challenges and Complementarity’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law  217.  
• Keller LM, ‘The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on “The  Complementarity Conundrum”‘ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 199. 
• Kleffner J, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (OUP 2008).  
• Kress C, ‘”Self-referrals” and “Waivers of Complementarity”: Some Considerations in  Law and Policy’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944. 
• McAuliffe PG, ‘From Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence of the ICC’s  Burden-sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping Cosmopolitan’ (2014) 13 Chinese  Journal of International Law 259.  
• Rigney S, ‘“The Words Don’t Fit You”: Recharacterisation of the Charges, Trial  Fairness, and Katanga’ (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1. 
• SáCouto S and Cleary K, ‘The Katanga Complementarity Decisions: Sound Law but  Flawed Policy’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 363.  
• Stahn C, ‘Perspectives on Katanga: An Introduction’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of  International Law 311.  
• Stahn C, Revitalizing Complementarity a Decade after the Stocktaking Exercise (TOAEP Policy Brief Series No 115, 2020).  
• Stigen J, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National  Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff 2008).  

Official Documents and Reports 

• Letter from the Director of the Immediate Office of the Chief Prosecutor of the High  Military Court in Kinshasa to the Office of the Prosecutor (14 March 2009). 
• ‘Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Challenge to  Admissibility made by the Defence for Germain Katanga’ (14 March 2009) ICC-01/04- 01/07-968-Conf-Exp-AnxJ-tENG. 

1 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga  against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07  OA 8, Appeals Chamber (25 September 2009) para 1 (hereinafter Katanga Admissibility Appeal); Susana SáCouto  and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Katanga Complementarity Decisions: Sound Law but Flawed Policy’ (2010) 23 Leiden  Journal of International Law 363, 364. 

2 Carsten Stahn, ‘Perspectives on Katanga: An Introduction’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 311,  312. 

3 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 8. 

4 Prosecutor v Katanga (Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga) ICC-01/04-01/07-1-US-tENG, Pre-Trial  Chamber I (2 July 2007); Christian M De Vos, ‘Mirror Images? Complementarity in the Courtroom’ in  Complementarity, Catalysts, Compliance: The International Criminal Court in Uganda, Kenya, and the  Democratic Republic of Congo (Cambridge University Press 2020) 59-80. 

5 Prosecutor v Katanga (Information to the Chamber on the Execution of the Request for the Arrest and Surrender  of Germain Katanga) ICC-01/04-01/07-40, Registrar (22 October 2007) 

6 Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case) ICC 01/04-01/07-949, Defence (11 March 2009). 

7 Ibid; Samuel C Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt  Journal of Transnational Law 307, 316. 

8 K atanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) paras 75, 78 conduct, the case is automatically admissible.9 To evaluate a State’s subjective unwillingness  under Article 17(2) or objective inability under Article 17(3) when no domestic case exists  would be to put the cart before the horse.10 

9 Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development  and Practice (Brill 2008) 159; Markus Benzing, ‘The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal  Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max  Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 591, 601. 

10 Jan Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (OUP 2008) 103; Jo  Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of  Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 199. 

11 Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging  the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, Trial Chamber II (16 June 2009) paras 77 to 78. 12 Gilbert Bitti and Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Katanga Trial Chamber Decision: Selected Issues’ (2010) 23  Leiden Journal of International Law 319, 324. 

13 Linda M Keller, ‘The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on “The Complementarity  Conundrum”‘ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 199, 211; Ben Batros, ‘The Evolution of the ICC  Jurisprudence on Admissibility’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal  Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 558, 564. 

14 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 82; Claus Kress, ‘”Self-referrals” and “Waivers of Complementarity”:  Some Considerations in Law and Policy’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944, 946.

15 Kevin Crow, ‘The Merits or the Messenger?: Complementarity and the Referral Process in the ICC’s Application  of Article 17’ (2017) 26 Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 53, 56; William W Burke White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System  of Justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 53, 102. 

16 Sophie Rigney, ‘”The Words Don’t Fit You”: Recharacterisation of the Charges, Trial Fairness, and Katanga’  (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 4.

17 Prosecutor v Katanga (Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga) ICC-01/04-01/07-1-US-tENG, Pre-Trial  Chamber I (2 July 2007); see also Susana SaCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Katanga Complementarity  Decisions: Sound Law but Flawed Policy’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 363, 364.

18 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07- 949, Defence (11 March 2009). 

19 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Oral Decision on Admissibility) ICC-01/04-01/07-T-67-ENG, Trial  Chamber II (12 June 2009). 

20 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the  Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, Trial Chamber II (16 June 2009); for analysis of Trial Chamber  II’s reasoning, see Linda M Keller, ‘The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on “The  Complementarity Conundrum”‘ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 199, 210–212. 

21 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial  Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Appeals Chamber (25  September 2009). 

22 Christian M De Vos, ‘Mirror Images? Complementarity in the Courtroom’ in Complementarity, Catalysts,  Compliance: The International Criminal Court in Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Cambridge University Press 2020) 59–80. 

23 Kinshasa High Military Court, Decision of the Auditeur Général (17 October 2007) ICC-01/04-01/07-40- Anx3.6. 

24 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 5) para 82; see also Samuel C Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process and the  International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 307, 316–317.

25 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 5) paras 78–81; for a broader critique of the “same conduct” requirement in  this decision, see Carsten Stahn, Revitalizing Complementarity a Decade after the Stocktaking Exercise (TOAEP  Policy Brief Series No 115, 2020) 1–2; L etter from the Director of the Immediate Office of the Chief Prosecutor  of the High Military Court in Kinshasa to the Office of the Prosecutor (14 March 2009), cited in Katanga (Reasons  for the Oral Decision) (n 4) para 93.

26 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision  of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Appeals Chamber  (25 September 2009) para 30; see also Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Katanga Complementarity  Decisions: Sound Law but Flawed Policy’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 363, 368 

27 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 40; see also Gilbert Bitti and Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Katanga  Trial Chamber Decision: Selected Issues’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 319, 324. 28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187  UNTS 3, art 17(2); see also Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law:  Origin, Development and Practice (Brill 2008). 

29 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 58; see also Linda M Keller, ‘The Practice of the International  Criminal Court: Comments on “The Complementarity Conundrum”‘ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International  Law 199, 211. 

30 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 87; see also Kevin Crow, ‘The Merits or the Messenger?:  Complementarity and the Referral Process in the ICC’s Application of Article 17’ (2017) 26 Florida State  University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 53, 56. 

31 Rome Statute, art 67(1); see also Sophie Rigney, ‘“The Words Don’t Fit You”: Recharacterisation of the Charges,  Trial Fairness, and Katanga’ (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 4–7.

32 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 98; see also P.G. McAuliffe, ‘From Watchdog to Workhorse:  Explaining the Emergence of the ICC’s Burden-sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping Cosmopolitan’ (2014)  13 Chinese Journal of International Law 259, 279.

33 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 55; see also Christian M De Vos, ‘Mirror Images? Complementarity  in the Courtroom’ in Complementarity, Catalysts, Compliance: The International Criminal Court in Uganda,  Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Cambridge University Press 2020) 59–80. 34 Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging  the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, Trial Chamber II (16 June 2009) paras 77–78; see also  Keller (n 4) 211–212. 

35 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 89; see also Samuel C Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process and the  International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 307, 335. 36 William W Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts  in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 53, 102. 

37 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 101; see also Claus Kress, ‘“Self-referrals” and “Waivers of  Complementarity”: Some Considerations in Law and Policy’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice  944, 946 

38 ‘Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Challenge to Admissibility made by the Defence  for Germain Katanga’ (14 March 2009) ICC-01/04-01/07-968-Conf-Exp-AnxJ-tENG, cited in Katanga  (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 80. 

39 Katanga (Admissibility Appeal) (n 1) para 79; see also Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on  the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the Decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 on  Admissibility) ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3, Appeals Chamber (19 October 2010) para 240; Crow (n 5) 59.

40 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga  against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07  OA 8, Appeals Chamber (25 September 2009) para 1 (hereinafter Katanga Admissibility Appeal). 41 ibid para 75; see also Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Katanga Complementarity Decisions: Sound  Law but Flawed Policy’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 363, 364. 

42 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) paras 78, 80; see also Carsten Stahn, ‘Perspectives on Katanga: An  Introduction’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 311, 312. 

43 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 78. 

44 ibid para 78; see also Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law:  Origin, Development and Practice (Brill 2008) 159. 

45 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 78; see also Carsten Stahn, Revitalizing Complementarity a Decade  after the Stocktaking Exercise (TOAEP Policy Brief Series No 115, 2020) 1. 

46 Samuel C Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal  of Transnational Law 307, 316.

47 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) paras 78-79 

48 Prosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging  the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute)) ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, Trial Chamber II (16 June 2009)  paras 77-78. 

49 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 83. 

50 ibid para 83; see also Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National  Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 311. 

51 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 83; see also Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on  the Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges) ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3, Appeals Chamber (19 October 2010)  para 240. 

52 Prrosecutor v Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case) ICC 01/04-01/07-949, Defence (11 March 2009) paras 15, 53. 

53 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) para 98. 

54 ibid para 111; see also Christian M De Vos, ‘Mirror Images? Complementarity in the Courtroom’ in  Complementarity, Catalysts, Compliance: The International Criminal Court in Uganda, Kenya, and the  Democratic Republic of Congo (Cambridge University Press 2020) 59-80.

55 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) paras 111-113; see also Sophie Rigney, ‘“The Words Don’t Fit You”:  Recharacterisation of the Charges, Trial Fairness, and Katanga’ (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law  1, 4. 

56 Katanga Admissibility Appeal (n 1) paras 30-31. 

57 Ibid para 38.  

58 Ibid para 56.  

59 Ibid para 57; see also Gilbert Bitti and Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Katanga Trial Chamber Decision: Selected  Issues’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 319, 324.

61 Rome Statute, preamble, para 5. 

62 Carsten Stahn, Revitalizing Complementarity a Decade after the Stocktaking Exercise (TOAEP Policy Brief  Series No 115, 2020) 1. 

63 Linda M Keller, ‘The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on “The Complementarity  Conundrum”‘ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 199, 211. 

64 Susana Sá Couto and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Katanga Complementarity Decisions: Sound Law but Flawed  Policy’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 363, 364. 

65 Stahn, Revitalizing Complementarity (n 3) 1.

66 Samuel C Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal  of Transnational Law 307, 316. 

67 Samuel C Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal  of Transnational Law 307, 316. 

68 Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al Senussi Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 Oct. 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of  the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi”) ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Appeals Chamber (24 July 2014) paras 215, 217. 69 Birnbaum, ‘Predictive Due Process’ (n 8) 335. 

70 Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility Challenges  and Complementarity’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 217.