Shell Plc v. Milieudefensie et al.

1. Case Citation and Basic Information

Shell plc v. Milieudefensie et al. ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:2099, Court of Appeal of the Hague (3-Judge Bench) Decided on 12 November 2024.

2. Introduction

This case summary examines the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Hague’s decision in Shell plc v. Milieudefensie et al. on 12th November 2024, which resulted from Shell’s appeal against a 2021 District Court decision mandating that it cut its global CO2 emissions by 45% by 2030. It represents one of the widely followed developments in the expanding field of climate litigation against private firms as the case sits at the intersection of Dutch tort law, international human rights law, and corporate climate governance. The judgment is significant as it strengthens the role of human rights and international soft-law principles in defining corporate climate responsibility while clarifying the boundaries of judicial action in establishing corporate emissions objectives. As a result, the case is expected to have an impact on both the developing legal frameworks governing corporate sustainability.

3. Facts of the Case
   

Shell plc is a public limited company that is based in the United Kingdom. It is the principal holding company of the Shell Group, whose activities involve the exploration, extraction, production, and sale of oil, gas, and other energy products. In April 2019, Milieudefensie (the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth) joined by six other environmental organizations and 17,000 individual Dutch co-claimants, filed a cause against Shell stating that their production of CO2 emissions violated the “social standard of care” under Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) in line with the right to life and the right to private and family life enshrined under Articles 2 and 8 of the European Court of Human Rights.^[1] They also ordered the Court to declare that Shell acts unlawfully if it is unable to reduce its Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions by 45% by 2030 relative to 2019 levels, in line with the Paris Agreement.^[2]

On 26 May 2021, the District Court of the Hague ruled in favor of the claimant by ordering Shell to reduce its CO2 emissions by at least 45% by 2030 relative to 2019.^[3] After which, Shell had appealed this ruling through the submission of ten separate grounds of appeal and asked the Court of Appeal to reverse this judgement and to dismiss the claims.^[4] Shell argued that although it acknowledges the need to tackle climate change, imposing a specific emissions reduction threshold on a single company exceeded the role of courts and conflicted with the responsibilities of international regulations concerning climate policy.^[5]

4. Legal Issues

1. Whether, in the absence of a specific legal requirement, a private company can owe an enforceable duty of care under Article 6:162 of the DCC to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate change issues.
2. Whether the principles of the right to life and to private and family life exemplified under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR can be applied to companies that owe a private law duty of care to private citizens through an indirect horizontal effect, even though it formally binds only states.
3. Whether a civil court can legitimately impose a specific quantified emissions reduction target on an individual company when the quantified target is derived from a global or average scientific threshold that is not designed for allocation to any single corporation or sector.

5. Arguments Presented

5.1 Petitioner/Appellant’s Arguments

Shell had argued that Milieudefensie’s claims were inadmissible as the case concerns “a political issue” that is not suited for civil litigation and thus, issues concerning the reduction of CO2 emissions would belong to the legislature and not the courts.^[6]

Shell had utilized the ECtHR’s Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz v. Switzerland to argue that since the case granted states only a limited margin of appreciation on how to fight climate change by leaving it to policymakers, then a civil court, reviewing a private company’s conduct, should show comparable restraint when managing climate change in private law disputes by not enforcing specific quantifiable thresholds.^[7]

Additionally, Shell also argued that there is no scientific consensus that supports allocating any global percentage to an individual company or sector. They argued this using experts such as A. Hawkes, who argued that imposing a universal percentage threshold on ‘fossil fuels’ as a category when coal, oil, and gas all have varying carbon intensities is not sensible.^[8]

5.2 Respondent’s Arguments

Milieudefensie argued on the grounds of Article 6:162 of the DCC that Shell, being a major contributor of fossil fuels in the market and because it endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, has a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Thus, they argue that Shell owes a duty of care to limit greenhouse gas emissions regardless of state regulation.^[9]

Additionally, they also argued for the extension of indirect horizontal effect from states to private companies based on Articles 2 and 8 ECHR and Articles 6 and 17 ICCPR.^[10] They also utilized the Court’s Urgenda judgment as precedent that these rights generate obligations to prevent dangerous climate change.^[11]

Moreover, Milieudefensie relied on the IPCC and IEA reports supporting a global 45% reduction by 2030 relative to 2010 as necessary to limit global warming to 1.5 C.^[12] They also argued that Shell should be held to a higher standard given that they are based in a wealthy industrialized country in line with the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle from the Paris Agreement and the Tyndall Centre report.^[13]

6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

First, the court established that the protection of climate change falls within the scope of human rights under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR. To reach this conclusion, the court had looked at various cases, including the Dutch Supreme Court’s Urgenda judgment, the ECtHR’s Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz v. Switzerland, and other cases from Colombia, Brazil, Montana, and India. The reason the court looked at various cases from around the world was to reach a global consensus across multiple jurisdictions so that the conclusion would be harder to dismiss.^[14]

Second, the court concluded that human rights obligations do not extend directly to Shell in the same way it binds a State, as human rights instruments are only formally binding on States due to their vertical effect. However, an indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights can be invoked to at least some extent. Thus, Shell’s actual legal obligation comes from Dutch tort law (Article 6:162 DCC). Additionally, Articles 2 and 8 ECHR do not bind Shell directly; they give meaning to what constitutes ‘proper social conduct’ for companies like Shell. Moreover, the social standard of care is further defined through UNGP and OECD guidelines.^[15]

Third, the court stated that the existence of a duty of care does not automatically mean the existence of a specific quantifiable target. They concluded that the duty of care is company-specific and context-dependent and not a universal standard by employing the IEA’s findings.^[16] They also stated that if institutionally best legislatures have not placed a target for individual companies, then courts should be cautious about inventing one themselves.^[17]

Fourth, the court concluded that a quantifiable target cannot be set to be applied directly to Shell as the 45% reduction obligation is a global reduction that concerns various sectors and companies.^[18] Additionally, based on the review of expert reports from Tyndall, Rogelj, Hawkes, and the IEA, they derived numbers ranging from 28.5% to 51.7% for oil, making it difficult to set a sector-specific standard for oil and gas instead.^[19]

7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal allowed Shell’s appeal in full. It quashed the District Court’s 2021 judgment ordering Shell to cut its CO2 emissions by 45% and also denied all of Milieudefensie et al.’s claims. Milieudefensie et al. were ordered to pay Shell’s and the joint intervening party’s (M&M’s) costs at both instances. Despite this outcome, the court’s reasoning upheld the private duty of care principle, requiring Shell to contribute to limiting climate change and that a specific, quantifiable reduction target would not be set for Shell individually.^[20]

The ratio decidendi is that a private law duty of care to limit climate change does bind large companies who contribute to it even though a specific statutory obligation is absent. This is established through Article 6:162 DCC, indirect horizontal effect of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, and soft law instruments (UNGP and OECD Guidelines).^[21] However, a civil court cannot convert that duty of care into a specific quantifiable target for an individual company to achieve, given that a universally agreed sectoral target is absent.^[22]

8. Critical Analysis

8.1 Significance of the Decision

Johannsen, Kotzé and Macchi state that one of the main ways this judgment contributed to the development of law was by extending the obligation to protect human rights to private actors, thereby recognizing the indirect horizontal effect of human rights.^[23] The Dutch courts’ technique of using international human rights treaties to interpret a domestic standard of care allows courts to establish liability for what is essentially a human rights violation, even though corporations are not directly bound by those treaties.^[24]

The judgement can also be seen as departing from the District Court’s reasoning as it rejects the straightforward application of the 45% reduction of CO2 emissions. Rather, the decision from the Court of Appeal highlights that these percentages are meant to be uniformly imposed on companies or economic sectors.^[25] But it is also important to note that the appellate judgement only narrows uncertainty on the quantification factor and doesn’t fully settle it, since a further appeal that was recently filed is pending.

8.2 Implications and Impact

The judgment of this case affects every other large company operating in or connected to Dutch jurisdiction, as the duty of care principle recognized by the court is grounded upon Article 6:162 of the DCC and in relation to Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR. Thus, any company that is significantly contributing to climate change and has the power to combat it is now under a comparable obligation as Shell is. ^[26]

For policymakers, this judgment puts pressure on EU and Dutch legislators to close the gap that the court declined to fill judicially. For example, since the court emphasized that the exact company-level reduction is best left to legislators, legislators would now feel the pressure to develop clearer benchmarks under regulations related to climate change.^[27]

8.3 Critical Evaluation

 Commentators like Johannsen, Kotzé, and Macchi affirm the judgement by stating that extending the responsibility of climate change beyond states to private actors is practically sound, as the responsibility is shifted to those who actually cause climate harm. However, they have also provided criticism by stating there were “missed opportunities” in the court’s analysis of Shell’s new fossil fuel investments.^[28] For example, the court had declined to draw any binding conclusion from the carbon lock-in it had itself identified in Shell’s planned investments because it wasn’t a direct claim as part of these proceedings, rather than because the underlying facts didn’t support it.^[29]

9. Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s judgment confirmed that Shell owes a private law duty of care to help limit climate change, grounded in Dutch tort law and interpreted in light of human rights values under the ECHR, but reversed the Dutch Court’s 2021 order requiring Shell to cut its emissions by 45% by 2030 due to a lack of scientific evidence to convert that threshold into a company-specific target. The main takeaway of this case is that companies can have a legal duty under Dutch law to limit climate change. Still, courts cannot impose a binding, specific emissions-reduction target unless there is sufficient scientific and legal basis to support it. Moreover, this ruling will have long-term implications for climate litigation against major emitters, primarily for its application of indirect horizontal effect as a method for extending human rights obligations to private corporations. Notably, several questions remain open regarding how courts should handle the quantification problem, but Milieudefensie’s pending appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court may revisit this area.

10. Reference(S):
    

Cases

Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:2099, Gerechtshof Den Haag (The Hague Court of Appeal), 12 November 2024

Legislation

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) 1950.

Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek)

Secondary Sources

Bibi Johannsen, Louis J Kotzé, & Chiara Macchi, ‘An empty victory? Shell v. Milieudefensie et al 2024, the legal obligations of carbon majors, and the prospects for future climate litigation action’(2025) 34(1) RECIEL 270-278.

Carlo Vittorio Giabardo, ‘Corporate Climate Responsibility After “Milieudefensie vs. Shell” Court of Appeal Decision’ (EJIL:Talk!, 17 December 2024) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/corporate-climate-responsibility-after-milieudefensie-vs-shell-court-of-appeal-decision/> accessed on 7 July 2026

Chiara Macchi, ‘Business and human rights implications of climate change litigation: Milieudefensie et al. V Royal Dutch Shell’ (2021) 30(3) RECIEL 414

^[1] Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), art 6:162 and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) 1950, arts 2 and 8

^[2] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al.ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:2099, Gerechtshof Den Haag (The Hague Court of Appeal), 12 November 2024, [4.1]

^[3] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [4.2]

^[4] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [5.1]

^[5] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [3.5]

^[6]  Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [5.1], [7.14] and [7.52]

^[7] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.11]

^[8] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.85]-[7.90]

^[9] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.1], [7.19]-[7.21]

^[10] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [4.1(1)(a)] and [7.5]

^[11] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.6]

^[12] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.69]

^[13] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.73] and [7.86]

^[14] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.13] – [7.15]

^[15] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.56]

^[16] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.77]

^[17] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.56] and [7.57]

^[18] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.75]

^[19] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.91]

^[20] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [9]

^[21] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.27]

^[22] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.96]

^[23] Bibi Johannsen, Louis J Kotzé, & Chiara Macchi, ‘An empty victory? Shell v. Milieudefensie et al 2024, the legal obligations of carbon majors, and the prospects for future climate litigation action’(2025) 34(1) RECIEL 270-278.

^[24] Chiara Macchi, ‘Business and human rights implications of climate change litigation: Milieudefensie et al. V Royal Dutch Shell’ (2021) 30(3) RECIEL 414

^[25] Carlo Vittorio Giabardo, ‘Corporate Climate Responsibility After “Milieudefensie vs. Shell” Court of Appeal Decision’ (EJIL:Talk!, 17 December 2024) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/corporate-climate-responsibility-after-milieudefensie-vs-shell-court-of-appeal-decision/> accessed on 7 July 2026

^[26] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.27]

^[27] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.52]–[7.53]

^[28] Bibi Johannsen, Louis J Kotzé, & Chiara Macchi, ‘An empty victory? Shell v. Milieudefensie et al 2024, the legal obligations of carbon majors, and the prospects for future climate litigation action’(2025) 34(1) RECIEL 270-278.

^[29] Shell plc v Milieudefensie et al. (n1) [7.59]–[7.60]