Jackson and Others v Attorney General, [2005] UKHL 56

Introduction

Jackson as a case can be seen to be a war between rural communities fighting to keep their traditions and conventions in place, against the overbearing rule of their urban counterparts, who are determined to destroy and replace rural communities and culture. This case is highly significant as it discusses a highly controversial Act, the Hunting Act 2004, but also calls into question the legitimacy of the Parliament Act 1949, and questions whether it is valid law at all, and therefore could not be used to enact the Hunting Act. Therefore, this case deals with a number of matters, including hunting and the regulation of countryside practices by urban lawmakers, and also constitutional issues, and the role and power of the House of Lords in the modern day. 

Case Facts

The appellants were a group of people who “all, in differing ways, have an interest in fox hunting.” The defendant was the government, who was represented by the Attorney General. The case was found in favour of the defendants in all three of its instances, at the District Court, the Court of Appeal’s Civil Division, and the House of Lords. Jackson was brought to court in order to challenge the passing of the Hunting Act the year before, and stop its terms, crucially banning fox hunting, from being enforced. However, the Hunting Act dealt with a number of hunting issues that the appellant thought to be reversed, including banning hunting any wild mammal with dogs, leasing land for hunting use, the banning of hare coursing participation and facilitation of such an event, and sets out the enforcement and penalties that may be put upon a person found guilty of the offences found under the act.  This case stems from the legitimacy of the Parliament Act of 1949, and so the court looked at the background surrounding this. The first Parliament Act of 1911 was brought in to limit the powers of the unelected House of Lords, against the elected House of Commons. It was enacted due to the Liberal government’s belief that the Conservative hereditary peers would not accept liberal change, as they saw with the Lords vote against what became the Great Reform Act. 

Legal Issues

The legal issues surrounding this case are questioning the legitimacy of laws made through the use of the Parliament Act 1911. This is due to the appellants claiming that law made through the use of this Act to bypass the consent of the House of Lords is secondary legislation, as an amendment of the original Parliament Act 1911, as opposed to primary legislation and an Act in its own right. Therefore, this would mean that the secondary legislation could be challenged in the court through judicial review, as opposed to it only being challenged against the Human Rights Act, or against any European Union (EU) pieces of legislation, and therefore sent to the European Court of Justice for review. The Parliament Act of 1911 does not give unlimited scope for Bills to be passed using it, as seen by S. 2(1) of the Act. Relevant to this case is the provision that Bills forced through under the Parliament Act 1911 should not be used to enlarge the powers of Parliament, or specifically the House of Commons. Finally, the appellants see the use of the Parliament Act 1911 to force a Bill through Parliament as making that Bill a modification of the Parliament Act, rather than an Act in its own right, limiting its legitimacy and crucially scope. This is limited by judicial review as secondary legislation can be brought to the court if it is enacted ‘ultra vires’, or beyond its powers. Therefore, if the courts deemed the Parliament Act 1949 and the Hunting Act 2004 to be secondary legislation, they could be repealed as laws due to being beyond the scope of the original legislation of the Parliament Act 1911. 

Court Reasoning and Judgement

The court looked at the Parliament Act 1911 S. 2(1) as not going beyond scope of the law, or that Parliament was attempted to expand its own law-making powers. This was due to a number of issues, but crucially the use of the purposive rule, meaning it is asked ‘what was the purpose of bringing this act into law?’, with the justices statutory interpretation meant that the ‘unjust’ ruling that may have occurred through the literal rule, meaning that the wording of the Act is taken at face value, even if it may lead to a ruling contrary to what the Act was meant to stop, was prevented. Therefore, the Parliament Act 1911 S. 2(1) has finally had clarity added to it with the ruling of the House of Lords, making future cases regarding these issues easier to predict before they come to court, and easier to rule on when in lower courts with judicial precedence. The courts also refuted the argument that Parliament was enlarging their devolved powers, akin to a minister or local council acting ultra vires. However, the courts did not find this argument convincing as they ruled that Parliament devolved or delegated no power to itself, and it cannot be made subordinate to itself, as Parliament is sovereign. Lord Bingham ends his judgement by warning of the worries that some may have, including Lord Scarman, “that the effect of the 1911, and more particularly the 1949, Act has been to erode the checks and balances inherent in the British constitution when Crown, Lords and Commons were independent and substantial bases of power, leaving the Commons, dominated by the executive”. Lord Bingham satiates this worry by showing that the Parliament Acts have not been used for constitutional change since the 1949 Parliament Act, but does agree it is worrisome that governments are using the Parliament Acts to put through statutes with little or not constitutional importance, often just for political aspirations, including the Hunting Act 2004, and the War Crimes Act 1991. The case of Pickin, was referenced numerous times throughout the Jackson judgement, especially Lord Reid’s judgement and concern that “It might involve a conflict between the courts and Parliament”, should the courts be too quick to rule a statute as unlawful. Therein lies the conflict between the arms of state, as the unelected judiciary must aim to enforce the law, but cannot hope to have the legitimacy or power to take on the combined legislature and executive branches of Parliament and government. This means that even if the courts did find the Parliament Act 1949 and Hunting Act 2004 to be unlawfully created, it would be difficult to enforce this in Parliament and across the country, as a group of unelected officials enforcing their will on our elected representatives. Lord Brown concluded by stating that there is no way to quantify the term “any public bill” from S. 2(1) of the Parliament Act 1911 as anything other than any Bill that Parliament may put forward. Therefore, he rules that it cannot be beyond the realm of possibility that in creating such a passage, that they were indicating that the Parliament Act of 1911 may be updated with later Acts, as seen by the Parliament Act 1949. Therefore, he, along with every other Lord Justice, unanimously decided to reject the appeal. 

Case Analysis

This is a highly significant development in constitutional law, as it reaffirms the legitimacy of the Parliament Act of 1949, meaning it is a law in its own right and can be used again to push through Bills in Parliament without the approval of the House of Lords. This also meant that the provisions of the Hunting Act 2004 were still enforced in the law, also reaffirming this Act’s legitimacy. Therefore, should the legitimacy of any future Act of Parliament enacted through the use of the Parliament Act 1949 be called into question, the justices presiding over that case now also have precedence set to use for their judgement. This means that the law has become clarified and that there is less confusion surrounding the Parliament Acts and their role has been defined. The case has been referenced many times, including cases such as Isherwood, R v JTB in the Obiter Dicta of Lord Nicholls, and in AD v Minister of Finance, where Hellman J uses the case to portray the court’s clarification of when “the legislature did not make it ‘crystal clear’”. This is also a great function of this case, to show a clear example of when the courts had to intervene between the public and government to clarify complex and unclear issues that have arisen from Acts of Parliament, as seen by the Parliament Act 1911 in this case, or the International Cooperation (Tax Information Exchange Agreements) Act 2005 in the case AD v Minister of Finance in the Bermudan court system, showing the international precedence set by the House of Lords in this landmark case. The case is still highly controversial to this day, as is the Hunting Act 2004, especially with renewed calls to ban trail hunting. Therefore, both the legitimacy of both the Parliaments Acts and the Hunting Act may yet be called into question again, especially with the building of tensions stemming from the campaigning against trail hunting, often seen as a last bastion of the culture and tradition that was lost with the Hunting Act 2004. 

Conclusion

In conclusion, the case of Jackson was a highly controversial one, as was the Act it was trying to find to be unlawful. However, the justices ruled in favour of the government and cemented the powers of the House of Commons over the House of Lords in Parliament by ruling and setting precedent that the Commons is supreme and may overrule the Lords on “Any public bill”. This is also a landmark case as there is currently more being discussed regarding hunting, and the possibility of banning trail hunting is being spoken of. This could not have occurred without the Jackson ruling. This ruling may however open the floodgates of Parliament, especially the Commons, to disregard the opinions of the Lords entirely and just push their Bills through. This would be extremely damaging to our existing model as the wealth of experience and knowledge in the Lords is unmatched and the Commons would be wise to listen and abide by their advice. 

Bibliography

Primary Sources

• AD v Minister of Finance (2015) 87 WIR 278

• BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD APPELLANTS AND PICKIN RESPONDENT [On appeal from PICKIN v. BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD] [1974] A.C. 765

• Human Rights Act 1998

• Hunting Act 2004

• International Cooperation (Tax Information Exchange Agreements) Act 2005

• Jackson and others v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56

• Parliament Act (1911)

• Parliament Act 1949

• R v JTB [2009] UKHL 20

• R (on the application of Isherwood and others) v Welsh Ministers [2022] EWHC 3331 (Admin)

• R (on the application of Jackson) v A-G [2005] EWCA Civ 126

• R (on the application of Jackson) and others v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin)

• The Great Reform Act (1832)

• War Crimes Act 1991

Secondary Sources

• BBC News Shropshire, ‘Hunting Act: Countryside Still Divided 20 Years On’, (November 2024), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1dp0w0ygwqo>, accessed 29/06/26
• Bonner T., ‘20 Years of the Petty and Prejudiced Hunting Act’, (The Countryside Alliance, 14/11/2024), <https://www.countryside-alliance.org/features/tim-bonner-20-years-of-the-petty-and-prejudiced-hunting-act>, accessed 20/06/2026
• Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial Review and Statutory Review’, (April 2024), <https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part54>, accessed 29/06/26  
• Protect the Wild, ‘Hunting: A Case for Change’, (2025), <https://protectthewild.org.uk/our-campaigns/proper-ban-on-hunting/hunting-a-case-for-change/>, accessed 29/06/26