Authored By: AKANSHA KUMARI
CHANDIGARH UNIVERSITY
Case Name: K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017)
Citation: (2017) 10 SCC 1 Court: Supreme Court of India (Nine-Judge Constitutional Bench)
Date of Decision: 24 August 2017
Bench: CJI J.S. Khehar, JJ. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, R.F. Nariman, A.M. Sapre, D.Y. Chandrachud, S.K. Kaul, and S. Abdul Nazeer
Background and Facts
The meaning was sought from the Constitution because a writ petition was filed by Justice K.S. Puttaswamy, a retired Judge of the Karnataka High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar scheme of the Government of India. The Aadhaar project, administered by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), aimed to have every citizen of India be assigned a 12-digit biometric ID by gathering demographic information along with fingerprints and iris scans. The petitioner argued that such compulsory collection and storing of biometric data infringes upon the right to privacy.
The Union of India had raised a preliminary objection before a three-judge bench that two previous eight-judge benches, namely M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954 AIR 300) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1963 SC 1295), had decided that privacy is not a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. These were decisions of eight-judge benches, and an 8-JA or more had to rule on it. This led to the formation of a nine-judge constitutional bench that consisted of just one question, but a very big question before it in 2015:
Whether the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India.
Issues Before the Court
Whether privacy is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19, and/or 21 of the Constitution.
Whether the earlier decisions in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh correctly laid down the law and, if not, whether they should be overruled.
The nature, content, and permissible restrictions on the right to privacy.
Overruling of Earlier Precedents
M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954): An 8-member Bench had earlier considered the search and seizure powers and opined that there was no fundamental right to privacy in the Constitution. The bench had been counting on the lack of an equivalent to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1963): A second bench, comprising eight judges, also found that the police can ignore a few surveillance rules, but did explicitly rule out the idea of a “fundamental right to privacy” not being recognized by the Indian Constitution.
The 9-member bench, however, in the Puttaswamy case, unanimously found both assertions to be incorrectly decided and both were overruled because both decisions had denied the right to be ‘left alone’ the status of a fundamental right. The Court ultimately found that these rulings were based on a “misguided reading of Part III, which has now been superseded in vast measure by decades of constitutional development.
Reasoning and Holding
Six distinct opinions were given, all agreeing. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud penned the plurality judgment, which is cited as the longest of the six. The court unanimously found that the right to privacy was guaranteed by Article 21, as an intrinsic element of the ambiguity of the right to life, and also under Article 19 and the equal liberty and human dignity that underpin the constitution in Part III.
Key Doctrinal Points
Privacy as an Aspect of Article 21 and Human Dignity: It stated that life and personal liberty in Article 21 have nothing to do with just being an animal, and also have a connotation of living with dignity, autonomy, and freedom. Privacy cannot be divorced from any other freedom (that of thought, belief, expression, and association), and forms part of the constitutional right to life. The court referred to the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi V. the Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597), which held that any procedure which abridges human life and liberty should be both fair, just, and reasonable and satisfy the twin requirements of Article 14 and Article 19 at the same time. The court reiterated the correct interpretation, introduced by the Maneka Gandhi framework.
Rejection of the “Unenumerated Rights” Objection: Against the “Unenumerated Rights” plea, the Union of India had contended that privacy was not mentioned specifically in the liberal Part III of the Constitution, and the framers had intentionally kept it out. The court found that this argument was not correct and cited the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v Union territory of Delhi (AIR 1981 SC 746), in which it had decided that the meaning of the right to life is the right to live with human dignity, inclusive of all the facilities that are required to live with it. The court said that fundamental rights should be interpreted ‘purposively’ and not ‘textually’ and that the absence of the Constitution on a specific issue of liberty does not nullify it.
Constitutionality of Privacy in Light of Gobind v. State of M.P. (1975) In Gobind v. State of M.P. (AIR 1975 SC 1378): In Gobind v. State of M.P. 1975, a three-judge bench of Justice Mathew had held that even the right to privacy is a ‘penumbral’ right that is implicit in some fundamental rights. The Puttaswamy court reiterated this and said that Gobind had actually been “suspicious” of the future direction of the law, while “nuances” of privacy in recent cases would show that it was considered a constitutionally recognized right.
The Trilogy of Post-Emergency Privacy Decisions: It analyzed an extensive post-Maneka Gandhi jurisprudence in which the right to privacy had been expressly recognized in various contexts, such as:
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994 (6) SCC 632): The right to privacy under a specific category, as rightly being the abuse of private information, it is held that the publication of information about the private life of any private person without his consent is intended with running the risk of violating that right.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1997 (1) SCC 301): Held that telephone tapping constitutes a serious infringement of the right to privacy under Article 21 and can only be justified under a procedure that is fair and just.
Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010 (7) SCC 263): Held that Mental privacy and cognitive liberty were recognized as interests worthy of protection, thereby holding involuntary administration of narcoanalysis, polygraph tests, and brain mapping to be violations of Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.
The nine-judge bench approved all three decisions, finding each correct and as a natural outgrowth of the constitutional recognition of privacy as a fundamental right.
5. Dimensions of Privacy: While speaking from a broader perspective, the nature and the purpose of the case, five aspects of Privacy Justice, as advocated by Justice Chandrachud, were recognized in his judgment –
personal autonomy – the right to take decisions regarding one’s own life;
informational privacy – the right to control the flow and use of personal data;
the privacy of a person’s home and body – protection against physical intrusion; and (iv) privacy of certain rights, such as the right to marriage; and
privacy of emotional privacy – the right for women to feel safe regarding risqué and dangerous matters of the mind.
It also highlighted the freedom of choice, as decisions about sexuality, identity, diet, dress, and faith fall right in the sanctum sanctorum of privacy.
Privacy and Sexual Orientation — Implication for Naz Foundation: In a significant statement, Justice Chandrachud clearly held that the previous decision of the Supreme Court on Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014 (1) SCC 1) was wrongly decided, as it did not accord any privacy and dignity to LGBT people. This fact was obiter dicta but paved the way for the reasons read later in the judgment in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018 (10) SCC 1), which read down Section 377 IPC.
Proportionality as the Standard of Review: The court identified four elements of a proportionality test that is recognized in international human rights law and in international practice: (i) an action by a State must be a matter of law; (ii) the State action must be directed at a legitimate state objective; (iii) the State action must be “necessary” to that objective, and must be “proportionate” as well; and (iv) “procedural” safeguards against abuse are required. The bench relied on the judgments in Modern Dental College and Research Centre vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2016 (7) SCC 353; and European Court of Human Rights, Germany, South Africa, and Canada.
Decision
The nine-judge bench has agreed unanimously that:
Right to privacy is one of the Fundamental Rights under the Constitution of India in Part III.
2. Privacy as their own is an essential characteristic of human dignity and liberty, and it cannot be removed except by a just, fair, and reasonable event under the law.
That M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh did and did not deny this right was overruled.
No right to privacy is absolute and can be lawfully interfered with by the State insofar as it achieves a legitimate end.
Significance and Legacy
Puttaswamy is one of the most significant Constitutional judgements in the jurisprudence of independent India. It reinvigorated the constitutional framework of India with values of dignity, autonomy, and liberty. The short-term fallouts of such decisions are the Navtej Singh Johar (2018) verdict, which struck down the archaic provision of Section 377 from the Indian Penal Code, the Aadhaar case (amplified to the SMS level in Puttaswamy II, 2018), and increased scrutiny of data surveillance and state action affecting private data. The judgment also led to legislative measures that resulted in India’s first comprehensive data protection law – the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. It is an absolute expression that constitutional rights should go through the evolution of the lives of those for whose benefit they are provided.
