Authored By: MIDRACH ANGEL MUKOOZA
NKUMBA UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
This article examines the doctrine of diminished responsibility within criminal law and its role in assessing criminal liability where the accused person‟s mental state is impaired. It explores the development of the doctrine from its early recognition in the Scottish law to its modern interpretation in English case law. The article considers how the doctrine is recognized under the Ugandan law and evaluates its practical application. By analyzing the weaknesses and strengths of the doctrine of diminished responsibility and incorporating the social and psychological perspectives the article highlights the importance of mental impairment in determining blameworthiness.
Introduction
Criminal responsibility is the legal notion that determines if an individual can be held criminally responsible for their actions. When determining criminal responsibility there must be assessing if the person had the intention or intent and understanding to commit the crime of which they are being accused of or whether they knew that the actions done by them were unlawful, free will has also been considered necessary for criminal responsibility1and other factors such as age and the specific circumstances of the offense play an important role in establishing criminal responsibility and without these elements a person may not be held criminally responsible for the alleged criminal offence. The age for criminal responsibility may always differ according to different countries or states for example in Uganda the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 12 years old2, meaning children below the age of 12 are all presumed incapable of committing a crime while in the UK the age of criminal responsibility is 10 years in England, wales and Northern Ireland.
The concept of criminal responsibility is also affected by the mental state. It becomes more complicated when the offender suffers from a mental abnormality. Criminal law assumes that individuals act voluntarily, rationally and with full control over their actions, so for the defendant to be guilty of a crime it must be proven that they had the mental capacity to commit the offense knowingly and willfully and without a proper criminal state of mind, an individual may not be held criminally responsible for their actions. When an individual‟s mental functioning is facing certain issues these assumptions become uncertain because mental disorders can affect an individual‟s ability to understand their actions, make sound judgments or even control their impulses.
The Doctrine of Diminished Responsibility
It is important to examine the circumstances which the law recognizes as an exception to liability after having established the general principles of criminal responsibility. The article examines the psychological foundations of diminished responsibility and evaluates whether the doctrine adequately balances justice. Such exception is the doctrine of diminished responsibility; this is a partial defence that arises where the accused‟s mental condition substantially impairs their capacity to be fully criminally responsible.
The background and origin of the Doctrine of diminished reasonability
This doctrine was first recognized by the Scottish common law to reduce the punishment of the partially insane3, it developed from the practice of juries in the 19th century of returning verdicts of guilty with a recommendation as to mercy of sentence to reflect any extenuating circumstances. In series of decisions, given mainly by Lord Deas, the doctrine grew that various types of mental weakness could have the effect of reducing what would otherwise be a conviction for murder to one for culpable homicide. An example of diminished capacity might be extreme low intelligence. Earlier cases show that the doctrine of diminished responsibility emerged as a practical response to situations where strict murder liability seemed morally excessive In an English case of Raven4a man who had a physical age of 22 years but a mental age of 9 years felt provoked by homosexual advances and killed his perceived attacker. His mental deficiency was not in dispute and since a child of 9 years would not have been criminally responsible and his mental responsibility for his act was substantially impaired, manslaughter was the only realistic verdict and the rationale of the defense is that as a precondition to punishment, criminal law requires conduct to be voluntary that if something happened to have interfered with the capacity of the individual to choose to break the law it should be reflected by an exculpation.
The historical Scottish practice also reflects this principle. In trial of Sir Archibald Gordon Kinloch for the murder of his brother Sir Francis Kinloch under McQueen, Lord Braxfield is also an example of the recognition of the doctrine of diminished responsibility, although found guilty and expecting a death sentence, but after his sentence he was eventually released after two days of the judgment into the care of a doctor on the understanding that Kinloch be kept in a secure environment5. During the 20th century the courts began to limit the mental conditions falling within diminished responsibility. In HM Advocate v savage6Lord Alness addressed the jury that It is very difficult to put it in a phrase, but it has been put in this way: that there must be aberration or weakness of mind, that there must be some form of mental unsoundness, that there must be a state of mind which is bordering on, though not amounting to insanity, that there must be a mind so affected that responsibility is diminished from full responsibility to partial responsibility. In other words, the prisoner in question must be only partially accountable for his actions. And I think one can see running through the cases that it is implied that there must be some form of mental disease.
Having analyzed the background and development of the doctrine of diminished responsibility, it‟s important to also analyze how the courts have applied it in practice and the leading case that illustrates the application of the doctrine is known as R v Byrne7
In the case of R v Byrne, the appellant was charged with murder of a young girl whom he had strangled and whose body he had mutilated. He admitted to the facts of killing and pleaded that he was suffering from diminished responsibility as defined in the section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 and was accordingly not guilty of murder but of manslaughter. The judge directed the jury to the effect that if the appellant killed the girl under an abnormal sexual impulse or urge which was so strong that he found it difficult to resist it, but that he was otherwise normal, the section would not apply to him and his was found guilty of murder and appealed on the grounds of a misdirection. It was held that abnormality of the mind in the section meant a state of mind so different from that of an ordinary of a human being that a reasonable man would term it as abnormal and was wide enough to cover the mind‟s activities in all its aspects, the ability to form a rational judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong and the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that of rational judgment. Byrne‟s conviction was substituted with manslaughter under diminished responsibility. The case is important because it clarified the meaning of abnormality of the mind and established a flexible test that gives juries discretion when determining if mental imprisonment reduces an offender‟s responsibility. The case therefore forms the foundation on which diminished responsibility is understood in many common law jurisdictions.
In Uganda, the doctrine of diminished responsibility is recognized in the penal Code where it states that; where a person is found guilty of murder or of being party to the murder of another, and the court is satisfied that that person was suffering from such abnormality of mind, whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind, or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury, has substantially impaired his or her mental responsibility for his or her acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the murder, the court shall make a special finding to the effect that the accused person was guilty of murder but with diminished responsibility8. And where a special finding is made, the person so convicted shall not be liable to suffer death but the court shall detain her or him in safe custody.9 Compared to the English approach, Uganda‟s provision is a bit more general and gives trial courts broader discretion, which can promote fairness but may also create inconsistent outcomes.
The doctrine of diminished responsibility comes with agreements and disagreements; its application raises questions about fairness, certainty and the role of psychology in criminal justice. Below is a critical evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of diminished responsibility as a partial defence.
The strengths of the doctrine are that it introduces flexibility when setting the sentencing; the doctrine allows murder to be reduced to manslaughter giving the court discretion instead of a mandatory life sentence as it had been the case in section 2(1) of the homicide Act 195710. It modernizes the law to reflect psychiatric knowledge; the phrase „abnormality of mental functioning‟ is now being used in law and the law now relies on medical expertise. The law commission‟s reasoning suggests that the new phraseology represents an update in the law11. Lastly, the doctrine of diminished responsibility recognizes the moral difference in culpability that is to say not all killers have same level of blameworthiness, the doctrine reduces moral responsibility, and it reflects qualitative impairment and reduces liability where abnormality justifies it12. This shows that the doctrine aims on delivering more individualized justice by taking mental conditions into consideration
However the doctrine of diminished responsibility also has its own weakness as identified below;
The doctrine of diminished responsibility lacks clarity in defining substantial impairment, the law doesn‟t give a clear or direct meaning of “substantial” which leaves judges and the jury to interpret it, it has been criticized for its vagueness in many cases like in R v Golds 13 the UK supreme court held that “substantial” doesn‟t simply mean more than trivial that it is means something important or weighty but still refused to give it an exact definition it also admitted that juries could still struggle with the meaning.
There is a huge risk of abuse in murder cases because the defence reduces murder to manslaughter; offenders may attempt to use it even when their mental impairment is mild. This concern has been noted in several law commission14 discussions and parliamentary debates15on reforming partial defences to homicide, which emphasized the need for clearer standards and reliable expert evidence. Even though the courts require strict prove, the possibility of fabrication or overstated impairment remains a persistent policy criticism of the doctrine.
The test of diminished responsibility is too subjective in that courts have to rely heavily on psychiatric evidence which always varies from expert to expert. In R v Byrne, Lord Parker described abnormality of mind in a very broad language, defining it as a state of mind different from that of any ordinary human being that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. Such an open ended definition requires expert interpretation and psychiatric experts frequently disagree on the extent of impairment. The inconsistency in expert opinion has been criticized for producing unpredictable outcomes in diminished responsibility cases.
Psychological and Social perspective on Diminished Responsibility.
A psychological perspective on the doctrine of diminished responsibility is important when trying to understand the doctrine because mental disorders like schizophrenia, paranoid schizophrenia, personality disorder, psychopath, intellectual disabilities and developmental disorders and acquired brain injury16 affect how an individual thinks, feels and behaves, which is all crucial to a person‟s ability to act responsibly. Psychological research therefore supports the idea that offenders with substantial mental impairments shouldn‟t be treated as fully blameworthy. This helps to explain the importance behind diminished responsibility as a partial defence in homicide matters.
From the social perspective, the doctrine of diminished responsibility reflects the society‟s belief that offenders with serious mental impairments shouldn‟t be judged in the same exact way as a fully capable person. The society recognizes that mental illness can reduce an individual‟s ability to manage stress, control impulses or understand consequences of their actions hence there level of blameworthiness is different. The doctrine serves as a purpose in society by encouraging treatment and rehabilitation, as social attitude towards mental illness having evolved, the law has increasingly acknowledged the importance of balancing public safety with compassion for mentally ill offenders making the doctrine of diminished responsibility a socially justified partial defence.
Conclusion
The article examines the doctrine of diminished responsibility by defining the doctrine, and exploring its historical development and application through different case law, and its recognition under the Ugandan law. Through case discussion for example in R v Byrne and the relevant provisions, the article has shown how the doctrine of diminished responsibility works as a partial defence that recognizes reduced mental capacity without completely excusing criminal conduct. The article shows that diminished responsibility plays an important role in promoting fairness in criminal law by differentiating between full responsible offenders and those whose mental functioning is substantially impaired. The doctrine of diminished responsibility also presents challenges in particularly the vagueness of the doctrine as such as the abnormality of mind and a lot of reliance on psychiatric evidence may lead to inconsistent outcomes. In accordance with the psychological and social perspective, the doctrine reflects an increasing recognition that mental illness affects behavior and blameworthiness and that the punishment should take these realities into account, though the doctrine is without weaknesses it still remains an important mechanism for achieving substantive justice in homicide cases. Therefore there is need for courts to apply the doctrine carefully and consistently, supported by clear legal guidance and reliable expert evidence, by strengthening the assessment of mental impairment it would help ensure that the doctrine continues to balance fairness to the accused with the protection of society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
STATUES
The Homicide Act 1957 (UK)
The Uganda Penal code Cap 128
The Ugandan Children Act Cap 62
CASE LAW
HM Advocate v Savage (1923) JC 49
R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396
R v Raven (1982) Crim. LR 51
R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61
OTHERS
Manifest Madness: Mental capacity in Criminal law by Arlie Loughnan
Arenella, Peter (October 1977). “The diminished capacity and diminished responsibility defenses: Two Children of Doomed Marriage”. Columbia Law Review. 77(6): 830
The Trial of Sir Archibald Gordon Kinloch for the murder of sir Francis Kinloch his brother German, 1795
Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing without free will, 2011 Utah L. REV. 1403, 1405(2011)
Forensic Psychology: Crime, Justice, Law Interventions 3 Edition by Graham M. Davies and Anthony R. Beech, Chapter 22: Types Of Mental Illness
1 Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing without free will, 2011 Utah L. REV. 1403, 1405(2011)
2 Section 88 of the Ugandan Children Act Cap 62
3 Arenella, Peter (October 1977). “The diminished capacity and diminished responsibility defenses: Two Children of Doomed Marriage”. Columbia Law Review. 77(6): 830
4 R v Raven (1982) Crim. LR 51
5 The Trial of Sir Archibald Gordon Kinloch for the murder of sir Francis Kinloch his brother German, 1795
6 HM Advocate v Savage (1923) JC 49
7 R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396
8Section 177 (1) of the Uganda Penal code Cap 128
9Section 177(3) of the Uganda Penal Code Cap 128
10 Manifest Madness: Mental capacity in Criminal law: Differences of degree and Difference of kind: Diminished Responsibility by Arlie Loughnan page 235
11 Manifest Madness: Mental capacity in Criminal law by Arlie Loughnan: abnormality of mental functioning page 235
12 Manifest Madness: Mental capacity in Criminal law by Arlie Loughnan page 239-240
13 R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61
16 Forensic Psychology: Crime, Justice, Law Interventions 3 Edition By Graham M. Davies and Anthony R. Beech, Chapter 22: Types Of Mental Illness
