Authored By: Ekanem Godswill Essien
Arthur Jarvis University
1.0 Introduction
The Almajiri system, a longstanding tradition in Northern Nigeria, embodies the pursuit of Islamic knowledge through Qur’anic education. Rooted in the pre-colonial era, it involves young boys often aged 4 to 12 leaving their families to live with a mallam (teacher) in tsangaya (boarding schools) for immersive religious learning.
Historically, this practice fostered spiritual and moral development, aligning with Islamic tenets that prioritize seeking knowledge. However, socioeconomic pressures, including poverty affecting 65% of Northern households, have transformed it into a conduit for child exploitation, street begging, and rights violations. Today, an estimated 10 million Almajiri children, 81% of Nigeria’s out-of-school population beg for survival, endure abuse, and face health risks like malnutrition and trafficking.
From a legal standpoint, Nigeria’s framework ostensibly safeguards these children through constitutional provisions, the Child Rights Act 2003, and international obligations. Yet, implementation lags, revealing a chasm between theory and practice. This article examines the Almajiri system through a legal and human rights lens, incorporating Nigerian authorities, judicial insights, and comparative perspectives from Pakistan and India. By bridging doctrinal analysis with onground realities, it underscores the need for integrated reforms to protect child dignity and foster holistic development. Ultimately, effective change demands not just enforcement but cultural and economic synergy.
2.0 The Nigerian Legal Framework: Statutory Protections and Gaps
Nigeria’s legal architecture for child protection is robust on paper, drawing from federal statutes that domesticate global standards. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 anchors these rights in fundamental principles. Section 17(3)(f) directs the state to protect children from exploitation and moral neglect, while Section 18(3) mandates free, compulsory primary education. Section 34(1) prohibits forced labor, slavery, and inhumane treatment, directly implicating Almajiri begging as degrading servitude.[1] These provisions position the state as parens patriae, obligated to intervene in exploitative systems.
The Child Rights Act (CRA) 2003, Cap C50, LFN, operationalizes these imperatives, incorporating the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).[2] Defining a child as under 18 (s 277), it prohibits exploitative labor (s 28), including begging and hazardous work that harms development. Section 28(1)(d) bans domestic employment outside the family, relevant to Almajiri tasks like errands or laundry. Violations attract fines up to N250,000 or five years’ imprisonment (s 28(4)). Section 11 safeguards against abuse, mandating reporting and state protection, while Section 1 guarantees survival and development rights echoing the Almajiri child’s right to education beyond rote Qur’anic memorization.
Complementary laws bolster this, The Labour Act 2004, Cap L1, LFN, restricts child employment: under-15s may only perform “light work” in family settings (s 59), excluding industrial or hazardous roles. The Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act 2015, No 4, criminalizes child recruitment for exploitation (s 23), with penalties up to seven years’ imprisonment applicable where Mallams traffic boys across states.
The Universal Basic Education Act 2004 enforces compulsory schooling, fining non-compliant parents.
Despite this scaffold, gaps persist. The CRA remains undomesticated in northern states like Kano and Zamfara due to Sharia sensitivities, creating a federal and state rift. Penal Code provisions in the North (e.g., on vagrancy) are outdated, with fines as low as N100, deterring enforcement amid 33.88% inflation. In practice, poverty drives parents to the system as a “free” education alternative, while Mallams cite religious duty, evading accountability.
3.0 Human Rights Perspective: International and Regional Obligations
Nigeria’s commitments under human rights instruments amplify domestic duties, framing Almajiri exploitation as a breach of global norms. The UNCRC, ratified in 1991, prohibits economic exploitation (art 32), sexual abuse (art 34), and other harms (art 36), emphasizing state due diligence.[3] Article 28 secures free primary education, violated by Almajiri exclusion from formal schooling. The CRA’s enactment domesticated these, yet non-enforcement contravenes Nigeria’s periodic reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.
Regionally, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), ratified in 2001, tailors protections to African contexts.[4] Article 15 bans harmful traditional practices, directly targeting begging as degrading. Article 16 prohibits child labor interfering with education or health, while Article 21 underscores parental responsibilities neglected when families abandon Almajiri children. The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) reinforces state liability for non-state actor abuses, as in Centre for Human Rights (University of Pretoria) & La Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v Senegal (2014), where Senegal was faulted for talibé begging in Qur’anic schools, ordered to integrate them formally. This precedent urges Nigeria to prohibit Almajiri forced begging and reintegrate children, bridging theory with accountability. These instruments impose reporting and monitoring, yet Nigeria’s shadow reports highlight implementation deficits, with Almajiri vulnerabilities exacerbated during COVID-19 trafficking and recruitment risks surged.
Judicially, Nigerian courts have invoked these in broader child rights suits, such as Maryam Ubale v The State (2018), upholding CRA protections against abuse, though Almajiri specific rulings remain scarce, signaling a need for proactive litigation.[5]
4.0 Judicial Authorities and Enforcement Challenges
Nigerian jurisprudence on child rights is evolving but sparse on Almajiri specifics, underscoring enforcement paralysis. In Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State (No 2) [2002] 6 NWLR (Pt 764) 542, the Supreme Court affirmed federal pre-eminence in child welfare, mandating CRA adoption, a doctrinal win, yet northern resistance persists.[6] Lower courts have applied CRA in begging related cases; for instance, in Kaduna State v Mallam Ibrahim (2019) (unreported), a magistrate convicted a Mallam for child exploitation under s 28 CRA, fining him N50,000, but appeals highlight procedural hurdles like proof of intent.
The ACERWC’s Senegal ruling offers persuasive authority, holding states liable for systemic failures in religious schools mirroring Almajiri dynamics of begging and neglect. Domestically, the National Human Rights Commission has invoked it in advisories, urging repatriation and prosecution post COVID rescues of 2,500 Almajiri children. However, judicial activism lags: only 20% of child rights cases reach conviction due to evidentiary gaps and cultural biases favoring Sharia over secular law. This theory and practice divide manifests in ad hoc interventions, like the 2019 Kaduna chaining scandal, where police raids exposed abuses but led to no overhaul.
5.0 Comparative Perspectives: Lessons from Pakistan and India
Comparative analysis reveals pathways for Almajiri reform. In Pakistan, post-9/11 madrassa reforms under the 2002 National Education Policy integrated secular subjects (math, science) into curricula, registering 20,000 institutions and providing stipends to curb extremism linked begging.[7]The Wafaq-ul-Madaris board certifies qualifications, reducing dropout by 30%, though challenges like funding shortfalls persist, mirroring Nigeria’s under resourced Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) efforts. Pakistan’s model bridges religious autonomy with child rights, offering Nigeria a blueprint for CRA compliant integrated schools.
India’s madrasa landscape, serving 4 million students, faced scrutiny in the 2024 National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) report, deeming them “unsuitable” for comprehensive education under Article 21A (right to education).[8] Reforms via state boards (e.g., Uttar Pradesh’s 2023 parity scheme) mandate modern subjects, with scholarships and infrastructure grants yielding 15% enrollment gains. Yet, autonomy clashes evoke Nigeria’s Sharia tensions. Both neighbors highlight stakeholder buy-in: involving ulema (scholars) in curriculum design fosters acceptance, unlike Nigeria’s top-down Almajiri Integrated Schools (157 built since 2012, but only 50% operational).
These perspectives underscore integration’s efficacy: Pakistan’s reduced vulnerabilities align with UNCRC art 32, while India’s judicial push (e.g., Madrasa Education and Child Rights petitions) parallels potential Nigerian public interest litigation.
6.0 Bridging Theory and Practice: Challenges and Recommendations
Theory falters in practice amid poverty, insecurity (1.1 million IDPs), and cultural entrenchment, parents view Almajiri as piety, Mallams as tradition. COVID 19 repatriations reunited 10,000 children, but relapse rates hit 40% without support. UBEC’s model schools exemplify progress, blending Qur’anic and Western curricula, yet funding gaps (N6 billion short) and Mallam resistance hinder scale.
Recommendations fuse legal rigor with pragmatism: (1) Full CRA domestication via federal incentives; (2) Judicial training on ACERWC precedents for proactive suits; (3) Economic aid—expand school feeding to tsangaya, subsidize family farms; (4) Awareness campaigns with imams, leveraging Zakat for sustainability; (5) Adopt Pakistan-India hybrids: certify Mallams, integrate vocational skills. Monitoring via NHRC dashboards ensures accountability.
7.0 Conclusion
The Almajiri system, once a beacon of faith, now casts shadows on Nigeria’s child protection ethos. Statutory bulwarks like the CRA and human rights treaties provide a shield, yet judicial implementation voids expose cracks. Comparative reforms from Pakistan and India illuminate integration’s promise, urging Nigeria to weave theory into tangible safeguards. By empowering stakeholders and addressing root causes, Nigeria can reclaim Almajiri’s noble intent, honoring children’s rights as sovereign imperatives. The time for half measures has passed; holistic action beckons.
8.0 Reference(S):
[1] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended. Section 35(1)
[2] Child’s Right Act 2003, Cap C50, s. 28
[3] Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 29 November, 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 UNCRC art 32
[4] African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 art 15
[5] Maryam Ubale v The State (2018) (High Court of Kano State Unreported)
[6] Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State (No 2) (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 764) 542 (Supreme Court of Nigeria)
[7] National Education Policy 2022 (Pakistan)
[8] NCPCR, Constitutional Rights of Children v Madrasas (2024).
