Authored By: Rashneet Kaur
Apex University, Jaipur
Abstract
Justice is conventionally symbolized as blind and impartial, immune to considerations of wealth, status, or power. However, both historical experience and contemporary realities reveal that this ideal is persistently undermined. Economic capital and political influence frequently distort legal processes, shaping outcomes from investigation to adjudication. This article critically examines how power and money influence the administration of justice in India. Through constitutional analysis, judicial precedents, empirical data, and comparative perspectives, it argues that inequality in legal representation, manipulation of investigative agencies, discriminatory bail practices, procedural delays, and media trials collectively erode the rule of law. The article contends that without structural reforms aimed at reinforcing judicial independence and access to justice, the constitutional promise of equality before law risks remaining merely aspirational.
Introduction
Justice occupies a foundational position in constitutional democracies. The Constitution of India explicitly commits itself to justice—social, economic, and political—as reflected in its Preamble. Article 14 guarantees equality before law, while Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. Together, these provisions establish a legal order premised on fairness and impartiality.
Despite these guarantees, access to justice in India remains deeply unequal. Legal outcomes are often influenced not only by facts and law, but by the socio-economic position of litigants. Individuals with financial resources and political connections enjoy structural advantages, while the poor and marginalized face systemic barriers at every stage of the justice process. This disparity challenges the very legitimacy of the rule of law.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar cautioned that political democracy cannot without social and economic democracy would remain hollow. His warning acquires renewed significance when legal institutions appear susceptible to power and wealth. When justice becomes contingent upon influence rather than entitlement, constitutional morality itself stands compromised. This article examines how power and money shape the Indian justice system and explores the urgent need for institutional reform.
Inequality in Legal Representation
One of the most evident manifestations of inequality within the justice system is the disparity in access to quality legal representation. The adversarial nature of Indian courts places immense importance on advocacy skills, procedural expertise, and strategic litigation. Consequently, the quality of legal counsel often plays a decisive role in determining outcomes.
Affluent litigants routinely engage senior advocates, specialized criminal lawyers, forensic experts, and legal consultants. They possess the resources to sustain prolonged litigation, commission expert opinions, and adopt strategic delays. In contrast, economically disadvantaged individuals largely depend on state-provided legal aid, which remains severely underfunded and overburdened.
The Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar recognized that the right to free legal aid is an essential component of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Court exposed the plight of undertrial prisoners incarcerated for years due to lack of legal representation. Although the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted to institutionalize legal aid, implementation gaps persist. Overburdened legal aid lawyers are often unable to provide effective representation, resulting in a substantive denial of justice.
Thus, equality before law frequently remains formal rather than real, with justice becoming a function of affordability.
Beyond the courtroom, inequality in legal representation also manifests in pre-trial stages such as police interrogation, remand hearings, and charge-framing. Economically privileged accused persons are often advised at the earliest stages, enabling them to avoid self-incrimination and procedural lapses. In contrast, indigent accused frequently face custodial processes without legal counsel, increasing the risk of coerced confessions and procedural violations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that legal representation must be available not only at trial but from the moment an individual is produced before a magistrate. However, the lack of effective implementation of this mandate disproportionately disadvantages the poor, reinforcing systemic inequality within the criminal justice process.
Influence Over Investigative Agencies
The rule of law presupposes that investigative agencies operate independently, guided solely by evidence and legal standards. However, in practice, investigative institutions in India have repeatedly been accused of political interference and selective enforcement.
Influential individuals often manipulate investigations through political patronage, administrative pressure, or indirect influence over law enforcement officials. The timing, scope, and outcome of investigations are frequently perceived to vary depending on the identity of the accused.
The Jessica Lal murder case illustrates this distortion. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manu Sharma, the Supreme Court overturned the initial acquittal that resulted from hostile witnesses and investigative lapses. The case demonstrated how power and influence can undermine investigations unless countered by sustained public scrutiny.
In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, the Supreme Court attempted to insulate the Central Bureau of Investigation from political control by issuing guidelines to ensure institutional autonomy. However, subsequent dilution of these safeguards has allowed investigative agencies to be perceived as instruments of political leverage, thereby eroding public confidence in impartial law enforcement.
The problem of influence over investigative agencies is further aggravated by frequent transfers of investigating officers and lack of fixed tenure. Such administrative instability creates vulnerability to external pressure, particularly in politically sensitive cases. The absence of structural insulation enables subtle forms of interference that may not be overtly illegal but significantly affect investigative integrity. Committees and commissions have consistently recommended fixed tenure and independent oversight to curb this vulnerability. Nevertheless, the persistence of executive control over appointments and transfers continues to weaken public trust in investigative neutrality and reinforces perceptions of selective justice.
Bail: Liberty for the Rich, Custody for the Poor
Bail jurisprudence in India is grounded in the principle that liberty is the norm and detention the exception. The presumption of innocence requires that an accused should not be punished prior to conviction. Yet, in practice, bail outcomes are often dictated by economic capacity rather than legal criteria.
Wealthy accused persons routinely secure anticipatory or regular bail through skilled legal representation and financial sureties. Conversely, poor accused persons remain incarcerated for minor or bailable offences simply because they cannot afford bail bonds or effective legal counsel.
In Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, the Supreme Court reiterated that arrest should not be used as a punitive tool and emphasized that bail must be granted liberally in cases involving lesser offences. Despite this clarification, implementation remains inconsistent across jurisdictions.
According to the National Crime Records Bureau Prison Statistics (2023), more than 75% of India’s prison population consists of undertrial prisoners. Many of these individuals remain incarcerated solely due to their inability to secure bail, transforming pre-trial detention into a form of punishment for poverty.
The economic bias inherent in bail jurisprudence also has cascading social consequences. Prolonged pre-trial detention often results in loss of employment, social stigma, and familial disruption, even when the accused is ultimately acquitted. For marginalized communities, incarceration prior to conviction deepens cycles of poverty and exclusion. The Law Commission of India has observed that monetary bail conditions effectively criminalize poverty and recommended a shift toward non-financial conditions wherever possible. Despite these recommendations, trial courts continue to rely heavily on surety-based bail, perpetuating economic discrimination within the criminal justice system.
Procedural Delays and Strategic Adjournments
The maxim “justice delayed is justice denied” encapsulates one of the gravest failures of the Indian justice system. While delays affect all litigants, their consequences are disproportionately borne by the poor. Wealthy litigants frequently exploit procedural loopholes, repeated adjournments, and forum shopping to prolong litigation.
The case of SEBI v. Subrata Roy Sahara illustrates how procedural manoeuvring can frustrate judicial enforcement. Despite multiple Supreme Court directions, prolonged litigation delayed compliance for years. Such endurance is possible only for litigants with substantial financial and legal resources.
Data from the National Judicial Data Grid (2024) indicates that over five crore cases are pending across Indian courts, with a significant number pending for more than three years. Procedural abuse by resource-rich litigants contributes substantially to this backlog, while weaker parties are often compelled to abandon claims due to exhaustion.
Judicial Independence and Post-Retirement Appointments
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of constitutional governance. However, concerns surrounding judicial appointments and post-retirement positions have raised serious ethical questions. While the collegium system aims to shield judicial appointments from executive interference, its opacity has led to allegations of arbitrariness and lack of accountability.
The controversy surrounding the death of Justice B.H. Loya, who was presiding over the Sohrabuddin Sheikh encounter case, intensified public concerns regarding judicial independence. In Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India, the Supreme Court declined to order an independent inquiry, a decision that further fuelled public skepticism.
Additionally, the appointment of retired judges to executive or quasi-judicial posts shortly after retirement raises concerns about perceived conflicts of interest. Such practices risk undermining public confidence in judicial neutrality.
Media Trial and Narrative Control
The rise of electronic media and social media has transformed criminal trials into spectacles. Media trials often precede judicial determinations, shaping public perception and indirectly influencing legal proceedings. Those with resources can manage narratives through public relations strategies and selective media engagement.
The Aryan Khan case exemplifies this phenomenon. Despite the absence of incriminating evidence, extensive media coverage created a presumption of guilt. When the case ultimately collapsed, the reputational harm had already been inflicted, highlighting how media trials undermine due process and fairness.
Beyond reputational harm, trial by media poses a direct threat to the fairness of judicial proceedings by creating a climate of presumed guilt. Continuous media speculation can exert subconscious pressure on investigators, prosecutors, and even judges, particularly in high-profile cases. The Supreme Court has previously cautioned that prejudicial reporting may interfere with the administration of justice and compromise the accused’s right to a fair trial. However, regulatory mechanisms remain weak, and enforcement by media oversight bodies is largely advisory in nature. In an era of digital virality, the asymmetry of power becomes sharper—those with resources can deploy public relations strategies to sanitize narratives, while ordinary accused persons are rendered defenceless against character assassination. This imbalance underscores the urgent need to reconcile freedom of the press with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Comparative Global Perspective
The influence of wealth on justice is not unique to India. In the United States, the cash bail system disproportionately affects poor and minority communities, prompting widespread reform movements. In the United Kingdom, cuts to legal aid following the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012 have raised concerns regarding access to justice, though judicial independence remains comparatively insulated from political pressure.
These comparative experiences demonstrate that while inequality in justice is a global challenge, robust institutional safeguards and accountability mechanisms can mitigate its impact.
A comparative analysis also reveals that jurisdictions which have actively invested in institutional safeguards have been relatively more successful in curbing the influence of wealth on justice. Several European countries, for instance, have adopted non-monetary bail systems and robust state-funded legal representation models to prevent economic discrimination in criminal procedure. In Scandinavian legal systems, prosecutorial independence is reinforced through strict separation from executive control, reducing political interference in investigations. These models demonstrate that inequality in justice is not inevitable but rather a consequence of policy choices. India’s experience suggests that without sustained institutional reform and political will, constitutional guarantees alone are insufficient to neutralize entrenched power asymmetries within the justice system.
Recommendations for Reform
To realign the justice system with constitutional ideals, comprehensive reforms are necessary:
Strengthening legal aid through increased funding and training.
Implementing police and prosecutorial reforms in line with Prakash Singh v. Union of India.
Reforming bail practices to eliminate economic discrimination.
Ensuring transparency in judicial appointments.
Regulating media reporting on sub judice matters.
Conclusion
The promise of equality before law lies at the heart of constitutional democracy. Yet, when power and money dictate access, speed, and outcomes of justice, the law risks becoming an instrument of privilege rather than protection. As observed in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.
Rebalancing the scales of justice requires structural reform, institutional integrity, and unwavering commitment to constitutional morality. Only then can justice truly serve the people rather than the powerful.
Ultimately, the credibility of the justice system depends not merely on constitutional text or judicial pronouncements, but on the lived experience of those who seek justice. When marginalized individuals encounter a system that appears inaccessible, delayed, or biased in favour of the powerful, faith in the rule of law begins to erode. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that access to justice is itself a fundamental right, intrinsic to the guarantee of life and liberty. Without meaningful institutional reform that addresses economic and political asymmetries, constitutional promises risk becoming symbolic assurances rather than enforceable rights. Restoring public confidence therefore requires a justice system that is not only formally equal, but substantively fair and perceptibly independent.
Bibliography
Constitutional & Statutory Sources
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012 (UK).
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
The Constitution of India, 1950.
Judicial Decisions
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 SCC 240.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) 3 SCC 532.
NCB v. Aryan Khan, Order dated 27 May 2022, Special NDPS Court, Mumbai.
Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 1.
R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87.
Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) 10 SCC 51.
SEBI v. Subrata Roy Sahara (2014) 8 SCC 470.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manu Sharma (2010) 6 SCC 1.
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172.
Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) 9 SCC 501.
Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226.
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Abhinav Chandrachud, Supreme Whispers: Conversations with Judges of the Supreme Court of India (Penguin Random House India, 2018).
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J. Chelameswar, Judicial Accountability and Independence (Speaking Tiger, 2019).
Mark Elliott & Robert Thomas, Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2020).
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (The New Press, 2010).
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Marc Galanter, “Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change” (1974) 9 Law & Society Review 95.
Upendra Baxi, “Access to Justice—A Human Right” (2002) 1 Indian Journal of Constitutional Law 1.
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Law Commission of India, 268th Report on Bail Reforms (2017).
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American Civil Liberties Union, Cash Bail and Its Discriminatory Impact (2019).
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Handbook on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems (2016).
