Authored By: Khadiza Alam
Abstract
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the central institution responsible for maintaining international peace and security, yet its legitimacy is increasingly scrutinised due to its anachronistic structure and political dominance of the five permanent members (P5). This article critically examines the structural and procedural flaws that hinder its effectiveness, focusing on representational inequality, misuse of the veto, and institutional paralysis. Employing a doctrinal and analytical approach, it considers recent cases, such as the United States’ vetoes of ceasefire resolutions in Palestine and Russia’s obstruction of accountability for its invasion of Ukraine, to demonstrate how this concentration of power sustains the status quo of Council paralysis. The analysis concludes that while comprehensive reform is essential for restoring credibility in the international legal order, it remains structurally unattainable within the framework of the existing UN Charter.
Introduction
Formed in the aftermath of World War II to prevent another global conflict, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains the most influential organ in the global legal context, however its credibility is fragile. Its composition and decision-making procedures have remained largely static for eighty years, despite the emergence of new political powers and the transformation of international relations through decolonisation and globalisation. Unless the institution adapts to the needs of the modern world, its authority and the international community’s faith in collective security will continue to erode.[1]
Reform of the Security Council has become one of the most pressing and divisive issues in contemporary international law. As UN Security-General António Guterres has warned, ‘reform of the Security Council is imperative and long overdue’.[2] This article argues that the need for reform is universally acknowledged, but the rigid amendment mechanisms of the UN Charter and the P5’s reluctance to relinquish power render meaningful change procedurally impossible.
Structure and Representational Challenges
The UNSC’s outdated composition is the primary criticism driving calls for its reform. The foundational structure of the Council is enshrined in Chapter V of the UN Charter, comprising of five permanent members (P5), namely the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Russia and China, alongside ten elected non-permanent members.[3] Established in 1945 in response to the League of Nations’ failure to maintain world peace, the UNSC was envisioned as the UN’s political heart, tasked with ‘fostering negotiations, imposing sanctions, and authorising the use of force’.[4] However its distribution of power among primarily Western nations and two Eastern autocracies has since become outdated, mirroring the geopolitical realities of the post-World War II era, rather than today’s world. The only structural amendment occurred in 1965, when the number of non-permanent seats increased from six to ten,[5] despite the UN’s membership growing from 51 to 193 States. As a result, the proportion of Council members to UN members represented at any given time is at a record low of less than 8%. This limited representativeness undermines the Council’s democratic legitimacy and disproportionately privileges Western powers and their allies.
This imbalance has produced chronic underrepresentation of nations from the global South and East, whose citizens often bear the burden of peacekeeping and conflict. Major regional economic and political actors such as Brazil, India, Nigeria and South Africa still lack permanent seats, while more than 50 States have never been elected as members since 1946.[6] This may be attributed to some nations lacking the political alliances needed to secure election, while other States face exclusion due to their international reputations or Western perceptions thereof. For example, Israel, Myanmar and Serbia have all stood before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention which may have affected their candidacy, while North Korea’s nuclear programme and human rights record may have hindered its prospects of election.
Despite this underrepresentation, the Council continues to deliberate on crises in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia without meaningful input from those directly affected, thus weakening the Council’s democratic validity. The question of Palestine illustrates this imbalance. Although the State of Palestine gained UN observer status in 2012,[7] more than 190 Security Council resolutions have addressed its situation without its participation, with at least 131 resolutions passed between 1967 and 1989 alone during the Arab-Israeli conflict.[8] The President of the General Assembly recently remarked that ‘the question of Palestine remains outstanding’, and criticised the tendency of Western States as acting as global rulers ‘in an effort to maintain its waning influence’, dividing the world into ‘democracies’ and ‘autocracies’.[9] This Western monopoly over decision-making in other regions sidelines the perspectives of those directly affected, perpetuating a hierarchy in which global security is reflects the political and economic interests of the P5, rather than the collective vision on which the Council was founded.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres has cautioned that Council reform is ‘imperative and long overdue’, arguing that expanding membership is vital to ensure fairness and genuine representation, especially for Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific.[10] A more inclusive Council, he suggests, could help ‘overcome deadlocks and strengthen stability in today’s multipolar world’.[11] Former Security-General Kofi Annan similarly warned that without structural change, the Council risks losing its influence and authority, descending into competition rather than collaboration among its members.[12] The current composition of three Western democracies and two Eastern authoritarian nations limits the Council’s capacity to act collectively in response to global crises. Annan predicted that unless new permanent members are admitted, the Council will become ‘increasingly irrelevant on the international stage’,[13] as regional organisations such as the African Union develop their own parallel mechanisms for security and governance. Unless the P5 accept a recalibration of power, the Council’s legitimacy as the arbiter of international security may not survive the century.
The Veto and Institutional Paralysis
The UNSC’s repeated failures to act in pivotal global calamities, such as the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, the unauthorised United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the ongoing Israeli occupation of Palestine, can largely be attributed to the P5’s entrenched abuse of veto power. This remains the most significant barrier to achieving reform and effectiveness. Under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, all substantive Council decisions require ‘the concurring votes of the permanent members’,[14] granting each permanent member the power to block any resolution that conflicts with their diplomatic interests. In practice, the veto has become less of a mechanism of consensus, and more of a tool of obstruction.
Recent events highlight the veto’s corrosive impact on justice, even in the face of grave violations of international law. Russia has used its veto repeatedly to shield itself from condemnation and sanctions following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including blocking resolutions on war crimes investigations.[15] Similarly, the United States have vetoed multiple ceasefire resolutions during the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict, in addition to a resolution recognising Palestine as a UN Member State despite overwhelming support among the rest of the Council, acting in alignment with the interests of its close ally, Israel.[16] These actions, particularly of the P5 exercising the veto to defend its own acts of aggression, frustrate global humanitarian efforts and intensify perceptions of Western double standards in international law, ultimately undermining the ‘credibility of the United Nations and the whole multilateral rules-based international system’.[17] Such actions exemplify what legal scholar B.S. Chimni aptly describes as the “imperialist” character of international law, which entrenches the hierarchy between the global North and South. By enabling the P5 and their allies to evade accountability, the veto perpetuates a system in which ‘great power privilege can trump sovereign equality’ at the expense of marginalised nations who are viewed as powerless on the international level,[18] exposing the limits of collective security and eroding faith in the UN’s authority.
The consequences of this dysfunction have also been recognised by the judiciary. In its 2024 advisory opinion regarding the Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, the ICJ indirectly questioned the Council’s effectiveness by stressing the UN’s collective duty to uphold international law.[19] The Court highlighted how the deadlock of the UNSC, which was caused by the United States’ veto, undermines the enforcement of international legal obligation.[20] Similarly, in Prosecutor v Tadić, the Tribunal affirmed the Council’s authority to establish ad hoc criminal tribunals under Article 41 of the UN Charter, illustrating its potential as a law-making organ.[21] Although, this power contrasts starkly with the Council’s selective inaction in current humanitarian crises such as in Myanmar and Sudan, where the P5’s vetoes have blocked draft resolutions for humanitarian intervention,[22] widening the gap between the Council’s legal power and its moral legitimacy.
Despite intensifying calls to reform the P5’s veto power, there is little scope for procedural change. Article 108 of the UN Charter requires that any amendment, including one altering the Council’s composition or veto provision, must be approved by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratified by nine Security Council members, including each of the P5.[23] This stringent requirement grants the permanent members control over any reform that could affect their authority, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of paralysis where the very mechanism paralysing the effectiveness of the UNSC is the same mechanism preventing its overhaul. Though reform is widely supported as being essential, it is procedurally impossible without the consent of the P5, who are least inclined to relinquish their powers. The Council’s dysfunction, therefore, is not accidental but structurally embedded.
Proposals for Reforming Structure and Representation
While most UN Member States support reforming the Security Council to enhance its representativeness, divisions persist within the General Assembly over how such reform should be achieved – whether by granting permanent seats to emerging regional powers, or by ensuring equitable representation. Although intergovernmental negotiations to increase diversity and Council membership formally began in 2008,[24] little tangible progress has been made. The current proposals for reform fall broadly within three blocs: the G4 coalition, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) coalition, and the African Union.
The G4 coalition, comprising Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, has been one of the most vocal advocates for reform since 2005, arguing that the Council must better reflect ‘contemporary geopolitical realities’.[25] Each of these states are significant political and economic actors within their respective regions, and the group supports mutual bids for permanent membership. The G4 visualise a 25-member Security Council, introducing six new permanent members and four additional non-permanent members. It also suggests a transitional period of 15 years before newly admitted permanent members are granted veto powers, as a compromise to ease opposition.[26]
In contrast, the UfC, led by Italy and including Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain and Türkiye, opposes the G4’s push for new permanent members. Instead, the UfC favours expanding only the number of rotating non-permanent seats,[27] which would strengthen the Council’s democratic legitimacy by being more representative, without further entrenching global power hierarchies. The group insists that any reform to the Council’s composition must be based on broad international consensus,[28] rather than bloc-driven bargaining.
Meanwhile, the African Union (AU)’s position emphasises parity through permanent African representation on the Council, with full veto rights, to redress long-standing geopolitical imbalances in representation. This position, articulated in the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and supported by all 54 African States,[29] asserts that Africa’s exclusion from permanent membership is incompatible with the UN’s founding principles of equality and universality.
However, despite nearly two decades of negotiations, no proposal has secured sufficient support to trigger a Charter amendment. This enduring deadlock reflects deep divisions over the acceptable scope of any additional membership, with the UFC advocating for an egalitarian and inclusive Council, while the G4 and AU seek to diversify the power hierarchy through additional permanent seats. As Bruce Russett aptly notes, every proposal ‘carries a poison pill to which the status quo was preferable’,[30] whereby even minor dissenters can prevent progress in reforming the Council by preferring inaction to change that may compromise their diplomatic interests. This persistent lack of global consensus prevents the development for a unified reform proposal, leaving change unlikely as the status quo is maintained and resulting in widespread frustration with the Council’s stagnant and exclusionary structure.
Proposals for Reforming the Veto
It is increasingly untenable in today’s international system that a handful of governments continue to monopolise decision-making matters of global peace and security. This concentration of power is most evident in the P5’s prerogative of the veto, which remains the principal barrier to the Council’s efficiency and authority, and must therefore be subject meaningful limitations. Eliminating the veto altogether remains an unrealistic prospect, as any such reform would require the consent of those very States that benefit from it. This aspiration can only be realised if the P5 choose to voluntarily refrain from using it, and if China, Russia and the United States be pressured to follow the example of France and the United Kingdom, who have not exercised their veto since 1989.[31]
A more pragmatic approach is to limit the veto’s use. France and Mexico have jointly proposed suspending it in cases involving mass atrocities, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and large-scale war crimes – an initiative now supported by over 100 Member States.[32] Although this marks a modest step towards greater accountability and fairness, its non-binding nature highlights the limitations of voluntary reform in an institution defined by privilege.
Other proposals suggest that a veto should be valid only if supported by at least one other permanent member, compelling the State exercising it to justify its decision before the General Assembly, or that a veto is invalidated if opposed by a qualified majority in the Assembly.[33] Following Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine in 2022, the General Assembly has since adopted a mechanism of convening automatically when a veto is cast,[34] marking a significant step towards reinforcing public scrutiny of P5 decisions and increasing the political cost of acting in self-interest.
Conclusion
Despite the pressing need for reform amid the current legal landscape, the UNSC remains largely resistant to meaningful change. Its outdated structure and entrenched P5 privileges continue to undermine its ability to respond effectively to global humanitarian issues, as seen in Myanmar, Sudan, and Palestine, demonstrating the widening gap between the Council’s legal authority and its practical credibility. By embedding the prerogative of the veto in the hands of the P5, the UNSC structurally protects the existing power hierarchy, rendering attempts at reform or amend the UN Charter inherently constrained unless these States willingly concede their privileges – a scenario so improbable that the reform debate becomes effectively circular.
More pragmatic measures, such as limiting the veto in cases of mass atrocities or requiring a second permanent member’s support for its use,[35] could improve accountability and reduce the paralysis of the Council. Even so, these proposals still rely on voluntary compliance by the P5. Without such reforms, the Council’s legitimacy will continue to erode, leaving it both indispensable yet constrained in its capacity to adapt to the demands of today’s international context.
Reference(S):
[1] Kofi Annan Foundation, ‘UN Security Council must be revamped’ (Harriet Grant, 23 September 2015) https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/publication/un-security-council-must-be-revamped-2860/ accessed 26 October 2025.
[2] UNSC, ‘Reform ‘Imperative’, Security-General Tells Security Council, Calling for Expansion of Membership, Renewed Commitment to ‘We the People’’ (24 October 2025) UN Doc SC/16201.
[3] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Chapter V, art 23(1).
[4] Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The UN Security Council’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 9 September 2024) https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council accessed 24 October 2025.
[5] UNGA, ‘Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council’ (17 December 1963) UN Doc A/RES/1991 (XVIII).
[6] United Nations, ‘Countries Never Elected Members of the Security Council’ (United Nations Security Council) https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/countries-never-elected-members-security-council accessed 24 October 2025.
[7] United Nations, ‘Recognition of Palestine: a long history’ (United Nations, 22 September 2025) https://unric.org/en/recognition-of-palestine-a-long-history/ accessed 25 October 2025.
[8] United Nations, ‘The Question of Palestine and the Security Council’ (United Nations Security Council) https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/security-council/ accessed 26 October 2025.
[9] United Nations, ‘Reform ‘Imperative’’ (n 2).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Kofi Annan Foundation (n 1).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Charter of the United Nations (n 3) art 27(3).
[15] Anne Peters, ‘The war in Ukraine and the curtailment of the veto in the Security Council’ (Groupe D’études Géopolitiques, June 2023) https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/the-war-in-ukraine-and-the-curtailment-of-the-veto-in-the-security-council/ accessed 24 October 2025.
[16] Al Jazeera, ‘US blocks Palestinian push for full UN membership at Security Council’ (Al Jazeera, 18 April 2024) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/18/palestinian-bid-for-un-membership-set-for-security-council-vote accessed 24 October 2025.
[17] UNGA, ‘General Assembly Holds First-Ever Debate on Historic Veto Resolution, Adopts Texts on Infrastructure, National Reviews, Council of Europe Cooperation’ (26 April 2023) UN Doc GA/12500.
[18] Stewart Patrick and others, ‘UN Security Council Reform: What the World Thinks: India’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 June 2023) https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/un-security-council-reform-what-the-world-thinks?lang=en accessed 25 October 2025.
[19] Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (Advisory Opinion) General List No 186 [2024] ICJ, para 142.
[20] ICJ (n 19) Declaration of President Salam, para 4.
[21] Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) CC/PIO/021-E (2 October 1995) paras 36, 40.
[22] Rebecca Barber, ‘Response to Myanmar coup shows need for UN reform’ (The Interpreter, 29 April 2021) https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/response-myanmar-coup-shows-need-un-reform accessed 2026 October 2025.
[23] Charter of the United Nations (n 3) Chapter XVIII, art 109(2).
[24] Stewart Patrick (n 18).
[25] G4 Countries, ‘Joint Press Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the G4 Countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) in the margins of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly’ (G4 Countries, 23 September 2024) https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/-/2677144 accessed 24 October 2025.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN, ‘Uniting for Consensus’ (Governo Italiano) https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/ accessed 26 October 2025.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Security Council Report, ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: “Addressing the historical injustice and enhancing Africa’s effective representation in the UN Security Council”’ (Security Council Report, 31 July 2024) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-08/maintenance-of-international-peace-and-security-addressing-the-historical-injustice-and-enhancing-africas-effective-representation-in-the-un-security-council.php accessed 25 October 2025.
[30] Bruce Russett, ‘Security Council Expansion: Can’t, and Shouldn’t’ in Ernesto Zedillo (eds), Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security (New Haven, CT: Yale Centre for the Study of Globalization, 2005), 153-166.
[31] UNSC, ‘Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia: draft resolution’ (22 December 1989) UN Doc S/21048.
[32] Merrow Golden, ‘Could a Code of Conduct Work? The Prospects of the French Proposal Limiting the Veto on the United Nations Security Council’ (2017) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 56(1), 101.
[33] Daniele Archibugi, ‘Reforming the UN Security Council: enlargement is not enough’ (Democracy Without Borders, 9 June 2025) https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/36950/reforming-the-un-security-council-enlargement-is-not-enough/ accessed 25 October 2025.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
