Authored By: Asokere Deborah
Lagos State University- Graduate
Case Title and Citation
Thaler v Perlmutter, No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023).
Note: The defendant, Shira Perlmutter, was sued in her official capacity as the Register of Copyrights, representing the United States Copyright Office (USCO).
Court and Bench
United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Howell J).
Date of Judgment
18 August 2023.
Parties
Plaintiff: Stephen Thaler
Defendant: United States Copyright Office (USCO) represnted by Perlmutter.
Facts of the Case
Stephen Thaler, the plaintiff, developed an artificial intelligence system known as the “Creativity Machine,” which autonomously generated a two-dimensional artwork titled ‘A Recent Entrance to Paradise’. Thaler applied to the United States Copyright Office (USCO) for registration of the work, identifying the AI system as the sole author and himself as the owner by virtue of ownership of the machine.1
The USCO refused Thaler’s application on the basis that copyright protection under United States law is limited to works of human authorship. Thaler sought reconsideration, arguing that denying protection to AI-generated works was inconsistent with the objectives of copyright law.2 The refusal was affirmed on reconsideration, after which Thaler commenced an action against the Register of Copyrights, Shira Perlmutter, in her official capacity before the District Court.
Issues Raised for Determination
- Whether a work generated autonomously by an artificial intelligence system qualifies for copyright protection under United States copyright law.
- Whether an artificial intelligence system can be recognised as an “author” for the purposes of copyright registration.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff’s Arguments:
The plaintiff, in person of Stephen Thaler, argued that the United States Copyright Act (referred to as Title 17 of the United States Code (17 U.S.C)) not expressly limit authorship to human beings and that denying protection to AI-generated works would undermine the constitutional objective of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.3 Thaler contended that copyright law should evolve in response to technological advancement and that refusing protection to AI-generated works would discourage innovation and investment in artificial intelligence technologies.
He further submitted that ownership and control of the AI system should justify recognition of copyright in the resulting work, drawing an analogy between AI systems and traditional tools used by human creators. Just as a camera or a musical instrument enables a human to produce a work, AI functions as an advanced tool that, while capable of autonomous operation, remains under the direction and guidance of its human operator. According to the plaintiff, the mere fact that a work is produced autonomously by an AI should not, in itself, preclude copyright protection, especially where a human has actively initiated, supervised, and shaped the creative process. He argued that the human’s role in setting the parameters, selecting input data, and determining the creative direction constitutes sufficient intellectual contribution to warrant recognition as the author. In this framework, the AI is viewed not as an independent creator but as an instrument through which human creativity is expressed, and denying protection would ignore the human agency that underpins the work’s conception and execution.
Defendant’s Arguments:
The United States Copyright Office, represented by the Register of Copyrights, Shira Perlmutter, maintained that copyright law has consistently required human authorship. It relied on statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding judicial precedent establishing that copyright subsists only in works created through human intellectual effort.4
In contrast, the United States Copyright Office (USCO) argued that recognising AI systems as authors would fundamentally alter the traditional structure of copyright law, which has always been premised on human creativity and intellectual contribution. The USCO emphasized that copyright is intended to reward the personal, original expression of human authors, and extending authorship to non-human entities would exceed the statutory framework and historical understanding of the law. It further contended that questions regarding innovation, economic incentives, and the promotion of creative progress are policy matters for Congress rather than the judiciary. Any expansion of copyright protection to include AI-generated works, the USCO asserted, must be expressly authorised by legislation, as such a move involves complex considerations about ownership, economic benefit, and public access to creative works. The office cautioned that judicial recognition of AI authorship could create legal uncertainty and disrupt the careful balance that copyright law seeks to maintain between protecting creators and serving the public interest.
Judgment
The court upheld the decision of the United States Copyright Office and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety. It affirmed that copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1976 is confined to works of human authorship and that a work generated autonomously by an artificial intelligence system does not qualify for copyright registration under the existing statutory framework.
In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasised that although the Copyright Act does not expressly define the term “author,” the concept has been consistently interpreted through judicial precedent and administrative practice as requiring human creative involvement. The court relied on the longstanding position of the United States Copyright Office, which has repeatedly refused registration for works lacking human authorship, and noted that this interpretation aligns with prior judicial decisions rejecting copyright claims by non-human actors.
The court further rejected the plaintiff’s argument that ownership or control of the artificial intelligence system could substitute for authorship. It held that copyright law does not recognise authorship arising merely from ownership of the means by which a work is produced, particularly where the output is generated without human creative choice or intellectual judgment.
Importantly, the court underscored the limits of judicial authority in addressing technological developments. It observed that extending copyright protection to AI-generated works would constitute a significant policy decision with wide-ranging implications, a determination that falls within the legislative competence of Congress rather than the judiciary. Until such legislative reform occurs, the court maintained that the existing human-centred interpretation of authorship must continue to govern copyright registration.
Legal Reasoning and Ratio Decidendi
The court’s reasoning was grounded in a historically consistent interpretation of authorship under United States copyright law. Although the Copyright Act does not expressly define the term “author,” judicial precedent has long associated authorship with human creative activity.5 The court relied on earlier authorities rejecting copyright claims by non-human actors, reaffirming that copyright protection presupposes human intellectual effort, creative choice, and intention.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that statutory silence permitted recognition of AI generated works. It held that silence could not be construed as legislative approval of non human authorship, particularly in light of settled judicial and administrative practice.6 The court further emphasised that extending authorship to artificial intelligence systems would amount to a significant policy shift better suited for legislative determination.
With respect to ownership, the court clarified that copyright law does not recognise authorship arising solely from ownership or control of the means of production. Unlike human employees or agents, artificial intelligence systems lack legal capacity, intention, and accountability.7 Accordingly, attributing authorship to the owner of an AI system without evidence of human creative contribution would undermine the originality requirement.
The ratio decidendi of the case was that copyright protection under United States law is confined to works of human authorship, and that works generated autonomously by artificial intelligence systems fall outside the scope of protection under the existing legal framework.
Conclusion and Observations
The decision in Thaler v Perlmutter reaffirms the human-centred foundation of copyright law and provides authoritative clarification on the legal status of AI-generated works under United States law. By insisting on human authorship as a prerequisite for protection, the court preserved doctrinal coherence and avoided an expansive interpretation that could destabilise existing copyright principles.
At the same time, the judgment exposes a regulatory gap in the face of rapidly advancing artificial intelligence technologies. As AI systems increasingly produce commercially valuable creative outputs without direct human involvement, the absence of protection raises questions about incentive structures, market regulation, and the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights.
Comparative Perspective: Implications for Nigeria
The reasoning in Thaler v Perlmutter sets a particularly instructive precedent for Nigeria. Nigerian copyright law, under the Copyright Act 2022, similarly presumes human authorship and grounds protection in the exercise of human skill and effort. Like the United States framework, it does not expressly contemplate works generated autonomously by artificial intelligence systems. As AI adoption grows within Nigeria’s creative and technology sectors, courts may soon be confronted with disputes analogous to Thaler.
Absent legislative guidance, Nigerian courts are likely to adopt a conservative, human centred interpretation of authorship consistent with existing doctrine. While this approach promotes legal certainty, it also highlights the need for proactive reform. Drawing from comparative models such as the United Kingdom’s statutory treatment of computer-generated works, Nigeria may need to clarify ownership rules, disclosure obligations, and the threshold of human involvement required for protection. Without such reform, Nigerian copyright law risks lagging behind technological realities and leaving significant categories of creative output in a state of legal uncertainty.
Reference(S):
1 US Copyright Office, Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing AI-Generated Material (2023)
2 Thaler v Perlmutter, No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023)
3 US Const art I, § 8, cl 8.
4 US Copyright Office, Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing AI-Generated Material (2023)
5 Naruto v Slater 888 F 3d 418 (9th Cir 2018).
6 Thaler v Perlmutter, No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023).
7 Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid 490 US 730 (1989)
