Authored By: Somya Agarwal
Nirma University Law
Capital punishment is the harshest sanction in our justice system and is still the subject of considerable legal, constitutional and ethical debate in India. It raises important questions concerning justice, human dignity, and constitutional morality regarding the State’s power to execute individuals for criminal offences.Though the Indian Constitution does not “specifically” prohibit capital punishment, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the “Right to Life”, which has led to the Courts placing very strict limits on the use of capital punishment.
As a result, the Supreme Court of India has developed the “rarest of rare” doctrine for the imposition of capital punishment, allowing the Supreme Court to balance the interests of society with the rights of the individual. However, the “rarest of rare” doctrine remains a matter of significant controversy, as it raises issues of subjectivity, inconsistency, and compatibility with evolving standards of human rights.In Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973), the Supreme Court of India examined the constitutionality of capital punishment for the first time directly, ruling that the imposition of a capital sentence was not contrary to the right to life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. According to the Court, the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing under the law does not amount to arbitrary action. However.
In later years, Indian courts have relied upon the doctrine in cases of extreme violence and barbarism. For example, in Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal (1994), the Supreme Court upheld a death sentence imposed on an accused who had raped and murdered a child, determining that such a heinous crime “has rightly outraged the collective conscience of our society” and therefore warranted a maximum penalty. The same principle applied in Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), known as the Nirbhaya case. The Supreme Court upheld the death sentences for those convicted of brutally gang raping and murdering a young woman, asserting that the crime demonstrated a level of depravity, brutality, and dehumanization such that no leniency could be afforded.
Conversely, the Supreme Court has exercised restraint and has ordered the commutation of those sentenced to death where there were substantially mitigating circumstances that outweighed the aggravating factors (e.g., Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009)). The Court has held that the death penalty is to be applied only after a rigorous review of all aspects of an offender’s background, including socio-economic status, and potential for reform. In that specific case, the Court said the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused could not be rehabilitated.
Since the time period referenced within this paragraph by the Indian courts, the doctrine provided through the usage of this same example has been used proximate to very vicious acts of violence. The case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal (1994) saw the Supreme Court uphold an execution sentence for a defendant that sexually assaulted and murdered a young female child, determining his actions to be of a total societal shock to conscience to the point that death represented the utmost total punishment appropriate to his actions. Likewise, in the case of Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) (the Nirbhaya case), the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence imposed upon the group of defendants that perpetrated repeated gang rapes and the murder of a young female, ruling that their actions were of the highest depravity and of total disregard of human dignity, which therefore warranted the imposition of the ultimate penalty of death with no lesser punishment option being available.
The Court has taken the position of not only ordering the death penalty be carried out when merited, but that the Court must be cautious in order not to commute death sentences because of mitigating circumstances rather than aggravating circumstances. The Court, while in the case of Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009), ruled that death sentences must not be imposed “mechanically” but that a complete individualized, meticulous analysis must be done to each individual offender’s background, socio-economic data, and the potential for rehabilitation prior to imposing such an extreme penalty. The Court found in this instance that the conviction was to be commuted because the prosecution could not show proof of the total lack of future rehabilitation opportunity for the defendant.
The issue of delays in resolving mercy petitions has become an important
factor affecting death penalty law. As established by the Supreme Court of India, prolonged periods of uncertainty regarding mercy petitions create intense psychological suffering to condemned prisoners; such suffering constitutes a breach of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court recognised this violation in Shatrughan Chauhan vs Union of India (2014) when it stated that long waiting times between the sentencing and implementation of a death sentence can serve as a reason to replace the death sentence with life imprisonment. The Court indicated that any delay caused by the criminal justice system does not justify the ongoing psychological torture inflicted upon individuals awaiting execution. This judgement represents a fundamental change in how capital punishment is viewed, moving toward a less inhumane understanding of the impact of capital punishment past the physical act of execution.
Additionally, the mental health of a convicted criminal has become more commonly cited as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The Supreme Court of India ruled in Accused X vs State of Maharashtra (2019) that if a death row convict has developed a mental illness after sentencing, this may also qualify as a reason to reduce their death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court further acknowledged that punishing an individual who suffers from severe mental health problems would violate Constitutional principles of dignity and the principle of humanity. Furthermore, this ruling establishes a fair application of death penalty principles in India consistent with the international human rights standards regarding the protection of vulnerable people in the criminal justice system.
The psychological and social aspects of capital punishment in India are a frequently ignored aspect of the capital punishment jurisprudence of India is the psychological and social effect of being held on Death Row, commonly referred to as the “death row phenomenon.” The extended time between being sentenced to death and actually being executed imposes on an individual a significant amount of emotional distress, uncertainty and social isolation. Recently, Indian Courts have come to recognize that the emotional stress associated with this extended incarceration also amounts to cruel and inhuman treatment, a violation of Article 21. In Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1989) the Supreme Court of India found that this unreasonable delay in execution causes emotional distress which amounts to a violation of Article 21, resulting in the commutation of the death sentence. This decision illustrates the shift from a punitive approach to capital punishment to an approach that incorporates a view toward recognizing one’s rights and the emotional and psychological distress experienced by the condemned.
As previously mentioned, the wide variety of possible forms of clemency adds another layer of complexity to the capital punishment process in India. Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution afford the President of India and the Governor of a State the authority to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, and commutations. While this constitutional authority was created to provide a safeguard against judicial error, there have been many criticisms about the way in which the clemency power is exercised, especially concerning transparency and consistency. The Supreme Court of India, in Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989), reinforced the idea that the power of the President to grant clemency is only subject to limited judicial review.
