Authored By: Amorei Coetzee
University of Western Cape
ABSTRACT:
This article critically examines the legality of publicly naming alleged perpetrators of sexual violence on social media as an emerging form of “alternative justice” in South Africa. Amid the country’s severe gender-based violence (“GBV”) crisis and waning faith in the criminal justice system, many survivors have turned to digital platforms to seek recognition and accountability. However, such practices raise complex constitutional questions concerning dignity, privacy, and the right to a fair trial. By analysing case law, particularly Booysen v Major and Another (2021) ZAWCHC 273 and evaluating the interplay between digital vigilantism and South African constitutional guarantees, this paper argues that public naming unjustifiably infringes on fundamental human rights while offering limited justice to victims. The study concludes by recommending legal and institutional reforms to restore faith in the justice system, promote safe reporting mechanisms, and harmonise freedom of expression with constitutional protections.
- INTRODUCTION
Sexual violence remains one of the world’s most pervasive human rights violations, with South Africa consistently recording some of the highest rates of sexual offences globally.1Interpol has labelled South Africa “the rape capital of the world,” with a sexual offence occurring roughly every 25 seconds.2 Despite the progressive framework of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) and the existence of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, victims of sexual offences frequently describe the criminal justice system as retraumatising, slow, and unjust.3In response, digital platforms have emerged as spaces of solidarity and informal justice. Movements such as #AmINext, #MenAreTrash, and #MeToo have empowered survivors to expose perpetrators online, giving rise to a phenomenon known as “public shaming” or “public naming”.4 Yet, while this practice offers emotional validation and social accountability, it also introduces serious legal and ethical dilemmas. This issue is especially critical in the current South African legal context, where the constitutional rights to dignity, privacy, and a fair trial must coexist with freedom of expression and the pursuit of justice for survivors. The rise of public naming challenges the conventional boundaries of justice, prompting an urgent legal question: whether alternative digital forms of justice can coexist with constitutional safeguards. Viewed through the lens of transformative constitutionalism, the practice of public naming appears inconsistent with South Africa’s constitutional commitment to procedural fairness, reconciliation, and human dignity. This article adopts a doctrinal and socio-legal analytical approach, drawing on case law, legislation, and academic commentary to evaluate how constitutional rights are interpreted in the digital context. It further employs principles of restorative justice theory to contrast the aims of online naming and shaming with the constitutional ideal of reconciliation and respect for due process.
This paper critically analyses the legality and implications of public naming of alleged perpetrators of sexual offences on social media within South Africa’s constitutional and legal framework. Accordingly, this article asks: to what extent does the public naming of alleged perpetrators of sexual offences on social media align with or violate the constitutional rights to dignity, privacy, and a fair trial in South Africa? It argues that while digital naming may empower survivors, it unjustifiably infringes upon fundamental rights and risks undermining due process.
- PUBLIC NAMING AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF JUSTICE
The violent murder and rape of Uyinene Mrwetyana, a University of Cape Town student, incited outrage, with social media being engulfed by allegations of sexual violence.5 Under the hashtag movements #AmInext? #MenAreTrash and #ShutDownSouthAfrica women have been anonymously naming men whom they are accusing of sexually violating them.6 This resulted in the release of social media pages where women revealed pictures and names of their alleged perpetrators.7 Some described the nature of their alleged assaults, while others simply named an individual.8 The spread of the #MeToo movement has been so influential that it was “recognised by Australia’s Macquarie Dictionary as the word of 2018, where it is listed as a noun, an adjective, and a verb, “to be Me Too-ed: to be accused of sexual harassment”.9 India has also demonstrated progress in addressing gender equity issues on social media.10 Student Raya Sarkar published, in October of 2017, on her Facebook page a list of academics who had allegedly sexually harassed women.11 Subsequently, it was acknowledged as the list of sexual harassers in academia (“LoSHA”).12 The list was shared more than 1000 times.13 Sarkar explained her deeds in an interview with the BBC, explaining that, “I wanted to make my friends, and friends of friends, aware and wary of different sexual predators, based on first hand testimonies. I put the list out to make students safe”.14 Women are thus using social media platforms to fight against human rights violations, to ask for support, and to stand together.15
While some women and/or victims have utilised social media as a platform to disclose personal experiences of the violence, other victims have used social media as an alternative place to report cases of sexual violence and name alleged perpetrators.16 One of the principal reasons for this is that, according to the victims, the criminal justice system has betrayed or disappointed them.17 The rationale behind public naming is to counter the failure and ineffectiveness of official avenues within the criminal justice system.18 Victims of sexual offences indicate that the court process barely encourages offenders and/or perpetrators to understand the consequences of their actions.19 Victims are too afraid to reveal their stories offline because of fear and mistrust in the criminal justice system.20 Therefore, they have exhausted hashtags such as the #MeToo movement to reveal their stories on social media.21 A study conducted in South Africa by Maluleke and Moyer illustrated that women indicated that “social media platforms provided them with a useful opportunity to seek justice”.22 Victims have stated that “the law operates to protect the perpetrators”.23 Additional research proposed that victims may use social media for revenge rather than seeking justice.24 This retribution is then seen as “naming and shaming the perpetrators”.25 However, Donica Walton further indicates that for victims, public naming on social media is not a culture of revenge, but instead taking “the law into their own hands” after being misled by the system that was supposed to protect them.26 Nonetheless, public naming on social media has become profoundly scrutinised.27 Numerous public reporters and judicial bodies are apprehensive about the effect of women who publicly accuse or name innocent men or make defamatory statements without evidence or due process to substantiate their accusations.28 This article shares these apprehensions. While public naming aims to provide a “safe space for comfort, relatability, and probable justice”, that is not what transpires in terms of South African law.29 The increasing digitalisation of justice-seeking behaviour has redefined how accountability is perceived. However, this intersection between social activism and the law presents unresolved tensions: should online exposure be treated as a legitimate form of justice, or as an infringement of legal safeguards? The following section evaluates this dilemma within South Africa’s constitutional and statutory framework.
- LEGAL FRAMEWORK & DIGITAL CONTEXT
Recent legal developments have intensified the debate on online accountability. The Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020, which has been operational since 2022, criminalises the malicious distribution of harmful data, including defamatory or harmful content shared online. These developments must be understood within the broader context of South Africa’s transformative constitutionalism, which seeks not only to protect rights but to reshape social relations in accordance with dignity, equality, and justice. This cybercrimes framework, although not directly addressing public naming, demonstrates the state’s recognition of the dangers inherent in unregulated digital speech, reflecting a growing judicial and legislative concern with the constitutional implications of online accountability. Sections 14 to 17 introduce offences relating to “malicious communications,” including the distribution of data messages that are harmful or defamatory. These provisions reflect the legislature’s intent to regulate online conduct that infringes on others’ rights to dignity and privacy. The Act, therefore, plays an indirect but significant role in shaping accountability for public naming on social media, as posts that cause reputational harm may fall within its scope.30 Moreover, the National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (“NSP-GBVF”) recognises social media’s role in advocacy but cautions against misuse that undermines fair trial rights.31 It calls for secure online reporting platforms integrated with the South African Police Services (“SAPS”) to protect victims’ privacy while ensuring due process.32
South African constitutional jurisprudence requires a balance between competing rights, as outlined in section 36 of the Constitution. South Africa has a limitation clause contained in section 36 of the Constitution. Thus, an individual’s right to freedom of speech and/or expression is weighed up against someone else’s rights, such as the right to dignity and the right to privacy.33 The right to freedom of expression is restricted to the extent that the expression statement cannot be in respect of “propaganda for war, provocation of imminent violence, or hate speech based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion that incites the causing of harm”.34 These restrictions demonstrate that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute, and a balance between personal freedom and the responsibility to respect the human rights of others must be recognised.35 This balancing exercise is underpinned by section 10 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to human dignity, and section 35(3), which protects the right of every accused person to a fair trial. When an individual is publicly accused on social media, these constitutional rights are placed in direct conflict with the right to freedom of expression under section 16. Courts must therefore carefully assess whether online accusations amount to an unjustifiable infringement of the dignity and fair trial rights of alleged perpetrators.36 This limitation is similarly applicable to what an individual posts on their social media platforms, and not just what a person speaks.37 Exercising the right to freedom of expression may violate another individual’s right to human dignity and privacy.38
The case of Booysen v Major and Another (2021) ZAWCHC 273 remains the leading authority, but its application is narrow and fact-specific.39 In Booysen v Major and Another, the Western Cape High Court dealt with a defamation and harassment claim brought by a man publicly named by his former partner as her alleged rapist on social media.40 The applicant sought an interdict to compel the removal of her posts, arguing that they infringed his constitutional rights to dignity, privacy, and a fair trial.41 The court, however, dismissed the application, holding that the posts were made five years after the alleged incident and that the applicant had no legal right to silence the survivor under the circumstances.42 Importantly, the judgment turned heavily on the facts, including the passage of time, the absence of ongoing proceedings, and the respondent’s right to express her lived experience, and thus does not establish a general principle allowing public naming.43 The case nevertheless marks the first judicial engagement with “naming and shaming” in South Africa’s digital context.44 Courts may tolerate limited public disclosures under exceptional circumstances, particularly where posts are not malicious, are factually supported, and relate to matters of public interest. Nevertheless, Booysen v Major leaves unresolved ambiguity in South African precedent. The judgment was highly fact specific and does not establish a general principle governing online accusations.45 As a result, there remains a pressing need for judicial clarification or guidance from the Constitutional Court on the boundaries of lawful expression and the protection of reputational rights in digital spaces. Legal scholars such as Salter and Citron warn that trial by social media can collapse procedural justice, eroding the presumption of innocence.46 In terms of the Constitution, “every accused person has a right to a fair trial which includes the right to a public trial before an ordinary court”.47 The trial is before an ordinary court and not in the public itself.48 Section 35 of the Constitution ensures that every accused person has the right to a fair trial, along with the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.49 What fair trial rights require is that an accused be treated fairly from the inception to the completion of the criminal process.50 Therefore, an alleged perpetrator must be considered innocent until proven guilty by a court of law.51 Alleged perpetrators will argue that the trial, influenced by public naming on social media, led to the court and the testimony of witnesses. Therefore, it can violate their constitutional right to a fair trial.52 Digital vigilantism may temporarily fill gaps in accountability, but it risks permanently damaging reputations without recourse or review. Although victims seek empowerment and recognition, these actions blur the line between justice and vengeance. The moral legitimacy of public naming, therefore, depends on whether it promotes accountability or reproduces harm. The Constitution’s transformative vision cannot tolerate justice achieved through constitutional violations.
Internationally, jurisdictions such as Australia, the United States, and India have grappled with similar debates on public naming in the #MeToo era.53 For example, in India, the LoSHA controversy highlighted the need for legal frameworks that both empower survivors and protect the reputations of accused individuals.54 Similarly, Australian courts have emphasised balancing freedom of expression with defamation law to prevent reputational harm.55 South Africa’s approach must draw from such experiences to ensure a proportionate and constitutionally aligned response.
This article, however, does not emphasise that victims should not seek justice. Victims should still seek justice, but through currently available avenues. Directly reporting to SAPS to begin investigations into the alleged asexual offence remains a pivotal factor in guaranteeing that victims have access to justice and perpetrators are held accountable.56 This avenue ensures that the reporting process, which involves disclosing the alleged perpetrators’ identity to the SAPS, is subjected to adequate procedural protections as recognised under South African law.57 The criminal justice system is a crucial part of dealing with sexual crime, as it is in addressing so many other aspects of criminal behaviour.58 Current avenues are attentive to the several procedures and rights; it considers a victim’s right to access to justice and the alleged perpetrator’s right to a fair trial, which cannot be achieved by publicly naming a suspected perpetrator of a sexual offence on social media platforms.59 As Citron argues, “naming and shaming can become a one-way ratchet to degradation. It can spiral out of control with cyber mobs on both sides and no ability to control the damage”. 60 Additionally, public naming as an alternative form of justice may challenge the due process of law within the criminal justice system.61 The criminal justice system remains the benchmark for measuring “real” justice, despite the growing willingness to explore public naming as an alternative avenue for justice on social media.62 The foregoing analysis illustrates that while public naming responds to legitimate frustrations with the criminal justice system, it also risks destabilising foundational legal norms. The courts, legislature, and society must therefore engage with how to preserve access to justice while ensuring that rights are not eroded in the digital sphere
- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Public naming on social media as an alternative form of justice reflects both the failures of the criminal justice system and the resilience of survivors in their quest for recognition. Yet, while emotionally and socially powerful, this practice remains legally precarious. It infringes upon the alleged perpetrators’ constitutional rights to dignity, privacy, and a fair trial, values central to South Africa’s transformative constitutional order. True justice cannot emerge from online shaming or digital vigilantism. Instead, reform must focus on making the formal justice system more accessible, efficient, and empathetic to victims. Legal reform, judicial clarity, and robust support mechanisms must coexist to ensure that both justice and rights survive in the digital age.
The following recommendations outline practical steps to achieve this balance: Reform in this area must strike a balance between empowering victims and upholding the constitutional rights of accused persons. First, the South African state should strengthen victim centred digital reporting mechanisms, such as secure online portals integrated with SAPS and the National Prosecuting Authority.63 These systems would enable survivors to report sexual offences digitally while preserving confidentiality and due process. Second, legal education and digital literacy must be prioritised. Citizens, particularly social media users, need greater awareness of the legal implications of defamation, cybercrime, and privacy violations.64 Third, judicial clarification is necessary. The Constitutional Court should provide clear jurisprudence on the interaction between section 16 (freedom of expression) and section 35 (fair trial) of the Constitution, especially in the context of social media speech.65 Fourth, the promotion of restorative justice mechanisms would allow survivors to pursue recognition and healing without infringing upon the rights of alleged perpetrators. Such mechanisms could be supported by trauma-informed community programmes under the Department of Justice’s Restorative Justice Framework.66 Finally, institutional accountability must be improved by strengthening the investigative and prosecutorial efficiency of sexual offence cases.67 Restoring public confidence in the justice system will reduce the perceived need for victims to seek extrajudicial remedies online. Collectively, these recommendations aim to harmonise technological realities with constitutional imperatives, ensuring that both justice and rights endure in South Africa’s evolving digital society. Ultimately, while social media provides visibility and empowerment for survivors, true justice requires conformity to constitutional values. South Africa’s legal response must evolve to accommodate the realities of digital speech without allowing virtual vigilantism to erode the rule of law.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
Constitution:
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Legislation:
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020.
Case Law:
Booysen v Major and Another (2021) ZAWCHC 273.
S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC).
National Documents:
Republic of South Africa, National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (Department of Women, Youth, and Persons with Disabilities, 2020).
Republic of South Africa, National Strategic Plan on GBVF (2020).
Secondary Sources:
Books and Chapters:
R Loney-Howes, ‘Justice Practices in Digital Spaces’ in Online Anti-Rape Activism: Exploring the Politics of the Personal in the Age of Digital Media (Emerald Publishing 2020) 121–141.
Journal Articles:
B Rushton, ‘Truth and Reconciliation? The Experience of Truth Commissions’ (2006) 60 Australian Journal of International Affairs 125.
A Marzouk and G Vanderveen, ‘Fighting Sexual Violence in Egypt on Social Media: A Visual Essay on Assault Police’ (2022) 17 Global Public Health 2329.
J Braithwaite, ‘Is There a Case for It with Crimes of the Powerful?’ (2014) Research Gate 1.
B McCall, ‘Taking the Battle Against Sexual Harassment in Global Academia Online’ (2019) 393 The Lancet 512.
M Rae, ‘Trial by Media: Why Victims and Activists Seek a Parallel Justice Forum for War Crimes’ (2020) 16 Crime, Media, Culture 359.
D Bronkhorst, ‘Naming Names: Identity and Identification in Human Rights Work’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 457.
M Krain, ‘J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?’ (2012) 56 International Studies Quarterly 574.
B Fileborn, ‘Justice 2.0: Street Harassment Victims’ Use of Social Media and Online Activism as Sites of Informal Justice’ (2017) 57 British Journal of Criminology 1482.
MR Dunsby and LM Howes, ‘The New Adventures of the Digital Vigilante! Facebook Users’ Views on Online Naming and Shaming’ (2019) 52 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 41.
C Ronken and R Lincoln, ‘Deborah’s Law: The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Sex Offenders in Australia’ (2001) 34 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 235. N Joyce-Wojtas and M Keenan, ‘Is Restorative Justice for Sexual Crime Compatible with Various Criminal Justice Systems?’ (2016) 19 Contemporary Justice Review 43.
L Vitis, L Naegler and A Salehin, ‘“This Is Not a Case of Gender Inequality. This Is a Case of Injustice”: Perceptions of Online Resistance to Camera Sexual Voyeurism’ (2022) 18 Crime Media Culture 491.
Theses:
S Kaone, Towards a Policy on Naming and Shaming of Sex Offenders in Botswana: Lessons Learnt from South Africa and the United States of America (LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2020).
DJ Walton, The Narratives of Women in South Africa Who Use Social Media to Talk About Gender-Based Violence (MA thesis, Rhodes University, 2021).
Online Sources:
SowetanLive, ‘Naming and Shaming Could Cost You Legally’ (5 March 2021) https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/good-life/2021-03-05-native-naming-and-shaming-could cost-you/ accessed 09 November 2025.
K Masweneng, ‘Want to Name and Shame a Sexual Perpetrator? Not So Fast’ (4 September 2019) TimesLIVE https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-09-04-want-to-name and-shame-a-sexual-perpetrator-not-so-fast/ accessed 09 November 2025.
OA Ampofo Anti, ‘Think Before “Outing” Sexual Offenders Online’ (10 November 2017) Mail & Guardian https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-10-00-think-before-outing-sexual offenders-online/ accessed 09 November 2025.
N Mclean, ‘Naming Alleged Perpetrators of Gender-Based Violence’ (18 November 2021) Grocott’s Mail https://grocotts.ru.ac.za/2021/11/18/naming-alleged-perpetrators-of-gender based-violence/ accessed 09 November 2025.
H Scott, ‘Where South African Defamation Law Stands on “Naming and Shaming”’ (25 April 2016) The Conversation https://theconversation.com/where-south-african-defamation-law stands-on-naming-and-shaming-58246 accessed 09 November 2025.
Q Qukula, ‘Emma Sadleir: Beware of the Risks Before Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Online’ (2021) CapeTalk https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/406264/emma-sadleir-beware of-the-risks-before-naming-and-shaming-perpetrators-online accessed 09 November 2025.
A Truter, ‘M Booysen v J Dolley-Major (Case No 5043/2021): Landmark Case – Naming an Alleged Rapist on Social Media’ (2021) DML Law https://www.dmllaw.co.za/m-booysen-v-j dolley-major-case-no-5043-2021-landmark-case-naming-an-alleged-rapist-on-social-media/ accessed 09 November 2025.
L Swales, ‘Naming and Shaming on Social Media in South Africa’ (1 August 2022) SA Regulatory Law https://saregulatorylaw.com/2022/08/01/naming-and-shaming-on-social media-in-south-africa/ accessed 09 November 2025.
AE Dastagir, ‘Evan Rachel Wood and the Healing Power of Naming Names’ (2 February 2021) USA Today https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/health-wellness/2021/02/02/marilyn manson-accused-name-evan-rachel-wood-why-matters/4349402001/ accessed 09 November 2025.
LegalWise, ‘Freedom of Expression: Be Careful What You Post on Social Media’ (30 October 2022) https://www.legalwise.co.za/news/freedom-expression-be-careful-what-you-post social-media accessed 09 November 2025.
1 M Maluleke and E Moyer, ‘Social Media and Gender-Based Violence in South Africa’ (2021) Global Public Health 5, 6.
2 Kgaugelo Masweneng “Want to name and shame a sexual perpetrator? Not so fast” available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-09-04-want-to-name-and-shame-a-sexual-perpetrator-not so-fast/, accessed 09 November 2025.
3 DJ Walton, The Narratives of Women in South Africa Who Use Social Media to Talk About Gender-Based Violence (MA thesis, Rhodes University, 2021) 34–35; Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007.
4 B Fileborn, ‘Justice 2.0: Street Harassment Victims’ Use of Social Media and Online Activism as Sites of Informal Justice’ (2017) 57 Brit J Criminol 1482, 1484–1488; R Loney-Howes, ‘Justice Practices in Digital Spaces’ in Online Anti-Rape Activism: Exploring the Politics of the Personal in the Age of Digital Media (Emerald Publishing 2020) 121–141.
5 Kgaugelo Masweneng op cit note 2.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9 Becky McCall “Taking the battle against sexual harassment in global academia online” (2019) 393 The Lancet at 512.
10 Becky McCall op cit note 9 at 513.
11 Ibid at 513.
12 Ibid at 513.
13 Ibid at 513.
14 Ibid at 513.
15 Ibid at 513.
16 DJ Walton op cit note 3 at 19.
17 Ibid at 19.
18 Ibid at 19.
19 Niamh Joyce-Wojtas & Marie Keenan “Is restorative justice for sexual crime compatible with various criminal justice systems?” (2016) 19 Contemporary Justice Review at 48.
20 DJ Walton op cit note 3 Ibid at 21.
21 Ibid at 21.
22 Ibid at 21.
23 Ibid at 21.
24 Ibid at 22.
25 Ibid at 22.
26 Ibid at 22.
27 R Loney-Howes, ‘Justice Practices in Digital Spaces’ in Online Anti-Rape Activism: Exploring the Politics of the Personal in the Age of Digital Media (Emerald Publishing 2020) 121 at 129.
28 Ibid at 129.
29 Ibid at 129.
30 Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 ss 14–17; L Swales, ‘Naming and Shaming on Social Media in South Africa’ (1 August 2022) SA Regulatory Law https://saregulatorylaw.com/2022/08/01/naming-and-shaming-on-social media-in-south-africa/ accessed 09 November 20255.
31 Republic of South Africa, National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities 2020) 32–33; N Mclean, ‘Naming Alleged Perpetrators of Gender Based Violence’ (18 November 2021) Grocott’s Mail https://grocotts.ru.ac.za/2021/11/18/naming-alleged perpetrators-of-gender-based-violence/ accessed 09 November 2025.
32 Ibid.
33 L Swales, ‘Naming and Shaming on Social Media in South Africa’ (1 August 2022) SA Regulatory Law https://saregulatorylaw.com/2022/08/01/naming-and-shaming-on-social-media-in-south-africa/ accessed 09 November 2025.
34 LegalWise “Freedom of expression. Be careful what you post on social media” available at https://www.legalwise.co.za/news/freedom-expression-be-careful-what-you-post-social-media, accessed 09 November 2025.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Booysen v Major and Another (2021) ZAWCHC 273; A Truter, ‘M Booysen v J Dolley-Major (Case No 5043/2021): Landmark Case-Naming an Alleged Rapist on Social Media’ (2021) DML Law https://www.dmllaw.co.za/m-booysen-v-j-dolley-major-case-no-5043-2021-landmark-case-naming-an-alleged rapist-on-social-media/ accessed 09 November 2025.
40 Booysen v Major and Another (2021) ZAWCHC 27 para 3-5.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid para 25.
43 A Truter op cit note 39; L Swales op cit note 33.
44 Ibid.
45 L Swales op cit note 33; A Truter op cit note 39.
46 M Salter, ‘Justice Practices in Digital Spaces’ in R Loney-Howes (ed), Online Anti-Rape Activism: Exploring the Politics of the Personal in the Age of Digital Media (Emerald Publishing 2020) 121–141; D Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press 2014) 75–78.
47 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 35(3).
48 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 35(3); H Scott, ‘Where South African Defamation Law Stands on “Naming and Shaming”’ (25 April 2016) The Conversation https://theconversation.com/where-south african-defamation-law-stands-on-naming-and-shaming-58246 accessed 09 November 2025. 49 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 35(3)(h); Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 105A. 50 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 16; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 35(3).
51 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 35(3)(h); L Swales, ‘Naming and Shaming on Social Media in South Africa’ (1 August 2022) SA Regulatory Law https://saregulatorylaw.com/2022/08/01/naming and-shaming-on-social-media-in-south-africa/ accessed 09 November 2025.
52 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 35(3); Q Qukula, ‘Emma Sadleir: Beware of the Risks Before Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Online’ (2021) CapeTalk https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/406264/emma-sadleir-beware-of-the-risks-before-naming-and-shaming perpetrators-online accessed 09 November 2025.
53 A Marzouk and G Vanderveen, ‘Fighting Sexual Violence in Egypt on Social Media: A Visual Essay on Assault Police’ (2022) 17 Global Public Health 2329, 2332–2334.
54 B McCall op cit note 9.
55 R Loney-Howes op cit note 27 at 121–141.
56 Mclean Nyx “Naming alleged perpetrators of gender-based violence” available at https://grocotts.ru.ac.za/2021/11/18/naming-alleged-perpetrators-of-gender-based-violence/, accessed 09 November 2025.
57 Ibid.
58 N Joyce-Wojtas and M Keenan, ‘Is Restorative Justice for Sexual Crime Compatible with Various Criminal Justice Systems?’ (2016) 19 Contemporary Justice Review 43.
59Mclean Nyx op cit note 56.
60 R Loney-Howes op cit note 27 at 129.
61 Ibid at 134.
62 Ibid at 136.
63 Republic of South Africa, National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities 2020) 34–36.
64 L Swales op cit note 33.
65 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 16, 35(3); Booysen v Major and Another (2021) ZAWCHC 273.
66 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Restorative Justice National Policy Framework (2017) 5–6.
67 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007; Republic of South Africa, National Strategic Plan on GBVF (2020) 45–46.
