Authored By: Pushkar Singh
Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar
PUSHKAR SINGH ABSTRACT :
Public Interest Litigation was developed by Indian courts to make justice accessible to people who could not approach courts on their own due to poverty, illiteracy, or social disadvantage. By relaxing strict procedural rules, PIL allowed concerned individuals and organisations to seek remedies on behalf of marginalized communities. Over time, it became a powerful tool for enforcing fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21, leading to major reforms in areas such as prison conditions, labour welfare, women’s rights, environmental protection, and access to basic necessities like food and healthcare. However, the increasing misuse of PIL has raised serious concerns about judicial overreach and interference with policy matters. This article traces the evolution and constitutional basis of PIL, analyses important judicial decisions, and evaluates its role in balancing social justice with constitutional discipline.
Keywords: Public Interest Litigation, Access to Justice, Fundamental Rights, Social Justice, Judicial Activism, Constitutional Governance.
INTRODUCTION
India’s Constitution guarantees equality before law under Article 14 and provides remedies for enforcement of fundamental rights through Articles 32 and 226. Yet, for decades, access to justice remained beyond the reach of large sections of society due to high litigation costs, procedural rigidity, lack of legal aid, and strict locus standi requirements. The traditional adversarial system failed to account for the realities faced by marginalized groups such as bonded labourers, pavement dwellers, women, and children. To address this gap, Indian courts in the late 1970s and early 1980s developed Public Interest Litigation, enabling public-spirited individuals to approach courts on behalf of the disadvantaged. Over time, PIL became a vital tool for social reform, contributing to developments in areas such as environmental protection, liability standards, and human rights. However, concerns regarding judicial overreach and misuse have also emerged. This article examines the evolution, constitutional foundations, and judicial impact of PIL in India.
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA: CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION
Historically, Indian courts followed a strict locus standi rule that only someone directly aggrieved by a government action could sue. This British-inherited rule prevented frivolous claims, but it also shut out the poor and marginalized (illiterate farmers, bonded labourers, homeless families, etc.) from justice. Courts themselves later acknowledged that rigid standing made many rights illusory the vast promise of Articles 32/226 meant little if only the well-off could enforce them.1 Beginning in the late 1970s, under Chief Justices Bhagwati and V.K. Iyer, courts decided that procedural formalities must yield to social justice. Even letters or phone calls to judges were treated as writ petitions where mass grievances were shown.
For example, Madras HC lawyer G. Vasantha Pai in the early 1970s challenged a judge’s conduct on behalf of the public, forcing the judge’s resignation. At the national level, Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar is often cited as the first modern PIL that activist Kapila Hingorani filed on behalf of undertrial prisoners languishing without trial, and the Supreme Court agreed an outsider could sue for them, noting that “speedy trial” is part of Article 21.2It ordered states to list and expedite all long-pending cases and even provide free legal aid leading to roughly 40,000 undertrials being released. This and other early cases like Sheela Barse v. Maharashtra,31983, on women prisoners paved the way for PIL by treating letters, media reports or NGO petitions as valid triggers for court action.
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
PIL rests on broad readings of the Constitution’s remedial articles. Article 32 empowers the Supreme Court and Article 226 every High Court to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental and legal rights. Courts interpreted these not narrowly only for formal petitioners but expansively, in keeping with the Constitution’s spirit. In particular, Article 21 (right to life and liberty) has been read to include many facets of dignity. Starting with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,4 SC said “life” means more than bare existence including education, health, livelihood, shelter, a clean environment, and legal aid, among others. Subhash Kumar v. Bihar was explicit that Article 21 guarantees citizens the right to “clean and pure” air, water and environment.5 PILs have invoked Article 21 repeatedly for socio-economic entitlements (food, housing, rural employment schemes) as essentials of life with dignity.6
Similarly, Article 14’s promise of equality and Article 15’s ban on discrimination have been interpreted to cover arbitrary or neglectful state action.7 Petitions often argue that a failure to act or a harmful act against a poor class violates these guarantees. Judges also draw on Directive Principles (Part IV) to bolster rights. For instance, in the Vishaka case (1997) a PIL born of the Bhanwari Devi rape where SC not only relied on Articles 14, 15 and 21 but also quoted Articles 39(e) and 51(c) (DPSPs promoting welfare and gender equality) and international norms like CEDAW.8 The Court framed binding “Vishaka Guidelines” for preventing workplace sexual harassment, noting that in absence of legislation it was duty-bound to fill the gap. These Guidelines treated as law under Article 141 later led to the Protection of Women at Workplace Act (2013).
PIL’s legitimacy is anchored in Articles 32/226 combined with a purposive reading of Articles 14, 15, 21 and related DPSPs. Courts have effectively used PIL as a bridge between unenforceable socio-economic ideals and enforceable fundamental rights. They hold that Article 21 itself enjoins the state to ensure basic life amenities reinforced by DPSP Article 47 on nutrition, Article 48A on environment, etc. Thus PIL stands on the Constitution’s promise that any citizen or NGO can approach the court in bona fide interest of deprived groups, to enforce these broad guarantees.
LANDMARK PIL CASES
PIL has generated landmark decisions across various fields. Some key examples include:
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS : Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar (1979) PIL led the Court to declare that “speedy trial” is part of Article 21 and to direct every jail to list long-pending trials and either expedite them or release detainees.9 The Court ordered free legal aid for undertrials and massive releases. The case demonstrated that courts could tackle systemic justice failures. In later Hussainara rulings, the Court continued to improve prison conditions and legal aid, underscoring that Article 21 requires speedy justice.
LABOUR RIGHTS : In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI (1984) PIL by an NGO, the SC struck down bonded labour as violative of Articles 21 and 23.10 It emphasized that bonded labourers – the “little Indians” are among the most backward of the backward, and that the State has an “ineluctable obligation” to identify, free and rehabilitate all bonded labourers. Importantly, the Court held that any person can advocate for the cause of these “little Indians”, even if not directly affected. It appointed commissions to find bonded workers and ordered their release. The ruling freed thousands from bondage and led to welfare schemes for their rehabilitation.
GENDER JUSTICE : The Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1997) triggered by the gang-rape of social worker Bhanwari Devi,11 this PIL addressed the lack of any law on workplace sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held that sexual harassment violates Articles 14, 15 and 21. Applying international conventions (CEDAW) and DPSPs, the Court framed interim Vishaka Guidelines imposing duties on employers like: mandated complaint committees, employer liability. The Court explicitly treated these guidelines as binding law under Article 141. These guidelines filled a legislative gap until Parliament enacted the POSH Act, 2013. PILs also expanded gender rights in other areas: for example, in Navtej Singh Johar & Others v. Union of India,12 a landmark 2018 SC case that decriminalized consensual same-sex sexual acts by striking down parts of Sec 377, IPC. These cases show PIL’s role in advancing gender and sexual-orientation rights when statutory law lags.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION : PIL has revolutionized environmental law. Prominent are the series of M.C. Mehta cases. After Bhopal (1984), and Oleum gas leak near Delhi (1985) resulted in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,13 1987. Justice Bhagwati famously imposed “absolute liability” on industries engaged in hazardous activities a far stricter rule than English strict liability holding them fully responsible for any harm. The Court then required defendant to compensate victims and implemented safety controls. Subsequent Mehta cases invoked the “polluter pays” and “precautionary” principles. For instance, in Taj Trapezium (1996) the Court banned industries polluting around the Taj Mahal and ordered relocation or cleaner fuel, to protect the monument from environmental damage.14 In Subhash Kumar v. Bihar (1991),15 SC explicitly held that “the right to life” in Article 21 includes “the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air”. PILs have also tackled river pollution, deforestation, mining and vehicular emissions. By reading ecological balance as part of life and liberty, courts have drawn on Constitutional morality and scientific norms to fill gaps in legislation.
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RIGHTS : PIL has opened courts for rights not expressly in Part III. Notably, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2001) linked starvation deaths to Article 21.16 The Supreme Court held that the right to life includes food, and directed states to streamline public distribution (PDS) and mid-day meal schemes. Unusually, the Court kept the case open under continuing mandamus requiring periodic status reports, appointing commissioners, and monitoring implementation of food entitlements for years. Similarly, PILs have enforced right to education, housing for slum-dwellers, and healthcare schemes (e.g. free medicines for pregnant women). Courts have also reinforced Article 39A (free legal aid) by ordering free lawyers for indigent prisoners as seen in many cases. Therefore, PIL has been a vehicle to translate Directive Principles (health, nutrition, work) into enforceable standards under Articles 21 and 14, turning the courts into watchdogs of neglected welfare duties.
PIL AS INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
By lowering procedural barriers, PIL democratized access to justice. NGOs, activists and even individuals could act as “friends of the court” for helpless classes. Children, the disabled, tribals, pavement-dwellers and other unorganized groups suddenly had a voice. Courts began accepting petitions on their behalf. PIL turned courts into forums for bringing change as, orders have ensured midday meals, free vaccinations and mid-day meals in rural areas, improved prison health, and release of labour bondages. Judges also began insisting on transparency as many PILs have compelled governments to publish budgets, pollution levels, crime data, etc.
Crucially, courts treated PIL as an ongoing process, They devised tools like continuing mandamus – a series of orders and follow-ups to ensure compliance. In the food security case of 2001,17 this approach directly supervised schemes over 16 years. Such active oversight meant PILs could actually enforce Article 21 rights for the poor, transforming abstract guarantees into lived reality. Through PIL, concepts like legal aid (Article 39A), dignity and equality in basic services have been recognised.
MISUSE OF PIL AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
However, PIL’s openness invited abuse. Over time the courts grew alarmed by petitions motivated by publicity or narrow agendas rather than genuine public interest. Some PILs resembled press releases or political stunts, lacking credible facts. The Supreme Court criticized this as “publicity interest litigation” and “private interest litigation” masked as PIL.
To curb misuse, courts have imposed penalties and strict tests. Writ-drafting now must show bona fide the petitioner must disclose all facts and motives. Courts have routinely fined or ordered costs against those filing frivolous PILs. For example, in Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India (2000) an asbestos manufacturer’s rival filed a baseless PIL to ban asbestos the SC fined ₹100,000, noting the petition “lacks bona fide”.18 The Court declared such “unscrupulous” litigation punishable, to preserve judicial time and public trust.
Modern benches now strike out PILs at the threshold if there’s no real grievance. They refuse relief on policy or administrative matters better left to legislatures. The Court has explicitly stated that petitioners must “come with clean hands” and not use litigation “as a game of chess”.
JUDICIAL OVERREACH AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
Critics argue PIL sometimes blurs the constitutional balance. The Constitution does not prescribe a rigid separation of powers, but its basic structure implies that each branch stays in its lane. When courts use PIL to frame detailed policies, allocate funds or direct administrative schemes, they are close to law-making. Critics argue that judges lack democratic legitimacy and technical expertise to design welfare programs. The Supreme Court itself has issued reminders in V.K. Naswa v. UOI (2012),19 it held that the judiciary has “no competence to issue directions to the legislature to enact the law in a particular manner.”. In simple terms, courts will protect rights but will not take up the legislature’s role. Some recent judgments, echoing separation of powers concerns, have bluntly stated that courts cannot stay executive functions or compel Parliament to legislate by means of PIL.
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF PIL
India’s PIL model is unusually broad by global standards. In the United States, for example, Article III standing requires plaintiffs to show concrete injury,20 causation and redressability as abstract & vague public grievances are typically dismissed. Similarly, UK courts insist on a “sufficient interest” in the case. India’s approach allows any good-faith citizen or NGO to sue for another’s rights which is virtually unparalleled among major democracies. This openness was born of India’s socio-economic context where massive inequality and a weak welfare state meant courts stepped in to protect the powerless.
RECENT TRENDS: TOWARD RESTRAINT
Since about 2010 the judiciary has shown greater restraint in PILs. Several Supreme Court benches and High Courts now routinely decline petitions they view as thinly-veiled policy debates. They emphasize prima facie scrutiny that a PIL must present cogent evidence of violation of rights before being admitted. In the Chandrachud Court era, justices have repeatedly refused “academic” or generalized PILs, insisting on concrete injury. For example, in 2023 the SC turned down a PIL asking it to expand workplace harassment law, noting that petitioners offered no real instances of harm and that tailoring laws is Parliament’s job. Similarly, in R. Subramanian v. Syndicate Bank (2019),21 SC reiterated that PIL is not a vehicle for political campaigning or economic regulation without legal basis. High Courts have also struck out PILs that were mere press notes or lacked any clear public grievance. The emerging jurisprudence insists on strict maintainability petitioners must demonstrate a tangible rights breach for justiciable remedy.
PRESERVING PIL’S INTEGRITY: A WAY FORWARD
To maintain PIL as a force for good, both courts and litigants must exercise caution. The judiciary can refine procedures: for instance, requiring detailed affidavits of genuineness at admission, issuing notices to the government before hearings, and imposing heavy costs on frivolous petitioners. Continuing mandamus should be used judiciously mainly where government inertia is evident so that courts oversee implementation without becoming permanent administrators. Judges can also stick to high-level directions, leaving policymakers to flesh out specifics. On the other hand, executives and legislatures should act proactively so that fewer rights deprivations reach court. Stronger social legislation and welfare schemes will reduce reliance on PIL. Empowering bodies like human rights commissions, environmental tribunals (e.g. National Green Tribunal), and local grievance redressal can handle many issues outside court. Expanding legal aid (Article 39A) and awareness will ensure that genuine cases by the marginalized are brought properly.
CONCLUSION
As, Indian PIL has proven to be a powerful instrument of social justice when used responsibly. It has enlarged the scope of Articles 14 and 21 to areas like food, health, education and environment, and it has made courts accessible to the voiceless. Tens of thousands of undertrials were freed, bonded labour addressed, women’s rights advanced, and public institutions improved thanks to PILs. But this very tool can be misused, turning courts into arenas of publicity or overreach. Recent jurisprudence shows the Supreme Court and High Courts keenly aware of this tension, and moving to balance “the need for judicial protection of rights with respect for democratic policymaking.” In the final analysis, PIL’s worth will hinge on its use: as long as it is wielded by genuine public-spirited litigants, it can remain a beacon of hope for the marginalized. Its corrective power must be preserved, even as its excesses are firmly checked so that justice becomes more accessible.
Reference(S):
1 Constitution of India arts 32 and 226
2 Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar (1979) 3 SCC 532 (SC).
3 Sheela Barse v State of Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96 (SC).
4 Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 (SC).
5 Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598 (SC).
6 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2001) 5 SCC 64 (SC).
7 Constitution of India arts 14 and 15.
8 Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 (SC).
9 Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar (1979) 3 SCC 532 (SC).
10 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 (SC).
11 Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 (SC).
12 Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 (SC).
13 MC Mehta v Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case) (1987) 1 SCC 395 (SC).
14 MC Mehta v Union of India (Taj Trapezium Case) (1997) 2 SCC 353 (SC).
15 Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598 (SC).
16 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2001) 5 SCC 64 (SC).
17 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2001) 5 SCC 64 (SC).
18 Kalyaneshwari v Union of India (2011) 3 SCC 287 (SC).
19 V K Naswa v Union of India (2012) 2 SCC 542 (SC).
20 US Constitution art III.
21 R Subramanian v Syndicate Bank (2019) 8 SCC 636 (SC).
