Authored By: Emmanuel Oise Ejere
University of Uyo, Akwa ibom State, Nigeria
Introduction
Local government autonomy in Nigeria has been a subject of intense legal, political , and social discourse for decades. As the third tier of government under Nigeria’s federal structure, local governments are constitutionally designed to bring government closer to the people, ensuring grassroots development and effective service delivery. However, the practical realization of this autonomy has been married by systematic challenges , notably the overbearing influence of state governments. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended ) ostensibly provides for local government autonomy, yet it’s provisions have been undermined by ambiguous interpretations and political realities. A landmark Supreme Court ruling in July 2024 sought to address this by affirming the financial independence of local governments, yet questions Persists about it’s enforceability and impact . This article critically examines the legal framework for local government autonomy in Nigeria , explores the challenges impending it’s realization, and offers recommendation for sustainable reform.
The Legal Framework For Local Government Autonomy
The foundation of local government autonomy in Nigeria is rooted in the 1999 Constitution . Section 7(1) guarantees the existence of democratically elected local government councils, stating that” the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution guaranteed.” Additionally, Section 162(6) establishes The State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA), through which funds allocated from the Federation Account are to be disbursed to local governments. However, this provision has been a double – edged sword. While it ensures funding, it places state governments in supervisory role, often leading to the diversion or mismanagement of these funds by state authorities.
The Fourth Schedule of the Constitution delineates the functions of the local governments, including the provision of primary education, healthcare, and rural infrastructure . These responsibilities suggest a degree of operational autonomy. Yet, Section 7(1) also subjects local governments to state legislation, creating a paradox where autonomy is granted but subordinated to state control . This tension was evident in Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation, where the Supreme Court held that states have supervisory powers over local governments but cannot dissolve elected councils arbitrarily.
In July 2024, the Supreme Court delivered a groundbreaking judgement in Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State and 35 Ors, affirming that local governments are entitled to direct allocation of funds from the Federation Account, bypassing the SJLGA. The court declared it unconstitutional for state governors to withhold or divert these funds , reinforcing the financial autonomy of local governments. This decision was hailed as a victory for grassroots governance, yet it’s implementation has exposed deep seated structural and political challenges.
Historical Context and Evolution
The quest for local government autonomy predates the 1999 Constitution. The 1976 Local Government Reforms under General Murtala Mohammed aimed to establish local governments as a distinct tier with administrative and financial independence. However, subsequent military regimes eroded this framework by centralizing power at the state level. The return to democracy in 1999 promised a revival of this vision, but state Governors, leveraging their political dominance, have consistently undermined it. The practice of caretaker committees in place of elected officials, despite being ruled unconstitutional in cases like Attorney General of Plateau State v Goyol , exemplifies this overreach.
Judicial Interventions and Their Limits
Judicial interventions have been pivotal in shaping the discourse on local government autonomy. In Attorney General of Ogun State v Attorney General of the Federation, the Supreme Court clarified that local governments are not mere appendages of state governments but a distinct tier under the federal structure. The 2024 ruling further entrenched this principle by mandating direct funding. However, the judiciary’s role is limited to interpretation and declaration; enforcements rest with political actors who often prioritize self interest over constitutional fidelity. As Femi Falana, a prominent human rights lawyer, argued in a 2025 interview, the Supreme Court’s decision “went off the track” by failing to address the practice mechanisms for enforcement, leaving local governments vulnerable to state interference.
Challenges and Recommendations
Challenges
- State Government Overreach: Despite the Supreme Court ruling, many governors continue to control local government funds through informal mechanisms, such as coercing council chairmen to sign over allocations. Posts on social media highlighted ongoing complaints from local officials about this practice.
- Ambiguity in the Constitution: The dual role of states as both supervisors and partners of local governments creates a legal grey area exploited to undermine autonomy.
- Weak institutional Capacity: Many local governments lack the administrative expertise and financial discipline to manage direct allocations effectively, raising concerns about accountability.
- Political Interference: The absence of free and fair local elections, often manipulated by state governors, stifles democratic governance at the grassroots.
Recommendations
- Constitutional Amendment: Section 162(6) should be amended to abolish the SJLGA, ensuring direct disbursements to local governments with clear accountability mechanisms. A legislative framework mandating transparency in fund utilization could complement this reform.
- Strengthening in Judicial Enforcement: The judiciary should establish a monitoring mechanism, such as a special tribunal, to oversee compliance with it’s rulings on autonomy.
- Capacity Building: Training programmes for local government officials, supported by federal and international agencies , would enhance their ability to manage resources independently.
- Electoral Reforms: The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should assume responsibility for conducting local government elections, reducing state interference and ensuring democratic legitimacy.
Conclusion
Local government autonomy in Nigeria remains a contested ideal, oscillating between constitutional promise and political reality. The 2024 Supreme Court ruling marked a significant step towards financial independence, yet it’s efficacy is curtailed by entrenched state dominance and structural deficiencies . Without robust reforms- legal, institutional, and political – the vision of autonomous local governance will remain elusive. Nigeria’s federal system thrives on balance; empowering local governments is not just a legal necessity but a democratic imperative for equitable development. As the nation navigates this complex terrain, sustained advocacy, judicial vigilance and legislative action will be critical to translating autonomy from rhetoric to reality.
Reference(S)
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999( As amended) .
- Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation (2004) 18NWLR (Pt 904) 1.
- Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State and 35 Ors SC/CV/ 343/2004(unreported 11July 2024).
- Attorney General of Plateau State v Goyol(2007) 16NWLR (Pt 1059) 57.
- Attorney General Of Ogun State v Attorney General of the Federation (2002) 18 NWLR( Pt 798) 232 .
- Aseigbu C, ‘Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria: Myth or Reality ?’ ( Veritas Africa, 4 April 2025) https://t.co/InI970dz45 accessed 7 April, 2025.
- Falana F, ‘ Supreme Court Went off the track on Local Government Autonomy’ (Mobile Punch, 3rd April 2025) https://t.co/ogMjFzBzZP accessed 7 April 2025.
- Mohammed M,’ The 1976 Local Government Reforms: A Historical Perspective’ in Adebayo A(ed), Local Government Administration in Nigeria(Spectrum Books 2000) 45.