Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Tan Wei Ling (IJWC 2025)

INTRODUCTION

This present case is concerning a contested dispute which occurred between the Kingdom of Atlantira (“Atlantira”) and the Republic of Novaris (“Novaris”). Novaris, via the “Project Sentinel Eye”, had conducted a massive covert surveillance operation targeting Atlantiran citizens. Therefore, Atlantira hereby made an allegation that Novaris had breached the principle of sovereignty, interfered upon its own internal affairs, and breached several rights guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 

Supported by Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the Court’s jurisdiction henceforth established pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”), as declared by both states beforehand. 

The purpose of this judgement is to determine whether Novaris’s impugned surveillance operations had constituted a breach under the international law, which enabled Atlantira to seek for any adequate relief against Novaris. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Due to the happening of such a diplomatic crisis resulting from the failure of negotiations, the Kingdom of Atlantira had initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) against the Republic of Novaris on 15th January 2025. 

The application brought by Atlantira was later duly communicated to Novaris. Novaris in a dissatisfied manner, contested the application and requested its dismissal on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds. The parties subsequently submitted their written pleadings which consist of their respective arguments. Now, the case came before this Court for its judgement. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris were neighbouring sovereign states that have maintained diplomatic relations pursuant to the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which upholds mutual respect for sovereignty and prohibits interference in each other’s internal affairs. Atlantiran government developed its country through gradual and controlled transformation. Whereas Novarian government, which emphasized on cybersecurity and digital intelligence capabilities, had established the National Digital Security Agency (“NDSA”). 

The “Project Sentinel Eye” operation had been conducted by NDSA since January 2022. This operation targeted Atlantiran nationals, specifically political activists, journalists, human rights advocates, opposition politicians, and their family members, living within or abroad Atlantira. Novaris infiltrated telecommunication servers and had established covert data collection facilities to intercept communications. Beyond that, there was an extensive breach of privacy when the collected data was used to create psychological profiles, map social networks, and monitor political activity within Atlantira. 

This operation caused severe harm to targeted Atlantiran citizens, in which at least 127 individuals were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and physical harm. Prominent victims were Dr. Helena Markos, Journalist Alexei Dimitrov, and Attorney Sofia Ramirez. 

In May 2024, Atlantira confronted Novaris with the evidence and Novaris initially denied the surveillance. Novaris later characterised this as legitimate intelligence gathering for national security. Between June and October 2024, both countries engaged in diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless, the negotiations collapsed in October 2024 when Atlantira discovered the continued surveillance of Atlantiran diplomats. Atlantira recalled its ambassador from Novaris and suspended most bilateral cooperation agreements with Novaris.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

1. Whether Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and breached the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for intervening Atlantira’s internal affairs by conducting covert surveillance operations upon Atlantiran nationals within and outside Atlantira?
2. Whether Novaris violated the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 17 of the ICCPR by systematically intercepting and monitoring Atlantiran nationals’ private communications? And if so, whether such violations were justified on grounds of legitimate limitations for national security?
3. Whether the surveillance operation violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression and press freedom, specifically by targeting journalists and restricting their right to seek and impart information?
4. Whether the monitoring of confidential communications between attorneys and clients violate the right to a fair trial and access to justice protected under international human rights law?
5. Whether Novaris was internationally responsible for the conduct of its NDSA? And if so, what legal framework applied for attributing cyber surveillance activities to the state?
6. What are the appropriate remedies available, which include cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition, if such violations were established? And whether the Court should order the destruction of surveillance data and disclosure of surveillance methods?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Atlantira had submitted several arguments. Firstly, Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty under Article 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter and breached the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. There was intervention of Atlantira’s internal affairs on Novaris’s part by conducting covert surveillance operations upon Atlantiran nationals within and outside Atlantira. Secondly, Novaris’s surveillance operation violated the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR and failed the test established by the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No.16. Novaris’s claim was implausible. Thirdly, Novaris violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by directing its surveillance operation upon targeted journalists and activists. Fourthly, the Novaris’s monitoring of confidential attorney-client communications constitutes breaches of the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 14 of the ICCPR. Fifthly, Novaris was internationally responsible for the conduct of its NDSA, since it was a state organ. NDSA’s operation was conducted in an official state’s capacity and authorized by high levels of Novarian government. Lastly, Atlantira was entitled to remedies due to the nature and severity of Novaris’s violations. 

Novaris had submitted several counter-arguments. Firstly, Novaris did not violate Atlantira’s sovereignty and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Intelligence gathering is a recognised and lawful function of sovereign states which was practiced by all nations virtually. Secondly,  Novaris did not violate the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR. The operation was conducted pursuant to the National Security Act 2021. Thirdly, Novaris’s surveillance operation did not violate Article 19 of the ICCPR, since such monitoring was only against suspected extremists and to prevent violence. Fourthly, the monitoring of confidential attorney-client communications by Novaris did not breach the right to a fair trial and access to justice. There was belief that some communications involved planning illegal activities. Fifthly, Novaris contended that although NDSA’s conduct attributable to the state, attribution alone does not create any liability. Conducting surveillance without Atlantiran authorisation also does not of itself breach the international law obligations. Lastly, Novaris submitted that remedies requested by Atlantira were disproportionate. The destruction of surveillance data and disclosure of surveillance methods amounted to a violation of Novaris’s sovereignty. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS & JUDICIAL REASONING 

The first issue before the Court is that, whether Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and breached the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for intervening Atlantira’s internal affairs by conducting covert surveillance operations upon Atlantiran nationals within and outside Atlantira. Article 2(1) of the UN Charter prescribed that the principle of sovereignty guaranteed each state’s exclusive authority over persons and activities within its territory. While Article 2(7) of the UN Charter is in regards to the principle of non-intervention, the states were subjected to prohibition made from interfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other states. As mentioned in the case of Nicaragua v. United States case, the ICJ upheld that intervention is wrongful when the matters involved are permitted to be decided freely, including political, economic, social and cultural systems. To determine whether the interference was considered as arbitrary, this Court had established 3 conditions. First, the conduct must relate to matters which fall within the ambit of the State’s internal affairs (domaine reserve). Second, there must be coercion. There are 2 main approaches. First approach is that, the coercive act will compel the victim living in that state to alter its behaviour within the domain reserve. Second, there is deprivation upon the State to control matters which can be decided freely. This constitutes an intervention. Third, there must be a causal nexus between the coercive act and the legal consequences upon the internal and external affairs of the targeted State.

Even though the dispute was not concerned with military activities and armed forces, this Court still recognised Novaris’s conduct as an intervention upon Atlantira’s sovereign state. The 3 elements can be fulfilled. The surveillance operation had mainly targeted specific Atlantiran individuals. This surveillance extended beyond mere monitoring, since the gathered information was later used to create psychological profiles, map social networks and identify the political organisation and activism’ patterns. All these affairs prove a direct correlation to Atlantira’s political system, which falls within the state affairs of Atlantira. Next, Novarian intelligence operatives installed malware on personal devices of targeted individuals such as the political activists, which resulted in the conduct of targeted individuals being monitored. Novaris’s act constitutes the exertion of pressure upon the internal political system and affairs of Atlantira. Even if the surveillance was not a direct compulsion, nevertheless it still constitutes as a coercion. Third, there was evidence showing that at least 127 individuals under surveillance were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and physical harm. Novarian government had revealed that NDSA had conducted a constant monitoring upon certain individuals, and the communications of Atlantiran diplomats. All this evidence proves that there was a causal nexus and connection on the part of Novaris against the internal affairs of Atlantira.

The second issue before this Court is whether Novaris violated the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 17 of the ICCPR by systematically intercepting and monitoring Atlantiran nationals’ private communications. Article 17 of the ICCPR forbids arbitrary or unlawful intrusion into a person’s privacy, family, home, or correspondence and obliges states to provide legal remedies against such actions. Based on the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No.16, the State party should ensure that all kinds of surveillance operations and interference with privacy are fully complied with the covenant, particularly Article 17 of the ICCPR. These activities should abide by the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality, and be authorized by the judiciary. The State must also ensure the surveillance is subjected to an independent judicial oversight and provide effective remedies when abuses happen. The Tele2 and Big Brother Watch cases ruled that the bulk interception surveillance regime violated the right to privacy if there was lack of sufficient safeguards. 

Novaris in this case had contended that the operation was meant to protect public safety and national security, nevertheless this Court did not discover any sufficient evidence that the vast 50,000 Atlantiran nationals were all subjected and involved as an extremist which will pose a significant threat towards Novarian government. Besides, even though Novaris alleged that the operation was implemented lawfully pursuant to Novarian domestic law, particularly the National Security Act 2021, such covert surveillance for an extensive period of 2 years against Atlantira was deemed to be an extra-territorial surveillance which did not satisfy the requirements prescribed in Article 17 of the ICCPR. Due to the absence of sufficient safeguards and surveillance acted beyond the necessary and appropriate scope, this Court ruled that Novaris had breached Article 17 of the ICCPR. The surveillance was grossly disproportionate and implausible. 

The third issue presented before this Court is whether the surveillance operation conducted by Novaris violated Article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 19 of the ICCPR prescribed that  everyone possessed the right to freedom of expression. Referring to the UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No.34, surveillance upon individuals based on their political or other opinions violates the freedom of expression as prescribed in Article 19 of the ICCPR. Novaris’s surveillance had created a chilling effect which undermines press freedom in Atlantira, especially when such monitoring only targeted certain individuals in relation to political affairs. This Court finds that the surveillance had undermined the freedom of expression, which constitutes as an interference and intrusion upon Atlantira’s sovereignty. Novaris argued that the surveillance was necessary and authorised. However, this Court ruled that the involvement of approximately 50,000 Atlantiran nationals was considered as a large scale beyond the necessary scope. The justification made by Novaris did not fulfill the strict interpretations of necessity and legality. 

The fourth issue before this Court is whether the monitoring of confidential attorney-client communications breached the right to a fair trial and access to justice, as stipulated under Article 14 of the ICCPR. This includes confidential consultation with legal counsel, as further reinforced in Michaud v. France. The consequences were catastrophic, as the attorney Ramirez’s communication in regards to the defense strategies had been revealed, which rendered trust in legal representation destroyed. This Court ruled that the aggravated clients were entitled for remedies, due to the monitoring of privileged communications conducted by Novaris. 

The fifth issue is whether Novaris liable for NDSA’s conduct. Article 4 of the ICL Articles on State Responsibility mentioned that conduct of state organs is attributable to the state under international law. NDSA was a state organ as it was established by Novarian law and operating under government authority and control. Novaris was thus stopped from denying liability and conduct of NDSA. This Court reaffirmed the case of Tehran Hostages which ruled that states will still be liable for the conducts of their organs when such organs exceed beyond its authority. Therefore, Novaris is internationally responsible for the conduct of its NDSA under the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 

The last issue is whether this Court should order the destruction of surveillance data and disclosure of surveillance methods, and whether the proper remedies should be granted. As established in Chorzow Factory, remedies must eliminate all consequences of illegal conduct and restore the initial position. Novaris must immediately cease all such surveillance operations. This Court acknowledged both material and moral harm suffered by targeted individuals and the state. Besides, Novaris must acknowledge its wrongdoing and establish effective measures to prevent similar violations. 

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

This Court found that, firstly, Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and breached the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Secondly, Novaris violated the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 17 of the ICCPR. Thirdly, Novaris’s surveillance operation violated Article 19 of the ICCPR. Fourthly, Novaris violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice. Fifthly, Novaris was internationally responsible for NDSA’s conduct. Lastly, all the appropriate remedies were available upon Atlantiran citizens as there was violation on Novaris’s part. The Court should order the destruction of surveillance data and disclosure of surveillance methods of Novaris. 

OPERATIVE PART (DISPOSITIF) 

This Court declared that, Novaris hereby violated Article 14, 17 and 19 of the ICCPR. Novaris was liable for NDSA’s surveillance operation. In this regard, Novaris shall immediately cease all surveillance operations and destroy all the data obtained unlawfully. Atlantira was entitled for all the necessary remedies. Novaris must conduct effective measures to prevent similar violations made in the future. 

[Signed]

 PRESIDING JUDGE (Hypothetical) TAN WEI LING 

(Hypothetical) INTERNATIONAL COURT 

Date of Judgment: 15TH NOVEMBER 2025

REFERENCES 

STATUTES

Article 2(1) & 2(7) of the UN Charter 

Article 14 & 17 & 19 of the ICCPR

Article 4 of the ICL Articles on State Responsibility

CASE LAWS

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) [1984] ICJ Rep 392.

Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others (Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15) [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.

Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom (Apps nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15) ECHR 2021.

Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6 December 2012).

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 3.

Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) [1928] PCIJ Rep Series A No 17.

WEBSITES

International cyber law: interactive toolkit, “Prohibition of Intervention” International cyber law: interactive toolkit (September 25, 2025) <https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Prohibition_of_intervention> accessed November 15, 2025.

“CCPR/C/DEU/CO/7: Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Germany ” (United Nations) <https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/DEU/CO/7> accessed November 15, 2025

“Document Viewer” <https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/DEU/CO/7> accessed November 13, 2025.

2025. Human Rights Committee (102nd sess. : 2011 : Geneva), “General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression” (United Nations Digital Library System) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/715606?ln=en&v=pdf> accessed November 15, 2025.