Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Syahifa Adilah Binti Badhuruzzaman (IJWC 2025)

Case Title : Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris

Case Number : IJWC/2025/HYP/18

Date of Judgment : 15 November 2025

Name of the Presiding Judge (Hypothetical) : Syahifa Adilah Binti Badhuruzzaman 

Competition Name : International Judgment Writing Competition 2025

I. Introduction 

1. The present case concerns a dispute between the Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris relating the legality of cross-border cyber surveillance operations that allegedly conducted by the Novaris (the Respondent) in opposition to Atlantira (the Applicant). This case raises many issues on state sovereignty, human rights obligations in cyberspace, digital espionage under the International law.
2. Atlantira claims that the Novaris have violated the International rules under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it’s independence and it’s citizen rights by hacking into it’s system and spying on it’s people without Atlantira consent. Novaris on other hand argues that the surveillance was lawful and said it was necessary for national security as well as there was no physical intrusion or damage happen in Atlantira
3. The Court’s jurisdiction have legal power to decide that founded from Article 36(2) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) statute and a treaty signed between the two countries, and upon Article 10 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which provides for the submission of disputes concerning treaty interpretation or application to the Court.
4. This judgment where sets out the court’s findings to decide whether Novaris (the Respondent) violated the International law and what’s the appropriate remedies that (if any) Atlantira (the Applicant) should get.

II. Procedural History 

1. Atlantira and Novaris, once one country but peacefully separated in 1952, are neighboring states with close ties. Under the 1955 Treaty of Friendship, they agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and non-interference. Both are parties to the UN Charter, ICCPR, and Vienna Convention.
2. The Kingdom of Atlantira filed an application on 12 January 2025 instituted a proceedings before the Court, alleging that the Republic of Novaris had violated it’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and obligations under International human rights law through extensive digital surveillance operations.
3. The Written pleadings were duly submitted by both parties. Oral hearings were held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 20-25 September 2025, after which the Court deliberated in private.

III. Statement of Facts

1. In early 2024, Atlantira discovered a covert surveillamce program known as a “Project Sentinet Eye”, operated by the Novarian Digital Security Agency (NDSA). This program allegedly targeted over 50,000 Atlantiran citizens, including journalists, lawyers, and political activists.
2. The Atlantiran government accused Novaris’s National Digital Security Agency (NDSA) of hacking into private emails, social media accounts and secret document of Atlantiran citizens, both at home and abroad.
3. Following diplomatic exchanges in May 2024, Novaris’s first denied the claims but later admitted that it had done some limited spying, saying it was for national security and counter-terrorism reasons. Negotiations collapsed after Atlantira discovered that Novaris had continued the operations even during talks.
4. As a result, Atlantira brought the present case before the court seeking declarations and remedies (if any) under the International law.

IV. Issues for Determination 

In this case, the Court identifies the following issues for determination : 

1. Whether Republic of  Novaris violate Kingdom of Atlantira’s independence and sovereignty through it’s cyber surveillance activities ?
2. Whether such activities is breach the right to privacy and freedom of expression under Articles 17 and 19 of the ICCPR?
3. Whether the surveillance on legal communications violate the right to a fair trial?
4. Whether the actions of the NDSA be legally linked to the State of Novaris under the Articles on State Responsibility?
5. What appropriate remedies or compensation should be given, if any?

V. Summary of Arguments 

A. The Kingdom of Atlantira (the Applicant)

1. Kingdom of Atlantira argues that Novaris’s cyber spying was a serious breach of sovereignty, similar to an illegal intrusion. It relying on Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania) and Nicaragua v. United States. It argues that the surveillance lacked Atlantira’s permission and interfered with it’s internal affairs.
2. Atlantira also argues that collecting a large amounts of personal data from it’s citizen have violated the right to privacy which mention under Article 17 and freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR. It cites Big Brother Watch v. UK and the UN Human Rights Committee’s guidance.
3. Beside that, Atlantira claims that Novaris spied on a private lawyer – client communications, affecting the right to a fair trial. It asks the Court to order Novaris to stop surveillance, make a public apology, delete the collected data and pay USD 750 million in compensation.

B. The Republic of Novaris (the Respondent)

1. Republic of Novaris argues that the intelligence gathering is not illegal under the International law unless it involves coercion. It refers on Nicaragua v. United States and the Tallinn Manual 2.0, asserting that its actions did not breach sovereignty.
2. Novaris also claims that the surveillance was lawful, limited and necessary for national security purposes as well as following it’s domestic laws. It denies violating human rights, saying the people monitored were linked to extremist activities.
3. Furthermore, Novaris also says that Atlantira’s demands are unreasonable then it’s politically motivated and no International wrong occurred.

VI. Legal Analysis and Judicial Reasoning 

Issue 1 (Violation of Sovereignty and Non – Intervention)

Sovereignty means that every country controls what happens inside it’s own borders. In Corfu Channel (1949), the Court held that unauthorized actions within a State’s territory violate sovereignty.

Beside that, the Court acknowledges that cyber activities can also break another countries sovereignty if they have harmful effects inside that country or target its important systems, such as government networks or power grids.

In this situation, Novaris’s security agency (NDSA) hacked Atlantira’s communication systems, placed malware on it’s computers, and spied on its citizens and diplomats. Such acts conducted by Novaris without getting Atlantira consent, constituting a clear breach of digital sovereignty and an unlawful intervention in Atlantira’s domestic affairs.

Therefore, the Courts finds that Novaris have violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary International law.

Issue 2 (Right to Privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR)

Referring Article 17 of the ICCPR says that no one’s privacy can be involved and it’s unlawful but as it established in Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 it’s stating that surveillance measure can be lawful, necessary and proportionate.

Here, Novaris’s spying was massive and secretive and it’s involved an indiscriminate data collection affecting thousands of civilians. No evidence was provided of judicial oversight or individualized suspicion. The surveillance was massive, covert, and disproportionate to the stated aims of counter-terrorism.

Consequently, the Court concludes that Novaris’s actions violated Article 17 of the ICCPR.

Issue 3 (Freedom of Expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR)

In such of this case, the Court take note that the surveillance of journalists and activists created a “chilling effect”, discouraging the exercise of free expression. The exposure and harassment of journalists such as Mr. Dimitrov exemplify how privacy violations can suppress public discourse.

Following a relevant case, Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (ECtHR, 2021), such interference, when not subject to adequate safeguards, contravenes Article 19 of the ICCPR.

Suitably, the Court claims that Novaris’s surveillance caused fear and limited free speech and therefore, Novaris have violated the right to freedom of expression.

Issue 4 (Right to a Fair Trial)

The interruption of confidential between lawyer-client communications, as in the case of Mr Ramirez, the principle of confidentiality have broken, which is a key part of a fair trial under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. Novaris’s (the Respondent) justification of “national security” does not outweigh the fundamental right to confidentiality.Hence, the Court finds this interference unjustified and unlawful.

Issue 5 (State Responsibility) 

According to International law under Article 4 and 7 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, a country is responsible for the actions of its government agencies. There is no evidence that these were ultra vires private acts.

That being the case, the Court finds out that the conduct of the NDSA is fully attributable to the Republic of Novaris, rendering it internationally responsible for the wrongful acts identified above.

VII. Findings and Conclusions 

For the reason stated, the Court finds : 

1. That Novaris have violated Kingdom Atlantira’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. That Novaris breached it’s obligation under Article 17, 19 and 14 of the ICCPR.
3. That the action of NDSA is attributable to Novaris under International Law.
4. That Atlantira is entitled to get a compensation for injury that they suffered.

VIII. Operative Part (Dispositif)

The Courts therefore declares that The Republic of Novaris, through it’s cyber surveillance operations known as a “Project Sentinel Eye”, violated the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Atlantira and t’s obligation under International law. The Court also discover that Novaris violated the rights to privacy, expression and fair trial of Atlantiran nationals protected under the ICCPR and orders Novaris immediately stop all surveillance targeting Atlantira and delete all unlawfully obtained data. Furthermore, The Courts directs Novaris to pay USD 500 million in compensation to Atlantira as partial compensation for material and moral damages and command Novaris publicly apologize and ensure this such actions are not repeated, with proper legal oversight in the future. Lastly, The Courts also rejects all the other claims and counterclaims. 

 

Judge (Hypothetical) Syahifa Adilah

(Hypothetical) International Court

 

REFERENCES

1.International Treaties 

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
• International Court of Justice (ICJ)
• Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 1955
• UN Charter 
• Vienna Convention 

2.Case Law 

• Corfu Channel (UK v.Albania) and Nicaragua v. United States 
• Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (ECtHR, 2021)
• Nicaragua v. United States and the Tallinn Manual 2.0
• Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda (2005) 
• Liberty v United Kingdom (2008)
• Escher v Brazil (IACtHR, 2009

3.Articles, Books and Reports Online  

• Tesic A, “Two BIRN Journalists in Serbia Targeted with Pegasus Spyware” (Balkan Insight, March 27, 2025) https://balkaninsight.com/2025/03/27/two-birn-journalists-in-serbia-targeted-with-pegasus-spyware/#:~:text=Two%20journalists%20from%20BIRN%20in%20Serbia%20were%20the,forensic%20analysis%20conducted%20by%20Amnesty%20International%20has%20confirmed.
• Kleiner S and Wolosky AL, “Time for a Cyber-Attack Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (Just Security, April 29, 2025) https://www.justsecurity.org/65809/time-for-a-cyber-attack-exception-to-the-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act/
• Amnesty International, “Forensic Methodology Report: How to Catch NSO Group’s Pegasus” (Amnesty International, August 10, 2023) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/
• Schmitt MN, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017) https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/tallinn-manual-20-on-the-international-law-applicable-to-cyber-operations/E4FFD83EA790D7C4C3C28FC9CA2FB6C9
• Gloria Alvarez and Kiran Nasir Gore, ‘The 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility – an Annotated Bibliography’ (2022) 37 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 565–591.

4.Online News 

• “The Pegasus spyware scandal highlights the threats activists and journalists face | Democracy Speaks” (Online Kaszinó) https://www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/pegasus-spyware-scandal-highlights-threats-activists-and-journalists-face#:~:text=In%20the%20summer%20of%202021%2C%20the%20news%20broke,journalists%2C%20political%20dissidents%2C%20and%20even%20heads%20of%20state.
• “Christina Tabacco” (November 4, 2021) https://manage.lawstreetmedia.com/news/tech/u-s-adds-nso-group-other-entities-to-restrictive-list-over-malicious-cyber-activities/#:~:text=Per%20Wednesday%E2%80%99s%20announcement%2C%20the%20Commerce%20Department%E2%80%99s%20Bureau%20of,the%20country%E2%80%99s%20national%20security%20and%20foreign%20policy%20interests.
• “Criminal Offences and Penalties for the Violation of EU Restrictive Measures | EUR-Lex” (May 20, 2025) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/criminal-offences-and-penalties-for-the-violation-of-eu-restrictive-measures.html