Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Shahana Khan (IJWC 2025)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns allegations that Novaris conducted systematic surveillance targeting Atlantiran nationals through “Project Sentinel Eye”, violating sovereignty principles, human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and bilateral treaty commitments. The dispute raises fundamental questions about how traditional international law applies to modern digital surveillance and the extent to which states may conduct extraterritorial intelligence operations for national security purposes.

The Court’s jurisdiction is established through Article 36(2) declarations made by both parties in 2010, accepting compulsory jurisdiction without reservations. Additionally, Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provides ICJ jurisdiction over disputes concerning treaty interpretation or application. The Court is satisfied it possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On 15 January 2025, the Kingdom of Atlantira instituted proceedings by filing an Application with the Registry. In its Application, Atlantira alleges that Novaris violated international law through Project Sentinel Eye. Atlantira requests the Court declare that Novaris breached sovereignty and non-intervention principles, violated ICCPR Articles 17 and 19, compromised fair trial rights, and engaged state responsibility for these violations. Atlantira seeks comprehensive remedies including cessation of surveillance, destruction of collected data, USD 750 million compensation, and guarantees of non-repetition.

The Republic of Novaris filed its Counter-Memorial contesting both jurisdiction and substantive merits. Novaris argues that intelligence operations fall within domestic jurisdiction and are not prohibited by international law, that surveillance was justified by legitimate national security concerns, and that claimed violations and damages are unsubstantiated. Written pleadings were completed according to the Rules of Court, and the case is now ready for judgment.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris are neighboring sovereign states in the Eastern Mediterranean region with a shared history extending to their peaceful separation into independent nations in 1952. Both states are parties to the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which explicitly prohibits interference in each others internal affairs. In recent years, Atlantira has undergone significant democratic reforms while Novaris developed advanced surveillance capabilities through its National Digital Security Agency established in 2021.

In March 2024, Atlantiran authorities discovered evidence of Project Sentinel Eye, a massive covert surveillance operation conducted by Novaris’s National Digital Security Agency since January 2022. The operation systematically targeted approximately 50,000 Atlantiran nationals, including political activists, journalists, human rights advocates, opposition politicians, and their family members. Novarian intelligence operatives installed malware on personal devices of targeted individuals, compromised several telecommunications servers located within Atlantira’s territory, and established covert data collection facilities in third countries. The surveillance intercepted emails, text messages, voice calls, social media communications, and even confidential attorney-client communications.

The consequences of this surveillance were severe and multifaceted. Dr. Helena Markos, a respected university professor and human rights advocate, discovered that her private communications had been monitored for eighteen months. Information from her intercepted communications was leaked to conservative groups, resulting in a smear campaign that destroyed her reputation and forced her resignation. She received death threats based on information that could only have come from her private communications, and she and her family were forced into hiding.

Journalist Alexei Dimitrov, who had written critically about both Atlantiran and Novarian government policies, found that his confidential communications with sources had been compromised. Three of his sources were identified through the surveillance. Two of these sources, who were Novarian nationals, were subsequently arrested in Novaris on charges of espionage and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The third source, an Atlantiran official, lost his position and faced criminal investigation. Dimitrov himself received threats indicating detailed knowledge of his movements and personal life that could only have been obtained through comprehensive surveillance.

Attorney Sofia Ramirez, who represented political dissidents and human rights organizations, discovered that her privileged communications with clients had been systematically monitored and recorded. This violation of attorney-client privilege compromised ongoing legal cases and exposed her clients’ defense strategies to authorities. Several of her clients reported that during interrogations, officials confronted them with information that could only have come from supposedly confidential conversations with their lawyer.

Between June and October 2024, Atlantira and Novaris engaged in intensive diplomatic negotiations attempting to resolve the crisis. Atlantira demanded immediate cessation of all surveillance activities, destruction of collected data, compensation for victims, and guarantees that such violations would not recur. Novaris offered limited concessions but refused to accept legal responsibility or provide comprehensive remedies. The negotiations collapsed when Atlantira discovered that Novarian surveillance activities had continued even during diplomatic discussions. New evidence showed that Novarian agents had monitored the communications of Atlantiran diplomats involved in the negotiations themselves, including intercepting strategy discussions and confidential legal analyses. This revelation completely destroyed any remaining trust between the parties. Atlantira subsequently recalled its ambassador from Novaris and instituted the present proceedings before this Court.

IV. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The Court identifies six principal legal issues requiring determination:

1. Whether the Republic of Novaris violated the Kingdom of Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs by conducting covert surveillance operations targeting Atlantiran nationals within Atlantira’s territory and abroad.
2. Whether the Republic of Novaris violated the right to privacy protected under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by systematically intercepting and monitoring private communications, and whether such violations can be justified under legitimate limitations for national security.
3. Whether the surveillance operation violated Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression and specifically targeting journalists, thereby undermining press freedom.
4. Whether the monitoring of confidential communications between attorneys and clients violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice protected under international human rights law.
5. Whether the Republic of Novaris is internationally responsible for the conduct of its National Digital Security Agency under the framework of state responsibility.
6. What remedies are appropriate if violations are established, including cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Atlantira submits that Novaris violated fundamental principles of sovereignty and non-intervention by installing malware within Atlantira’s territory, compromising telecommunications infrastructure, and systematically targeting domestic political activities. Atlantira argues that the 1955 Treaty explicitly prohibits such interference and that the surveillance exceeded permissible intelligence gathering, creating coercive effects on civil society. Regarding privacy rights, Atlantira contends that the surveillance was unlawful, unnecessary, and disproportionate under Article 17 of the ICCPR, lacking judicial authorization, independent oversight, or individual remedies. Atlantira emphasizes that the vast majority of targeted individuals were engaged in peaceful activism and journalism, not activities threatening security. Atlantira asserts that Article 19 was violated through surveillance that created documented chilling effects on expression, particularly affecting journalists and their sources. Attorney-client privilege violations fundamentally undermined fair trial rights. Atlantira argues Novaris bears full state responsibility under ILC Articles and seeks comprehensive remedies.

Novaris maintains that intelligence gathering is a recognized sovereign function practiced universally and that the absence of explicit prohibition reflects international acceptance of such activities. Novaris argues that its surveillance did not constitute coercion and that traditional territorial sovereignty concepts require adaptation for cyberspace. Regarding privacy, Novaris asserts that Article 17 permits limitations for national security, that the surveillance was conducted pursuant to domestic law, and that targeted individuals had connections to extremist networks. Novaris emphasizes that its program involved targeted surveillance based on specific threat assessments, distinguishing it from impermissible bulk surveillance. Novaris argues that surveillance for legitimate security purposes does not violate expression rights, that journalist sources were prosecuted for espionage rather than journalism, and that attorney-client privilege is not absolute when communications potentially facilitate criminal activity. Novaris contends that even if some violations occurred, requested remedies are disproportionate and would constitute unprecedented interference with sovereign security functions.

VI. LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

The principle of sovereignty enshrined in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter guarantees each state exclusive authority over persons and activities within its territory. The corollary principle of non-intervention, articulated in Article 2(7) of the Charter and elaborated by this Court in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, prohibits states from interfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other states. In the Nicaragua case, this Court held that intervention is wrongful when it bears on matters in which each state is permitted by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely, and when it involves methods of coercion.

The Court observes that Novaris installed malware on devices located within Atlantira’s territory, compromised telecommunications servers physically situated in Atlantira, and recruited insiders within Atlantiran companies, all without Atlantira’s knowledge or consent. These actions involved both physical and technical intrusions into infrastructure located on Atlantiran sovereign territory. While the Corfu Channel case involved physical territory, the Court finds that the principle established therein applies equally to digital infrastructure and communications networks, which in the modern era form an integral component of state territory and sovereign functions.

The Court must carefully distinguish between territorial violation and prohibited intervention. Novaris argues that intelligence gathering is a recognized sovereign function practiced by virtually all states and that the absence of explicit treaty prohibition reflects international acceptance of such activities. The Court acknowledges that state practice demonstrates widespread engagement in intelligence operations. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the scale, systematicity, and specific targeting of Novaris’s surveillance operation exceed the bounds of permissible intelligence gathering.

The surveillance specifically targeted political activists, journalists, and civil society organizations engaged in matters of purely domestic concern to Atlantira, the exercise of democratic rights and political organization within Atlantira’s own society. This targeting was not incidental or inadvertent but deliberate and sustained over a two-year period.

While intelligence surveillance differs from the military and paramilitary activities at issue in Nicaragua, the element of coercion need not be military in nature. The monitoring of 50,000 individuals’ private communications, combined with subsequent harassment and targeting based on surveillance data, created a demonstrable coercive effect on Atlantiran civil society and political activity. The documented chilling effect on political activism and journalism demonstrates that the surveillance achieved coercive outcomes comparable to more traditional forms of intervention.

The Court finds that the Republic of Novaris violated both customary international law principles of non-intervention and its specific treaty obligations under Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

2. Right to Privacy

Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy and requires states to provide legal protection against such interference. The Human Rights Committee has clarified in General Comment No. 16 that this protection extends to electronic communications and emphasizes that surveillance must be authorized by law, necessary for legitimate aims, and proportionate to those aims.

The Court finds that Novaris’s surveillance operation was unlawful in multiple respects. First, it was conducted entirely without authorization under Atlantiran law, which is the law applicable to many of the targeted individuals and to the territory where surveillance infrastructure was deployed. Second, even when evaluated under Novarian domestic law, the evidence demonstrates that the surveillance exceeded any reasonable legal authorization. The monitoring of 50,000 individuals over a two-year period, including comprehensive device access through malware and interception of attorney-client communications, goes far beyond what could be considered targeted intelligence operations against specific security threats.

Regarding necessity, the Court has carefully examined Novaris’s claims that the surveilled individuals posed security threats warranting such comprehensive monitoring. While Novaris asserted that targeted individuals had connections to extremist networks, the evidence reveals that the vast majority of those targeted were engaged in peaceful political activism, journalism, and legal advocacy, activities that are expressly protected under international human rights law. The Court notes that Novaris provided no credible evidence demonstrating that individuals such as Dr. Helena Markos, a university professor, or Attorney Sofia Ramirez, a legal professional representing clients, posed genuine security threats that would justify comprehensive surveillance of their private lives.

The surveillance was also grossly disproportionate to any legitimate security aims. The European Court of Human Rights in Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom held that bulk surveillance programs violate privacy rights when they lack adequate safeguards including independent authorization, effective oversight, and accessible remedies for affected individuals.

The Court finds that the Republic of Novaris violated Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights through surveillance that was unlawful, unnecessary for any legitimate security purpose, and grossly disproportionate, and that invocations of national security do not validate these fundamental violations of privacy rights.

3. Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of expression including the right to seek, receive, and impart information through any media. The Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 34 has emphasized that this right is fundamental to democratic societies. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression has consistently warned that surveillance of journalists and their sources creates chilling effects that undermine press freedom and public discourse.

The Court observes that Novaris’s surveillance operation specifically targeted journalists, including Alexei Dimitrov, and resulted in the identification and subsequent prosecution of his confidential sources. The protection of journalistic sources is widely recognized as a fundamental component of press freedom. The European Court of Human Rights has held that without robust source protection, journalists cannot effectively fulfill their role as public watchdogs essential to the functioning of democratic society.

The consequences of Novaris’s surveillance demonstrate a direct and measurable chilling effect on freedom of expression. Following public revelation of the surveillance operation, journalists in Atlantira ceased using digital communications for sensitive discussions, sources withdrew cooperation fearing identification, and civil society organizations reported dramatic declines in participation and membership. This is not speculative or theoretical harm but documented suppression of expression directly attributable to the surveillance operation.

The Court rejects Novaris’s argument that it did not formally prohibit expression and therefore violated no rights under Article 19. The protection afforded by Article 19 extends not merely to the formal right to speak but encompasses the practical ability to exercise that right free from interference. Systematic surveillance that causes widespread self-censorship and destroys the confidential relationships essential to journalism effectively suppresses expression as surely as formal legal prohibition.

The Court finds that the Republic of Novaris violated Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by conducting surveillance that created documented chilling effects on freedom of expression and specifically undermined press freedom through the targeting of journalists and the compromise of source confidentiality.

4. Fair Trial Rights and Attorney-Client Privilege

The monitoring of confidential communications between Attorney Sofia Ramirez and her clients raises fundamental questions concerning the right to a fair trial. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right to adequate facilities for preparation of defense, which necessarily encompasses the ability to consult confidentially with legal counsel. While Article 14 does not explicitly enumerate attorney-client privilege, international human rights bodies have consistently recognized this privilege as an essential component of fair trial guarantees and access to justice.

The European Court of Human Rights in Michaud v France held that the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and their clients constitutes a basic right that is fundamental to the proper administration of justice.

The Court finds that Novaris’s systematic monitoring of attorney-client communications constituted a severe violation of fair trial rights. The evidence demonstrates that clients of Attorney Ramirez found their defence strategies known to prosecutors before proceedings commenced, that confidential information shared with counsel was subsequently used against them, and that several individuals abandoned legitimate legal challenges because they could not communicate confidentially with their lawyer. These consequences fundamentally undermine the right to legal representation and meaningful access to justice.

Novaris argues that attorney-client privilege is not absolute and may not protect communications when there is credible evidence that such communications are being used to facilitate ongoing criminal activity. While the Court acknowledges that most domestic legal systems recognize limited exceptions to privilege in such circumstances, Novaris has provided no credible evidence whatsoever that Attorney Ramirez was complicit in any criminal activities or that her clients’ communications with her involved planning or facilitating illegal acts.

The Court finds that the monitoring of attorney-client communications violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice as protected under international human rights law.

5. State Responsibility

Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that the conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under international law. The National Digital Security Agency is indisputably a state organ, having been established by Novarian law and operating under express government authority and control. All conduct undertaken by officials of the National Digital Security Agency in executing Project Sentinel Eye is therefore directly attributable to the Republic of Novaris for purposes of international responsibility.

Novaris cannot escape international responsibility by claiming that intelligence services operated with some degree of operational independence from direct political oversight. This Court established in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran that states bear responsibility for the acts of their organs even when such organs exceed their authority or contravene instructions, provided that they acted in their official capacity. Officials of the National Digital Security Agency were unquestionably acting in their official capacity when conducting surveillance operations pursuant to their mandated national security functions.

The Court finds that the Republic of Novaris bears full international responsibility under the ILC Articles on State Responsibility for the conduct of its National Digital Security Agency in executing Project Sentinel Eye.

6. Remedies and Reparations

Having determined that the Republic of Novaris committed multiple violations of international law, the Court must now determine what remedies are appropriate and necessary. The fundamental principle established by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Factory at Chorzów requires that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.

Given the continuing nature of the violations established, cessation is an essential component of full reparation. The Court orders the Republic of Novaris to immediately and permanently cease all surveillance activities targeting Atlantiran nationals that are conducted without proper legal authorization and independent oversight consistent with international human rights standards.

The Court orders the Republic of Novaris to destroy all data and information collected through Project Sentinel Eye. The continued possession and potential use of data obtained through unlawful means constitutes a continuing violation of the privacy rights of affected individuals. The destruction of this data must be verified through independent international monitoring to ensure compliance.

After careful consideration of the evidence presented regarding economic losses and individual harm, the Court awards compensation in the amount of USD 450 million. This amount reflects documented economic losses to Atlantira’s telecommunications sector, costs necessarily incurred for enhanced security measures, and appropriate compensation for individual victims who suffered concrete harm. The Court directs that compensation for individual victims should be administered through a joint commission that will assess individual claims based on the severity of documented harm

The Court orders the Republic of Novaris to provide a public acknowledgment of the wrongful nature of its conduct and to issue a formal apology to both the Kingdom of Atlantira as a state and to the individual victims of the surveillance operation. The Court orders the Republic of Novaris to establish effective safeguards for any future intelligence operations including requirements for judicial authorization, establishment of independent oversight mechanisms, creation of accessible remedies through which individuals may challenge surveillance, and periodic reporting to an appropriate international body regarding compliance.

VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

After careful and thorough consideration of all the facts presented, the applicable international law, and the arguments advanced by both parties, the Court makes the following definitive findings:

1. The Republic of Novaris violated the Kingdom of Atlantira’s sovereignty and the fundamental principle of non-intervention in internal affairs through its systematic covert surveillance operations, in breach of both customary international law and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
2. The Republic of Novaris violated Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by conducting surveillance that was unlawful, unnecessary, and grossly disproportionate, and national security justifications do not validate these violations.
3. The Republic of Novaris violated Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by conducting surveillance that created documented chilling effects on freedom of expression and undermined press freedom.
4. The Republic of Novaris violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice by monitoring attorney-client communications.
5. The Republic of Novaris bears full international responsibility for National Digital Security Agency conduct.
6. Comprehensive remedies are necessary including cessation, data destruction, compensation of USD 450 million, public acknowledgment and apology, and guarantees of non-repetition.

The ratio decidendi of this judgment rests upon several key legal principles. First, traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty and the prohibition on intervention apply with full force to activities conducted in cyberspace. States may not employ technological means to circumvent their fundamental obligations of mutual respect for sovereignty. Second, while intelligence gathering is a recognized function of sovereign states, it must be conducted consistently with human rights obligations. Third, national security concerns cannot serve as blanket justification for systematic violations of fundamental rights. Any limitations must be lawful, necessary, proportionate, and subject to effective safeguards. Fourth, the emergence of sophisticated surveillance technologies does not create legal vacuums; established principles of international law continue to apply to new technological contexts.

VIII. OPERATIVE PART

For these reasons,

THE COURT,

By fourteen votes to two:

(1) Finds that the Republic of Novaris violated the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Atlantira and the principle of non-intervention;

(2) Finds that the Republic of Novaris violated Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(3) Finds that the Republic of Novaris violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice;

(4) Finds that the Republic of Novaris bears international responsibility for these violations;

By unanimous vote:

(5) Orders the Republic of Novaris to immediately and permanently cease all surveillance activities targeting Atlantiran nationals conducted without proper legal authorization and independent oversight;

(6) Orders the Republic of Novaris to destroy all data collected through Project Sentinel Eye, with destruction to be verified through independent international monitoring;

(7) Orders the Republic of Novaris to pay compensation in the amount of four hundred and fifty million United States dollars to the Kingdom of Atlantira;

(8) Orders the Republic of Novaris to provide public acknowledgment of wrongdoing and issue a formal apology;

(9) Orders the Republic of Novaris to establish effective safeguards including judicial authorization, independent oversight, individual remedies, and periodic international reporting;

(10) Decides that individual victim compensation shall be administered through a joint commission assessing documented harm;

(11) Decides that the Court shall remain seised of this matter for purposes of overseeing implementation.

 

(Signed)

Shahana Khan
Judge (Hypothetical)
Hypothetical International Court
Date: 13 November 2025

REFERENCES

Treaties and Conventions:

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.

United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.

United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.

International Court of Justice Cases:

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.

Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3.

Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) PCIJ Rep Series A No 17 (1928).

Human Rights Bodies:

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) (8 April 1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I).

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression) (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34.

Regional Human Rights Courts:

Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom App nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 13 September 2018).

Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6 December 2012).

Other Authorities:

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) UN Doc A/56/10.

UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report on Surveillance and Human Rights (17 April 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/40.