Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Muhammad Haqim Hussin Bin Mohd Roslan (IJWC 2025)

Introduction

1. The present case concerns the legality of a large-scale extraterritorial digital surveillance programme codenamed Project Sentinel Eye conducted by the Republic of Novaris and allegedly targeting tens of thousands of Atlantiran nationals, including journalists, activists, lawyers, and diplomats. The Applicant, the Kingdom of Atlantira, contends that the Respondent violated core principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity, as well as several fundamental rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It further asserts violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and the bilateral 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Parties.

2. Jurisdiction is established under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, to which both States submitted in 2010 without reservation, and Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty, granting this Court competence over disputes involving interpretation or application of that treaty.

3. This judgment addresses whether Novaris’s digital surveillance activities violated international law, determines Novaris’s international responsibility, and sets out appropriate remedies.

Procedural History

4. On January 15, 2025, the Kingdom of Atlantira filed a case against the Republic of Novaris with the International Court of Justice after exhausting diplomatic options. In 2010, both governments declared under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute that they accept the Court’s obligatory jurisdiction without reservation. Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Atlantira and Novaris grants the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over issues related to the treaty’s interpretation and application.

5. Novaris challenges the application and seeks rejection on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds. Furthermore, Novaris argues that national security and intelligence operations are within the internal jurisdiction of states and are not subject to international judicial review.

Statement of Facts

6. Atlantira and Novaris are neighbouring States with deep historical, cultural, and economic ties. Both are parties to the UN Charter, ICCPR, CAT, and the VCDR, and parties to a 1955 bilateral Treaty requiring mutual respect for sovereignty and prohibiting interference.

7. Between January 2022 and March 2024, the Novarian National Digital Security Agency (NDSA) conducted a covert surveillance operation titled Project Sentinel Eye. The programme infiltrated Atlantiran telecommunications networks, installed malware on personal devices, intercepted communications, accessed stored data, and compiled psychological and social-network profiles of approximately 50,000 Atlantiran nationals.

8. Targets included political activists, journalists, human-rights defenders, lawyers, opposition politicians, and their families. Consequences for targeted persons included intimidation, threats, prosecutions of journalistic sources, loss of employment, compromised legal proceedings, and forced displacement.

9. Atlantira confronted Novaris in May 2024. After initial denial, Novaris claimed the surveillance was a necessary national-security measure. Diplomatic negotiations failed after evidence emerged that Novaris had continued monitoring even during negotiations, including intercepting communications of Atlantiran diplomats.

10. Atlantira seeks cessation of surveillance, destruction of data, full disclosure, compensation of USD 750 million, apology, prosecution of responsible officials, and guarantees of non-repetition. Novaris asks for the Application’s dismissal, arguing intelligence activities fall within sovereign discretion and are not prohibited by international law.

Issues for Determination

The Court must determine:

I. Whether the Respondent violated the Applicant’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention by conducting large-scale extraterritorial digital surveillance operations?

II. Whether Respondent’s systematic monitoring of the Applicant’s nationals constitutes an unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR?

III. Whether the Respondent’s conduct violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression, particularly through surveillance of journalists, human-rights defenders, and political activists?

IV. Whether the interception of attorney-client communications violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice under international human rights law, including Article 14 of the ICCPR?

V. Whether the conduct of the National Digital Security Agency in carrying out Project Sentinel Eye is attributable to the Republic of Novaris under international law, thereby engaging the Respondent’s international responsibility for any resulting breaches of its international obligations?

VI. Whether, if breaches are established, the Applicant is entitled to the forms of reparation it requests, including cessation, assurances of non-repetition, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and orders relating to the destruction of data and disclosure of surveillance methods?

Summary of Arguments

Atlantira’s Submissions

11. Atlantira asserts that Novaris’s intrusion into its digital infrastructure constitutes a violation of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention as defined in Corfu Channel[1] and Nicaragua v. United States.[2] Surveillance of private communications violates Articles 17 and 19 ICCPR, and the systematic monitoring of lawyers violates Article 14 ICCPR. It further argues the acts are attributable to Novaris under ILC Articles on State Responsibility and seeks full reparation following Chorzów Factory.[3]

Novaris’s Submissions

12. Novaris maintains that intelligence collection is a universally accepted practice not prohibited by international law. It asserts that ICCPR privacy and expression rights permit limitations for national security. It argues that attorney-client privilege is non-absolute and that some communications involved suspected extremists. The Respondent disputes injury and claims Atlantira seeks disproportionate remedies.

Legal Analysis & Judicial Reasoning

Issue 1: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

13. Sovereignty is a foundational principle of international law, reflected in Articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the UN Charter. The Court has repeatedly held from Corfu Channel[4] to Nicaragua[5] that States may not engage in activities on another State’s territory without consent, including “interference” in matters within the exclusive domain of the State.

14. While espionage is widely practised, no settled rule declares all intelligence gathering lawful. Instead, legality turns on methods used and effects on the territorial State.

15. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, though non-binding, reflects expert consensus that remotely conducted cyber operations may violate sovereignty where they:

(a) cause effects on the territory;
(b) interfere with inherently governmental functions; or
(c) involve penetration of cyber infrastructure located in another State.

16. The Court finds that Project Sentinel Eye involved multiple forms of territorial intrusion:

(i) Infiltration of Atlantiran telecommunications servers;
(ii) Installation of malware on devices located physically within Atlantira;
(iii) Recruitment of insiders in Atlantiran companies; and
(iv) Interception of communications of diplomats.

17. These activities went far beyond passive data collection and constituted active operations on Atlantiran infrastructure, in clear violation of sovereignty.

18. The Respondent’s argument that cyber operations do not constitute territorial intrusion unless they cause physical damage is inconsistent with contemporary interpretations and State practice. As the Court stated in Corfu Channel,[6] a State may not “in any form or for any reason penetrate the territory of another State” without consent.

19. Furthermore, the surveillance targeted political activists and democratic movements within Atlantira, matters squarely within its domestic jurisdiction. Under Nicaragua,[7] coercion is not limited to economic or military force; covert interference designed to shape political life constitutes unlawful intervention.

20. The Court therefore holds that Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.

Issue 2: Right to Privacy under Article 17 ICCPR

21. Article 17 prohibits “arbitrary or unlawful interference” with privacy, family, home, or correspondence. General Comment No. 16 affirms that surveillance must be:

(i) provided by law;
(ii) necessary for a legitimate aim; and
(iii) proportionate.

22. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Big Brother Watch and Weber & Saravia[8] holds that bulk surveillance without adequate safeguards violates privacy rights.

23. The surveillance was not “lawful” under Article 17 because it lacked any basis in Atlantiran law. Extraterritorial surveillance cannot be legitimized solely by the Respondent’s domestic law.

24. Necessity was also absent. Novaris provided no evidence that the 50,000 Atlantirans targeted posed genuine threats. Targeting journalists, activists, academics, and lawyers indicates surveillance based on political opinions, not security needs.

25. The Respondent’s argument that oversight existed through internal parliamentary committees does not meet the standard of independent, effective review required by the Human Rights Committee.

26. The sheer scope of data collection—continuous monitoring, capture of medical records, financial records, private conversations, and video calls—is manifestly disproportionate.

27. The Court thus finds a clear violation of Article 17 ICCPR.

Issue 3: Freedom of Expression (Article 19 ICCPR)

28. Under General Comment No. 34, surveillance of journalists and human-rights defenders creates a “chilling effect” incompatible with Article 19.

29. Limitations on expression for national security must be necessary, proportionate, and may not target individuals for political speech.

30. Surveillance of journalist Alexei Dimitrov and identification and prosecution of his sources constitute direct interference with press freedom. The prosecution of two Novarian sources, based on intelligence from Sentinel Eye, had the deliberate effect of discouraging whistleblowers.

31. The chilling effect is not speculative: evidence shows dramatic decline in civil-society engagement in Atlantira following revelation of surveillance.

32. Novaris’s claim that expression was not “restricted” because no content was censored ignores that fear of surveillance can itself violate Article 19.

33. The Court therefore finds that Article 19 ICCPR was violated.

Issue 4: Fair Trial & Attorney-Client Privilege

34. Article 14 ICCPR guarantees adequate facilities for the preparation of defence, which includes confidential communication between lawyers and clients. International bodies from ECHR in Michaud v. France[9] to the Inter-American Court recognize this as fundamental.

35. Interference is only permissible in extremely limited circumstances and under strict oversight, which was absent here.

36. Novaris intercepted communications between attorney Sofia Ramirez and numerous clients, including political dissidents. This enabled authorities to learn defence strategy and use privileged information in interrogations, fundamentally undermining fair-trial rights.

37. The Respondent’s claim that some clients were suspected extremists does not negate the need for judicial authorization or oversight.

38. Accordingly, the Court finds violations of Article 14 ICCPR.

Issue 5: Attribution & State Responsibility

39. The NDSA is a state organ under Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Its conduct is therefore attributable to Novaris, regardless of whether officials exceeded their authority.

40. The Court notes the Tehran Hostages[10] principle: States are responsible for the acts of their organs even when they act contrary to instructions.

41. As multiple senior Novarian officials authorized Project Sentinel Eye, attribution is clear.

42. Because the conduct breached obligations under the UN Charter, ICCPR, VCDR, and the bilateral 1955 Treaty, Novaris bears international responsibility.

Issue 6: Remedies

43. Under Chorzów Factory,[11] reparation must “wipe out all consequences of the illegal act.” The Court considers available forms of reparation: cessation, assurances of non-repetition, restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.

44. First, Novaris must immediately terminate all surveillance targeting Atlantiran nationals. Second, all data must be destroyed, as retaining illegally obtained personal data constitutes a continuing breach. Third, the Court accepts Atlantira’s request for partial disclosure sufficient for independent verification while preserving sensitive operational details.

45. The Court accepts Atlantira’s evidence of material and moral damages but finds USD 750 million excessive. Based on documented harms, the Court awards USD 410 million, covering:

(i) economic losses to individuals;
(ii) reputational and psychological harm;
(iii) costs of infrastructure repair and enhanced cybersecurity; and
(iv) administrative and security expenses incurred by Atlantira.

46. As a preventive measure, the Court orders guarantees of non-repetition: Novaris must adopt safeguards including independent oversight of intelligence operations and agree to a joint monitoring mechanism for five years.

Findings

47. Novaris violated Atlantira’s territorial sovereignty and principle of non-intervention by conducting cyber operations on Atlantiran infrastructure and targeting political and civil society actors.

48. Novaris violated Article 17 ICCPR through arbitrary and disproportionate interference with privacy.

49. Novaris violated Article 19 ICCPR by targeting journalists and creating a chilling effect on political expression.

50. Novaris violated Article 14 ICCPR by intercepting attorney–client communications.

51. All conduct of the NDSA is attributable to Novaris.

52. Atlantira is entitled to cessation, assurances of non-repetition, partial disclosure, destruction of data, and monetary compensation.

Order of the Court

Therefore, the Court is satisfied that:

1. The Republic of Novaris has violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Atlantira;

2. Novaris has violated its obligations under Articles 17, 19, and 14 of the ICCPR;

3. The conduct of the National Digital Security Agency is attributable to Novaris;

4. Novaris must immediately cease all surveillance activities targeting Atlantiran nationals;

5. Novaris must destroy all data collected through Project Sentinel Eye within six months, under independent verification by a technical panel jointly appointed by the Parties;

6. Novaris shall disclose to Atlantira, within confidential procedures, the general scope, categories of data collected, and affected individuals, excluding methods whose divulgence would compromise essential national security interests;

7. Novaris shall pay USD 410,000,000 in compensation to Atlantira;

8. Novaris shall adopt guarantees of non-repetition, including establishing independent oversight of foreign-targeted digital surveillance and participating in a five-year bilateral monitoring mechanism; and

9. All other claims are dismissed.

Judge (Hypothetical) Haqim Roslan
(Hypthetical) International Court
15 November 2025

References

[1] Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9).
[2] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
[3] Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
[4] Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9).
[5] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
[6] Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9).
[7] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
[8] Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14, and 24960/15, Grand Chamber Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 25, 2021).
[9] Michaud v. France, App. No. 12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 6, 2012).
[10] United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24).
[11] Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).