Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Manas Pratim Talukdar (IJWC 2025)

I. Introduction

The Court is seized of the Application filed by the Kingdom of Atlantira against the Republic of Novaris concerning alleged violations of international law arising from a cyber-surveillance programme known as Project Sentinel Eye. Atlantira alleges that Novaris, acting through its National Digital Security Agency (NDSA), conducted extraterritorial monitoring of Atlantiran citizens and infrastructure, thereby infringing the principles of sovereignty, privacy, freedom of expression, and fair trial.

The Court’s jurisdiction is founded on Article 36(2) of its Statute and Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Parties, which provides for compulsory submission of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty

This dispute lies at the confluence of sovereignty, technology, and human rights. The Court affirms that the digital domain, though intangible, remains governed by established norms of international law.

II. Procedural History

The Application was filed on 15 January 2025. Written pleadings were duly submitted, and oral hearings took place in June 2025. Both Parties were represented by counsel of distinction.

Atlantira seeks cessation of all surveillance activities, destruction of unlawfully obtained data, compensation of USD 750 million, and assurances of non-repetition. Novaris contests jurisdiction and denies all alleged violations, asserting that the surveillance was a lawful exercise of sovereign functions to protect national security.

 III. Issues for Determination

The Court identifies the following questions for adjudication:

1. Whether Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention through extraterritorial cyber-surveillance activities;
2. Whether such surveillance infringed Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (right to privacy);
3. Whether the operation created a chilling effect on freedom of expression and press freedom under Article 19 ICCPR;
4. Whether monitoring of attorney–client communications violated the right to a fair trial under Article 14 ICCPR;
5. Whether the conduct of the NDSA is attributable to the State of Novaris;
6. The appropriate remedies and reparations in case of breach.

IV. Summary of Arguments

*Atlantira* contends that Novaris’s cyber operations constitute unlawful interference in its domestic affairs, amounting to a violation of sovereignty under Article 2(1) and (7) of the UN Charter and Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty. It further alleges breaches of Articles 17, 19, and 14 ICCPR, asserting that the surveillance was arbitrary, disproportionate, and devoid of legal oversight. Atlantira relies on Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) (1949), Nicaragua v United States (1986), and Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom (2018 ECHR).

*Novaris* argues that intelligence collection is a legitimate function of sovereign states, not prohibited by international law. It submits that Article 17(2) ICCPR permits necessary interferences for national security, that surveillance was targeted rather than indiscriminate, and that attribution does not arise absent a specific breach.

V. Legal Analysis and Findings

Issue 1: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

Sovereignty is the foundation of international law. Article 2(1) UN Charter guarantees the sovereign equality of States, and Article 2(7) prohibits intervention in domestic affairs.

The evidence before the Court indicates that Novaris infiltrated Atlantiran telecommunications networks, deployed malware on domestic servers, and recruited insiders within Atlantiran companies—all without consent. These actions directly interfered with Atlantira’s internal political and civil society processes.

In Corfu Channel (1949 ICJ 4), the Court held that no State may, even for self-protection, undertake activities on another’s territory without authorization. The principle applies equally to cyber operations. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017) affirms that cyber intrusions causing effects within another State’s territory may breach sovereignty (Rule 4).

The Respondent’s submission that intelligence gathering is universally tolerated cannot prevail where such conduct penetrates a State’s core infrastructure or exerts coercive influence, as articulated in Nicaragua v United States (1986 ICJ 14).

The Court therefore finds that Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Issue 2: Right to Privacy (Article 17 ICCPR)

Article 17 ICCPR protects individuals against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy and correspondence. According to the Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 (paras 8–10), surveillance must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate.

Project Sentinel Eye involved the bulk interception of communications of more than 50,000 individuals, including activists and journalists unconnected to terrorism. The Respondent’s measures lacked judicial authorization or oversight.

The Court finds guidance in Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom (2018 ECHR No. 58170/13), where bulk interception without independent supervision was held incompatible with the right to privacy.

The Court determines that Novaris’s actions fail the tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality and thus violate Article 17 ICCPR.

Issue 3: Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom (Article 19 ICCPR)

Article 19 ICCPR safeguards the right to seek, receive, and impart information. General Comment No. 34 (para. 23) clarifies that surveillance targeting political expression contravenes this right.

The surveillance of journalist Alexei Dimitrov and exposure of his sources constituted direct interference with press independence. The resultant “chilling effect” documented in Atlantira demonstrates ongoing impairment of free expression.

The Court finds that Novaris’s operation violated Article 19 ICCPR.

Issue 4: Fair Trial and Attorney–Client Privilege (Article 14 ICCPR)

Article 14 ICCPR guarantees the right to adequate facilities for the preparation of one’s defence. Confidentiality between lawyer and client is intrinsic to that right, as recognised in Michaud v France (2012 ECHR No. 12323/11).

The interception of communications between attorney Sofia Ramirez and her clients compromised the integrity of legal representation. Even where clients are under investigation, privilege endures unless communications are demonstrably abused for criminal ends, which is unproven here.

The Court therefore holds that Novaris breached Article 14 ICCPR.

 Issue 5: State Responsibility and Attribution

Under Article 4 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC 2001), conduct of any State organ is attributable to the State. The NDSA, established by statute and under governmental authority, qualifies as such an organ.

The principle in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980 ICJ 3) confirms that actions performed in official capacity remain attributable even if exceeding instructions.

Consequently, the acts of the NDSA are attributable to the Republic of Novaris.

 Issue 6: Remedies and Reparation

Pursuant to Factory at Chorzów (1928 PCIJ Series A No. 17, p. 47), full reparation must wipe out all consequences of the illegal act. Articles 31–36 of the ILC Articles codify forms of reparation—cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.

Considering the scale of harm, the Court orders:

(a) *Cessation:* Novaris shall immediately and permanently cease all surveillance operations targeting Atlantiran nationals or infrastructure.

(b) *Assurances of Non-Repetition:* Novaris shall establish an independent judicial oversight mechanism for all future digital surveillance and report compliance to the United Nations Human Rights Committee within one year.

(c) *Restitution:* Novaris shall destroy all data obtained through Project Sentinel Eye and disclose to Atlantira the categories and storage locations of the data.

(d) *Compensation:* Novaris shall pay Atlantira USD 500 million as compensation for material and moral damage, including injury to sovereignty and dignity.

(e) *Satisfaction:* Novaris shall issue a formal public apology acknowledging its wrongful acts and their consequences.

VI. Ratio Decidendi

The Court concludes that:

* Cyber-surveillance conducted extraterritorially without consent violates the sovereignty of the target State;

* Mass surveillance without oversight breaches Articles 17, 19, and 14 ICCPR;

* Conduct of national intelligence agencies is attributable to the State; and

* The injured State is entitled to cessation, compensation, and guarantees of non-repetition.

Technological advancement does not exempt States from foundational international obligations. The digital realm is bound by the same respect for sovereignty and human dignity as the physical one.

VII. Obiter Dictum

The Court observes that reconciling security with liberty is a defining challenge of this century. Law must adapt to technology, yet remain anchored in the inviolable worth of the human person.

 VIII. Operative Clauses

For these reasons, THE COURT:

1. Finds unanimously that it has jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute and Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation;
2. Declares, by fourteen votes to one, that the Republic of Novaris has violated the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Atlantira;
3. Holds, unanimously, that Novaris has breached Articles 17, 19, and 14 of the ICCPR;
4. Orders, by thirteen votes to two, that Novaris:

    (a) Cease all surveillance targeting Atlantiran nationals;

    (b) Destroy data obtained through Project Sentinel Eye;

    (c) Pay USD 500 million in compensation within twelve months;

    (d) Issue a formal apology; and

    (e) Establish independent judicial oversight for future intelligence operations.

5. Encourages both Parties to cooperate under United Nations auspices to develop norms for responsible State conduct in cyberspace.
6. Reserves the right of Atlantira to seek additional reparation should further violations be proven.

(Signed)

Hypothetical International Court
Date: 13 November 2025

IX. References

Treaties and Conventions

• Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171
• Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris (1955)

ICJ and PCIJ Cases

• Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4
• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14
• United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3
• Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) PCIJ Series A No 17 (1928)

European Court of Human Rights

• Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom App nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 25 May 2021)
• Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6 December 2012)

Other International Instruments and Commentary

• International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) UN Doc A/56/10
• Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge University Press 2017)
• Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) (1988)
• Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34: Article 19 (Freedom of Opinion and Expression) (2011)