Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Mahir khan (IJWC 2025)

I. INTRODUCTION

The Present case concerns a contentious claim by the Kingdom of Atlantira against the Republic of Novaris, arising from alleged extraterritorial cyber-surveillance and attendant human rights violations. Proceedings are instituted before the ICJ, whose jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Article 36(2) of its Statute. The Court’s judgment principally addresses state responsibility and remedies in relation to these cyber operations.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On 15 January 2025, the Kingdom of Atlantira commenced proceedings before the ICJ, invoking its jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Republic of Novaris under Article 36(2) of the Statute. The application was duly registered and written pleadings followed, with the Applicant submitting its memorial in February 2025, which set out the factual matrix, grounds for jurisdiction, and the claims advanced. The Respondent entered an appearance in April 2025 with a counter-memorial addressing both jurisdictional and substantive issues. In June 2025, oral hearings ensued, marked by reasoned advocacy and presentation of documentary evidence. Both parties availed themselves of their right to present confidential materials. The Court assured procedural equity and transparency, and following culmination of hearings, reserved judgment for deliberation in accordance with established legal practice.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris are neighbouring sovereign states with historical ties and established diplomatic relations governed by treaties ensuring mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference. Recent years witnessed political reforms in Atlantira and enhanced cybersecurity measures in Novaris. In 2024, Atlantira uncovered “Project Sentinel Eye,” a covert Novaris surveillance targeting thousands of Atlantira nationals, including activists and journalists. Despite diplomatic efforts, Novaris defended its actions citing national security. Following failed negotiations, Atlantira brought the case before the ICJ in January 2025, alleging violations of territorial sovereignty, human rights, and international law. Novaris contests jurisdiction and the allegations, asserting legitimate sovereign intelligence functions and justified security measures.

IV. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The court will determine the following issue:

1. Whether Novaris infringed upon Atlantira’s sovereignty and violated the principle of non-intervention by conducting covert surveillance targeting Atlantiran nationals within and beyond its territory.
2. Whether Novaris breached the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR by systematically intercepting private communications of Atlantiran citizens, and if such actions can be lawfully justified for national security purposes.
3. Whether the surveillance operation violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by causing a chilling effect on freedom of expression, especially by targeting journalists and undermining press freedom.
4. Whether the monitoring of confidential attorney-client communications amounted to a violation of the right to a fair trial and access to justice under international human rights law.
5. Whether Novaris bears international responsibility for the actions of its National Digital Security Agency, with regard to legal standards for state attribution of cyber surveillance.

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1 Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

Atlantira contends that Novaris’ clandestine surveillance breaches its sovereignty and violates the prohibition of intervention entrenched in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, infringing upon territorial integrity and political independence. Novaris responds that such intelligence activities fall within the scope of legitimate state functions for national security, and do not constitute unlawful interference or coercion in domestic affairs.

ISSUE 2 Right to Privacy

Atlantira invokes Article 17 of the ICCPR, arguing that Novaris’ mass surveillance unlawfully interferes with privacy rights, absent lawful authorization and proportionality. Novaris asserts that the surveillance complies with Article 17(2), being necessary and proportionate for legitimate national security interests grounded in credible extremist threats.

ISSUE 3 Freedom of Expression

Atlantira claims that targeted surveillance of journalists violates Article 19 of the ICCPR by suppressing freedom of expression and press freedoms. Novaris denies any impermissible restriction, justifying its actions as lawful measures compatible with ensuring public order and security.

ISSUE 4 Fair Trial and Attorney-Client Privilege: 

Atlantira states that interception of confidential legal communications undermines fundamental fair trial rights and access to justice under international human rights law. Novaris maintains that any intrusions were limited, incidental, and justified by legitimate security investigations.

ISSUE 5 State Responsibility and Attribution

Atlantira relies on customary international law and the ILC Articles to hold Novaris responsible for its agency’s actions as acts of the state. Novaris counters that attribution alone does not establish unlawfulness, asserting compliance with international legal obligations.

ISSUE 6 Remedies and Reparations

Atlantira seeks cessation of wrongful acts, destruction of unlawfully acquired data, compensation, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and guarantees of non-repetition. Novaris opposes excessive remedies, emphasizing the lawfulness and necessity of its intelligence operations.

VI. LEGAL ANALYSIS & JUDICIAL REASONING

Issue 1: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

• The Court observes that the principle of sovereign equality, as enshrined in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, embodies each State’s exclusive authority to exercise governance within its territory. Accompanying this, the principle of non-intervention affirmed in Article 2(7) and customary international law prohibits States from meddling in areas fundamentally within another State’s domestic jurisdiction. In line with its decision in Nicaragua v. United States, the Court notes that interference becomes unlawful where it affects a State’s freely chosen political, economic, or social systems.

• Novaris contends that intelligence collection is an inherent sovereign function and argue that cyber operations differ from conventional breaches of territory. The Court accepts that not all intelligence gathering amounts to intervention; however, the intrusive techniques and scale of “Project Sentinel Eye”—including the unauthorized installation of malware, infiltration of Atlantiran communications infrastructure, and recruitment of local insiders—constitute direct violations of Atlantira’s sovereign authority. Such actions, though digital, are analogous in effect to physical intrusions, as recognized in Corfu Channel Case.

• By systematically targeting Atlantiran activists, journalists, and political figures, Novaris intruded into Atlantira’s core domestic affairs. The 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, particularly Article 3, explicitly forbids interference in each State’s internal matters. 

Issue 2: Right to Privacy under International Human Rights Law (ICCPR Article 17)

• The Court notes that Article 17 of the ICCPR protects individuals against arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence, requiring clear legal safeguards. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 16 highlights that these protections extend to electronic communications. For any interference to be justified, it must be grounded in law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be proportionate.

• In this case, Novaris’ “Project Sentinel Eye” does not meet these standards. The surveillance was carried out covertly, without legal authorization under Atlantiran laws, and its expansive reach likely exceeds what Novaris law would permit under international human rights norms.

• Moreover, the necessity of the surveillance is not convincingly established. There is insufficient evidence to show that the large number of individuals monitored including peaceful activists, journalists, and lawyers posed real threats to national security. Broad claims of extremist affiliations do not justify such indiscriminate surveillance.

• The operation’s scope was clearly disproportionate. Monitoring extensive personal information, including communication, medical, and financial data, with malware installed for continuous access, goes beyond what reasonable security concerns warrant.

• Finally, Novaris’ internal oversight mechanisms fall short of the independent checks required for such intrusive measures. Without judicial authorization or effective avenues for those affected to seek redress, the surveillance breaches fundamental privacy protections.

Issue 3: Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom (ICCPR Article 19)

• The Court recalls that Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the crucial freedoms to seek, receive, and impart information. This right is a cornerstone of democratic society and holds particular significance for journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34, supported by UN Special Rapporteurs, emphasizes that surveillance of journalists and their sources produce a chilling effect, undermining press freedom and open public debate.

• In this case, Novaris surveillance directly targeted journalists like Alexei Dimitrov, infringing upon the confidentiality of their sources. This intrusion impedes the essential role of the press in holding authorities accountable. The subsequent arrest and prosecution of Dimitrov’s sources, framed as “espionage,” reflect an active interference with journalistic activity, with serious repercussions for those disclosing information in the public interest. Although Article 19 permits restrictions on information disclosure that would genuinely threaten national security, Novaris has not substantiated any such high-level threat nor proven that the surveillance was a proportionate measure.

• The evidence establishes a tangible chilling effect journalists and activists in Atlantira curtailed sensitive communications, abandoned sources, and reduced activism. This self-censorship amounts to a continuous violation of Article 19, stifling democratic discourse.

Issue 4: Fair Trial Rights and Attorney-Client Privilege (ICCPR Article 14)

• The Court recalls that Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights secures the right to a fair trial, which encompasses the fundamental principle of confidentiality between a legal representative and the person they advise. This protection is indispensable to the integrity of the judicial process and the effective exercise of the right to defence. Jurisprudence from international human rights bodies consistently affirms that any interference with privileged communications undermines fair trial guarantees.

• In the instant case, it is uncontested that Novaris surveillance extended to confidential communications between attorney Sofia Ramirez and her clients. The evidence adduced reveals that such surveillance was conducted without judicial authorization or adequate procedural safeguards. These intrusions exposed sensitive defence strategies and private exchanges, thereby impairing the clients’ ability to communicate candidly with counsel. The resultant erosion of trust caused several clients to desist from pursuing legal remedies.

• Novaris invokes the necessity to monitor communications on grounds of national security and contends that privilege may be overridden where reasonable suspicion exists. However, the state has failed to demonstrate that such surveillance was narrowly targeted, strictly necessary, and proportionate to any legitimate aim. The Court finds the absence of independent oversight and effective safeguards to be particularly concerning.

Issue 5: State Responsibility and Attribution

• The Court recalls the fundamental principle established in Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, which holds that the conduct of any State organ is attributable to the State itself, regardless of whether such conduct exceeds instructions or contravenes internal law. Novaris contends that some actions by its National Digital Security Agency may have exceeded authority; however, the Court notes that in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, the ICJ affirmed that States are responsible for acts of their organs acting in an official capacity, even if those organs act ultra vires. This principle is further supported by the Corfu Channel case United Kingdom v. Albania, 1949, which recognized State responsibility for violations committed by agents operating in a state’s name.

• Atlantira has demonstrated that Project Sentinel Eye was a systematic and coordinated operation executed by the NDSA under government authorization, not a rogue endeavour. The Court also notes the Factory at Chorzów principle, emphasizing that the State must make full reparation for internationally wrongful acts attributed to it.

• Novaris invokes that the intelligence operations fall within sovereign prerogatives. Yet, sovereignty does not absolve a State from responsibility when internationally wrongful acts are attributable to its organs. The Court concludes that the extensive evidence reflects official sanction and control, linking the NDSA’s conduct directly to Novaris.

Issue 6: Remedies and Reparations

• The Court reiterates that the principles of remedies and reparations are rooted in the maxim that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the wrongful act and re-establish the situation that would have existed had the breach not occurred Chorzow Factory, PCIJ, 1928. Under international law, the purpose of remedies is not only punitive but also restorative, aimed at restoring the innocent party to the position it would have occupied absent the breach.

• Atlantira demands comprehensive remedies, including cessation of surveillance, destruction of data, damages, and an acknowledgment of wrongdoing. The Court recognizes the legitimacy of these claims, supported by the responsibilities articulated in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The Court also notes that the ECHR in Big Brother Watch v. UK emphasizes that effective remedies require independent oversight and adequate safeguards standards absent in Novaris operations.

• Novaris contends that some remedies such as destruction of data could compromise national security.

 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

• The Court finds that Novaris actions violate fundamental principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, constituting a serious breach of both international law and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This unlawful interference infringes upon Atlantira’s sovereign authority and territorial integrity.

• Regarding privacy rights, the Court concludes that Novaris engaged in arbitrary and unlawful surveillance of Atlantiran nationals, contravening Article 17 of the ICCPR. The covert and expansive nature of this surveillance lacked proper legal basis and proportionality, violating recognized human rights standards.

• On freedom of expression, the Court holds that targeted surveillance undermined journalistic independence and the public’s right to information, breaching Article 19 of the ICCPR and producing a tangible chilling effect on democratic discourse.

• Furthermore, Novaris monitoring of attorney-client communications constitutes a breach of Article 14, infringing the right to a fair trial by compromising legal confidentiality and effective representation.

• The Court finds that the National Digital Security Agency’s conduct is fully attributable to Novaris under international law, establishing State responsibility for the wrongful acts.

OPERATIVE PART (Dispositif)

The Court Orders: –

1. 1.  Immediately cease all surveillance activities targeting Atlantiran nationals that violate international law.
   2.  Destroy all data, including copies and derivatives, collected through “Project Sentinel Eye.”
   3.  Disclose to the Kingdom of Atlantira the full scope, methods, and specific individuals targeted by “Project Sentinel Eye.”
   4. Pay to the Kingdom of Atlantira, by way of compensation for the material and moral harm suffered, an amount to be determined by the Court in a subsequent phase of the proceedings, failing agreement between the Parties within six months from the date of this Judgment.
   5. Issue a public acknowledgment of wrongdoing and a formal apology to the Kingdom of Atlantira.
   6.  Provide guarantees of non-repetition, including establishing independent oversight mechanisms for its intelligence operations and dismantling extraterritorial surveillance capabilities used for unlawful purposes against Atlantiran nationals.
   7.  Investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute those responsible for authorizing or carrying out the international law violations identified in this Judgment.

SIGNATURE & DATE:

Judge Mahir Khan (Hypothetical)

(Hypothetical) INTERNATIONAL COURT

15th November, 2025