Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Jabalin Su Kan Ya (IJWC 2025)

I. Introduction

The present case concerns a dispute brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by the Kingdom of Atlantira against Republic of Novaris, arising out of allegations that Novaris conducted an extensive, convert digital surveillance program known as Project Sentinel Eye.

Atlantira alleges that the operation, orchestrated by Novaris’s National Digital Security Agency (NDSA), infiltrated Atlantiran communication networks, intercepted personal data, and targeted journalists, activists, lawyers and diplomats. It claims that such actions violated principles of sovereignty, privacy, freedom of expression and fair trail rights, as well as the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two States.

The jurisdiction of this Court is established under the Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute and Article 15 of the aforementioned Treaty.

II. Procedural History

Atlantira instituted proceedings on 15th January 2025, following failed diplomatic negotiations between May and October 2024. Written memorials were exchanged and oral hearings were held in August 2025 at The Hague. Both States presented detailed arguments on the jurisdiction, human rights and cyber security under the international law. The Court now delivers its judgement.

III. Statement of Facts

1. Atlantira and Novaris are neighbouring sovereign States with shared historical and economics ties.
2. In March 2024, Atlantira discovered evidence that Novaris’s NDSA had engaged in mass digital surveillance of approximately 50,000 Atlantiran nationals over a two-year period.
3. The operation involved hacking of telecommunications infrastructure, installation of malware and collection of private communications.
4. Those targeted included journalists, human rights advocates, lawyers and political reformers.
5. Several individuals suffered harassment, reputational damage, and threats; privileged legal communications were compromised.
6. Diplomatic negotiations collapsed when Atlantira discovered that Novaris had continued surveillance even during peace talks.
7. Atlantira therefore approached this Court, alleging multiple violations of international law.

IV. Issues for Determination

1. Whether Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.
2. Whether Novaris violated the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR.
3. Whether the surveillance operation violated freedom of expression and press freedom under Article 19 of the ICCPR.
4. Whether the monitoring of attorney-client communications violated the right to a fair trial under Article 14 of the ICCPR.
5. Whether the acts of the NDSA are attributable to Novaris, engaging State responsibility.
6. What remedies and reparations are appropriate under international law.

V. Summary of Arguments 

Issue 1: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention – Both parties acknowledge the centrality of sovereignty under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The Applicant (Atlantira) contends that Novaris’s cyber operations amount to a violation of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, relying on Nicaragua v. United States (1986) and Corfu Channel (1949). The Respondent (Novaris) maintains that intelligence collection is not prohibited under international law and does not amount to coercion as defined in Nicaragua.

Issue 2: Right to Privacy (Article 17 ICCPR) – Atlantira argues that Novaris’s large-scale digital surveillance violates Article 17 ICCPR, as it was arbitrary and disproportionate, citing Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (2021) and HRC General Comment No 16. Novaris responds that the surveillance was justified under the national security limitation recognized by Article 17(2) and consistent with State practice.

Issue 3: Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom (Article 19 ICCPR) – Atlantira claims that targeting journalists and activists infringes Article 19 ICCPR, referencing Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) and Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom (1991) Novaris argues that restrictions on expression were necessary for the protection of national security and public order, permitted under Article 19(3).

Issue 4: Fair Trial (Article 14 ICCPR) – Atlantira asserts that interception of attorney-client communications violated Article 14 ICCPR, relying on Michaud v. France (2012) and HRC General Comment No 32. Novaris submits that no individual was denied access to legal remedies and that surveillance did not target privileged communication intentionally.

Issue 5: State Responsibility and Attribution – Atlantira contends that the National Digital Security Agency (NDSA) acted as a State organ, making its conduct attributable to Novaris under Article 4 and 7 of the ARSIWA. Novaris argues that any unauthorized actions by individual officers cannot be attributed to the State under Article 8 ARSIWA.

Issue 6: Remedies – Atlantira seeks cessation of the wrongful acts, compensation and guarantees of non-repetition under Articles 30-37 ARSIWA and the Factory at Chorzow (1928) principle. Novaris asserts that its conduct did not constitute an internationally wrongful act and therefore no obligation of reparation arises.

VI. Legal Analysis and Judicial Reasoning

Issue 1: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention – The Court recalls that sovereignty and non-intervention are foundational principles of international law, enshrined in Article 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. In Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the court held that intervention is wrongful when it bears upon matters within the domestic jurisdiction of another State and involves coercion. Evidence shows that Novaris infiltrated Atlantiran networks, installed malware and accessed telecommunications servers within Atlantira. Such actions constitute intrusions into territorial sovereignty, irrespective of the digital medium The Corfu Channel (1949) principle states that the State must not use its territory or means to violate another’s rights and this applies equally in cyberspace. Furthermore, Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation explicitly prohibits interference in internal affairs. By targeting journalists and reform movements within Atlantira, Novaris breached that obligation.

The court therefore finds that Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.

Issue 2: Right to Privacy (Article 17 ICCPR) – Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family or correspondence. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 16 affirms that any surveillance must be lawful, necessary and proportionate. Novaris’s surveillance lacked judicial authorization, oversight or redress mechanism, rendering it unlawful. The mass interception of communication from over 50,000 individuals, many of whom posed no threat, was disproportionate and arbitrary.

The Court aligns with Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (2021), holding that mass privacy rights. Further, as held in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (HRC 1979), obligations under the ICCPR extend to extraterritorial acts under a State’s effective control. Accordingly, Novaris violated Article 17 ICCPR by engaging in arbitrary, disproportionate and extraterritorial surveillance of Atlantiran nationals.

Issue 3: Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom (Article 19 ICCPR) – Article 19(2) ICCPR protects the freedom to seek, receive and impart information. Article 19(3) allows restrictions only when lawful, necessary and proportionate. Surveillance of journalists and whistle-blowers constitutes direct interference with press freedom. The exposure of journalist Alexei Dimitrov’s confidential sources and subsequent arrests demonstrate a violation of journalistic protection. Following General Comment No. 34 and Big Brother Watch (2021), the Court reaffirms that surveillance creating a “chilling effect” on expression violates Article 19. Novaris’s acts silenced journalists and civil society, diminishing democratic discourse.

The Court concludes that Novaris violated Article 19 ICCPR, as the surveillance was neither necessary nor proportionate to a legitimate aim.

Issue 4: Fair Trial (Article 14 ICCPR) – Article 14 ICCPR guarantees the right to a fair trial, encompassing confidential communication with counsel (HRC General Comment No. 32). By intercepting the communications of attorney Sofia Ramirez and her clients, Novaris breached the principle of legal professional privilege. Such monitoring undermines defence preparation and public trust in the legal system. In Michaud v. France (2012), the ECtHR emphasized that confidentiality between lawyer and client is a cornerstone of justice. Novaris’s actions, lacking judicial oversight and targeting entire client groups, cannot be justified under any national security exception.

The Court finds that Novaris violated Article 14 ICCPR by unlawfully monitoring attorney-client communications, thereby undermining the right to a fair trial and access to justice.

Issue 5: State Responsibility and Attribution – Under Article 4 and 7 of the ARSIWA, acts of State organs are attributable to the State even when they exceed authority or contravene instructions. The NDSA, created under Novarian law and operation under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is therefore a State organ. The conduct of its agents in executing Project Sentinel Eye is directly attributable to Novaris. As in Tehran Hostages (1980), the act of State-controlled entities constitutes acts of the State itself. Domestic authorization cannot excuse international illegality (Article 3 ARSIWA; Corfu Channel, 1949). Hence, the Republic of Novaris bears full international responsibility for the NSDA’s conduct.

Issue 6: Remedies and Reparations – Following Factory at Chorzow (1928), full reparation must “wipe put all the consequences of illegal act”. Remedied include cessation, restitution; compensation and satisfaction (Article 30-37 ARSIWA). The Court orders the following measures:

1. Cessation and Non-Repetition: Immediate termination of all surveillance directed at Atlantiran national; destruction of all data collected under Project sentinel eyes and institutional safeguards ensuring judicial oversight of future surveillance programs.
2. Restitution: Deletion of unlawfully obtained data and notification to affected individuals and verification by a neutral international panel under UN supervision.
3. Compensation: Payment of USD 750 million to Atlantira within 12 months, representing both material and moral damages.
4. Satisfaction: Public acknowledgment of wrongdoing; a formal apology by the head of State of Novaris and publication of this Judgement in Novaris’s official records.
5. Guarantees of Non-Repetition: Establishment of an independent judicial oversight board and Legislative reforms aligning with international privacy and protection standards.
6. Monitoring of Compliance: The Court shall retain jurisdiction for 24 months to oversee implementation, with both parties submitting biannual reports.

The Court thus orders Novaris to cease the wrongful; acts, make full reparation and provide guarantee of non-repetition.

VII. Findings and Conclusions:

1. 1. Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.
   2. Novaris violated the right to privacy under Article 17 ICCPR.
   3. Novaris violated freedom of expression and press freedom under Article 19 ICCPR.
   4. Novaris violated fair trial rights under Article 14 ICCPR.
   5. The acts of the National Digital Security Agency are attributable to Novaris under Articles 4 and 7 ARSIWA.
   6. Novaris is obligated to cease the wrongful conduct, make full reparation, and provide guarantees of non-repetition.

VIII. Operative Part (Dispositif)

THE COURT, by unanimous decision,

1. Declares that the Republic of Novaris has violated multiple obligations under international law, including UN Charter, the ICCPR and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation;
2. Orders Novaris to immediately cease all surveillance of Atlantiran nationals and destroy all unlawfully obtained data;
3. Directs Novaris to pay USD 750 million in compensation within 12 months;
4. Orders Novaris to issues a public apology and adopt legislative safeguards preventing recurrence; and
5. Decides to retain jurisdiction for 24 months to monitor compliance and implementation.

(Signed)

Judge (Hypothetical) Jabalin Su Kan Ya, 

Hypothetical International Court of Justice,

Date of Judgment: 15 November 2025.

References:

• Charter of United Nations (UN) (adopted 26th June 1945, entered into force 24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16th December 1966, entered into force 23rd March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
• Articles on Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) (adopted by UNGA Res 56/83, 12h December 2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83.
• Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris (1955).
• Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Judgement) [2005] ICJ Rep 168.
• Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montengro) (Judgement) [2007] ICJ Rep 43.
• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.
• Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.
• United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep3.
• Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom App nos 5817/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 25th May 2021).
• Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737.
• Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153 (ECtHR).
• Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6th December 2012).
• Campbell v United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 137.
• Factory at Chorzow (Germany v Poland) (Merits) [1982] PCIJ (Set A) No. 17.
• Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgement) [1997] ICJ Rep7.
• Lopez Burgos v Uruguay (HRC, Communication No. 52/1979, 29th July 1981).
• Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol 1) (1988).
• Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32: Article 14 (Right to a Fair Trial) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007).
• Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedom of Expression) UN CCPR/C/GC/34 (2007).
• UN Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (30 June 2014) Un Doc A/HRC/27/37.