Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by FILZAH HUSNA BINTI MOHD NAZLI (IJWC 2025)

Introduction 

This case concerns a dispute between the Kingdom of Atlantira, as the Applicant, and the Republic  of Novaris, as the Respondent. The dispute arises from allegations that Novaris conducted a large scale digital surveillance operation known as Project Sentinel Eye. Atlantira claims that through  this programme, Novaris unlawfully infiltrated its communication networks and monitored the  private activities of Atlantiran citizens, journalists, lawyers, and diplomats both within and outside  its territory. 

Atlantira contends that these acts violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the  rights of its nationals under international law. It argues that the surveillance campaign breached  Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on  Civil and Political Rights, and provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  Novaris, on the other hand, maintains that its actions were lawful measures carried out for national  security purposes. The Respondent submits that international law does not prohibit states from  engaging in intelligence gathering through digital means, provided such activities are necessary  and proportionate to legitimate security objectives. 

The jurisdiction of this Court is based on the declarations made by both parties under Article 36(2)  of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as well as Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation between Atlantira and Novaris, which grants the Court competence to  decide disputes concerning the interpretation or application of that treaty. This judgment therefore  addresses whether the surveillance activities attributed to Novaris amount to violations of  international law and, if such violations are established, what remedies are appropriate to ensure  justice and reparation.

Procedural History  

The Kingdom of Atlantira instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice on 15  January 2025 against the Republic of Novaris. In its application, Atlantira alleged that Novaris had  violated several principles of international law through the conduct of a covert surveillance  programme known as Project Sentinel Eye. Atlantira sought declarations and remedies for  breaches of sovereignty, privacy, and freedom of expression, as well as compensation for the harm  suffered by its nationals. 

Jurisdiction of the Court was invoked under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court  of Justice, as both parties have accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction without reservations.  In addition, Atlantira relied on Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation  between the two states, which provides for the submission of disputes to the Court concerning the  interpretation or application of the treaty. 

Following the filing of the Application, the Registrar of the Court duly notified the Government  of the Republic of Novaris. The Respondent submitted its counter-memorial contesting both  jurisdiction and the merits of the claim. Written pleadings were exchanged in accordance with the  Court’s procedural schedule, and oral hearings were subsequently held at the Peace Palace in The  Hague. During these hearings, both parties presented their arguments, witnesses, and documentary  evidence concerning the alleged surveillance activities and their implications under international  law. 

After considering all written and oral submissions, the Court now proceeds to deliver its judgment  on the issues presented for determination.

Statement of Facts  

The Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris are neighbouring sovereign states in the  Eastern Mediterranean region. Both countries share a long historical relationship, having once  formed part of a unified territory before peacefully separating in 1952. They maintain close  economic and cultural ties and are parties to several international agreements, including the 1955  Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on  Civil and Political Rights, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 

In 2021, the Government of Novaris established the National Digital Security Agency with the  stated objective of strengthening national security and combating threats such as terrorism and  organized crime. Two years later, Atlantiran authorities discovered what they described as a covert  cyber-surveillance programme conducted by Novaris, codenamed Project Sentinel Eye. According  to Atlantira, this operation had been active since January 2022 and had targeted approximately  50,000 Atlantiran nationals, including journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, and  legal professionals. 

Investigations by Atlantiran intelligence services revealed that the surveillance involved the  interception of emails, phone calls, text messages, and social media communications. It was also  found that malware had been installed on personal devices, allowing access to private information  such as documents, photographs, and location data. Some of the affected individuals reported  harassment, intimidation, and other forms of harm following the exposure of their private  communications. 

Atlantira maintains that the scope of the surveillance extended beyond ordinary intelligence  gathering and amounted to interference in its internal affairs. It further alleges that Novaris’s agents  infiltrated its telecommunication systems, accessed privileged communications between lawyers  and clients, and monitored its diplomatic officials during negotiations. Novaris has acknowledged  conducting certain digital monitoring activities but insists that these were lawful and necessary for  national security, arguing that several of the targeted individuals were linked to extremist  networks. 

Efforts to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means were unsuccessful. Between June and  October 2024, both states engaged in direct negotiations aimed at reaching a settlement. However,  the discussions collapsed after Atlantira discovered that the surveillance continued during the  negotiation period and that its diplomats had also been monitored. Diplomatic relations  deteriorated rapidly, leading Atlantira to recall its ambassador and suspend bilateral cooperation.  With no resolution achieved through diplomacy, Atlantira brought the matter before the  International Court of Justice in January 2025, seeking a judicial determination on the legality of  Novaris’s actions and appropriate remedies under international law.

Issues for Determination  

Having considered the pleadings and submissions of both parties, the Court identifies the following  issues for determination: 

1. Whether the conduct of the Republic of Novaris in carrying out Project Sentinel Eye constituted a violation of the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Atlantira and the principle of  non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state. 
2. Whether the surveillance activities undertaken by Novaris infringed upon the right to  privacy protected under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights, and whether such interference can be justified on the grounds of national security. 
3. Whether the surveillance programme violated the freedom of expression guaranteed under  Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly in  relation to journalists and members of the press. 
4. Whether the monitoring of communications between attorneys and clients by Novaris  amounted to a breach of the right to a fair trial and access to justice under international  human rights law. 
5. Whether the acts of the National Digital Security Agency are attributable to the State of  Novaris under the principles of state responsibility established in international law. 6. If violations are established, what remedies and reparations are appropriate, including  cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.

Summary of Arguments 

The Applicant, the Kingdom of Atlantira, contends that the actions of the Republic of Novaris,  through its National Digital Security Agency, amount to serious violations of international law.  Atlantira argues that Project Sentinel Eyeinvolved unauthorized digital intrusions into its territory  and communication systems, thereby breaching the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention  under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and customary international law. The Applicant  submits that the surveillance was directed at Atlantiran nationals, journalists, human rights  defenders, and legal professionals, and that such actions interfere with its internal political affairs.  Atlantira further asserts that the surveillance violated Articles 17 and 19 of the International  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by infringing upon the rights to privacy and freedom of  expression. It also claims a breach of the right to a fair trial, as the operation included the  interception of confidential communications between lawyers and their clients. The Applicant  maintains that the conduct of the National Digital Security Agency is attributable to the State of  Novaris under the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, and that full  reparation is required, including cessation, destruction of unlawfully obtained data, compensation,  and guarantees of non-repetition. 

The Respondent, the Republic of Novaris, denies any breach of international obligations and  contends that its actions were lawful exercises of sovereign authority conducted in the interest of  national security. Novaris argues that intelligence gathering, including digital surveillance, is a  legitimate function of the state and is not expressly prohibited under international law. It submits  that the surveillance activities were targeted, necessary, and proportionate responses to credible  threats posed by extremist groups operating across borders. Novaris maintains that Article 17 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows for lawful limitations on privacy  where necessary to protect national security, and that Article 19 similarly permits restrictions on  freedom of expression for the same purpose. The Respondent further contends that no coercion or  interference occurred within Atlantira’s domestic affairs and that its conduct did not constitute a  violation of sovereignty. Finally, Novaris challenges the scale of damages sought by Atlantira,  asserting that the alleged harms are speculative and that ordering destruction of intelligence data  or prosecution of officials would amount to unlawful interference with its sovereign functions.

Legal Analysis & Judicial Reasoning  

Issue 1: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention 

The first issue before the Court is whether the surveillance activities conducted by the Republic of  Novaris under Project Sentinel Eye violated the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Atlantira and the  principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state. 

The principle of sovereignty is a cornerstone of international law, enshrined in Article 2(1) of the  United Nations Charter and recognized in the Court’s jurisprudence, including Military and  Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) and the Corfu  Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania) cases. It affirms that each state possesses exclusive authority  over its territory and domestic affairs. The corresponding principle of non-intervention prohibits  coercive interference in matters that a state is entitled to decide freely, as affirmed in the Nicaragua case. 

The Court observes that the surveillance activities attributed to Novaris involved the infiltration of  communication networks, the installation of malware on devices located within Atlantira, and the  recruitment of insiders within Atlantiran telecommunications companies. Such acts, carried out  without the consent of Atlantira, amount to intrusions into the Applicant’s territory through digital  means. While cyberspace presents unique challenges to traditional notions of territoriality, the  Court considers that digital intrusions producing effects within another state’s sovereign sphere  may still amount to a breach of sovereignty. The Corfu Channel judgment established that a state  may not use its territory, or permit the use of its territory, to the detriment of another state’s rights.  By parity of reasoning, Novaris’s digital operations within Atlantira’s infrastructure constitute  violations of that principle. 

The Court further finds that the operation’s nature and scope indicate a deliberate attempt to  monitor and influence Atlantira’s domestic political environment, particularly its pro-democracy  movement and media activity. Such conduct falls within the sphere of matters in which Atlantira  is entitled to decide freely. The Court therefore concludes that Project Sentinel Eye constitutes a  violation of Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention under both the United  Nations Charter and customary international law.

Issue 2: Right to Privacy under International Human Rights Law 

The second issue concerns whether Novaris’s surveillance activities violated the right to privacy  guaranteed under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and  whether such interference can be justified as necessary for national security. 

Article 17 provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their  privacy, family, home, or correspondence. The Human Rights Committee in General Comment  No. 16 clarified that surveillance must be authorized by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be  necessary and proportionate. The Court recognizes that states may lawfully limit privacy rights in  the interest of national security, but such limitations must be exceptional and subject to strict  safeguards. 

In the present case, the evidence indicates that the surveillance extended to tens of thousands of  Atlantiran nationals, including individuals with no demonstrable connection to extremist activity.  The programme entailed continuous monitoring, data interception, and intrusion into personal  devices, resulting in access to sensitive personal and professional information. The absence of  judicial oversight or independent review mechanisms renders the interference arbitrary within the  meaning of Article 17. 

The Court notes that international jurisprudence, including Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom and Weber and Saravia v. Germany before the European Court of Human Rights, has held that  mass or indiscriminate surveillance without adequate safeguards violates the right to privacy.  Applying these principles, the Court concludes that the measures undertaken by Novaris were  neither necessary nor proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting national security.  Accordingly, the surveillance conducted under Project Sentinel Eye constitutes an unlawful  interference with the right to privacy protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR.

Issue 3: Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom 

The third issue before the Court concerns whether the surveillance programme undertaken by the  Republic of Novaris violated the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly in relation to journalists and  members of the press. 

Article 19 protects the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds. The  Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 34 has emphasized that restrictions on this  right must be provided by law and be necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others,  or for the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 

The evidence presented shows that the surveillance extended to journalists, including Mr. Alexei  Dimitrov, whose communications with confidential sources were intercepted. The exposure and  prosecution of these sources, as well as subsequent intimidation, indicate a direct interference with  the press’s ability to operate freely. The Court finds that such actions created a chilling effect that  discouraged the exchange of information and undermined the role of the media in promoting  accountability and transparency. 

While the Respondent justifies its actions on national security grounds, the Court finds that the  measures were neither narrowly tailored nor proportionate to the alleged threats. Accordingly, the  Court concludes that the surveillance operation violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by unlawfully  restricting the freedom of expression and press freedom of Atlantira nationals.

Issue 4: Fair Trial Rights and Attorney–Client Privilege 

The fourth issue concerns whether the monitoring of confidential communications between  attorneys and their clients violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice as protected under  international human rights law. 

Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right of every  person to a fair and public hearing and to have adequate facilities for the preparation of their  defence. Confidentiality between a lawyer and client is a fundamental element of this right. The  Court notes that evidence before it demonstrates that the communications of attorney Sofia  Ramirez and her clients were intercepted, and that information obtained from these  communications was later used in legal proceedings. 

The Court recalls the reasoning in Michaud v. France, where the European Court of Human Rights  affirmed that lawyer–client confidentiality is essential to the proper administration of justice.  Surveillance that compromises such communications undermines trust in legal representation and  prevents effective defence. The Respondent’s claim that such surveillance was justified by security  considerations is unpersuasive, as no evidence has been produced to show that these  communications posed an immediate threat. The Court therefore finds that the actions of Novaris  violated Article 14 of the ICCPR by depriving affected individuals of the right to a fair trial and  legal counsel. 

Issue 5: State Responsibility and Attribution 

The fifth issue addresses whether the acts of the National Digital Security Agency are attributable  to the State of Novaris under international law. 

Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility provides that the  conduct of any state organ is considered an act of that state, whether the organ exercises legislative,  executive, judicial, or other functions. The Court finds that the National Digital Security Agency  was established by statute, operated under the authority of the Novarian government, and carried  out functions connected to state security. Its actions therefore fall within the scope of conduct  attributable to Novaris. 

The Court further notes that the surveillance operation was systematic and sustained over a  significant period, suggesting authorization or acquiescence by senior officials. In United States  Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court held that even acts that exceed authority  remain attributable to the state if committed by an official in an official capacity. Applying that  principle, the Court concludes that the acts of the National Digital Security Agency are fully  attributable to the Republic of Novaris, thereby engaging its international responsibility.

Issue 6: Remedies and Reparations 

The final issue concerns the appropriate remedies where violations of international law have been  established. 

The principle of full reparation, articulated in the Factory at Chorzów case, requires that reparation  must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act. In view of the Court’s  findings, Novaris bears an obligation to cease all ongoing surveillance targeting Atlantiran  nationals and to provide adequate reparation. Such reparation includes the destruction of all data  unlawfully obtained, the payment of fair compensation for both material and moral harm, and  public acknowledgment of responsibility. 

The Court considers Atlantira’s request for guarantees of non-repetition reasonable in the  circumstances. Novaris is therefore directed to adopt effective legal and institutional safeguards to  prevent similar violations, including the establishment of independent oversight mechanisms for  intelligence operations. While the Court does not consider it appropriate to prescribe specific  criminal prosecutions, it expects Novaris to ensure accountability for officials responsible in  accordance with its domestic law.

Findings and Conclusions 

Having examined the pleadings, evidence, and arguments presented by both parties, the Court  concludes as follows. The surveillance activities conducted by the Republic of Novaris under  Project Sentinel Eye constitute a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the  Kingdom of Atlantira and amount to unlawful interference in its internal affairs. The Court further  finds that the said activities violated the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and fair trial as  protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The conduct of the  National Digital Security Agency is attributable to the State of Novaris, thereby engaging its  international responsibility. Consequently, Novaris is under an obligation to cease its wrongful  conduct and provide adequate reparation to Atlantira and the affected individuals.

Operative Part 

For these reasons, 

The Court 

1. Declares that the Republic of Novaris has violated the sovereignty of the Kingdom of  Atlantira and the principle of non-intervention in international law. 
2. Finds that the surveillance activities conducted under Project Sentinel Eye breached  Articles 17, 19, and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3. Holds that the conduct of the National Digital Security Agency is attributable to the  Republic of Novaris. 
3. Orders the Republic of Novaris to immediately and permanently cease all surveillance  activities targeting Atlantiran nationals and to destroy all data obtained through such  means. 
4. Directs the Republic of Novaris to pay appropriate compensation to the Kingdom of  Atlantira and the affected individuals for the material and moral harm suffered. 6. Further Directs the Republic of Novaris to establish effective oversight mechanisms and  legal safeguards to prevent recurrence of similar violations. 

[Signed]

Judge (Hypothetical) Filzah Nazli 

(Hypothetical) International Court 

References 

1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States  of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 
2. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4 
3. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3 
4. Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) (1928) PCIJ Series A No 17 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266 
5. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep 665 
6. Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998)