Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Elsie Mbalane (IJWC 2025)

INTRODUCTION

The current case addresses a dispute between the two sovereign states, namely the Kingdom of Atlantira and the Republic of Novaris. This case addresses a dispute regarding the legality of a massive covert surveillance operation targeting Atlantiran citizens conducted by Novaris’s National Digital Security Agency. In 2021, the Novarian government established the National Digital Security Agency to safeguard national security through the advanced monitoring of digital communications. Novaris named this operation Project Sentinel Eye. Atlantira discovered that this operation conducted by Novaris had infiltrated telecommunications networks, internet service providers, and digital platforms used by Atlantiran citizens, specifically targeting political activists, journalists, advocates, and their family members.  Novarian had installed malware on the personal devices of targeted individuals and monitored their personal information, including photographs, documents, communications, and location data. Atlantira also declares that Novarians had violated obligations under international law. 

The Court’s jurisdiction is established through the declarations that both states made in terms of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 32 (2) of the ICJ submits that the states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty.

Procedural History

On January 15, 2025, the Kingdom of Atlantira instituted proceedings against the Republic of Novaris before the International Court of Justice. This was Novaris because Novaris had violated the principles of sovereignty and non-interference by conducting a covert surveillance operation targeting specific individuals, thereby monitoring their personal information. Antlantira argues that these activities constitute a breach in terms of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Atlantira requests permanent and immediate cessation of all surveillance activities targeting individuals, destruction of all data collected through Project Sentinel Eye, full disclosure of the scope and methods of surveillance, compensation of USD 750 million for injured individuals, and a public apology. 

Novaris contends that the application should be dismissed on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds because matters of national security and intelligence operations fall within the domestic jurisdictions of states. Novaris stated that its activities do not violate sovereignty or constitute a prohibited use of force, as cyber surveillance differs from traditional concepts of force and intervention. Novaris contests the claimed damages as exaggerated, asserting that any negative repercussions experienced by the individuals resulted from their own activities and not from lawful intelligence operations. 

Summary of facts

The Kingdom of Antlantira and the Republic of Novaris are neighbouring sovereign states in the Eastern Mediterranean region. These two sovereign states were part of a unified territory but separated in 1962. Both countries have maintained diplomatic relations and are bound by several bilateral treaties, such as the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1955, which guarantees mutual respect for sovereignty and prohibits interference in each other’s internal affairs. Both states are also parties to the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  The two countries share a 520-kilometer land border. 

Atlantiran authorities uncovered that Novaris had systematically infiltrated telecommunications networks, internet service providers, and digital platforms used by Atlantarian citizens to target specific individuals. The evidence also indicated that Novarian agents had even accessed medical records, financial information, and attorney-client communications of targeted individuals. Novarian agents had monitored emails, text messages, voice calls, social media communications, and even private video calls. The collected information was used to create comprehensive psychological profiles, map social networks and relationships, and identify patterns of political organization and activism. The targeted individuals were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and, in some cases, physical harm. 

Issues in question 

1. Whether Novaris violates Atlantira’s sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention?
2.  Whether Novaris violates the right to privacy protected under Article 17 of the ICCPR?
3. Whether the surveillance operation violates Article 19 of the ICCPR on creating an effect on freedom of expression and undermining press freedom?
4. Whether the monitoring of confidential information between attorneys and clients violates the right to fair trial and access to justice?
5. Whether Novaris is internationally responsible for the conduct of its NDSA, and what is the applicable legal framework for attributing cyber surveillance?
6. What remedies are appropriate, and should the court order the destruction of surveillance?

Summary of arguments

Issue 1

Atlantira argues that Novaris’s conduct violates its sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. They relied on the case of Nicaragua v. United States. Atlantira argued that the surveillance directly targeted matters of purely domestic concern and political activities within its territory, including recruiting insiders and installing malware on devices, thereby compromising communication without their consent, which creates a clear intent to interfere in Atlantira’s internal affairs. Antlantira argues that Novaris did not respect its sovereignty and violated Article 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.  Novaris argues that the case of Nicaragua states that not every form of involvement in another state’s affairs amounts to prohibited intervention. Novaris stated that intervention is prohibited when it involves coercion and that intelligence surveillance does not amount to coercion. It also argues that it did not violate Article 3 of the Treaty because it does not prohibit all intelligence surveillance.

Issue 2

Atlantira argues that Article 17 of the ICCPR is violated. The Human Rights Committee stated that surveillance must be conducted lawfully. Atlantira argued that the surveillance was conducted without lawfulness. The installation of malware on targeted devices is a breach of reasonable security measures. In the case of Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, the court ruled that bulk interception programs infringed upon the right to privacy. Atlantira argued that the surveillance lacks adequate safeguards. Novaris acknowledges that Article 17 of the ICCPR protects the right to privacy, but emphasizes that this right is not absolute. The operation targeted individuals reasonably suspected of connections to extremist networks that pose genuine threats. 

Issue 3

Antlantira argues that Novais violated the right to freedom of expression under Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. Altantira also argued that the surveillance specifically targeted journalists like Alexei and compromised their confidential source, resulting in a direct attack on press freedom. Novaris argues that Article 19 ICCPR permits limitations necessary for national security and public order. Monitoring communications of individuals suspected of extremist connections does not violate freedom of expression when such monitoring is necessary to prevent violence and protect public safety. It argued that Alexei’s sources were prosecuted for passing classified information to unauthorised persons. 

Issue 4

Antlantira argues that the monitoring of confidential communications between attorney Sofia Ramirez and her clients infringes the right to a fair trial, as protected under Article 14 of the ICCPR.  Novaris argues that they respect the principle of attorney-client confidentiality. The ICCPR does not explicitly protect attorney-client communications; fair trial guarantees apply in cases of criminal proceedings. It argues that surveillance of attorney communications was limited. The targeted individuals were monitored based on threats, and it did not violate their right to a fair trial.

Issue 5

The NDSA is indisputably a state organ, established by Novarian law and operating under the authority of the government. Novaris cannot escape responsibility by claiming that surveillance operations were conducted by intelligence services operating with some operational independence. Novaris has demonstrated that its conduct did not violate international law; therefore, no responsibility arises. Article 27 of the ILC states that internal law cannot be invoked as a justification for failure to comply with international obligations. Novaris’s intelligence activities may have been conducted without Atlantiran authorization, but the absence of permission does not equal a violation of international law.

Issue 6

Based on the nature and severity of Novaris’s violations, comprehensive remedies are necessary. Atlantira argues that Novaris must immediately and permanently cease all surveillance activities targeting Atlantiran nationals. Novaris argues that Atlantira provides no credible evidence that surveilled individuals suffered quantifiable economic losses caused by surveillance rather than by their own activities. Many claimed harms are speculative or result from individuals’ choices to abandon activities after learning of surveillance.

Legal Analysis and Judicial Reasoning

The Court examines the issues presented to it. Sovereignty and non-intervention are governed by the United Nations Charter. The court explicitly states that Article 2(1) of the UN Charter submits that the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. Article 2(7) states that the present Charter authorizes the UN to intervene in matters which are important within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Article 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation prohibits interference in each other’s internal affairs. These articles state that states must respect one’s territory and not interfere with internal matters belonging to another state. In the case of Nicaragua v. United States, It is submitted that intervention is prohibited when it bears on matters in which a state is permitted to decide freely, including in political matters. Antlatira argues that the cyber surveillance violated international principles by targeting its citizens without any legal right to do so. Novaris argues that cyber surveillance is a lawful function of sovereign states, practiced by all nations, and is distinct from intervention. The Court acknowledges that not all cyber surveillance constitutes unlawful intervention. The court finds that the cyber surveillance is unlawful as it targeted certain Atlantira citizens and political activities within its territory, including recruiting insiders and installing malware on devices, thereby compromising communication without their consent. The court ruled that Novaris violated the principles of international law and breached Article 3 of the Treaty. 

The right to privacy is protected under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that no one shall be subjected to unlawful interference with their privacy. The Human Rights Committee recognized that national security constitutes a legitimate basis for limitations on privacy rights, provided such limitations are lawful. Article 17(2) of the ICCPR states that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference. Given the arguments by Atlantira that the law does not authorize the surveillance, while Novaris argues that the surveillance is lawful because the National Security Act of 2021 authorizes NDSA to conduct surveillance operations necessary to protect national security. The Court states that surveillance monitored approximately 50,000 Atlantiran nationals, which is inappropriate. In the Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, it was stated that the bulk infringed upon the right to privacy. The court finds that the NDSA, as conducted by Novaris, lacks adequate safeguards, thereby violating the right to privacy.

Article 19(2) of the ICCPR states that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. The Human Rights Committee stated that surveillance of journalists and their sources undermines press freedom. The evidence presented by Atlantira in the court shows that the surveillance targeted journalists like Alexei and compromised their confidential sources, resulting in a direct attack on press freedom. In contrast, Novaris stated that the surveillance did not prohibit anyone from expressing their views, did not compromise communications, and did not punish individuals for their opinions. The Court rules that Novaris violated Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression protects journalists from surveillance interference, and that Novaris surveilled individuals due to their political views.

Article 14 of the ICCPR provides that everyone shall be entitled to a fair trial. The European Court of Human Rights, in Michaud v. FranceIt stated that the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications is a fundamental right connected to the proper administration of justice. The evidence presented before the court states that the monitoring of confidential communications between attorney Sofia Ramirez violated the right to a fair trial. However, Novaris argued that the targeted individuals were monitored based on threats, and not because they wanted to violate the right to a fair trial. The court considers Novaris’s reasoning insufficient as it does not provide many details. The court rules that Article 14 of the ICCPR is violated because the principle of attorney-client privilege is universally recognized as essential to effective legal representation and the pursuit of justice.

Article 4 of the ILC provides that the conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state, regardless of whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, or judicial powers. Tehran Hostages also states that states are responsible for the acts of their organ even when such organs contravene instructions. The NDSA is a state organ, established by Novarian law and operating under the authority of the government. The court finds that, in terms of the Tehran Hostages, Novaris is responsible for unlawful acts performed by them through the Project Sentinel Eye. 

The principle established in the Chorzow Factory requires that reparation must wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation that would have existed in the absence of the wrongful conduct. The court urges Novaris, with immediate effect, to terminate all unlawful surveillance operations targeting Antlatira citizens. Novaris should destroy all the information collected unlawfully and pay compensation for the wrongful acts committed by them. 

Findings and Conclusions

The court finds that Novaris did not respect Antlatira’s sovereignty. The court finds that the installation of malware on devices exceeds any reasonable security measure. The court finds that the surveillance of targeted citizens based on their political views violates freedom of expression. The court finds that interference with confidential information between an attorney and a client constitutes a violation of fair trial guarantees. The court finds that the NDSA officials were clearly acting in their official capacity when conducting surveillance operations. The court finds that Novaris should pay compensation for the damages it caused.  

Operative Part 

The court declares that the use of Project Sentinel Eye, conducted by Novaris to collect information from Atlantira, violates numerous international principles and treaties. The court orders the Respondent to terminate the project, destroy all collected data, and pay compensation. The application is dismissed.

Signature and Date

 (signed)

Judge (Hypothetical) Elsie Mbalane

(Hypothetical) International Court 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cases

Nicaragua v. United States.

Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom.

 European Court of Human Rights, in Michaud v. France.

Treaties

 International Court of Justice, 2010.

International Law Commission, 2001.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.

Human Rights Bodies

Human Rights Committee. 

Tehran Hostages.