Kingdom of Atlantira v. Republic of Novaris – Hypothetical Judgment by Akhshaya Adlyn (IJWC 2025)

INTRODUCTION 

1. The case concerns a dispute between the Kingdom of Atlantira (Atlantira) and the Republic of Novaris (Novaris) regarding the lawfulness of a digital surveillance operation. Atlantira claims that Novaris’s operation constitutes a violation under international law. Novaris claims that its conduct were legitimate as per the interest of national security. 
2. The case is brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) according to Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute as well as Article 15 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between both states. 
3. The purpose of this judgement is to determine whether Novaris’s conduct breached international obligations and to order remedies if so. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

4. The case was brought before the ICJ through an application filed on 15 January 2025 by Atlantira against Novaris after failed diplomatic negotiations concerning Project Sentinel Eye by National Digital Security Agency (NDSA), an agency in Novaris. 
5. Both parties contested six issues and proceedings were heard. The case is now deemed ready for judgement. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6. Formerly part of a unified territory, Atlantira and Novaris became independent neighbouring states which maintained diplomatic relations through treaties and are also parties to the UN Charter, ICCPR and VCDP. 
7. In March 2024, the state’s relationships declined as Novaris’s surveillance program came to light which led to severe harm. Atlantiras formally confronted Novaris through diplomatic negotiations however it failed to produce good results. 
8. Having exhausted diplomatic channels, Atlantira filed an application before the ICJ on15 January 2025. 

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION 

9. Issue 1 : Whether Novaris had violated the sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention against Atlantira by conducting covert surveillance operations targeting Atlantrian nationals. 
10. Issue 2 : Whether Novaris violated the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR bymonitoring and intercepting Atlantiran citizens’ private communications, and whether such actions are acceptable restrictions for national security. 
11. Issue 3 : Whether the surveillance operation violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by undermining press freedom and the right to seek and disseminate information by specifically targeting journalists. 
12. Issue 4 : Whether the monitoring of private and confidential communications violated the right to a fair trial and the access to justice protected under international human rights law.
13. Issue 5 : Whether Novaris is internationally responsible for the conduct of the NDSA, thereby engaging the international responsibility of the State under the law of State responsibility. 
14. Issue 6 : Whether the Court should order the destruction of all surveillance data and the disclosure of surveillance techniques, and whether Atlantira is entitled to appropriate remedies in the event that violations are proven. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 

ISSUE 1 – SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION : 

15. Atlantira claims that by conducting extensive surveillance on its territory without permission, Novaris violated ITS sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. Based on the Corfu Channel (1949) and Nicaragua v. United States (1986) cases, it is seen that Novaris’s actions amount to unlawful interference. Atlantira also cites Article 3, 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’s. 
16. According to Novaris, obtaining intelligence is a common and legal duty of sovereign states and does not qualify as intervention under international law, arguing that intervention is only unlawful when it involves coercion (Nicaragua). Further, no customary law forbids cross-border cyber surveillance, and cyberspace functions differently from physical territory .It emphasizes that the interpretation of the 1955 Treaty should consider its purpose. 

ISSUE 2 – RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW :

17. 17. Atlantira claims that the ICCPR’s Article 17 forbids arbitrary or illegal interference with privacy is violated by Novaris’s surveillance. Citing Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 16 and the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) ruling in Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, it contends that the surveillance lacked legal justification, necessity, and proportionality. 
18. Although Novaris acknowledges that Article 17 protects privacy, emphasizing that this right is not unqualified. It says the operation was carried out in accordance with its National Security Act of 2021. Novaris argues that the interference was legal, necessary, and proportionate to legitimate national security goals, citing Article 17(2) ICCPR. 

ISSUE 3 – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRESS FREEDOM : 

19. Atlantira claims based on Article 19 of the ICCPR that there was a violation towards the targeted journalist, further referring to the UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 34 whereby it is a violation of freedom of expression to target individuals based on their political views. 
20. Novaris argues that the surveillance does not violate such matters, stating no one was punished for their views. Further arguing that Article 19 and 17 allows such conduct for national security and public order. 

ISSUE 4 – FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE :

21. Atlantira states that Novaris violated Article 14 of the ICCPR, citing Michaud v France whereby lawyer-client confidentiality is a basic right. 
22. Novaris argues that lawyer-client privilege is not absolute and that the ICCPR does not explicitly protect it and that those individuals were targeted based only on threat assessments . 

ISSUE 5 – STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ATTRIBUTION : 

23. Atlantira argues that since NDSA is a state organ, thus conducts of it are attributable to Novaris as in Article 4 of the ILC. 

Novaris argues that state responsibility only arises when an internationally wrongful act occurs claiming that the operation is not a wrongful conduct, recognised under customary law. 

ISSUE 6 – REMEDIES AND REPARATION 

24. Citing Chorzow Factory, Atlantira requests the court for remedies while Novaris states the requested remedies are unreasonable and if found liable to order appropriate remedies. 

Legal Analysis & Judicial Reasoning 

Issue 1 

1) Sovereignty. 

25. A State’s obligation to respect another State’s territorial sovereignty has been upheld by the Court (Corfu Channel, I.C.J. Reports 1949). The document demonstrates the recruitment of insiders within Atlantiran companies, the installation of malware on devices physically situated in Atlantira, and continuous access to Atlantiran telecommunications servers.
26. Novaris defends intelligence gathering as standard practice, claiming it does not breach sovereignty without physical presence or damage. While the Court recognizes espionage lacks comprehensive treaty coverage, it emphasizes the significance of context. Infiltrating another State’s networks and controlling its infrastructure without consent violates sovereignty. The extensive and prolonged nature of Project Sentinel Eye, targeting around 50,000 entities over two years, exemplifies a persistent intrusion that undermines sovereign equality. 

2) Non-intervention. 

27. Coercive interference in domestic affairs is forbidden by the principle of non-intervention (Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1986). According to the Court, intervention may be justified by systematic, focused monitoring of political actors that significantly restricts or controls the exercise of protected civic activity. In this case, the record shows that the domestic civic space was materially changed by downstream effects. The Court concludes that Novaris’s actions violated the duty of non-intervention in conjunction with the clandestine breach of Atlantiran infrastructure. 

3) Treaty obligation. 

28. Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty obliges each Party to refrain from ”any interference, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs” of the other. The Court interprets this provision in good faith and in light of its object and purpose (VCLT, Article 31–32). The sustained, targeted monitoring of Atlantira’s political and civil society actors is an ”indirect interference” within the ordinary meaning of that term. 

Issue 2

1) Jurisdiction ratione loci/personae. 

29. The ICCPR binds a State with respect to persons within its power or effective control. Novaris exercised decisive control over the interference with the communications and personal data of identified Atlantiran individuals through malware and server access it orchestrated. The Court is satisfied that, for these interferences, Novaris exercised the requisite control to engage its obligations under Article 17. 

2) Lawfulness, necessity, and proportionality. 

30. Article 17 prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interferences with privacy, correspondence, and home. Even where national security is invoked, clear legal basis, necessity, proportionality, and adequate safeguards are required (HRC General Comment No. 16). According to Atlantira, the operation was indiscriminate, lacked any legitimate Atlantiran foundation, and lacked adequate oversight. Novaris cites internal legal review and parliamentary reporting, asserts targeting based on threat assessments, and cites its National Security Act 2021. 
31. At the international level, domestic authorisation might not be enough because actions that are disproportionate or devoid of safeguards can still be considered “arbitrary” even if they comply with domestic law. The evidence points to widespread surveillance techniques, such as device-level malware, bulk access, and the tracking of many people involved in protected activities. Internal checks are insufficient for such intrusive measures, as the Court concludes that the scope of these actions was not strictly necessary for their stated objectives and that there was no independent oversight to limit discretion or provide remedies. 
32. The Court therefore finds a violation of Article 17 ICCPR.

Issue 3 

33. Novaris claims it did not censor speech or punish opinion, asserting that prosecutions were related to espionage. The Court points out that surveillance targeting journalists can interfere with newsgathering and lead to self-censorship. The identification of journalist Dimitrov’s sources and the related threats present real chilling effects. Given the already disproportionate methods of collection found under Article 17, Novaris failed to demonstrate necessity or precision in impacting journalistic activities. Consequently, the Court finds a violation of Article 19 ICCPR. 

Issue 4 

34. The interception of attorney–client communications particularly where used to anticipate defence strategy strikes at the core of equality of arms. 
35. Novaris argues that privilege is not absolute and that surveillance was limited to individuals suspected of abusing legal channels for illicit ends. The Court accepts that privilege may yield in narrowly defined circumstances supported by safeguards, prior authorization, and strict minimization. The evidence discloses systematic capture of protected exchangesand subsequent use of that information against clients. There is no indication of prior independent authorization, minimization, or segregation protocols to protect legal privilege. 
36. The Court therefore finds that Novaris violated Article 14 ICCPR. 

Issue 5

37. Referring to ARSIWA Article 4, the NDSA, a statutory national agency, acted within its official mandate. Even if some acts exceeded internal instructions, attribution remains ( United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980). Novaris’s position that attribution requires a separate showing of breach is correct as a matter of structure; however, the Court having found multiple breaches above, international responsibility is engaged. 

Issue 6 

38. Referring to Chorzów Factory , full reparation should wipe out the consequences of the wrongful act, subject to feasibility and proportionality. 

1) Cessation and non-repetition. 

39. Novaris must cease all operations violating Atlantira’s sovereignty and ICCPR obligations and provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. 

2) Restitution / destruction of data. 

40. Atlantira has requested the destruction of all collected data and methods due to violations of international law. The Court has ordered the verifiable deletion of data related to Atlantiran nationals and infrastructure obtained through Project Sentinel Eye, with a narrow exception allowing retention of limited materials necessary for ongoing judicial proceedings under independent escrow and with notice to Atlantira. 

3) Disclosure. 

41. Wholesale disclosure of methods may threaten security interests. Effective compliance monitoring necessitates confidential technical reporting to an independent monitor, such as a

panel of appointed experts, outlining tool categories, deletion protocols, and verification outcomes. Public disclosure is not mandated. 

4) Compensation and satisfaction. 

42. Atlantira seeks USD 750 million. The record establishes material and moral harm to individuals (loss of employment, reputational damage, psychological injury) and institutional costs (security hardening, remediation). The Court considers the quantum proposed insufficiently particularized to be awarded in full. It therefore orders: 

• Compensation to Atlantira for reasonable, evidenced State costs of incident response and remediation; 
• a Novaris-funded claims process for impacted parties, run by an impartial registrar using established heads of damage (including moral harm) and verification processes; and ● satisfaction in the form of a public admission of improper meddling with the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR and Atlantira’s sovereignty. 

5) Diplomatic communications. 

43. Given findings that Atlantiran diplomatic communications were monitored, Novaris shall provide assurances of non-recurrence and certify deletion of any such materials, subject to the confidential verification mechanism above. 

Findings & Conclusions 

Issue 1

44. The Court found that Novaris violated Atlantira’s sovereignty and the non-intervention principle by using Project Sentinel Eye for cyber surveillance. Insider recruitment and illegal access to Atlantiran communication networks were considered equivalent to a physical invasion of territory. The Court held that a state violates its sovereignty when its cyber operations impact another state without that state’s consent or legal basis, citing the same duties under the UN Charter and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 

Issue 2 

45. Novaris’s surveillance was deemed disproportionate and arbitrary, lacking independent authorization or safeguards. It exceeded the “necessary and proportionate” criteria for national security under Article 17 ICCPR. Compliance with international privacy obligations requires that surveillance measures be legal, necessary, proportionate, and subject to independent oversight. 

Issue 3 

46. The monitoring of political activists and journalists has been shown to have a chilling effect on civil society and the media, unjustly limiting the right to free speech under Article 19 of the ICCPR. Unless it is strictly justified by compelling national security interests, state surveillance that exposes or discourages journalistic activity and sources is an illegal restriction on freedom of expression. 

Issue 4 

47. The right to prepare a defence and access to justice were compromised by the monitoring of private legal communications between clients and solicitors, which was against Article 14 of the

ICCPR. The right to a fair trial protects communications between solicitors and clients; any interference must be extraordinary, separately permitted, and strictly restricted. 

Issue 5 

48. As the Agency acted in its official capacity and within its statutory authority, Novaris is responsible for the NDSA’s actions under Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. When a state organ acts in an official capacity, its actions are attributable to the state, even if they go beyond internal directives. 

Issue 6: Remedies and Reparations 

49. Novaris must guarantee the removal of illegally obtained data, stop the illegal surveillance, guarantee that the data won’t be repeated, and reimburse Atlantira for confirmed material and moral harm. Implementation will be supervised by a private compliance and verification system. Internationally wrongful acts must be stopped, restitution must be made when feasible, and compensation must be adequate to return the situation to what it would have been in the absence of the violation. 

Operative Part (Dispositif) 

For these reasons, 

THE COURT, 

Having considered the written and oral submissions of the Parties and the evidence presented,

1. Declares that, in violation of Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter and Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Novaris has violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Atlantira as well as the principle of non-intervention through its NDSA. 
2. Determines that Novaris’s surveillance activities under Project Sentinel Eye violated Article 17 of the ICCPR by interfering disproportionately and arbitrarily with Atlantiran citizens’ right to privacy. 
3. Concludes that such surveillance violated Article 19 of the ICCPR by illegally restricting freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
4. Declares that Novaris violated the right to a fair trial and access to justice guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR by intercepting private communications between lawyers and their clients. 
5. Engages the international responsibility of the State by declaring that the NDSA’s actions are the Republic of Novaris’ responsibility under Article 4 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
6. Directs the Republic of Novaris to: (a) immediately stop all surveillance operations, whether direct or indirect, that target Atlantiran citizens or infrastructure; (b) destroy, subject to independent verification, all data and materials obtained illegally through Project Sentinel Eye; (c) offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, including the adoption of independent oversight and authorisation mechanisms governing cyber surveillance activities; (d) compensate the Kingdom of Atlantira for the material and moral harm caused, in an amount to be decided through a mutually agreed claims mechanism; (e) create a neutral, jointly supervised compensation and verification commission to evaluate and distribute individual claims arising from the violations established; and (f) formally acknowledge and apologise to the Kingdom of Atlantira for the violations of international law discovered by this Court. 

Judge (Hypothetical) Akhshaya Adlyn 

(Hypothetical) International Court