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INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KERALA (2018)

Authored By: Palak Rastogi

Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KERALA (2018) 

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

Bench: Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, Rohinton Fali Nariman, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu  Malholtra (Constitutional Bench) 

Date of Judgment: September 28, 2018 

Parties Involved: Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. … Petitioners  State of Kerala & Ors. … Respondents 

FACTS OF THE CASE 

This writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the Indian Young  Lawyers Association and others, seeking directions against the State of Kerala, the Travancore  Devaswom Board, the Chief Thanthri of the Sabarimala Temple, and the District Magistrate of  Pathanamthitta to allow the entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 years  into the Temple. The petitioners challenged the long-standing practice which prohibited women  of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala Temple, a place of public worship dedicated to  Lord Ayyappa, a Naishtik Brahmachari, on the basis of custom and usage. It was contended that  such exclusion was discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under  Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 

The constitutional validity of Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship  (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, framed under Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of  Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965, was also challenged on the ground that it  permitted exclusion of women based on custom and usage, thereby violating constitutional  principles of equality, non-discrimination and dignity of women under Article 51A (e).

ISSUES RAISED 

  1. Whether the exclusionary practice based upon a biological factor excluding females of a  particular age amounts to “discrimination” and thereby violates the very core of Articles  14, 15 and 21? 
  2. Does the exclusion of women based on notions of “impurity” amount to untouchability prohibited under Articles 17 of the Constitution? 
  3. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an “essential religious  practice” under Articles 25 and 26 and whether a religious institution can assert a claim in  that regard under the umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the matters of  religion? 
  4. Whether the Sabarimala Temple constitutes a religious denomination and, if so, is it  permissible on the part of a ‘religious denomination’ managed by a statutory board and  financed under Article 290-A of the Constitution of India out of the Consolidated Fund of  Kerala and Tamil Nadu to indulge in such practices violating constitutional principlesmorality embedded in Articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A (e)? 
  5. Whether Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of  Entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship  (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 and violative of Part III of the Constitution? 
  6. Whether Rule 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)  Rules permits ‘religious denomination’ to ban entry of women between the ages of 10 to  50 years? And, if so, would it not play foul of Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution  by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex? 

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 

Arguments of the Petitioners 

  1. The petitioner submitted that the restriction is in violation of Article 14 as it is  discriminatory in nature and such a restriction of entrance even lacks the existence of  intelligible differentia and the rational nexus with the object of preventing the deity from being polluted. The petitioner cited the case of Shayara Bano vs. Union of India and  Ors.1, said that the exclusionary practise is arbitrary in nature as it is based upon  physiological factors that fail the test of reasonable classification under Article 14 of the  Constitution. The practise is also violative of Article 15 as it amounts to discrimination  on the basis of sex as the physiological feature of menstruation is exclusive to females  alone. The petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Anuj Garg  and Ors v. Hotel Association of India and Ors2and Charu Khurana v. Union of India3, to  accentuate that gender bias in any form is opposed to constitutional norms. 
  2. It was contended that the practice also violates Article 17 and 21 as it founded on the  notions of purity and pollution, which stigmatizes women and undermines their dignity  and autonomy. The expression „in any form‟ in Article 17 includes untouchability based  on social factors and is wide enough to cover menstrual discrimination against women. Compulsory disclosure of menstrual status by women is also a violation of their right to  privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
  3. It is further contended that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are just Hindus and they do not constitute a separate religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution as they  do not have a common faith or a distinct name. Moreover, it has also been averred that  Sabarimala does not satisfy the test of religious denomination as laid down in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and Ors4
  4. It has further been submitted that Rule 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act and is also  unconstitutional for it violates Articles 14, 15, 17, 21 and 25 in so far as it prohibits  women from entering a public temple. The said Rule 3(b), as per the petitioner, is not an  essential practice protected under Article 26 of the Constitution for it is not a part of  religion as the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are just Hindus and they do not constitute a  separate religious denomination. The practice is not an essential one as it does not satisfy  the test laid down in Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta5
  5. The petitioners emphasized that customs and traditions, after the coming into force of the  Constitution, are subject to constitutional scrutiny, and any custom inconsistent with  fundamental rights cannot be upheld. 

Arguments of the Respondent 

  1. The respondents argue that the classification is not between men and women but between  women themselves, corresponding to their menstruating phase. This is a clear and  identifiable biological distinction which satisfies the requirement of intelligible  differentia. Further, the classification had a direct nexus with the object of maintaining  the religious sanctity and celibacy of Lord Ayyappa. Thus, the restriction was a  regulatory measure, not discriminatory in nature as women were not excluded as a class.  It is based on the age old- customs and does not amount to discrimination, hence, is not  violative of Articles 14, 15, 17. 
  2. The respondents argued that the restriction is a religious discipline associated with the  observance of Vrutham and is not intended to stigmatize women or undermine their  dignity. Further, it was submitted that Article 21 must be harmoniously interpreted with  Articles 25 and 26, which protect essential religious practices. 
  3. The respondents contended that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa pass the test of separate  religious denomination as laid down in the case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India6,  requiring a collection of individuals with a common faith, common organization and  distinctive name. They argued their belief in celibacy, penance and austerity distinguishes  Ayyappa devotees from other Hindu worshippers. These practices are exclusive to  Sabarimala and have been followed for time immemorial and thus, form the core of the  denomination‟s religious identity under Articles 25, 26. 
  4. The respondent submitted that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places Worship  (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is valid and intra vires the parent Act, as it was  framed under the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Act. Rule 3(b), merely recognises  existing customs regarding entry into places of public worship, does not create a new  prohibition and strikes a balance between social reform and freedom of religion under  Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 
  5. Respondents argued that Lord Ayyappa is worshipped as a Naishtik Brahmachari and that  the maintenance of celibate nature of the deity is central to the worship and identity of the  Sabarimala Temple and thus form an essential religious practice. 

JUDGEMENT 

  1. The Supreme Court, by a majority of 4:1, held that the practice of excluding women  between the age group of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala Temple is  unconstitutional, as it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15(1),  21 and 25(1) of the Constitution of India. 
  2. The Court ruled that the impugned practice is discriminatory and arbitrary, as it denies  women equal access to a public place of worship on the basis of biological factors,  thereby infringing their right to dignity, autonomy and freedom of religion. 
  3. The Supreme Court rejected the respondents‟ contention that the practice constitutes an  essential religious practice, holding that the exclusion of women is not integral to Hindu  religion and therefore does not enjoy protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the  Constitution. 
  4. It was further held that the Sabarimala Temple does not qualify as a separate religious  denomination, and consequently, cannot claim the right under Article 26(b) to manage its  affairs in a manner that violates fundamental rights. 
  5. The Court declared Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship  (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 unconstitutional, holding that customs and usages  are subject to constitutional morality, and directed the State of Kerala and the Travancore  Devaswom Board to ensure the entry of women of all age groups into the Sabarimala  Temple and Indu Malholtra J. dissented on the ground of non-interference in matters of  faith.

LEGAL REASONING 

The Supreme Court held that customs and religious practices are subject to constitutional  scrutiny, and any practice which violates fundamental rights, cannot be protected under Articles  25 and 26 of the Constitution. The Court applied the doctrines of equality, constitutional morality  and essential religious practices, and ruled that the practice is not an essential religious practice,  and that the Sabarimala Temple does not constitute a separate religious denomination. The Court  further held that Rule 3(b) defeats the object of social reform under Article 25(2)(b) and is  therefore unconstitutional, emphasizing that customs cannot override the dignity and equal  religious rights of women.

Reference(S):

1(2017) 9 SCC 1 

2(2008) 3 SCC 1 

3(2015) 1 SCC 192 

4(1983) 1 SCC 51 

5(2004) 12 SCC 770

6(1983) 1 SCC 51

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