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Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty after the Responsibility to Protect: Legal Challenges in Contemporary Conflicts

Authored By: Nowrin Jahan Borna

Gopalganj Science and Technology University

Abstract:

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), endorsed by the United Nations in 2005,  represents a significant normative shift in international law by reconceptualizing state  sovereignty as a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic  cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This article examines the legal and practical tensions  between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, highlighting how R2P challenges the  traditional Westphalian model. Drawing on case studies including Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine,  and Ethiopia, it analyses the limitations of R2P in practice, including Security Council politics,  selective enforcement, and accountability gaps. The study argues that while R2P strengthens the  normative imperative to safeguard human rights, its effectiveness is constrained by political and  legal obstacles. It concludes by exploring possible avenues for reconciling sovereignty with  humanitarian obligations, such as clearer intervention criteria, regional cooperation under UN  guidance, and strengthened international legal mechanisms, offering a pathway toward more  consistent and accountable application of R2P. 

Introduction: 

The rise of human rights norms has challenged the concept of state sovereignty in international  law.1 The classical notion of sovereignty has been used as a shield against intervention by other  states, but when states are unwilling or unable to protect their people against mass atrocities, the  concept has proven insufficient. In this respect, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), adopted by  the United Nations in 2005, attempts to redefine sovereignty as a responsibility rather than a  right, thus trying to find a balance between non-intervention and the prevention of genocide, war  crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.2 Notwithstanding its normative attributes,  R2P has been legally questioned. The lack of a specific legal norm on humanitarian intervention  has still not been remedied, as evidenced by the cases of Kosovo and Syria, in which states have  failed to send a consistent legal message on the use of force. 3The scholarly efforts to describe  such interventions as “illegal but legitimate” are significant, because they indicate a degree of  ambiguity, especially with regard to exceptions to the use of force, which are still not supported  by the regime of state responsibility. 4The conflicts in Syria, Myanmar, Libya, and Ukraine  indicate that political difficulties, lack of agreement in the Security Council, and certain indefiniteness of law still impede a balance between sovereignty and the protection of human  rights. 

Historical and Legal Background 

Traditional notions of state sovereignty reflect this Westphalian system, where the notions of  territorial integrity and political independence became synonymous with the non-interference in  a state’s domestic affairs. 5Before the development of R2P, humanitarian intervention did not  have a legal framework. Mass atrocities, such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 showed that  strict non-intervention becomes catastrophic, but the international community could not take the  step to firmly establish a legal right to humanitarian intervention. 6The action by NATO in  Kosovo in 1999 enhanced this controversy.7 The use of force was without explicit authorization  from the Security Council and was considered politically justifiable despite being legally  dubious. In response to these failures, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was advanced by the  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and later supported by the  United Nations at the 2005 World Summit.8 R2P’s most important normative shift has been its  redefinition of sovereignty in terms of a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war  crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. While it is underpinned by established  norms of international law-particularly human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the  collective security framework of the UN Charter ,the exact legal status and enforceability of R2P  remain contested. 

Legal Framework of the Responsibility to Protect: 

Key principles of R2P: 

“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is founded on three foundational tenets: prevention, reaction,  and rebuild. 9The proactive side of the Responsibility to Protect focuses on ensuring that states  themselves safeguard their citizens via adherence to human rights law, with the initial step being  engaging with the international community. Meanwhile, the reactive side of R2P allows for  “collective security action” should a state clearly fail to safeguard its citizens, with military  intervention universally left as a last resort. Finally, rebuild focuses on “post-conflict  reconstruction efforts.” 

Relation to UN Charter, especially Articles 2(4) and 7, and Security Council mandates:

R2P is framed in the context of the UN Charter, specifically in Articles 2(4) and 2(7), where the  use of force is forbidden and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states is guaranteed.  10Contrary to establishing a novel right of humanitarian intervention, R2P falls back on Security  Council authorization through Chapter VII of the UN Charter in maintaining international peace  and security. This makes R2P vulnerable to political impasse. 

International law controversies:  

One of the major legal issues that remain contentious in R2P is the issue of the difference  between legality and legitimacy. Though some intervention activities are regarded as morally  valid, their lack of authorization by the Security Council tends to render them inconclusive in  terms of positive international law. This debate among scholars in terms of “illegal but  legitimate” intervention reflects the current ambiguity in state responsibility regulations that do  not regard humanitarian need as valid force intervention.11 

State Sovereignty and Human Rights: 

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) squarely challenges the classic understanding of absolute  sovereignty by correlating state power with the responsibility to protect populations against mass  atrocity crimes. In so far as responsibility to protect is concerned, sovereignty is no longer to be  viewed as a shield protecting states from interference by external actors; instead, it depends on  states’ compliance with their primary responsibility for human rights in international law. A state  that fails to meet that responsibility triggers R2P, which allows international intervention, thus  tempering the exclusivity of sovereignty. This shift in understanding the concept of sovereignty  has triggered a significant debate between sovereignty as responsibility and sovereignty as  control.12 While supporters of R2P underline that sovereignty involves responsibility for the  people, and that it is justifiable to intervene if such responsibility is not fulfilled, opponents of  the concept assert that sovereignty is still a tenet of political independence. These practices  indicate an opposition to R2P, especially among states that emphasize the policy of non interference. Such states include China and Russia, who through the use of sovereignty, must  oppose any authorization by the Security Council for the use of forceful intervention, such as in  Syria and Myanmar. Again, states dealing with conflicts within their borders often do not accept  R2P-based oversight as efforts to interfere with their internal affairs, despite challenges aimed at  protecting human rights. 

Contemporary Legal Challenges: 

The application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) continues to face significant legal and  political obstacles. 13This is through the influence of the veto power wielded by permanent  members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China, in matters such as Syria and  Ukraine. Additionally, selective intervention has undermined the legitimacy of R2P with  concerns of double standards emanating from this inconsistency in the application of  humanitarian crises. Accountability questions remain, linked to a lack of clarity on who is  responsible for determining the application of intervention in a given situation. Moreover, issues  of the application of R2P continue, including the relevant relationship between the use of force  and other soft methods like diplomacy, sanctions, and humanitarian support. 

Case Studies: 

The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is a relevant example of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P)  challenge. Violence directed at the Rohingya, including crimes that have been determined to be  crimes against humanity or potentially genocide by United Nations bodies, clearly suggested that  R2P principles were pertinent. Notwithstanding considerable evidence of violence and a clear  lack of responsible protection by the state, the international community generally chose not to  employ forceful means to protect the people of Myanmar. A strong emphasis on sovereignty  principles, especially among key nations such as China and Russia, clearly impeded more  effective actions on the part of the United Nations Security Council in this situation, highlighting  challenges related to the effective application of R2P principles.14 

In the Ukrainian situation, the application of R2P has taken a more indirect form. The  humanitarian implications of the conflict, such as loss of life, displacement, and purported war  crimes, have led a number of states and international institutions to couch their reaction to the  situation in terms of R2P, primarily with regard to protecting civilians. However, military  intervention on the basis of R2P is not currently being entertained, at least in significant part due  to the presence of a permanent Security Council member and the strictures of the UN Charter.  The situation in Ukraine illustrates the role of R2P in shaping political or humanitarian reactions  such as sanctions, investigations, or humanitarian relief without necessarily affecting the  UNGA’s legal ban on the use of force.15 

In the situation in Ethiopia ,the situation highlights the challenge of applying R2P with regard  to sovereignty. There were reports of mass atrocities and humanitarian blockage, prompting the  international community to make calls for intervention consistent with R2P. This situation is one  where the application of R2P is fraught with challenges, given that sovereignty is still a  persuasive argument. It is important to note that the international community could not take  direct action, given that there was no Security Council resolution that could provide a mandate  for intervention. Taken together, these individual cases make it clear that R2P, while it has altered the debate about sovereignty and human rights, is currently limited by political factors  and the preexisting strength of sovereignty in international law.16 

Balancing Sovereignty and Human Rights: 

In order to ensure an effective reconciliation between state sovereignty and the safeguarding of  human rights, it is important that the legal framework surrounding Responsibility to Protect  (R2P) be strengthened. One such way of achieving this is by beefing up the international legal  framework so that selective dispensation is limited. This requires more consistency from the  Security Council, more transparency in the decision-making process, and more cooperation with  international judicial institutions to ensure accountability for atrocity crimes regardless of  political expediency. A second course of action would be to support regional interventions with  the guidance of the United Nations. This is because regional bodies like the African Union or  European Union often have better context-specific information, which allows for more adequate  responses to emerging crises. At the same time, such interventions would still address issues of  unilateralism. Finally, it is important to ensure that the substantive and procedural standards of  intervention are clearly spelled out to reduce any potential for abuse of R2P. Improved standards  for gravity of harm, for example, through the measures of proportionality or reasonable prospects  of success, could ensure that R2P does not end up serving political agendas or is exploited for  personal gain. All the above efforts would work to improve the credibility of R2P without  undermining the principles of sovereignty or international law. 

Conclusion: 

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has completely transformed the debate about state sovereignty  and its definition from a right to a responsibility for protecting populations. While the  Responsibility to Protect Doctrine provides a guiding framework for the prevention of genocide,  war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, it still remains limited by political,  legal, and institutional realities in its implementation through the veto power of state sovereignty  held by the United Nations Security Council in their selective intervention policies, as seen in  various conflicts in states such as Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Ethiopia. These incident cases  illustrate both the strength and the weakness of R2P. It has reaffirmed the normative need to  protect populations, but it has failed to clarify the conflict between sovereignty and human rights.  This is often the result of uncertainty about the law of R2P, as well as geopolitical factors that  make states resistant to its implementation. Future trends in international law could gain momentum by focusing on improving collective decision-making, defining the criteria of  intervention, and encouraging regional cooperation with United Nations oversight. In this  respect, by improving legal clarity, accountability, and consistency, the global community would  be better equipped to reconcile the respect for state sovereignty with the responsibility for  protecting core human rights, thus developing the ideal objectives of R2P despite current  challenges. 

Bibliography  

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1Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press 1999). 

2 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, paras  138–139. 

3 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (4th ed, Oxford University Press 2018).

4 Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible  Humanitarian Countermeasures?’ (2001) 10 European Journal of International Law 23. 

5Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press 2012). 

6 UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in  Rwanda (15 December 1999). 

7Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law

8International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (IDRC 2001) 9 UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677.

10 Charter of the United Nations arts 2(4), 2(7) and ch VII 

11 International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).

12 Francis M Deng and others, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Brookings Institution Press 1996).

13 Alex J Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On’ (2010) 24 Ethics & International Affairs 143.

14 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (2018).

15 N General Assembly Res ES-11/1 (2 March 2022).

16 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Tigray (2021).

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