Home » Blog » GIG PLATFORM ECONOMY: LEGAL PROTECTION OF WORKERSUNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY CODE 2020

GIG PLATFORM ECONOMY: LEGAL PROTECTION OF WORKERSUNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY CODE 2020

Authored By: Archee Samaiya

KLE Society's Law College, Bangalore

ABSTRACT 

In recent years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented transformation in the nature of work.  The rise of the gig and platform economy—characterized by short-term, task-based engagements  mediated through digital platforms—has fundamentally altered the employer–employee  relationship. Millions of Indians now earn their livelihood through platforms such as Swiggy,  Zomato, Ola, Uber, Amazon, and Urban Company. While this new economic model offers  flexibility and autonomy, it has also created a precarious class of workers without job security,  social protection, or collective bargaining rights. 

The enactment of the Code on Social Security, 20201 represents the first significant attempt by the  Indian legislature to extend the umbrella of social welfare to these workers. This article critically  examines the evolution of the gig economy in India, analyses the legal recognition accorded to gig  and platform workers under the Code, evaluates judicial and policy responses, and compares  international approaches to regulating digital labour. It further explores the social and economic  implications of this emerging labour model, identifies the implementation challenges, and  proposes reformative suggestions to ensure inclusive protection. 

The study concludes that while the Social Security Code, 2020 marks a commendable step toward  universal welfare, its success depends upon effective enforcement, participatory governance, and  a shift in the state’s regulatory approach from passive observation to proactive protection of  workers’ rights. 

KEYWORDS: Gig economy, Platform workers, Social Security Code 2020, Labour  protection, Digital employment, Legal reform. 

INTRODUCTION 

Work has always been central to human existence, yet its meaning and structure have continually  evolved. The twenty-first century marks a dramatic shift from conventional employment toward  flexible, digitalised, and on-demand work structures. The gig economy—derived from the  colloquial expression “gig,” meaning a short performance—represents a marketplace in which  temporary, freelance, or project-based work is performed, often mediated by technology. 

India, one of the fastest-growing digital economies in the world, has become a major hub for gig  work. According to the NITI Aayog Report (2022)2titled India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy, the country had nearly 7.7 million gig workers, projected to increase to 23.5 million by  2030. These include delivery partners, cab drivers, online tutors, repair technicians, and several  others. Despite their growing contribution to GDP and urban livelihoods, these workers largely  operate outside the purview of existing labour protections. 

Traditional labour laws in India were designed for industrial workers within fixed establishments,  where employer control and subordination could be clearly established. However, gig work  dismantles this paradigm. Workers operate as independent contractors, remunerated per task, while  platforms assert that they merely act as intermediaries. This classification allows companies to  circumvent statutory obligations such as provident fund, maternity benefits, or gratuity.  Consequently, gig workers inhabit a legal grey zone—neither employees nor entrepreneurs— rendering them invisible to most welfare schemes. 

The Code on Social Security, 2020 (hereinafter “the Code”) attempts to bridge this gap by formally  recognising gig and platform workers and by mandating the formulation of welfare schemes. Yet,  the Code stops short of conferring employee status, leaving fundamental rights like minimum  wages and collective bargaining unresolved. This article delves deeply into this complex terrain to  evaluate whether India’s labour reform adequately addresses the realities of digital work. 

EVOLUTION OF THE GIG AND PLATFORM ECONOMY 

The gig economy’s roots can be traced to the rise of digital marketplaces in the early 2000s, such  as eBay and Craigslist, which introduced peer-to-peer commerce. Over time, platforms like Uber,  Airbnb, and TaskRabbit expanded this model to services, creating algorithmically mediated  employment. 

In India, platforms such as Ola, Uber, Swiggy, and Zomato revolutionised urban mobility and food  delivery, providing flexible earning opportunities to millions. The COVID-19 pandemic further  accelerated this shift. As traditional businesses faced lockdowns, digital platforms became lifelines  for essential services. However, this convenience came at a cost: gig workers, often hailed as  “frontline heroes,” lacked medical insurance, paid leave, or compensation mechanisms. 

A 2021 survey by the Indian Federation of App-Based Transport Workers (IFAT) revealed that 90%  of delivery and cab drivers lacked any form of social security. The absence of a legal framework  not only exposed these workers to economic vulnerabilities but also raised ethical concerns  regarding algorithmic control, data privacy, and unilateral contract changes imposed by platforms. 

Conceptual Framework: Understanding Gig and Platform Work 

The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines gig work as “short-term, task-based work  mediated by digital platforms where the relationship between worker and employer is ambiguous.”  

Two key categories exist: 

Gig Workers – Defined under Section 2(35) of the Code on Social Security, 2020

“Gig worker means a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns  from such activities outside of traditional employer-employee relationship.” 

Individuals engaged in income-earning activities outside of a traditional employer–employee  arrangement. The term gig worker refers to individuals who engage in income-earning activities  outside traditional employer-employee relationships, often facilitated through digital platforms.  Gig work is usually characterized by short-term, flexible jobs or “gigs,” such as food delivery,  ride-hailing, freelancing, and personal services. 

With the rise of platforms like Uber, Zomato, Swiggy, Ola, Dunzo, Urban Company, etc., the gig  economy in India has grown exponentially, reshaping the contours of the labour market. However,  this growth has also led to complex legal and policy debates regarding the rights, protections, and  classification of gig workers. 

Platform Workers – Workers who access employment opportunities through online platforms  that connect providers and consumers of services. 

Platform Worker Defined under Section 2(60) of the same Code: 

“Platform worker means a person engaged in or undertaking platform work.” 

Section 2(61), Code on Social Security, 2020: “Platform work means a work arrangement outside  of a traditional employer–employee relationship in which organisations or individuals use an  online platform to access other organisations or individuals to solve specific problems or to provide  specific services in exchange for payment.” 

While the distinction may appear semantic, it is significant for legal regulation. Gig workers may  operate offline (e.g., construction freelancers), whereas platform workers rely on technological  mediation (e.g., app-based delivery). Both, however, share the insecurity of temporary contracts  and dependency on algorithmic assignments. 

The challenge lies in reconciling this non-traditional work structure with established labour  jurisprudence, which historically hinges on the control test or organisation test to determine  employment relationships. 

Legal Background: Pre-Code Scenario 

Prior to 2020, India’s labour legislation revolved around the binary distinction between “employer”  and “employee.” Acts such as the Industrial Disputes Act, 19473, the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 19484, and the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 19525defined  employment in terms of control, supervision, and permanence. 

Gig workers, functioning as self-employed contractors, were thus excluded from most welfare  provisions. Even the Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Act, 2008 did not explicitly include  them, though they constituted a significant portion of the unorganised sector. 

This regulatory gap persisted despite judicial recognition of broad social security obligations. The  Supreme Court in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982 AIR 1473)6 emphasised that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and humane  working conditions. Yet, without legislative backing, enforcement for gig workers remained elusive. 

The Social Security Code, 2020: A Legislative Milestone 

The Code on Social Security, 2020 amalgamates and rationalises nine central labour laws,  including the Employees’ Compensation Act, 19237 and the Maternity Benefit Act, 19618. It  marks the first statutory attempt to bring gig and platform workers into the social security net. 

Recognition and Definitions 

Section 2(35) of the Code defines a “gig worker” as a person who performs work or participates  in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside the traditional employer–employee  relationship. Similarly, Section 2(61) defines a “platform workeras a person engaged in work  through an online platform that connects them with consumers. 

This recognition is significant—it symbolically acknowledges gig workers as part of the nation’s  productive labour force and lays the groundwork for targeted welfare schemes. 

Provisions for Social Security Schemes 

1.Section 109–114 (Chapter IX) empowers the central and state governments to frame schemes  for gig and platform workers, including insurance, health, maternity, and old-age benefits. 

2.Funding Mechanism: Contributions may be drawn from three sources—government grants,  platform companies (aggregators), and voluntary worker contributions

3.Aggregator Contribution (Section 114): Aggregators such as Swiggy, Uber, and Urban  Company must contribute between 1–2% of annual turnover, capped at 5% of each worker’s  remuneration, to the Social Security Fund. 

4.National Database: The Code mandates the creation of a comprehensive digital registry of  unorganised, gig, and platform workers for portability of benefits. 

By institutionalising these measures, the Code partially bridges the welfare gap. Yet, it stops short  of redefining the employment relationship, thereby maintaining gig work’s non-employee status. 

Judicial and Policy Developments 

Indian courts have begun to confront the legal ambiguities surrounding platform work. 

In Ola Drivers Union v. State of Karnataka (2022)9, the High Court acknowledged the absence of  statutory protection for platform drivers and urged the state to expedite welfare implementation  under the Social Security Code. Similarly, in Indian Federation of App-Based Transport Workers  v. Union of India (2021)10, the Supreme Court entertained a public-interest petition demanding  social security for gig workers, directing the government to respond under Articles 14 and 21. 

Judicial discourse increasingly recognises that digital labour, though unconventional, is integral to  modern economies and thus merits constitutional protection. 

Policy initiatives have also evolved. The NITI Aayog’s 2022 Report recommended universal  social security coverage, contributory insurance schemes, and a national gig worker registry. Several states, including Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, have proposed welfare boards for platform  workers. 

Comparative International Frameworks 

United Kingdom 

The landmark judgment in Uber BV v. Aslam [2021] UKSC 511 fundamentally altered the  employment landscape. The UK Supreme Court held that Uber drivers are “workers,” not  independent contractors, thereby entitled to minimum wage, paid leave, and pension benefits. The  Court emphasised Uber’s control through pricing algorithms, route assignment, and performance  monitoring as evidence of subordination. 

European Union 

The EU Directive on Platform Work (2022)12 introduces a presumption of employment for  platform workers. It reverses the burden of proof—platforms must demonstrate that a worker is  genuinely self-employed. This measure ensures access to collective bargaining and social  protection. 

United States 

The U.S. approach is fragmented. California’s Assembly Bill 5 (2019) sought to classify gig  workers as employees using the “ABC test,” but subsequent lobbying by tech companies led  to Proposition 22 (2020), which exempted app-based drivers from full employment status.  Litigation continues, reflecting the ongoing struggle between innovation and regulation

Lessons for India 

India’s model, while progressive in recognition, lacks enforceable rights. Unlike the UK and EU,  the Code does not presume employment; instead, it treats gig work as sui generis. For meaningful  protection, India must consider hybrid frameworks that balance flexibility with guaranteed  welfare. 

Socio-Economic Significance and Challenges 

The gig economy contributes approximately 1.25% of India’s GDP, employing millions in urban  and semi-urban areas. Yet, this growth is accompanied by income volatility, lack of bargaining  power, and algorithmic exploitation. 

Implementation Barriers 

1.Delayed Enforcement: Despite its passage in 2020, the Code remains unimplemented pending  subordinate legislation. 

2.Data Deficiency: Absence of a unified database makes identification and benefit distribution  difficult. 

3.Awareness Deficit: Most gig workers are unaware of available schemes or procedures for  registration. 

4.Corporate Resistance: Aggregators often contest contribution obligations, citing financial  stress. 

5.Gender Disparity: Women constitute less than 20% of the gig workforce, facing unique safety  and maternity challenges. 

6.Technological Divide: Many workers lack digital literacy, hindering access to welfare portals. 

The International Labour Organization (2023) warns that without state regulation, the gig  economy risks institutionalising a “race to the bottom” in wages and working conditions. 

Constitutional and Human Rights Dimensions 

The Indian Constitution enshrines social and economic justice as guiding principles. Articles 38,  39, 41, and 43 obligate the State to ensure adequate means of livelihood and social security.  Moreover, Article 21 guarantees the right to life and dignity. 

In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984)13, the Supreme Court held that humane  conditions of work and social welfare are essential components of Article 21. Extending these  principles, gig workers—though digitally employed—deserve protection from economic  exploitation and deprivation. 

Furthermore, India’s international commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  (Article 22) and ILO Convention 102 underscore its duty to provide social security for all workers,  formal or informal. 

Critical Evaluation of the Social Security Code, 2020 

The Code represents a transformative legislative step but remains limited in scope and  enforceability. 

1.Symbolic Recognition Without Rights: While gig workers are recognised, the Code does not  grant them employee rights such as collective bargaining or minimum wages. 

2.Voluntary Schemes: Many welfare provisions are discretionary, leaving implementation to the  will of governments and aggregators. 

3.Fragmented Institutional Framework: Absence of a centralised regulatory authority leads to  policy inconsistency across states. 

4.Weak Enforcement Mechanisms: Without clear penalties for non-compliance, companies may  evade contributions. 

5.Digital Inequality: Reliance on online registration may exclude rural and semi-urban gig  workers lacking internet access. 

Hence, the Code serves more as a welfare declaration than a rights-based guarantee. 13 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984)

CONCLUSION 

The expansion of globalization has fundamentally reshaped the structure and scope of  international financial transactions, allowing money, goods, and services to circulate across  national borders with unprecedented speed and efficiency. This study underscores that cross border financial dealings are not purely economic in nature but are deeply embedded within  complex legal frameworks that span multiple jurisdictions, international conventions, and  contractual relationships. A core observation derived from this research is that the legal  implications of global finance transcend the conventional boundaries of contractual  enforcement. They touch upon broader concerns such as financial stability, fiscal sovereignty,  taxation, and compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing  (CFT) obligations. National and international frameworks, including India’s Foreign Exchange  Management Act (1999), the Basel III regulatory standards, and the OECD’s Base Erosion and  Profit Shifting (BEPS) guidelines, collectively reflect the global attempt to maintain  transparency, accountability, and systemic stability within international markets. 

Equally vital is the role of dispute resolution in sustaining the integrity of cross-border finance.  The modern trend clearly leans toward alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly  international arbitration and mediation, due to their efficiency and global enforceability.  Instruments like the New York Convention (1958) and the Singapore Convention on Mediation  (2019), together with the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985,  amended 2006), have established uniformity and predictability in resolving transnational disputes.  Judicial precedents such as BALCO v Kaiser Aluminium and Dallah Real Estate v Pakistan further  reinforce the importance of party autonomy, the doctrine of competence-competence, and the  recognition of foreign arbitral awards. Nonetheless, the regulatory environment remains  fragmented. Persistent challenges such as conflicts of laws, the execution of foreign judgments,  and inconsistencies in the treatment of cross-border financial instruments continue to hinder  complete harmonization. The rise of digital finance, cryptocurrencies, and blockchain technologies  has further blurred jurisdictional boundaries, as countries adopt diverse approaches to regulation  and enforcement. The contrast between the frameworks of the European Union, the United States,  and India reveals the absence of a unified legal approach capable of addressing the rapid evolution  of fintech ecosystems. 

From a policy perspective, this research emphasizes the need for enhanced cooperation among  international financial and regulatory bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the  International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Strengthening preventive mechanisms  through early mediation, standardized contractual terms, and pre-arbitration negotiations could  substantially reduce cross-border legal disputes. Moreover, soft law instruments—notably the  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Basel Principles—play a crucial role in  promoting ethical and transparent financial practices globally. 

In summation, the future trajectory of cross-border financial regulation depends on greater  harmonization, digital adaptability, and institutional consistency. Although international legal  frameworks have evolved significantly, their efficacy ultimately rests on uniform enforcement and judicial cooperation. The delicate equilibrium between national sovereignty and global  economic interdependence will continue to shape the legal contours of international finance. 

For emerging economies such as India, aligning domestic policies with global standards while  safeguarding local interests remains an essential yet challenging endeavor. Hence, as the study  concludes, the realm of cross-border finance will increasingly operate at the confluence of law,  technology, and economic governance, demanding continuous legal innovation and collaboration  to foster a stable, transparent, and equitable international financial order. 

RECOMMENDATION 

1.Immediate Operationalisation: The central and state governments must expedite notification  of rules and schemes under the Code. 

2.Presumption of Employment: Introduce a rebuttable presumption that gig workers are  employees unless proven otherwise, following the UK model. 

3.Unified Welfare Board: Establish a National Gig and Platform Workers Welfare Authority to coordinate policy, registration, and dispute resolution. 

4.Minimum Standards Charter: Guarantee minimum wages, working hours, and accident  insurance irrespective of employment classification. 

5.Tripartite Dialogue: Include representatives of workers, aggregators, and government in policy  formulation. 

6.Gender-Sensitive Measures: Provide maternity benefits, safety infrastructure, and skill training  for women gig workers. 

7.Technology-Enabled Transparency: Mandate algorithmic transparency and data rights for  workers to prevent digital exploitation. 

8.Fiscal Incentives: Offer tax benefits to aggregators complying with social security obligations. 

9.Judicial Oversight: Empower labour courts or industrial tribunals to adjudicate disputes  involving platform workers. 

10.Awareness Campaigns: Promote literacy on social security rights through multilingual digital  campaigns. 

These steps would align India’s labour policy with constitutional directives and global best  practices.

REFERENCE(S): 

PRIMARY SOURCES 

1.Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (India).  

2.Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (India).  

3.Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (India).  

4.UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (amended 2006).  5.New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958.  

6.Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III Framework, Bank for International  Settlements, revised June 2024.  

7.OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2023 update. 

8.International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement, 2023.  

9.European Union Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments  in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Recast Regulation).  

10.United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation  (Singapore Convention), 2019.  

CASE LAWS 

11.Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the  Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. 

13.Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA (2002) 4 SCC 105 (India). 

14.BALCO v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc (2012) 9 SCC 552 (India).  14.Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co (1994) Supp (1) SCC 644 (India).

15.Union of India v Vodafone International Holdings BV (2012) 6 SCC 613 (India). 

16.Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Limited (2017) SCC OnLine Del 7810.

17. Eitzen Bulk A/S v Ashapura Minechem Ltd (2016) SCC OnLine Bom 10036. 

18.Morgan Stanley & Co International plc v Skelton [2021] EWCA Civ 1421.  19.Republic of Argentina v BG Group plc [2014] USSC No 12-138.  

20.Deutsche Bank AG v Comune di Savona [2018] EWCA Civ 1740. 

BOOKS 

21.Rosa Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edn, OUP 2019).

22.Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2nd edn, OUP 2018). 

23.Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation  (Routledge 2020).  

24.Roy Goode, Commercial Law (5th edn, Penguin 2021).  

25.Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual  Obligations (OUP 2022).  

26.Craig Forrest, Private International Law and International Commercial Arbitration (Springer  2023).  

27.Benjamin Richardson, Socially Responsible Finance and Investing (Routledge 2024). 

28.Mark Weston Janis, International Law (8th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2023).  

29.Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit and the Harmonisation of Law: The Role of Secured  Transactions Conventions (Edward Elgar 2022).  

JOURNAL ARTICLES 

30.Michael Waibel, ‘Sovereign Debt and International Law: The Legal and Institutional  Framework’ (2023) 24 Journal of International Economic Law  

31.Simon Gleeson, ‘Cross-Border Banking and the Law’ (2024) 39 Banking & Finance Law  Review 87.  

32.Fiona Beveridge, ‘International Financial Regulation after Basel III’ (2024) 21 Law and  Financial Markets Review 134.  

33.Rohan George, ‘India’s Approach to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A New  Dawn?’ (2023) 45 Company Lawyer 210. 

34.Harini Raghavan, ‘Crypto-assets, Cross-border Transactions, and Emerging Legal  Challenges’ (2025) 12 Journal of FinTech Law 57.  

35.David Collins, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Financial Regulation: Trends and  Reform’ (2024) 35 ICSID Review 88.  

36.Prateek Surana, ‘International Arbitration and Enforcement in India Post-2023’ (2024) Indian  Journal of Arbitration Law 112.  

ONLINE REPORTS & RECENT SOURCES 

37.World Bank, Global Financial Stability Report (April2025) https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr

38.International Monetary Fund, IMF Annual Report 2024–25: Restoring Confidence in Global  Financial Systems https://www.imf.org.  

39.OECD, International Tax Reform – Global Minimum Tax Implementation Handbook  (2024) https://www.oecd.org/tax.  

40.Financial Stability Board, Cross-Border Payment Systems and Data Governance Report  (February 2025) https://www.fsb.org.  

41.Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2024–25 https://www.rbi.org.in.  

42.United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment  Report 2025: Financing Sustainable Development https://unctad.org.  

43.Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee Newsletter No. 54: Developments in  Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation (June 2025).  

44.Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Global Forum on  Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: 2025 Update.

1 Social Security Code, 2020

2 NITI Aayog Report (2022)

3Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

4 Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 

5 Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 

6 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982 AIR 1473) 

7 Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 

8 Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

9 Ola Drivers Union v. State of Karnataka (2022) 

10 Indian Federation of App-Based Transport Workers v. Union of India (2021) 

11 Uber BV v. Aslam [2021] UKSC 5

12 EU Directive on Platform Work (2022)

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top