Authored By: Palak Rastogi
Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University
INTRODUCTION
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting committee, observed, ―I think it is agreed that our constitution, notwithstanding the many provisions which are contained in it; whereby the Centre has been given powers to override the Provinces (States), nonetheless, is a Federal Constitution‖. This observation encapsulates the inherent tension within the Indian constitutional framework, giving rise to persistent debates on whether India is truly federal or, instead, a unitary state with subsidiary federal features.
Traditionally, constitutions are either unitary or federal. In the unitary constitution, the powers of the government are centralized in one government while in the federal constitution, there is a division of powers between the Federal and the State Governments. But there arises a huge difference of opinions when it comes to the nature of the Indian Constitution. In the opinion of Prof. K.C. Wheare, ‗The Constitution of India establishes a system of Government which is almost quasi-federal, a unitary State with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal State with subsidiary unitary features‘1.
THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE
The American Constitution is universally regarded as an example of federal Constitution. The existence of co-ordinate authorities independent of each other with division of powers is the gist of the federal principle. It simply seeks to bring unity in diversity and the achievement of common national goals. Although certain exceptions are permissible keeping in mind that the federal principle predominates, there are some essential characteristics that define a federal constitution.
- Distribution of Powers- Federalism means distribution of powers of the State among a number of co-ordinate bodies each originating in and controlled by the constitution.2 2. Supremacy of Constitution- In a federal state, every power, executive, legislative or judicial is subordinate to and controlled by the Constitution. Constitution, in a federal state is the supreme law of the land.
- Written Constitution- The foundations of a federal state are complicated contracts. It will be practically impossible to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution unless the terms of the Constitution have been reduced to writing.
- Rigidity- A rigid Constitution does not make it legally unalterable but simply implies a complicated and difficult procedure of amendments. This rigidity helps maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution. However, the constitution is an organic document and should be flexible enough to accommodate according to changing times.
- Authority of Courts- The legal supremacy of the constitution is essential to maintain the division of powers between the two levels of government. This, in a federal polity, must be done by an independent and impartial judiciary which has the final power to interpret the Constitution.
DOES THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION ALIGN WITH FEDERAL PRINCIPLES?
The Constitution of India possesses all the essentials of the federal constitution. It establishes a dual polity with division of powers between the central and the state government. The Constitution of India is written and supreme. The provisions which are concerned with federal principle cannot be altered without the consent of majority of the States. The Constitution also establishes a Supreme Court to decide the disputes between the Union and the States which also acts as a final interpreter of the provisions of the Constitution.
The governmental powers are divided between the national and the regional governments by way of three lists provided in the 7th Schedule. The Central government deals with the issues mentioned in the Union List. The State government legislates on the areas mentioned in State List while the Concurrent List contains subjects where both the Centre and the State can function. Moreover, the Constitution provides a full-fledged procedure for the amendments by way of simple majority, special majority and by special majority along with ratification by not less than half of the States. Thus, the Constitution establishes a perfect blend of rigidity and flexibility exhibiting the principle of federalism in its spirit.
But some scholars still hesitate to characterise the Indian Constitution as a truly federal one because according to them, in certain circumstances, the Constitution empowers the Centre to interfere into the matters of the State list, thus placing the States in a position subordinate to the Centre and hence violating the federal principle. Jurists use different expressions for it, like, ‗quasi-federal‘, ‗unitary with federal features‘, ‗federal with unitary features‘, ‗a federation with a strong centralising tendency‘3and many more.
This debate regarding the true nature of the Indian Constitution is neither recent nor conclusively settled. While certain structural features unmistakably reflect a federal arrangement, the presence of extensive centralising provisions has repeatedly invited skepticism regarding the autonomy of the States. Consequently, Indian federalism continues to occupy a contested constitutional space, one that resists rigid classification and instead reflects an evolving balance between the imperatives of national unity and the demands of regional governance.
PROVISIONS REFLECTING STRONG CENTRALISING TENDENCIES: CRITIQUES AND JUSTIFICATIONS
Indian Constitution lays down a double polity system where the Central Government is neither merely a league of states nor the States are the administrative units or agencies of the Central Government. However, certain strong centralising tendencies reflect the unitary nature of the constitution. But, a closer constitutional analysis reveals that such provisions were consciously incorporated to address India‘s unique socio-political realities, including the need for national integration, administrative efficiency, the preservation of the constitutional supremacy and the protection of national sovereignty. Therefore, while these provisions have attracted sustained criticisms for undermining federalism, they also have compelling constitutional justifications which constrain the rigid assessment of Indian federalism through the lens of limited classical federalism. The Indian Constitution embodies a dynamic and adaptive federal structure that extends beyond the classical federal formulations, which cannot be adequately evaluated by conventional juristic standards.
Union of States
Article 1 of the Indian Constitution states that India, i.e., Bharat shall be a Union of States4. The use of the phrase ‗Union of States‘ has often been cited by critics as indicative of a strong centralising bias. But, the reason for this centralization dates back into the history of the making of the Indian Constitution. India‘s independence accompanied by the partition of the country made it obvious for the Constitutional framers to think that the country might fragment if the Central Government is not strong enough. Thus, the constitution incorporates the word ‗Union‘ rather than a ‗Federation‘ which emerges from an agreement among sovereign units, but the Indian Constitution does not recognize any inherent right of the States to secede, hence, reinforcing the perception that the States derive their authority from the Union.
However, this choice of terminology has led jurists to characterise India as a unitary state with subsidiary federal features but this rigid interpretation overlooks the historical and constitutional background in which the expression was adopted. The framers consciously employed the term ‗Union‘ to emphasise the indestructible nature of India, while simultaneously preserving a federal distribution of powers between the Union and the States. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, during the Constituent Assembly Debates, clarified that the expression was intended to ensure national unity rather than to negate the federal character of the Constitution. Conclusively, while the description of India as a ―Union of States‖ reflects a strong commitment to the protection of territorial integrity of the nation, it does not undermine the federal structure but instead reinforces a uniquely integrated model of Indian federalism.
Appointment of Governors
Article 153 of the Indian Constitution states that there shall be a governor for each state. Article 154(1) states that the executive powers of the State must be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the constitution. This makes the Governor; a Constitutional Head of the State.
Article 155 states that the Governor of the State shall be appointed by the President and thus is answerable to him. Article 74 of the Constitution states that the President shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Thus, the constitutional scheme relating to the appointment of the Governor has frequently been criticized for the governor being objected as a representative of the Union Government in the State. Critics argue that this arrangement compromises the autonomy of the States and risks transforming the Governor into an agent of the Centre. Critics, further, object that since the Governor is appointed by the Union executive and holds office during the pleasure of the President, the office tends to operate as an instrument of central influence within the States. This concern is particularly accentuated by the discretionary powers exercised by the Governor in matters such as recommending the imposition of President‘s Rule under Article 356, reserving State legislation for the consideration of the President, and reporting on the breakdown of constitutional machinery.
There are provisions in the Constitution under which the Governor is required to send certain State laws for the assent of the President. The Sarkaria Commission which studied the Centre-State Relations made certain suggestions regarding the appointment of the governor in the state because there was no effective consultation by the central government to the Chief Ministers of the States during such appointments. It was thus recommended that the Governors should be some eminent person from any sphere of life.
Further, in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union Of India5, the Supreme Court put up questions as to the unbiasedness of the Governor as President’s Rule was imposed in Bihar on the advice of the Governor on the ground that no political party was in the position to form the government. The Centre did not further investigate the report sent by the governor, and as a result, the Assembly was dissolved. The Supreme Court, in this case, pointed out that the Governor did not act according to his duties and stated that the Governor is not supposed to be an agent of the ruling party at the Centre. The dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly was held as unconstitutional.
Further, in the case of B.P. Singhal v. Union of India6, Supreme Court held that a Governor cannot be removed by the Central government on the grounds that he is not acting in accordance with the policies of the Central government.
Thus, conclusively, even if the appointment of Governors is constantly questioned, the Governor only remains as a constitutional head who normally acts on the advice of his ministers. Further, whatever the letter of constitution says, in practice, there are not many examples where the President has vetoed State laws. The only example remains the Kerala Education Bill where the Centre obtained the advisory opinion of the Suprem3e Court before sending it back to the State legislature.
Thus, the judicial limitations on arbitrary removal and the convention of acting on ministerial advice ensure that this arrangement strengthens constitutional unity without eroding the federal balance.
Parliament‘s Power To Legislate In National Interest
Under Article 249, the Parliament is empowered to make laws with respect to every matter enumerated in the State List if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by 2/3 majority that it is necessary in the national interest. The Constitution recognises that rigid adherence to legislative compartments may impede effective governance when the national interest so demands and none would deny that if a subject in the State List assumes national character, the Parliament should be empowered to make laws on it. Importantly, this power is not exercised unilaterally by the Union; it is activated only upon a resolution passed by the Rajya Sabha by a two-thirds majority, thereby reflecting the collective will of the States themselves. The temporary nature of legislation enacted under Article 249 further reinforces its exceptional character; as such laws cease to operate after a prescribed period unless renewed. This mechanism provides an expedient alternative to formal constitutional amendment, enabling Parliament to address emergent national concerns without permanently altering the federal distribution of powers. Consequently, Article 249 does not subordinate the States but operates as a cooperative constitutional device, ensuring that national interests are safeguarded with the consent and participation of the States, thereby preserving the federal balance within a flexible and pragmatic constitutional framework. In normal course this cannot be done unless the Constitution is amended. But in this provision we have devised an expedient way by which without formally amending the Constitution we can achieve the desired effect, namely, the acquisition by the Centre of the power to administer and legislate upon a subject which has assumed national importance.
Parliament’s Power To Form New States And Alter Boundaries Of Existing States
Article 3 of the Indian Constitution empowers the Parliament of India to form new States, increase or diminish the area of any State and alter the boundaries or name of any State. Thus, it empowers the Parliament to redraw the political map of India just by a simple majority in the Parliament. Moreover, the Constitution only provides for consultation by the Centre of the concerned State. The requirement of consultation with the concerned State Legislature, though not binding, ensures that the views of the State are institutionally acknowledged without permitting territorial reorganisation to be stultified by political deadlock. This arrangement enables the Union to respond effectively to demands for administrative convenience, regional development, and national integration, as evidenced by the creation of States such as Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Telangana and Chhattisgarh.
Critiques argue that due to this provision the very existence of the State depends upon the sweetwill of the Union Government. But the power conferred on Parliament to make territorial adjustment is better explained on the historical basis. The Government of India, while establishing a federal polity in India, for the first time, deliberately created the constituent units of the federation although they had no organic roots in the past. The framers of the Constitution were well aware of the peculiar conditions under which and the reasons for which the States were formed and their boundaries were defined and so
they deliberately accepted the provisions in Article 3 with a view to meeting the possibility of the redistribution of the State territory after the integration of Indian States. The provisions in Article 3 take into account the fact that the Constitution contemplated readjustment of the territories of constituent States which might arise in future. Thus, Articles 2 and 3 do not negate the federal character of the Constitution but reflect a pragmatic accommodation of unity and diversity, reinforcing the conception of India as a federal State with inherent flexibility rather than rigid territorial permanence.
Emergency Provisions
The emergency provisions embodied in Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution represent one of the most significant departures from classical federalism, as they fundamentally alter the normal distribution of powers between the Union and the States. The Constitution envisages three types of emergencies: a national emergency arising out of war, external aggression or armed rebellion under Article 352; a constitutional emergency resulting from the failure of constitutional machinery in a State under Article 356; and a financial emergency under Article 360. Upon the proclamation of an emergency, the federal balance undergoes a vital transformation, with the Centre assuming an overriding role in both legislative and executive spheres.
Under Article 352, Parliament is empowered to legislate on matters enumerated in the State List, while the Union executive may issue binding directions to the States regarding the exercise of their executive powers. Additionally, the President may modify the constitutional scheme governing the distribution of financial resources between the Centre and the States under Article 354. Even more far-reaching is Article 356, which authorises the President to assume the functions of a State government and either dissolve or keep the Legislative Assembly when the governance of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with constitutional provisions. Collectively, these provisions have often been criticised for completely suspending the federal structure and converting the Constitution into a unitary framework during the operation of an emergency.
Although Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had cautioned that this power was intended to be used only as a measure of last resort, its repeated misuse raised serious concerns regarding the erosion of State autonomy. However, in the case, S.R. Bommai v. Union of India7, the Court subjected the exercise of power under Article 356 to judicial review, holding that mala fide or arbitrary proclamations could be invalidated. It further emphasised that Legislative Assemblies should ordinarily be kept under suspension until parliamentary approval is obtained.
While the emergency provisions recognise the temporary dominance of the Centre, they are constitutionally justified as they are designed to safeguard national integrity, constitutional governance, and fiscal stability in exceptional circumstances. These provisions reflect the framers‘ awareness of India‘s historical vulnerabilities and the necessity of a strong Union during crises. Rather than negating federalism altogether, the emergency framework underscores the Constitution‘s dynamic character and prioritises unity and constitutional order without permanently displacing the federal principle.
CONCLUSION
The cumulative effect of provisions such as the Union‘s dominance in Centre–State relations, Parliament‘s power to reorganise States, legislative intervention in the national interest, and the operation of emergency provisions has often invited the objection that the Indian Constitution departs from the classical federal model and tilts towards unitarism. However, these departures do not negate the federal character of the Constitution; rather, they reinforce its functional resilience. Federalism is not a rigid or uniform concept and cannot be applied in the same manner across all countries. Even classical federations like the United States and Australia have witnessed increased centralisation during times of war and national crisis. The Indian Constitution recognises such contingencies in advance and equips the Union with sufficient powers to safeguard national unity and constitutional governance. While the Centre may exercise a dominant role in exceptional situations, the distribution of powers between the Union and the States remains intact in normal circumstances. Therefore, describing India as a ―quasi-federal‖ State is misleading. The Indian Constitution establishes a unique form of federalism—neither purely federal nor purely unitary—which prioritises national interest while preserving the federal structure. In essence, Indian federalism is adaptive, functional, and well-suited to the country‘s diverse and complex needs.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
J.N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (62nd ed., 2025) V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8th ed. 2017)
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2015) K.C. WHEARE- INDIA‘S NEW CONSTITUTION ANALYSED, (1950)
Websites
https://www.manupatrafast.com/ipaccess.aspx
https://blog.ipleaders.in/nature-of-indian-constitution/ ∙ Case Laws
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1
1K.C. WHEARE- INDIA’S NEW CONSTITUTION ANALYSED, (1950)
2A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 157 (10th ed.)
3JENNINGS, SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
4India Const. Art. 1, cl.(1)
5(2006) 2 SCC 1
6(2010) 6 SCC 331
7(1994) 3 SCC 1
