FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA V CHARLES AKAEZE

INTRODUCTION

The case of FRN v AKAEZE[1] is a landmark recent Supreme Court decision that significantly shaped the jurisprudence on police interviews and pre-trial investigations, reinforcing the necessity of strict compliance with the provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. Addressing the issue of admissibility of confessional statements obtained during police interrogations, the Supreme Court emphasized that observance of statutory safeguards is mandatory, including the audio-visual recording of confessional statements. Notably, it highlights the age-long tension between the overarching powers of the police in pre-trial processes and the rights of private citizens, a dilemma which the court substantially addressed by this decision, consequently fortifying the rights of suspects in criminal trials, and curbing potential abuse of power. Establishing an authoritative precedent governing criminal procedure, the case is undoubtedly significant for giving primacy to procedural regularity.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent and two other persons were arraigned before the trial Federal High Court on a two-count charge of conspiracy and failure to declare the sum of $102,885 (One hundred and two thousand, eight hundred and eighty-five dollars) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos State, Nigeria to the Nigeria Customs Service, in contradiction to Sections 2(3), 8(5), and 18 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended).[2] During the course of the trial, the prosecution attempted to tender by its witness, the extra-judicial statements of the respondent. The respondent challenged the admissibility of the statements, on the basis that they were made non-voluntarily and in violation of Sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Justice Act 2015 (ACJA).[3]

Consequently, the court directed a trial-within trial proceedings to be carried out, after which, the court delivered its ruling. The court discovered that, the respondent having written his statements on the day he was remanded in custody, there was no evidence that he was tortured or coerced to make the statements concerned. Hence, the court held that that they were relevant, voluntarily provided in accordance with the law, and therefore admitted in evidence. The respondent appealed against the ruling to the Court of Appeal, which held that for failure to comply with the aforementioned provisions of the law, particularly the audio-visual recording requirement, the statements ought to be rejected in evidence. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the ruling of the trial court, and remitted the case to the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court for reassignment to another Judge for retrial.

Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, which, having considered the relevant provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, unanimously dismissed the appeal.

LEGAL ISSUES

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was wrong in holding that the extra-judicial statements of the respondent should be rejected in evidence for failure to comply with Sections 15(4) and 17(2) of ACJA 2015[4] without having regard to the general provisions of the Act and the particular provisions of Section 492(3) and 491 of the Act.[5]
2. Whether the Court of Appeal rightly set aside the ruling of the trial court admitting the extra-judicial statements of the respondent, and rightly remitted the case to the trial court for retrial by another Judge.

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant’s brief of argument, spanning a total of 26 pages, was settled by Abba Muhammed Esq. As deciphered from the issues for determination comprised in the grounds for appeal, the appellant advanced the following arguments:

1. That there was no ambiguity in the provisions of Section 15(4) and 17(2) of the ACJA, as to necessitate the adoption of the mischief rule of interpretation of statutes instead of the literal rule of interpretation, and thereby arrive at the finding that the use of the word “may” in the aforementioned provisions imposes mandatory and not permissive duty on law enforcement agents.
2. That the learned lower court was not right in holding that the extra-judicial statements of the respondent shall be rejected in evidence and be marked accordingly, for failure to comply with Sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the ACJA, and setting aside the ruling of the trial court admitting same. The appellant relied on particular provisions of the Act, to wit:

Section 14(1)[6]: “A suspect who is arrested, whether with or without a warrant, shall be taken immediately to a police station, or other place for the reception of suspect, and shall be promptly informed of the allegation against him in the language he understands”.

Section 491: “Where no other sanction is provided for in this Act, failure on the part of a person to discharge his responsibility under this Act without reasonable cause shall be treated as misconduct by the appropriate authority”.

Section 492(3): “Where there are no express provisions in this Act, the Court may apply any procedure that will meet the justice of the case”.

In consideration of the above provisions of law, the appellant urged the Supreme Court to allow the appeal in the interest of justice, and set aside the judgment of the court below, and uphold the ruling of the trial Federal High Court on the trial-within-trial proceedings.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Contrariwise, the respondent’s brief of argument, spanning a total of 40 pages, and settled by Edwin Anikwem Esq, counter-argued as follows:

1. That the lower court, having regard to the provisions of Sections 1, 15(4) and 17(2) of the Act, was right in interpreting the word “may” to be mandatory, having regard to the fundamental aim giving rise to the promulgation of the Act, and that the provisions of the law are for the advantage of private citizens, protecting them against intimidation by law enforcement agencies while obtaining statements.

LEGAL REASONING AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT

Interpreting Sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the ACJA, the Supreme Court per Saulawa JSC highlighted that the meanings of the words “may” and “shall” have been subject for over a century to divergent constructions, and that though the use of the word “may” connotes permissive action, the courts will interpret it as mandatory wherever it is used to impose a duty upon a public functionary, to be performed in a prescribed manner to the advantage of private citizens. The court also placed reliance on the mischief rule of interpretation posited in UGWU V ARARUME[7] in stating that a decision to accord it a discretionary meaning would not cure the mischief, but strengthen it against the public interest. In his words, “it would mean that the legislature gave a cure to the mischief with one hand, and took it away with the other hand”. Thus, the court reasoned that the Act, having strictly provided for recording of the defendant’s statement, it cannot be denied that neglect to accord with the directives of the law is considered a significant non-compliance with the law, and the court in such a situation is empowered to invoke its interpretative jurisdiction against the recalcitrant party. ADESANOYE v ADEWOLE.[8]

In unanimity with the lead judgment, Ogunwumiju JSC, relying on Adesanoye’s case, stated that where a statute explicitly provides for a particular act to be performed, failure to perform the act on the part of the party will not only amount to unlawful conduct, but non-compliance also. The outcome of this is that despite that the statute did not provide for punitive measures, by application of its interpretative jurisdiction, the court can conclude that such failure is against the party in default. His Lordship further stated that the necessity of making such provisions imperative is to circumvent undesirable situations where confessional statements are obtained by torture or duress, avert the miscarriage of justice, significantly reduce instances of retractions, and time expended on trial-within-trial proceedings. The essence of the video/audio visual evidence is in order for the court, having assessed the disposition of the defendant, and all other surrounding circumstances, to determine if he voluntarily made the confessional statement. In his reasoning, to grant a permissive interpretation to the law would reduce it to futility and defeat its purpose. COCA-COLA (NIG) LTD V AKINSANYA[9]; NNAJIOFOR V FRN.[10]

Furthermore, the Court per Agim JSC, quoted Crawford’s Construction of Statutes[11] to wit: “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature, and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed”…  Thus, he held that the established case law across jurisdictions is that the intendment of a legislative provision that imposes a public duty on a public officer for the advantage of any person is to make the execution of the duty mandatory, regardless of whether or not a permissive or mandatory word is employed.

Therefore, the court upheld the argument of the respondent, and dismissed the contention of the appellant for its failure to comply with the law, and that the combined effect of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the ACJA[12] underscore the critical significance of ensuring the inviolability of lives, dignity and property of persons under the Rule of Law. The court thus dismissed the appeal for lacking merit.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

This decision broadened the ambits of Section 15(4) and 17(2) of the ACJA significantly, by making it mandatory for law enforcement agencies to obtain confessional statements from suspects through audio-visual means. Prior to now, conventionally, these sections enjoyed permissive coloration. As F.E Ojeih and others[13] stated, “From the wordings of the ACJA, there is no mandatory duty placed on the police to take the statement in video recording. All that can be gathered from the calm reading of the section is that it is desirable if the statement is so recorded…”

The requirement only appears mandatory under Section 9(3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law, Lagos State,[14] which provides that “where any person who is arrested with or without a warrant volunteers to make a confessional statement, the Police shall ensure that the making and taking of such statement is recorded on video…”. In line with the objectives of the Act and the intent of the legislature, the reasoning and decision of the court is very commendable, as it fortifies and reinforces the rights of suspects against police abuse. Globally, the police institution is vested with the duty to ensure public safety and protect the lives and properties of citizens. Notwithstanding, there have been several incidences of unlawful and disproportionate employment of force by the police. Recurrent among such is the wanton violation of human rights through torture in order to extract confessional statements. In JOSEPH ZHIYA V THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE,[15] The Court of Appeal stated that “the mischief sought to be cured…is the abuse inherent in taking statements from accused persons by investigation police officers…”.

However, it is trite that one of the objectives of the ACJA as provided in Section 1 is to ensure the protection of the society from crime. One of the likely contentions against this decision could be that the decision creates a procedural shield for criminals under Section 15(4) and 17(2) of the ACJA to perpetrate crimes, only to use the absence of audio/video recording as a leeway to escape justice. But on a closer look, the decision is a significant attempt aimed at strengthening procedural safeguards in criminal investigations. By insistence on due process, the court fortifies the legitimacy of convictions, which command greater public confidence and would be more sustainable on appeal. It therefore calls for the police, in the current state of technological advancement, to align with the law in the utmost interest of justice.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the decision of the court in this case marks a crucial reiteration of the primacy of due process in Nigeria’s criminal justice system. While concerns linger as to the likelihood of constraints to prosecutions, the case strengthens the credibility of criminal convictions, and constitutional safeguards in the administration of justice.

Reference(S):

[1] (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt 1951) 1

[2] Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (as amended)

[3] Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt 1048) 365.

[8] (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt 671) 127.

[9] (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt 1593) 74, 123.

[10] (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt 1655) 157.

[11] Crawford, Construction of Statutes, Page 516.

[12] ACJA (n 3)

[13] F.E Ojeih, J. N Egemonu & D. O Okanyi: Criminal Litigation in Nigeria: Practice and Procedure (2nd End, Chenglo Limited 2019) 77-78.

[14] Administration of Criminal Justice Law, Lagos State 2015 (as amended).

[15] (2016) LPELR-40562 (CA)