Authored By: Shumail Tariq Kiani
Fatima Jinnah Women University
Abstract
The rapid development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS), capable of selecting and engaging targets without direct human intervention, poses unprecedented challenges to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This article examines the legal framework governing the use of AWS, analyzes judicial interpretations and relevant case law, and highlights critical accountability and ethical issues arising from their deployment. Despite growing technological capabilities, existing IHL principles, such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution, face practical limitations in application to autonomous systems. The article also evaluates ongoing international debates, particularly within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and proposes a regulatory path combining legal, technological, and ethical safeguards. Ultimately, it advocates for a proactive, internationally coordinated approach to ensure compliance with humanitarian principles while striking a balance with military necessity.
Introduction
Autonomous weapons systems, often referred to as “killer robots,” have emerged as a focal point in modern warfare. Unlike conventional weapons, AWS can independently identify, select, and engage targets without continuous human control, raising profound legal, ethical, and operational questions. Recent reports indicate the proliferation of AWS prototypes across multiple states, including the United States, Russia, China, and Israel, highlighting the urgency of establishing a coherent legal framework to govern their use.1
International Humanitarian Law, rooted in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, aims to minimize human suffering during armed conflict by imposing constraints on the conduct of hostilities. However, the integration of autonomous decision making into warfare challenges foundational principles, such as the distinction between combatants and civilians, the proportionality of force, and accountability for unlawful acts.2
The central objective of this article is to critically examine the legality and accountability frameworks applicable to AWS under IHL, assess judicial interpretations and state practices, and propose practical pathways for international regulation.
Research Methodology
This article employs a doctrinal and analytical methodology. Primary sources include the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinions. Secondary sources encompass peer-reviewed journal articles, UN reports, and legal commentaries. Comparative approaches are employed to evaluate national and international policies, highlighting gaps and best practices for regulating AWS. The research also draws insights from reported military trials and technological assessments to connect doctrinal rules with practical deployment scenarios.
Legal Framework
- International Humanitarian Law
Under IHL, the principle of distinction mandates that combatants must differentiate between military targets and civilians, while the principle of proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause excessive civilian harm relative to the anticipated military advantage.3 AWS (Autonomous Weapons System) operating with machine learning algorithms may struggle to apply these principles reliably, raising questions about compliance with customary law.4
The Martens Clause, incorporated in the preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and reflected in Additional Protocol I, emphasizes that in cases not explicitly covered by treaties, civilians and combatants remain under the protection of principles of humanity and public conscience.5 This clause underscores the normative foundation for regulating emerging autonomous technologies not foreseen by traditional treaties.
- Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
The CCW provides a platform for addressing new weapons with indiscriminate effects. In 2014, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) discussed the need for interpretive guidance on compliance with IHL.6 Although no binding treaty currently exists, the CCW framework remains the primary forum for international deliberation on AWS.
- Judicial Interpretation
Judicial scrutiny of autonomous or analogous weapons remains limited. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ emphasized that states must comply with customary IHL principles even in technologically advanced contexts.7 This principle extends to AWS: any deployment must adhere to distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
At the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), accountability for remote or automated actions was assessed under command responsibility, establishing precedent for attributing liability even when direct human engagement is limited.8 This doctrine provides a potential framework for assigning responsibility in AWS operations.
Case Study: Deployment of Autonomous Drones in Conflict Zones
A practical example of an AWS application can be observed in the testing and limited deployment of autonomous drones by military forces in conflict zones in the Middle East. These drones, equipped with advanced sensors and targeting algorithms, were used to identify and engage hostile combatants in areas with active civilian presence. Reports indicate that while the drones successfully neutralized designated threats, there were instances of misidentification due to sensor errors and algorithmic misclassification, which could have led to civilian casualties.9
This case illustrates critical gaps in accountability and operational reliability. Commanders were required to oversee AWS operations remotely, but the autonomy of the system limited real-time human intervention. The scenario highlights the tension between operational efficiency and adherence to IHL principles, emphasizing the need for robust regulatory frameworks, mandatory human oversight, and clear reporting protocols. The implications extend to liability in cases of civilian harm and ethical concerns regarding delegating life-and death decisions to machines.
Critical Analysis
- Accountability Gaps
AWS deployment raises complex accountability questions. Unlike human combatants, machines cannot bear criminal liability. Command responsibility and state responsibility frameworks must adapt to address scenarios where autonomous systems commit war crimes or unlawful attacks. Scholars have debated hybrid models, combining human oversight with algorithmic control, to ensure legal compliance.10
- Technical and Ethical Challenges
The distinction between combatants and civilians may be compromised by sensor errors or algorithmic bias. Similarly, proportionality assessments require nuanced judgment that current AI lacks. Ethical debates also emphasize the erosion of human moral agency, raising questions under the Martens Clause and customary humanitarian norms.11
- Comparative Perspectives
Some states, such as Germany and Switzerland, advocate preemptive bans on fully autonomous lethal systems, while others, including the United States and Russia, support continued development under IHL compliance reviews.12 This divergence highlights the absence of a uniform international approach, increasing the risk of inconsistent application and legal ambiguity.
- Recent Developments
The 2018 GGE report recognized that AWS may challenge existing IHL norms but stopped short of proposing a binding prohibition.13 Several states have introduced national guidelines emphasizing human control over life-and-death decisions. The European Parliament has called for a moratorium on AWS development until a regulatory consensus is reached.14 Recent technological reports indicate increased integration of autonomous targeting systems in drones and missile platforms, underscoring the urgency of regulation.
Suggestions / Way Forward
- International Treaty Development: Establish a legally binding protocol under the CCW specifically addressing AWS, clarifying compliance obligations and prohibiting inherently indiscriminate systems.15
- Command Responsibility Models: Develop hybrid accountability frameworks that assign liability to operators, commanders, and states in proportion to the human oversight exercised.
- Technological Safeguards: Implement audit trails, “ethical governors,” and fail-safe mechanisms to ensure adherence to IHL.
- Transparency and Reporting: States deploying AWS should submit annual reports detailing systems, operational parameters, and legal compliance reviews.
- Multilateral Cooperation: Encourage dialogues through UN forums, academic consortia, and NGOs to harmonize ethical standards, technological norms, and humanitarian obligations.
Conclusion
Autonomous weapons systems present an unprecedented challenge to International Humanitarian Law. While existing treaties, judicial doctrines, and customary law provide foundational guidance, accountability gaps and operational ambiguities persist. Without proactive regulation, the deployment of AWS risks undermining the principles of distinction, proportionality, and humanity. A coordinated international response, combining legal instruments, technological safeguards, and ethical oversight, is essential to ensure that advancements in warfare technology do not outpace humanity’s moral and legal frameworks. The urgent question remains: can humanity harness the benefits of autonomous technology without compromising the core values of IHL?
Reference(S):
Allen, Gregory C., & Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, CNAS Report (2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on LAWS, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (2013), https://www.ohchr.org/en/cases/2013- laws-report (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
Docherty, Bonnie, Lethal Autonomous Weapons and the Martens Clause, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 601, 605–607 (2010), https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/lethal-autonomous weapons-martens-clause (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
European Parliament, Resolution on Autonomous Weapon Systems, P8_TA(2018)0023 (Feb. 2018), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0023_EN.html (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
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1 Michael C. Horowitz, Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power, 30 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 3, 7-10 (2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1296073 (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
2 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/380-600061.
3 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 2, at 287.
4International Committee of the Red Cross, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects, ICRC Report (2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon-systems report (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
5 The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Preamble,36 Stat. 2277, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/195-200062.
6 UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the 2014 GGE on LAWS, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2014/CRP.1 (2014), https://documents.unoda.org/ccw/2014-gge-on-laws (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
7 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), https://www.icj cij.org/en/case/95.
8 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 16 Nov. 1998, https://www.icty.org/en/case/mucic.
9 Gregory C. Allen & Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, CNAS Report 7–10 (2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
10 Heather Roff, Autonomous Weapons and Accountability, 94 INT’L L. STUD. 56, 61–63 (2018), https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ils/vol94/iss1/5 (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
11 Bonnie Docherty, Lethal Autonomous Weapons and the Martens Clause, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 601, 605–607 (2010), https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/lethal-autonomous-weapons-martens-clause (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
12 Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on LAWS, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (2013), https://www.ohchr.org/en/cases/2013-laws-report (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
13 UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018 GGE Report on LAWS, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/CRP.1 (2018), https://documents.unoda.org/ccw/2018-gge-on-laws (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
14 European Parliament, Resolution on Autonomous Weapon Systems, P8_TA(2018)0023 (Feb. 2018), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0023_EN.html (visited Aug. 28, 2025).
15 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Protocol on LAWS, Dec. 2014, U.N. Treaty Doc. CCW/CONF.I/2014, https://treaties.unoda.org/ccw-laws-protocol.
