Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat

Case Name: Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat

Citation: 2025 INSC 410; Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2025

Court: Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision: 28 March 2025

Bench: Justice A.S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Introduction

The judgment in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat stands out as one of the most significant judgments in modern Indian Constitutional Law and Criminal Procedure. As the case occurred amidst the early implementation of the new criminal procedural laws – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – it also became one of the earliest judgments by the apex court addressing the interplay between procedural guarantees provided for in the new criminal procedure laws and the constitutional guarantee of right to free speech under Constitution of India.

In this case, the prosecution of an elected representative of the people for posting a recitation of poetry on his social media feed in allegedly offensive language became an issue. While the poet’s choice of words to express discontent could be characterized as metaphoric resistance, he was charged under section 153-A of IPC with promoting communal disharmony. What made the case noteworthy is that it involved the Court recognizing that procedural law could serve as constitutional law protection against wrongful prosecution. In its judgment, the Court made a rule out of the interpretation of Section 173(3) of BNSS.

Facts of the Case

The Appellant, Imran Pratapgarhi, was a Member of Parliament, personality, and poet. While participating in a mass marriage ceremony conducted in public, he had a poem read and then posted on social media platforms through a video clip posted on Instagram, lasting about forty-six seconds. The theme of the poem comprised of resilience, pride, and non-violent resistance to oppression. The language used was metaphorical and not literal. Amongst the many themes contained in the poem, there was a proposition that despite oppression and injustices during the fight for rights, love and non-violent responses were going to be the answer.

After the viral posting of the video clip on social media platforms, the police in the State of Gujarat noted the nature of the language used in the poem. They came to a conclusion that the poem promoted enmity and hatred amongst religious communities. Based on this conclusion, they booked a First Information Report (FIR) against the Appellant under Section 196 of the BNS, which proscribes the promotion of enmity, hatred or disharmony on account of religion, race, place of birth, language, and other factors.

The lodging of the FIR created immediate constitutional and legal implications. Prosecution in cases relating to public utterances is a chilling process for the accused and public at large. Even without conviction, the investigations, summoning, and further criminal process can prevent the person from making legitimate political statements.

The appeal was made in the High Court in relation to the FIR. The claimant alleged that the poem was clearly not violent in nature but metaphorical and could not have satisfied the ingredients of the crime under the law. He also alleged that the police did not adhere to Section 173(3) of BNSS which provided for an initial inquiry prior to filing an FIR in cases of offences where there was a possibility of imprisonment of three-seven years.

The High Court refused to quash the proceeding. Investigation may continue in the normal course of criminal proceeding.

In light of their denial of relief, the aggrieved party petitioned the Supreme Court of India. In effect, the matter was not only one of statutory construction, but it became an issue that related to the larger debate over free speech versus police discretion and due process under the new criminal law.

Legal Issues

1. Whether the reading out and publishing of a poem supporting the principle of suffering in silence when facing oppression would amount to the offense of promoting enmity or discord among communities under Section 196 of the BNS.
2. Whether there was a mandatory requirement on the police to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 173(3) of the BNSS before registering an FIR against offenses punishable with imprisonment ranging from three to seven years.
3. Whether the challenged FIR is an abuse of process and unconstitutional violation of the right to free speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

Arguments Presented

A. Appellant

The appellant stated that the poem was both a political and literary piece. The poem did not promote any kind of violence or hatred against any religious community or class of persons. The language used in the poem in its ordinary sense spoke of non-violent protest and fortitude. Hence, there was no element of Section 196 of the BNS Act.

It was also contended that literary expression had to be seen within its proper context. Literature worked on the principles of metaphors and symbolic meaning along with emotion. Snipping a word out of its context amounted to criminalizing literature.

Further, the appellant was able to put emphasis on the procedural safety provided in the BNSS. As the case concerned an offence attracting a punishment for imprisonment of three to seven years, Section 173(3) demanded the conducting of an investigation by the police within 14 days before making any registration of the FIR. In this case, the police ignored that provision.

Last but not least, the case for continuance of the case was likely to result in a chilling effect on democracy. In criminal laws, especially where politics are involved, there needs to be constitutional restraints on its exercise.

B. Respondent State

The State of Gujarat contended that the poem could lend itself to more than one interpretation. The social or communal context within which speech is being circulated, it was contended, is as important as the exact meaning conveyed by the speech. A seemingly innocent statement may, based on audience reaction, provoke enmity and lawlessness.

The State contended that preventive action must be taken by the police when there is a possibility of causing communal unrest. Registration of the complaint in the form of an FIR would serve the public good, it was contended, by investigating the matter before things turn ugly.

On the matter of procedure, the State tried to justify registration on account of the sensitivity of the case. Preliminary investigation need not hinder preventive measures from being taken, it was contended.

It thus became imperative for the respondent to argue that the FIR ought to be allowed and that the facts ought to be ascertained during investigation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court examined the case through two related dimensions; namely, substantive free speech law, and procedural legality according to the BNSS.

In the first place, the Court considered the substance of the poem. It decided that an assessment of artistry must take into account the complete work. It did not call for any violence, hatred, or aggressive response. The Supreme Court highlighted that literature and politics should be considered in their entirety and not by selective and prejudiced interpretation. In constitutional law adjudication, it should be evaluated by the reasonable, balanced, and sensible person rather than the hypersensitive and sensitive individual.

It may thus be concluded that there were no prima facie elements of the crime of Section 196 BNS present.

Second, and more importantly for purposes of evolution in law, the Court referred to the statutory provisions of the BNSS. According to the Court, Section 173 is a clear development in legislation when compared to the previous regime under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

Under the CrPC, the law governing FIR registration was found in Section 154. Although it is settled by judicial authority, particularly from the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, that there may be some circumstances that would warrant conducting a preliminary inquiry before FIR registration, the statutory provision itself failed to explicitly provide for such a procedure in respect of certain offences.

Section 173(3) of the BNSS provided for an additional safeguard in law, whereby if an offence punishable by imprisonment between three and seven years occurs, then a preliminary inquiry to decide on whether there is a prima facie case has to be conducted by the police.

The Court saw this as something more than a mere procedural formality, but rather as a substantive legal duty. The legislative decision-making process was clearly aimed at striking a balance between the efficiency of investigation and safeguarding the individual from being criminally charged arbitrarily. The requirement of conducting a preliminary inquiry is endowed with special constitutional import when the speech of the citizenry is concerned since even the commencement of any criminal process itself could amount to an encroachment on freedom of speech and expression.

In this light, the Court ruled that the police were engaged in mechanistic behavior. There was no serious inquiry into the poem in question. The poem itself was never considered in its proper context to determine what it actually communicated and whether the elements necessary for the commission of the crime were satisfied under the statute.

The filing of the FIR was therefore seen by the Court as merely a mechanical exercise of the powers conferred by the BNSS.

Judgment & Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court upheld the appeal and dismissed the FIR filed against the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: In a situation where speech-related actions fall under an offence that is punishable for three to seven years of imprisonment, according to the BNSS, Section 173(3) requires that there be a preliminary inquiry conducted prior to registering an FIR. Failure to conduct such inquiry, together with no incitement or promotion of enmity, makes the prosecution liable to judicial nullification under Article 19(1)(a).

Critical Analysis

The significance of the decision can be appreciated in at least three ways.

First, it amounts to one of the earliest authoritative interpretations of the BNSS. Uncertainty is inherent in transitional periods within any criminal justice system. The police, who have been accustomed to their own procedures since earlier times, might persist in adhering to those procedures. The Court ensured that the BNSS had a clear meaning in the context of its application by specifying that Section 173(3) was mandatory. In other words, the BNSS was not only symbolic but also brought about changes in procedure.

Second, the decision enhances constitutional safeguards for free expression. The protection of free speech under Indian law has always involved the discussion of substantive doctrines such as public order, incitement, reasonableness of restrictions, and proportionality. This decision has a significant procedural component. The Court acknowledged that the violation of freedom of expression need not necessarily take place through conviction but also through the criminal process itself.

Thirdly, the ruling is institutionally significant in relation to policing. More thought must go into the use of the criminal law where speech, poetry, art, satire, and dissenting politics are concerned. The Court has decisively dismissed the notion that controversy by itself necessarily mandates prosecution.

One particular element stands out. There has been a marked shift from CrPC to BNSS in relation to the period of preliminary inquiry. Whereas the CrPC inquiry period was largely dependent on judicial principles, specifically Lalita Kumari, there is now a statutory provision for a fourteen-day inquiry under the BNSS.

There are, however, certain constraints associated with this decision.

Firstly, the Court failed to clearly lay out criteria for evaluating the extent of investigation. Consequently, questions may later emerge regarding the adequacy of the compliance with such criteria. Should officers simply write down a superficial memo, or do they have to provide objective rationale for their decisions?

Secondly, although the judgment ensures the protection of political and literary discourse, further developments in the area will depend on how well lower courts implement this case precedent. If such judicial bodies remain indifferent toward the matter, the scope of constitutional protection might not be uniform.

Despite these constraints, the decision itself carries normative significance. It recognizes that the government cannot subject its citizens to criminal prosecution for expressing disagreements just because such expression makes others feel uncomfortable.

Conclusion

This decision of Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat may be taken as an important one when it comes to constitutional interpretation of the new criminal procedural regime in India. The Court made it clear once again that the freedom of artistic and political speech is constitutional and is not liable to being turned into criminal offenses through excessive imagination and oversensitivity on the part of authorities.

The more important point here is that the judgment is based on the premise that procedural law is anything but institutionally neutral. The requirement laid down by s.173(3) of the BNSS became a significant protective provision intended to ensure that the arbitrary exercise of the police power is avoided.

The present case is thus a landmark judgment connecting substantive free speech guarantee of Article 19(1)(a) with the procedural framework of the BNSS. Its significant contribution will be seen in the recognition that legality in a constitutional democracy is twofold in its essence as far as criminal procedure is concerned.

Reference(S):

Cases

Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 410.

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 S.C.C. 1.

Constitution, Statutes, and Codes

Constitution of India art. 19, cl. 1(a).

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2 of 1974, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).