Authored By: Madhurima Gope
Bharti Vidyapeeth New Law College, Pune
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of India rendered a landmark decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma on August 11, 2020, which was both significant and groundbreaking. The ruling had successfully eliminated the male chauvinism that pervaded Hindu ancestral property division. By stating that daughters are entitled to an equal share of properties inherited from fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956.[i]
This historic decision clarified the legal complexities surrounding daughters’ inheritance rights. This lengthy 122-page ruling is extremely significant and is generally considered a landmark in the advancement of society. In order to secure her rightful share, it significantly broadens the range of situations in which a daughter can successfully assert partition against her male relatives.
This decision sets a strong legal precedent and was required to resolve the current disagreement over a daughter’s rights as a coparcener, especially when it comes to identifying the conditions in which those rights may be legitimately claimed.
It is important to remember, though, that the court made it clear that the Amendment Act of 2005 would not apply retroactively, which meant that daughters who were alive at the time of the amendment—even if they were born earlier—would not be eligible to inherit under the revised provisions. The purpose of this clarification was to define the law’s application and scope in a way that was in line with established legal precedents and principles.
The Vedic Aryan ideals have an impact on the Hindu concept of dharma. Mitakshaa and Dayabhaga are the two main schools in terms of Hindu law. Benaras, Mithila, Maharashtra, and Dravida are the divisions of Mitakshara. Thus, Mitakshara School is applicable on a regional basis.
Hindu law has never been static; rather, it has always evolved as a result of judicial decisions filling in the gaps left by states’ silence on particular issues. Codification became necessary over time, particularly for women’s rights, in order to eliminate certain irregularities and unethical practices.
Women were granted equal status under the constitution, and the written law was periodically amended to reflect these principles. The 2005 amendment was the most recent, granting equal rights to daughters and sons in matters of succession of coparcenary property.
FACTS OF THE CASE IN BRIEF
The deceased coparcener in this case is Shri Dev Dutt Sharma, who left behind three sons, a widow, and a daughter. On December 11, 1999, he passed away. On July 1st, 2001, one of his unmarried sons also passed away. Following this, the daughter, Vineeta Sharma, the petitioner in this case, sued to obtain a one-fourth stake in the coparcenary property.
The other family members rejected her claim, arguing that she could not be considered a coparcener and, as a result, had no claim to the family’s property because her father died in 1999, long before the amendment took effect.
Additionally, they contended that because she was married, she is no longer a part of the joint family, she has no claim to the family’s assets. Along with their mother, Vineeta Sharma filed a lawsuit against her brothers, Satyendra and Rakesh Sharma. Because she was born into the family, she asserted coparcenary rights to the joint family property.Birth is recognized by the law as a legitimate means of obtaining coparcenary rights.
The Delhi High Court maintained the Trial Court’s ruling that Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 would not apply in this case because Vineeta Sharma’s father was not living when the amendment was started.
This decision was based on the Prakash v. Phulavati (2015) [ii]ruling, which held that for the amended provisions to be applicable, the father and daughter had to be alive at the time the Amendment of 2005 was enacted. The daughter was upset by this ruling and appealed to the Supreme Court of India to have the case reexamined and a decision rendered.
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE
In order to dispel ambiguity on a number of issues, the Apex Court had to address some very important legal questions in the Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma (2020) case:
1. Can Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as modified by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, be applied in the past or in the future?
2. Whether the father and daughter must both be living at the time the amendment is made in order for the provisions to apply when determining the stock?
3. Can a matter that was pending in court at the time the amendment was made be covered by the amended provisions?
The Apex Court took these concerns into account when rendering its decision.
ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT IN BRIEF
Arguments by the appellant
The learned attorney Shri Amit Pai contended that the provisions should be interpreted according to the golden rule of interpretation. The original Act of 1956’s enactment is connected to the Amendment to Section 6. An actual partition, which determines the shares definitively, cannot be considered equivalent to a fictional partition upon the death of a coparcener. Since daughters cannot be denied their right to equality, as stated explicitly in the Statements of Objects and Reasons, Section 6’s provisions must be fully implemented. The Apex Court’s ruling in the Phulavati case is incorrect. The provisions’ wording does not require a living father’s daughter to become a coparcenary.
A statute cannot have more words added to it or read into it. The Court can just fix mistakes. The clause applies to all daughters, regardless of whether or not their fathers were still living on the day the amendment was enacted. The learned attorney Shri Sameer Shrivastava contended that although the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 does not define the term “coparcener,” it has been regarded as a body more limited than a joint family since it only includes those who were born into it or who have acquired claims to the coparcenary property, allowing them to seek a division whenever they so choose. Subject to the limitations imposed by Sections 6(1) and 6(5), daughters are entitled to shares.
In cases where a Hindu dies before the Amendment Act is passed, the only options left are testamentary or intestate succession, as the idea of survivorship has been eliminated. The bench’s ruling in Prakash vs. Phulavati (2015), which requires the principle of a living daughter of a living father, is utterly unclear and cannot be upheld by the law. The only exception to the rule that coparcenary status is conferred by birth is through adoption.
The learned attorney Ms. Anagha S. Desai contended that, as of September 9, 2005, Section 6 establishes equality of interests between the sons and daughters of a Hindu joint family. It is clear and unequivocal that a coparcener’s daughter will have the same rights and obligations as his son, as stated in Section 6. [iii]Since it negates the entire intent of the clause, the requirement of a living father is illogical.
Arguments of the respondent
The learned attorney Shri Sridhar Potaraju argued that the Prakash v. Phulavati (2015) ruling gave the law the correct interpretation. Despite the fact that they were once considered Class I heirs, he maintained that married daughters are not eligible to be recognized as part of their father’s joint family. According to the learned counsel, the Hindu joint family is larger than the Hindu coparcenary. The term “daughter of a coparcener” must refer to a coparcener’s living daughter. Severance of jointness of status and settlement of shares are intended outcomes in a statutory partition scenario.
He maintained that the amended provisions could not take away the rights granted by survivorship that had been granted before the amendment. A daughter whose father was deceased at the time the amendment was introduced could not be subject to Section 6 in its modified form.
Regarding the preliminary decree, he contended that it was possible to use it to determine the parties’ respective shares and that it was final when it was used to assign individual shares to the parties. Following a preliminary decree, the only action required was the distribution of shares according to the metes and bounds specified in the preliminary decree.
DECISION OF THE COURT
In the end, the Supreme Court maintained the following guidelines:
A daughter born before or after the amendment is granted the status of a coparcener under the provisions of the amended Section 6, which entitles her to the same rights and obligations as a son.
According to Section 6(1), which safeguards any disposition or alienation that occurred prior to December 20, 2004, a daughter born before September 9, 2005, may assert her rights with savings.
It is not required to have a father alive on the date the amendment takes effect because coparcenary rights are acquired from birth.
There was no real division or disturbance of the coparcenary as a result of the statutory fiction of partition, which was implemented in the proviso to Section 6 of the unaltered Act. [iv]The fiction could not be used for anything other than determining the shares of a deceased coparcener.
An oral partition defense cannot be accepted as a legally permitted method of partition carried out by a court order or a properly registered deed. Rarely, a defense of oral partition established by trustworthy documents may be recognized in the same way as a court order.
Because of the legal ambiguity, all lawsuits and appeals that were pending in different courts on related issues had been postponed, so the Apex Court ordered the resolution of those lawsuits within six months while adhering to these guidelines.
In this case, the bench of the Supreme Court cited a number of Hindu legal doctrines, including codified and customary laws like the Joint Hindu Family and the Coparcenary. They examined a plethora of judgments and talked about both obstructed and unobstructed heritage. The Court noted that joint Hindu family property is regarded as unhindered heritage, with the right to divide it being absolute and derived from a person’s birth. A distinct property, on the other hand, is obstructed heritage, in which the owner’s passing prevents the right to ownership and division.
The Supreme Court ruled that a daughter’s right to partition is based on her birth, which is covered by unhindered heritage. Whether the father coparcener was alive or deceased on the day the amendment was passed makes no difference. The Court explained that coparcenary rights do not transfer from a living coparcener to a living daughter, but rather from the father to his living daughter, overturning the ruling in Phulavati v. Prakash.
The Court determined that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are retroactive in nature rather than prospective or retroactive by overturning the Phulavati and Danamma rulings. The Court outlined the fundamentals of prospective, retroactive, and retrospective laws, noting that characteristics determine whether a law is applied retroactively.
OPINION OF THE JUDGEMENT
The Indian Constitution’s tenets of social justice and gender equality are upheld by the Supreme Court’s progressive and constitutionally sound decision in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma.
The Court correctly concluded that a daughter’s coparcenary rights are derived from her birth, not from her father’s position in life. The language and goal of the 2005 amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, which aimed to end the long-standing discrimination against women in inheritance matters, are in line with this interpretation. The amendment’s goal would have been defeated if a daughter’s rights had been conditional on the father’s survival, arbitrarily depriving many women of their just share.
The Court strikes a fair balance between redressing historical injustice and preserving established family arrangements by making it clear that the amendment has retroactive effect and does not interfere with legally completed partitions prior to December 20, 2004. Another defense against false allegations is the requirement that oral partitions be supported by documentation.
Additionally, the ruling ensures consistency in the application of the law by resolving the ambiguity created by the contradictory rulings in Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma v. Amar.
This ruling, in my opinion, guarantees that daughters are regarded as equal members of the family on both a legal and social level and represents a major advancement in the interpretation of Hindu personal laws.
REFRENCE(S):
[i] The Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956)
[ii] Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013 (India), Supreme Court of India, Oct. 16, 2015.
[iii] The Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, Section 6, INDIA CODE (1956)
[iv] Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, § 6, INDIA CODE (1956) (unamended)
